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Chapter 9: Application of the United Nations drug control conventions to 
the regulation of chemical incapacitants 
 
9.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the range of chemicals investigated as 
potential incapacitants has included a range of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances. Many of these substances have legitimate medical, veterinary or 
other scientific uses, whilst others have been widely utilised by the civil 
population as recreational drugs often resulting in drug dependency and 
addiction. Since the signing of the International Opium Convention in 19121305, 
the international governmental community has developed a number of 
agreements and other mechanisms to combat the illicit trade and use of such 
“drugs of abuse” whilst safeguarding the legitimate use of such substances. As 
part of the second stage of the HAC analytical process, this chapter surveys the 
potential applicability of two such agreements – the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs and the UN Convention on Pyschotropic Substances – to the 
regulation of incapacitants intended for law enforcement or military 
operations.1306  
 
9.2. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (SCND)1307 was signed in 1961, a 
Protocol amending the text was agreed in 19721308 and the revised text came 
into force in August 1975.1309 As of 1st September 2012, it had 183 States 
Parties.1310 The Single Convention codified all existing multilateral treaties on 
                                                          
1305 League of Nations, International Opium Convention, signed at the Hague on 23
rd
 January 1912, 
Treaty Series, volume VIII, number 222. 
1306 Following an initial review it became clear that no agreements developed in this context had any 
relevancy to the regulation of RCAs or related means of delivery.  
1307 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, New York, 30
th
 March 1961, text available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1964/12/19641213%2002-14%20AM/Ch_VI_15.pdf (accessed 24th 
February 2012). 
1308 United Nations, Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, 25
th
  March 
1972, text available at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1975/08/19750808%2007-
44%20PM/Ch_VI_17p.pdf (accessed 24th February 2012). 
1309 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs. New York, 8
th
 August 1975, For amended text see United Nations Treaties 
Database: http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-
18&chapter=6&lang=en (accessed 24
th
 February 2012). 
1310 For details of States Parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, see: UN Treaty Collection 
Database, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-
18&chapter=6&lang=en   (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). On 29
th
 June 2011, Bolivia notified the 
Secretary General that it had decided to denounce the Convention. In accordance with article 46 (2), the 
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narcotic drug control and extended the existing control systems to include the 
cultivation of plants that were grown as the raw material of narcotic drugs.1311 
The principal objectives of this Convention have been to restrict the possession, 
use, trade in, distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of 
narcotic drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes,1312 and also to 
address narcotic drug trafficking through international cooperation.1313  
 
The narcotic drugs covered by the Convention have been elaborated in four 
Scheduled lists1314 which can be updated following recommendations by States 
Parties or the World Health Organisation to the United Nations Secretary 
General.1315 The current schedules list a number of narcotic drugs that have 
been explored as potential incapacitants, including cocaine,1316 etorphine,1317 
fentanyl,1318 morphine,1319 and sufentanil.1320   
 
The explicit requirement under Article 4 of the Convention that States Parties 
“shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary” 
to “limit” narcotic drugs “exclusively to medical and scientific purposes”1321 
appears to put into question the legitimacy of the development, transfer and use 
of narcotic drugs by States Parties for activities such as use as weapons in 
armed conflict, military operations other than war or law enforcement. However, 
the applicability of the Convention to such activities is uncertain as the SCND 
was developed as a crime control instrument and not as a means of arms 
disarmament or arms control,1322 and to date there is no public record of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
denunciation will take effect on 1
st
 January 2012 and consequently the State is no longer party to the 
Convention. 
1311 See introduction to Convention on International Narcotics Control Board website, 
http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1961.html (accessed 24th February 2012). 
1312 See in particular, United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1972) op.cit, Article 4.  
1313 See introduction to Convention on International Narcotics Control Board website, 
http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1961.html (accessed 24
th
 February 2012). 
1314 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Schedules 1-4. It should be noted that the lists 
of chemicals scheduled under the SCND are completely different to the three categories of scheduled 
chemicals found in the Chemical Weapons Convention or in the UN Convention on Pyschotropic 
Substances (see below). 
1315 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 3. 
1316 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Schedule 1. 
1317 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Schedule 4. 
1318 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Schedule 1. 
1319 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Schedule 1.  
1320 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Schedule 1. 
1321 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 4. 
1322 This issue does not appear to have been widely discussed by the arms control expert community. 
However one Western Government expert interviewed by the author has stated his belief that the use of 
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Convention being applied to such activities.1323 Furthermore, even if the 
Convention could be applied to such activities it is uncertain which activities 
would be considered permissible and which prohibited, particularly as the 
SCND allows for the retention of so-called “special stocks” of narcotic drugs. 
These “special stocks” are defined under Article 1 as: “drugs held in a country 
or territory by the Government of such country or territory for special 
government purposes and to meet exceptional circumstances…”1324 ; the nature 
of these “special government purposes” or “exceptional circumstances” are not 
defined under the Convention.1325  
 
Although it is currently unclear whether and how the Convention's limitations on 
use could be applied to the weaponisation of narcotic drugs, the Convention 
has included certain reporting and investigatory provisions that could still be 
utilised by a State Party to obtain information of potential benefit in the 
regulation of certain incapacitants. The Convention has obliged States Parties 
to provide the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) - the independent 
and quasi-judicial monitoring body for the implementation of the United Nations 
international drug control conventions1326 - with annual estimates of drug 
requirements1327 and drug production1328 for scheduled chemicals. The 
Convention has not, however, required States Parties to furnish statistical 
returns respecting “special stocks.”1329 The statistical information provided by 
States Parties has subsequently been incorporated into INCB annual reports 
which have been made publicly available.1330 A review of all published INCB 
                                                                                                                                                                          
narcotic substances for military operations or law enforcement activities would be contrary to the 
Convention. Interview of Western Government expert, 28
th
 April 2010 and subsequent correspondence, 
19
th
 September 2012. 
1323 A review was undertaken of relevant documents publicly available on the International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB) website on 28
th
 February 2012. It is worth noting that the INCB have reported the 
use of narcotic drugs to facilitate crime including robbery and sexual assault and highlighted government 
actions to counter such activities. See for example: INCB, Annual Report, press release number 7, INCB 
urges Governments and industry to take action to prevent the use of drugs to facilitate crime, 2
nd
 March 
2011, p.13.  
1324 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit, Article 1. 
1325 A review of the INCB website on 28
th
 February 2012 found no documents publicly available of the 
States Parties or relevant organs of the SCND clarifying these issues. 
1326 For mandate and functions of the INCB see http://www.incb.org/incb/en/mandate.html. (accessed 
24th February 2012). 
1327 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 19.1 and 19.2. 
1328 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 20. 
1329 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 20.3. 
1330 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 15. An archive containing 
each Report of the International Narcotics Board from 1995 to 2011 is available at 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annual_report.html (accessed 24
th
 February 2012). 
306 
 
annual reports could find no details of research, development or use of “law 
enforcement” incapacitants with narcotic properties, and it is unknown whether 
States Parties have provided details of such activities to the INCB. A Western 
Government expert interviewed by the author has noted that “it might take an 
express amendment to include material specifically developed for law 
enforcement purposes [in the reporting obligations] and this might not be 
desirable from a purely Narcotic Convention's perspective.”1331 
 
The Convention has included procedures that allow the INCB to investigate 
potential circumstances of concern. If, following information received from 
governments, UN organs or specialised agencies, approved intergovernmental 
organisations or international NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status and 
competence in the area, the INCB has “objective reasons to believe that the 
aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure 
of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this 
Convention,”1332 it could initiate consultations with the State concerned, “request 
it to furnish explanations,”1333  or institute a “study of the matter.” 1334 If the 
matter was resolved at this stage then such requests and the information 
provided would be treated as confidential.1335 If the aims of the Convention were 
being “seriously endangered” and it had not been possible to “resolve the 
matter satisfactorily in any other way” - and particularly where “the situation is 
serious” and required “cooperative action at the international level” - the INCB 
could alert the States Parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter. 
Consequently, if required, the Council could “draw the attention of the UN 
General Assembly to the matter.”1336 It is not known whether the INCB has 
received information or investigated any reports of research, development, 
stockpiling or use of scheduled chemicals by States Parties for military or law 
enforcement purposes. For example, no information is publicly available 
concerning INCB deliberations or actions regarding the Russian Federation’s 
use of fentanyl (or a derivative) to end the Moscow theatre siege and the 
                                                          
1331 Author’s interview with Western Government expert, 28
th
 April 2010. 
1332 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 14.1.a. 
1333 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 14.1.a. 
1334 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit. , Article 14.1.b. 
1335 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 14.1.a. 
1336 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) op.cit., Article 14.1.d. 
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presumptive manufacture and stockpiling of such potentially scheduled 
chemicals.1337  
 
9.3. The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances  
The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances (CPS)1338was agreed in 1971 
and came into force in August 1976. As of 1st September 2012 it had 183 States 
Parties.1339 This Convention established an international control system for 
psychotropic substances. It was developed in response to the diversification 
and expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse and it introduced controls over 
a number of synthetic drugs according to their abuse potential on the one hand 
and their therapeutic value on the other.1340  
 
As with the SCND, the drugs covered by the CPS have been elaborated in four 
scheduled lists which could be updated following recommendations by States 
Parties or the World Health Organisation to the United Nations Secretary 
General.1341 The current schedules list a number of psychotropic drugs that 
have been explored as potential incapacitants for use in law enforcement or 
military activities, including: amphetamine,1342 dexamphetamine,1343  LSD,1344 
mescaline,1345 methamphetamine,1346 midazolam,1347 phencyclidine,1348 and 
psilocybine.1349  In addition the schedules also include  amobarbital,1350 
pentobarbital1351, secobarbital1352 and temazepan1353 which have been explored 
or utilised in judicially sanctioned lethal injections and/or narco-analysis.1354 
                                                          
1337 A review was undertaken of relevant documents publicly available on the INCB website on 24
th
 
February 2012. 
1338 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Vienna, 21
st
 February 1971, 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1976/08/19760816%2008-16%20AM/Ch_VI_16p.pdf (accessed 24th 
February 2012). 
1339 For details of States Parties to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, see: United Nations 
Treaty Collection Database, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-
16&chapter=6&lang=en (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1340 See introduction to Convention on INCB website, http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1971.html. 
(accessed 24th February 2012). 
1341 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 2. 
1342 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 2. 
1343 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 2. 
1344 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 1. 
1345 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 1. 
1346 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 2. 
1347 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 4. 
1348 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 2. 
1349 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit , Schedule 1.  
1350 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 3. 
1351 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 3. 
1352 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 2. 
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Under the Convention, each State Party has been required to “limit by such 
measures as it considers appropriate the manufacture, export, import, 
distribution and stocks of, trade in, and use and possession of, substances in 
Schedules II, III and IV to medical and scientific purposes.”1355  The restrictions 
for Schedule I chemicals are even stricter with States Parties required to: 
“prohibit all use except for scientific and very limited medical purposes by duly 
authorized persons, in medical or scientific establishments which are directly 
under the control of their Governments or specifically approved by them”1356 
and to “require that manufacture, trade, distribution and possession be under a 
special licence or prior authorization.”1357 
 
Unlike the SCND, the CPS has contained no ambiguously worded provision 
allowing the State Parties to hold “special stocks” of drugs to be used for 
“special government purposes” or in “exceptional circumstances.” Instead, the 
Convention has allowed the use of Schedule II, III and IV psychotropic 
substances for three specific activities – the carrying by international travellers 
of small quantities of preparations for personal use; during the manufacture of 
non-psychotropic substances, and for the capture of animals.1358 There has 
been no specific exemption detailed for use of such substances in law 
enforcement activities or by the military.  
 
Although the applicability of the CPS to the military or law enforcement 
utilisation of psychotropic substances is uncertain, the restrictions elaborated 
under the Convention do appear to put into question the legitimacy of the 
development, stockpiling, transfer and use of certain psychotropic drugs by 
States Parties for such activities. To date, there are no documents publicly 
available of the States Parties or relevant organs of the CPS clarifying these 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1353 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Schedule 4. 
1354 For further discussion of the use of certain incapacitating agents in lethal injection and narco-analysis 
see Chapters 3 and 12 of this thesis. 
1355 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit , Article 5. 
1356 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit , Article 7.a. 
1357 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 7.b. 
1358 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 4.a-c. 
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issues.1359  Whilst this issue does not appear to have been formally addressed 
by the inter-governmental arms control community, one Western Government 
expert interviewed by the author has stated his belief that the use of schedule I 
psychotropic substances as incapacitants in law enforcement or military 
operations would contravene the Convention although he has contended that 
this prohibition would not automatically extend to substances in other 
schedules.1360  
 
As with the SCND, the CPS has included a number of reporting and 
investigation provisions that could potentially be utilised to provide information 
of benefit in the regulation of certain incapacitants. Under the Convention, 
States Parties have been required to provide the INCB with an annual report of 
quantities of each Schedule I, II, III and IV drug manufactured, imported and 
exported as well as details of stocks held of Schedule I and II chemicals – 
though there has been no requirement to provide information on the intended 
use of such chemicals.1361 The statistical information provided by States Parties 
has subsequently been incorporated into INCB annual reports which have been 
made publicly available.1362 A review of all published INCB annual reports could 
find no details of research, development or use of psychotropic substances for 
law enforcement or military activities, and it is unknown whether States Parties 
have provided details of such activities to the INCB. 
 
If, on the basis of its examination of information submitted by Governments to 
the INCB or of information communicated by United Nations organs1363, the 
INCB had reason to believe that the aims of this Convention were “being 
seriously endangered” by the actions of a country or region, it could seek 
“explanations from the Government of the country or region in question.”1364 If 
                                                          
1359 A review was undertaken of relevant documents publicly available on the INCB website on 24
th
 
February 2012. 
1360 Author’s interview with Western Governmental expert, 28
th
 April 2010. and subsequent 
correspondence, 19
th
 September 2012. 
1361 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 16. 
1362 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 18. An archive 
containing each Report of the International Narcotics Board from 1995 to 2011 is available at 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annual_report.html (accessed 1st September 2012). 
1363 Unlike the SCND, there is no provision in the CPS for the INCB to formally receive information from 
inter-governmental organisations or international non-governmental organisations. 
1364 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 19.1.a. 
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the matter was resolved at this stage then such requests and the information 
provided would be treated as confidential. 1365  If unsatisfied by the State’s 
response, the INCB could bring the matter to the States Parties, the Council 
and the Commission, and could recommend that the States Parties “stop the 
export, import, or both, of particular psychotropic substances, from or to the 
country or region concerned” for a “designated period” or until the INCB was 
“satisfied as to the situation in that country or region.”1366  It is not known 
whether the INCB has formally received information or investigated any reports 
of research, development, stockpiling or use of scheduled chemicals by States 
Parties for law enforcement or military purposes. 1367 
 
9.4. Conclusion 
From the HAC stage two analysis summarised in this chapter, it is clear that 
although both the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the UN Convention 
on Pyschotropic Substances were developed as crime control instruments and 
not as mechanisms for disarmament or arms control, both treaties do appear to 
restrict the use of a range of incapacitating agents to “medical and scientific 
purposes”. Further research is required to establish the implications of these 
restrictions upon the research, development, stockpiling, transfer and use of 
“weaponised” chemical incapacitants. Furthermore, even if the limitations on 
use established by one or both treaties were not deemed, by the States Parties, 
to be applicable to “weaponised” incapacitants, the reporting (and potentially the 
investigatory) mechanisms of both Conventions should be considered as 
potential routes for obtaining information relevant to the regulation of such 
agents, as part of a broader HAC regulatory strategy.    
                                                          
1365 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 19.1.a. 
1366 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) op.cit., Article 19.1.c & Article 19.2 
1367 A review was undertaken of relevant documents publicly available on the INCB website on 24
th
 
February 2012. 
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Chapter 10: International criminal law applicable to riot control agents and 
incapacitants  
 
10.1. Introduction 
The preceding analysis of potential mechanisms to regulate riot control agents 
(RCAs), incapacitants and means of delivery has concentrated upon 
agreements, instruments and international law intended to constrain and 
influence the activities of States. Another important alternative approach is to 
address individual responsibility and culpability through the employment of 
international criminal law. According to Cassese, “International crimes are 
breaches of international rules entailing the personal criminal liability of the 
individuals concerned”.1368 Some of the crimes under international law have 
been considered to be violations of jus cogens, peremptory norms that “have a 
rank and status superior to those of all the other rules of the international 
community” and which cannot be set aside by States, through for example a 
treaty.1369 According to Oñate, Exterkate, Tabassi and van der Borght, although 
there was not necessarily a consensus on a definite list of such crimes under 
international law it has been widely accepted that war crimes and genocide 
would certainly be included.1370 In addition, Aceves1371 has added crimes 
against humanity to this list, and Hampson has included both aggression and 
crimes against humanity.1372 In certain situations international criminal law could 
be applied by national courts or international courts to the use, and possibly the 
transfer of, chemical weapons. As part of the HAC stage two analysis, this 
chapter explores the potential applicability of international criminal law and 
judicial mechanisms to cases involving the serious misuse of incapacitants and 
RCAs. 
 
                                                          
1368
 Cassese, A. International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press,  2003, p.23, as cited by 
Oñate, S., Exterkate, B., Tabassi, L. and van der Borght, E.  Lessons learned: Chemicals Trader 
Convicted of War Crimes, Hague Justice Journal, volume 2, number 1, 2007, p.37. 
1369
 Cassese, A. International Criminal Law, Oxford: 2
nd 
ed Oxford University Press, 2005, p.199. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23
rd
 May 1969, entered into force 27
th
 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331 Article 53, as cited by Oñate, S., Exterkate, B., Tabassi, L. and van der Borght, E. (2007) 
op.cit., p.37. 
1370
 Oñate, S., Exterkate, B., Tabassi, L. and van der Borght, E. (2007) op.cit., p.38. 
1371
 Aceves, W. Human Rights Law and the Use of Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons,  in Pearson, A., 
Chevrier, M. & Wheelis (2007) op.cit., p.262.   
1372
 Hampson, F. International law and the Regulation of Weapons, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis 
(2007) op.cit., p.232. 
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10.2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), governed by the Rome Statute, 1373  is 
the first permanent, treaty based, independent international criminal court 
established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community.1374 The ICC came into being on the 
1st July 2002 when the Rome Statute entered into force following its ratification 
by 60 States Parties. As of 1st September 2012, there were 121 States Parties 
to the ICC with a further 32 having signed but not ratified the Rome Statute.1375 
Pursuant to the Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecutor can initiate an investigation 
on the basis of a referral from any State Party1376 or from the United Nations 
Security Council1377. In addition, the Prosecutor can initiate investigations 
proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court received from individuals or organisations.1378 
 
The Rome Statute has asserted jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide.1379 The Statute’s definition of “war crimes” has 
included: 
"(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons; 
"(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous 
                                                          
1373
 International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17
th
 July 1998, 
A/CONF.183/9, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-
0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf. (accessed 29
th
 February 2012). 
1374
 International Criminal Court, About the court, ICC website, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (accessed 29
th
 February 2012). 
1375
 For full details of the States Parties and Signatories see: International Criminal Court website 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/  (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). Three of the 32 
signatory States – Israel, Sudan and the United States – subsequently informed the UN Secretary General 
that they no longer intended to be party to the treaty and have no legal obligations arising from their 
signatures. Copies of the relevant correspondence is available on the UN treaty collection database 
webpage.  
1376
 As of 1
st
 September 2012, three States Parties to the Rome Statute – Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic – have referred situations occurring on their 
territories to the Court. The Prosecutor has opened and is conducting investigations in these situations. 
See: International Criminal Court, Situations and cases, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (accessed 1
st
 September 2012).  
1377
 As of 1
st
 September 2012, the Security Council has referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, and the 
situation in Libya – both non-States Parties to the Court. The Prosecutor has opened and is conducting 
investigations in these situations. See: International Criminal Court, Situations and cases, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/(accessed 1
st
 September 2012).  
1378
 As of 1
st
 September 2012 the Pre-Trial Chambers have granted the Prosecution authorisation to open 
an investigation proprio motu in the situations of Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. See: International Criminal 
Court, Situations and cases, ICC website, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ 
(accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1379
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Article 5. 
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liquids, materials or devices;...”1380  
 
It should be noted that whilst these two prohibitions have referred to chemical 
and biological weapons, they have done so implicitly rather than explicitly. The 
first has appeared to enunciate a norm first codified in the Second Hague 
Convention whilst the second has derived from the Geneva Protocol. Certain 
legal commentators have stated “that it remains unclear whether all chemical 
weapons are included, and whether biological weapons are included at all”.1381 
 
In September 2002, the Assembly of States Parties adopted the “Elements of 
Crimes” which was intended to “assist the Court in the interpretation and 
application of articles 6, 7 and 8, consistent with the Statute.”1382  The Elements 
of Article 8(2) (b) (xviii) relating to employment of “asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” were specified as: 
 “The perpetrator employed a gas or other analogous substance or 
device. 
 The  substance  was  such  that  it  causes  death  or  serious  damage  
to  health  in  the ordinary course of events, through its toxic properties. 
 The  conduct  took  place  in  the  context  of  and  was  associated  with  
an  international armed conflict. 
 The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.”1383 
 
The Elements of Article 8(2) (b) (xvii) relating to the employment of “poison or 
poisoned weapons” were essentially the same except for the first element which 
reads: “The perpetrator employed a  substance  or  a  weapon  that  releases  a  
substance  as  a result of its employment.”1384 
 
                                                          
1380
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Articles 8 (2) (b) (xvii) and (xviii). 
1381
 Allen, K. with Spence, S. and Leal, R. Chemical and biological weapons use in the Rome Statute: a 
case for change, VERTIC brief 14, February 2011, p.2.  
1382
 International Criminal Court, Elements  of  Crimes, Official  Records  of  the  Assembly  of  States 
Parties  to  the  Rome  Statute  of  the  International Criminal  Court (ASP),  First  session,  New  York,  3
rd
 
-10
th
  September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3, part  II.B. 
1383
 International Criminal Court, Elements  of  Crimes, Official  Records  of  the  Assembly  of  States 
Parties  to  the  Rome  Statute  of  the  International Criminal  Court (ASP),  First  session,  New  York,  3
rd
 
-10
th
  September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3, part  II.B, Article 8(2) (b) (xviii), Elements. 
1384
 International Criminal Court, ASP (2002) op.cit., Article 8(2) (b) (xvii), Elements. 
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Given the information publicly available regarding the characteristics of the 
range of agents previously developed as incapacitants coupled with the 
experience of the use of an incapacitant during the Moscow siege, it can be 
argued that incapacitants are likely to cause “death or serious damage to 
health” at least to a certain proportion of the target population “in the ordinary 
course of events”. Consequently, the use of incapacitants in an armed conflict 
appears to fall within the scope of Article 8(2) (b) (xvii) and/or 8(2) (b) (xviii), and 
would be considered a war crime, with the possibility that those responsible for 
such acts might be tried before the Court.1385  
 
However, the possible applicability of the Statute with regard to RCAs has been 
questioned. Tabassi, for example, has argued that the use of RCAs as a 
method of warfare did not come under the jurisdiction of the Court.1386 
Furthermore, Allen has noted “though ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases…’ has widely been interpreted to include some chemical weapons, other 
chemical agents, such as irritants, may not be included since they are not 
poisons.”1387 Indeed it is clear that the use of RCAs will not “in the ordinary 
course of events” cause “death or serious damage to health” and would 
therefore fail to fulfil one of the “Elements of Article 8(2)”. However, although the 
employment per se of RCAs in an armed conflict may not fall within the scope of 
a crime under the Rome Statue, their use in certain specific circumstances may 
do so for example if such use facilitated other actions covered by the Rome 
Statute namely “torture or inhuman treatment”1388 or was employed to “wilfully 
caus[e] great suffering, or serious injury to body or health”.1389 
 
Whilst the use of incapacitants (and potentially RCAs in certain circumstances) 
in armed conflict appears to be considered a crime under the ICC, the scope of 
ICC applicability in this area is restricted. For example, the Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited to nationals of States Parties that have ratified the Statute and it can only 
                                                          
1385
 To date, however, there has been no such case brought before the ICC. For further discussion of ICC 
and chemical weapons see: Aceves, W. (2007) op.cit.; Hampson, F. (2007) op.cit.; Tabassi, L. (2004) 
Impact of the CWC: progressive development of customary international law and evolution of the 
customary norm against chemical weapons, CBW Conventions Bulletin 63, March 2004. 
1386
 Tabassi, L. (2004) op.cit., p.2. 
1387
 Allen, K. (2011) op.cit., p.10. 
1388
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Article 8(2) (a) (ii). 
1389
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Article  8(2) (a) (iii). 
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prosecute crimes committed on or after the date of its establishment.1390 
Furthermore, under the Rome Statute the Court will not admit cases that are 
being, or have already been, investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over the case, unless the State is genuinely unwilling or unable to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.1391 In addition, according to Tabassi, 
the ICC would only have jurisdiction over cases involving the use of chemical 
weapons, but not cases solely involving development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling or transfer of such agents per se. 1392   
 
Furthermore, until recently, the ICC jurisdiction only covered the use of 
chemical weapons in an international armed conflict.1393 Cases involving the 
use of chemical weapons in internal armed conflicts or for law enforcement 
operations were not covered – except potentially in cases of genocide or crimes 
against humanity.1394 Tabassi and van der Borght highlighted the anachronism 
of such a position which “dates back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol”, particularly 
given the near universal adherence to the CWC which has made no distinction 
between internal and international armed conflict.1395 Furthermore, the authors 
contended that both the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the ICRC study on IHL “concluded that the customary 
international law prohibition, binding on all States, on the use of chemical 
weapons in international armed conflict now extends to the use in non-
international armed conflict as well.” 1396 
 
In order to address this limitation, Belgium1397 together with 11 co-sponsoring 
States1398 submitted a proposal to the First Rome Statute Review 
                                                          
1390
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Articles 11 and 12. 
1391
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Article 17. 
1392
 Tabassi, L. (2004) op.cit., p.2. 
1393
 Tabassi, L. and van der Borght, E. Chemical Warfare as Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 
Hague Justice Journal, volume 2, number 1, 2007, p.5. 
1394
 Tabassi, L. (2004) op.cit., p.2. 
1395
 Tabassi, L. and van der Borght, E. (2007) op.cit., p.22. 
1396
 Tabassi, L. and van der Borght, E. (2006) op.cit., p.22.  
1397
 International Criminal Court, Rome Statute amendment proposals, Elements of crimes corresponding 
to the proposed amendment contained in annex III to resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.6, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/ICC-ASP-8-Res.9-ENG.20April1600.ANNEX.VIII.pdf (accessed 29
th
 
February 2012). 
1398
 Austria, Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Romania, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland were the co-sponsoring 
States. 
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Conference1399 recommending the amendment of Article 8 of the Statute so as 
to extend the criminalization of the use of poison, poisoned weapons, 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases [as well as expanding bullets] to armed 
conflicts not of an international character. 
 
The Belgium proposal was supported by the ICRC, which declared that:  
“The adoption of the weapons amendment would initiate a sound movement 
towards a greater protection for civilians as well as combatants in non-
international armed conflict and would bring Article 8 of the Statute more in line 
with the content of customary international humanitarian law. The ICRC 
considers that the adoption of the weapons amendment would be a significant 
achievement and a very positive message to come out of the first Review 
Conference.”1400 
 
The Resolution to amend Article 8 was subsequently adopted by consensus at 
the First Review Conference1401 and will enter into force for individual States 
one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance.1402 
As well as extending the Rome Statute prohibition of poison, poisoned 
weapons, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases to internal armed conflicts, 
the process of review and amendment conducted by the Review Conference 
has been important in helping to ensure that the Rome Statute remains a “living 
document” capable of adapting to changing circumstances and needs.  
 
10.3. International, hybrid and internationalised-domestic courts and 
tribunals 
                                                          
1399
 First Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 31
st
 May - 10
th
 June, Kampala, Uganda. For more 
information see ICC website: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/ (accessed 1
st
 
September 2012). 
1400
 ICRC, The Weapons amendment, (Article 8.2, letter e of the ICC Statute, March 2010, 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICRC_The_weapons_amendment.22april10.1755.pdf.  (accessed 25
th
 
May 2010). 
1401
 International Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute concludes in Kampala, 12
th
 June 
2010, press release, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/asp/reviewconference/pressreleaserc/ 
review%20conference%20of%20the%20rome%20statute%20concludes%20in%20kampala (accessed 29
th
 
February 2012); International Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala, Uganda, 
31
st
 May-11
th
 June 2010, Resolution RC/Res.5, Amendments to article 8 of the Rome Statute, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf (accessed 29th February 2012). 
1402
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Article 121, paragraph 5. 
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Starting in the 1990s, a small number of international bodies have been 
established to deal with international crimes, including the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)1403 and Rwanda (ICTR).1404 In 
addition four “hybrid (national/international) tribunals” were created, namely the 
Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court in East Timor (and its 
Court of Appeal)1405, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Trial Chambers 
and an Appeal Chamber)1406, the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of 
Cambodia1407, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.1408 These courts have a 
mixed membership of local and international judges. There are also 
“internationalised-domestic courts or tribunals” established in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH)1409, Kosovo and Iraq1410 with jurisdiction for certain 
international crimes.  
 
The courts highlighted in this section are limited by the terms of their constituent 
instruments with regard to the crimes they can try, and their jurisdiction may be 
limited geographically and to certain time periods.1411 To date one case – the 
Anfal trial -involving the use of chemical weapons has been prosecuted in such 
a court (see Appendix 5 of this thesis). It is possible that the use of an 
incapacitant (or less likely an RCA) to facilitate war crimes could fall within the 
jurisdiction of such courts, but this would be dependent on the specific nature of 
the alleged crimes as well as that of the court itself. 
                                                          
1403
 For further information see: United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (accessed 29th February 2012). 
1404
 For further information see: United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (accessed 29
th
 February 
2012). 
1405
 For further information see: International Bar Association, Special Panels for Serious Crimes (East 
Timor), http://www.ibanet.org/Committees/WCC_EastTimor.aspx (accessed 29th February 2012). 
1406
 For further information see: International Bar Association, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
http://www.ibanet.org/Committees/WCC_SCSL.aspx (accessed 29th February 2012). 
1407
 For further information see: International Bar Association, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, http://www.ibanet.org/Committees/WCC_Cambodia.aspx (accessed 29th February 2012). 
1408
 For further information see: United Nations, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, http://www.stl-tsl.org/ 
(accessed 29
th
 February 2012). 
1409
 For further information on the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia-Herzegovina see: International Tribunal 
Spotlight, War Crimes Chamber: Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, American Society of International Law 
and the International Judicial Academy, July/August 2007, Volume 2, Issue 2, 
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_0707/spotlight.html (accessed 29th February 2012). 
1410
 For further information on the Iraqi High Tribunal see: International Bar Association, Iraqi High 
Tribunal, http://www.ibanet.org/Committees/WCC_IHT.aspx (accessed 29th February 2012); Scharf, P. 
The Iraqi High Tribunal: a viable experiment in international justice? Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 2007, pp.1-6. 
1411
 Hampson, F. International law and the Regulation of Weapons, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis 
(2007) op.cit., p.232. For further information on these bodies see Rikhof, J. (2009) op.cit., pp.4-8.   
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10.4. National courts 
In the case of international crimes, any State is free to try a suspected 
perpetrator providing for requisite jurisdiction and subject to sovereign 
immunity.1412 Individuals responsible for crimes under international law can be 
prosecuted once the jurisdiction of the State, which initiates the prosecution, 
has been asserted. A number of principles exist, under international law, to 
determine the legal grounds for jurisdiction. These include the principle of 
territoriality (the crime has been committed on the territory of the State which 
intends to prosecute); the principle of active nationality (the perpetrator of the 
crime is a national of the State which is initiating prosecution); the principle of 
passive nationality (the victim of the crime is a national of the State which is 
initiating prosecution); the principle of protection (fundamental [i.e. security] 
interests of the State are affected) and the universality principle (no specific 
connection exists between the State which is initiating the prosecution and the 
offender).1413  
 
As Rikhof has noted, while it had previously been possible in the domestic 
context to initiate criminal prosecutions for genocide and war crimes as a result 
of ratifying the 1948 Genocide Convention1414 and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions1415, the coming into force of the Rome Statute (see above) has 
“provided an important impetus for a large number of countries to not only 
examine their domestic legislation dealing with the regulation of war crimes, 
                                                          
1412
 Hampson, F. International law and the Regulation of Weapons, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis 
(2007) op.cit., p.232.  
1413
 Oñate, S., Exterkate, B., Tabassi, L. and van der Borght, E. (2007) op.cit., p.38.  
1414
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York, 9
th
 December 
1948. For text see: International Humanitarian Law – treaties and documents, International Committee of 
the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/357?OpenDocument (accessed 17th February 2012). As of 
16
th
 February 2012 there were 142 States Parties and one Signatory State to this Convention. For further 
details see: the International Committee of the Red Cross website at: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/357?OpenDocument (accessed 17
th
 February 2012). 
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 Conventions (I-IV), Geneva, 12
th
 August 1949 [Geneva Conventions].For text and commentaries see: 
International Humanitarian Law – treaties and documents, International Committee of the Red 
Cross,http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ CONVPRES?OpenView (accessed 17
th
 February 2012).  As of 16
th
 
February 2012 there were 194 States Parties to these Conventions. For further details see: the 
International Committee of the Red Cross website at: http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/%28SPF%29/ 
party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf  (accessed 21
st
 February 2012). 
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crimes against humanity and genocide but also to introduce changes to their 
laws to ensure that they were in compliance with international obligations and 
the tenets of the Rome Statute.”1416 
 
Legal scholars such as Hankin1417 and Rikhof1418 have analysed the divergent 
mechanisms by which countries have incorporated international criminal law 
into their domestic legislation. Whether and how such domestic legislation could 
be applied to the use of incapacitants or RCAs in armed conflict would have to 
be determined on a case by case basis. In a number of States, national law 
dealing with the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes has incorporated1419 or made reference1420 to the relevant definitions 
set out in the Rome Statute. In such countries, at least, a case could be made 
that the use of RCAs or incapacitants to commit genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes would fall within the national court’s jurisdiction as 
would the use per se of incapacitants in armed conflict. 
  
To date, there has been one case – the van Anraat trial (see Appendix 5 of this 
thesis) - where a national court has employed international criminal law to try an 
individual accused of complicity in international crimes involving the use of 
chemical weapons. In addition, the Republic of South Africa unsuccessfully 
prosecuted Wouter Basson on 61 charges of domestic crimes relating to 
activities whilst he was head of Project Coast, including murder, conspiracy to 
murder, possession of drugs of addiction and fraud. 1421Other related cases of 
interest include attempts to prosecute individuals accused of facilitating 
provision of conventional arms to those engaged in international crimes.1422 
                                                          
1416
 Rikhof, J. Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions on International 
Impunity, Criminal Law Forum, volume 20, number 1, 2009, p.8. 
1417
 Hankin, S. Overview of Ways to Import Core International Crimes into National Criminal Law in: 
Importing Core International Crimes into National Criminal Law, (eds) Bergsmo, M., Hayashi, M., and 
Harlem, N. Second Edition, 2010,Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2010, pp.20-28. 
1418
 Rikhof, J (2009) op.cit., pp.9-12. 
1419
 For example Australia, Jordan, Malta and the UK. See Rikhof, J (2009) op.cit., p.9; Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, Regional and Country Info available on CICC website, http://www.iccnow.org 
(accessed 29
th
 February 2012). See Rikhof, J (2009) op.cit., p.9; CICC website. 
1420
 For example Kenya,  New Zealand, South Africa and Uganda. 
1421
 The Hague Justice Portal, State Vs Wouter Basson, 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/8/135.html (accessed 29th February 2012); Gould, C.  
More Questions Than Answers: The Ongoing Trial of Dr Wouter Basson, Disarmament Diplomacy, issue 
number 52, November 2000. 
1422
 See for example trial by Dutch courts of Guus van Kouwenhoven, convicted of violating a United 
Nations arms embargo in Liberia, whose verdict was subsequently overturned; and the Belgian court 
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10.5. Harvard Sussex Draft Convention 
The Harvard Sussex Project (HSP) has proposed an alternative approach to 
employing international criminal law to address individual responsibility and 
culpability in the development or misuse of chemical and biological weapons, 
through the development of a stand-alone Convention. 
 
Meselson and Robinson have argued that: “Any development, production, 
acquisition, or use of biological and chemical weapons is the result of decisions 
and actions of individual persons, whether they are government officials, 
commercial suppliers, weapons experts, or terrorists.” 1423 However, they have 
contended that the BTWC and CWC “are directed primarily to the actions of 
states, and address the matter of individual responsibility to only a limited 
degree.”1424 
 
Although both the BTWC and the CWC have required that States Parties enact 
domestic legislation which criminalised the prohibitions contained in these 
conventions, these are limited in scope. For example, the BTWC and the CWC 
have stopped short of requiring a State Party to establish criminal jurisdiction 
applicable to foreign nationals on its territory who have committed biological or 
chemical weapons offenses elsewhere—and neither convention contained 
provisions dealing with extradition.  
 
In addition, Meselson and Robinson have noted that:  
“National criminal legislation, so far enacted by only a minority of states, is no 
substitute for international criminalization. Purely national statutes present 
daunting problems of harmonizing their various provisions regarding the 
definition of crimes, rights of the accused, dispute resolution, and judicial 
assistance, among others.”1425  
                                                                                                                                                                          
indictment of Ephrem Nkezabera for activities in the Rwandan genocide related to financing and arming of 
the interahame militia, as discussed in Rikhof, J. (2009), op.cit , p.21 and pp.22-23. 
1423
 Meselson, M. and Perry Robinson, J., 2004, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological  and Chemical 
Weapons under International Criminal Law, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, volume 28, edition 1,Winter 
2004, pp.57-70, Tufts University, p.57. 
1424
 Ibid. 
1425
 Meselson, M. and Robinson, J. P.(2004)  op.cit., p.58. 
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Consequently, Meselson and Robinson have argued that: “What is needed is a 
new treaty, one that defines specific acts involving biological or chemical 
weapons as international crimes, like piracy or aircraft hijacking.”1426 
 
To this end, HSP with advice from an international group of legal authorities, 
developed a Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons 
under International Criminal Law. If enacted, the HSP Draft Convention would 
make it a crime under international law for any person knowingly: to develop, 
produce, acquire, retain, transfer, or use biological or chemical weapons; to 
order, direct, or knowingly render substantial assistance to those activities; or, 
to threaten to use biological or chemical weapons.1427 
 
Under the HSP Draft Convention, each State Party would be required to 
“establish jurisdiction with respect to such crimes according to established 
principles of judicial law” and where the State had jurisdiction and was satisfied 
that the facts warranted such action, “to submit those cases to competent 
authorities for the purpose of extradition or prosecution.” 1428 Furthermore, with 
respect to the actual use of chemical or biological weapons, each State Party 
would be required to “establish jurisdiction over all persons found on its territory 
regardless of their nationality or place of the offence.”1429 
 
The Draft Convention has defined biological and chemical weapons as they 
were defined in the BTWC and the CWC, on the basis of a general purpose 
criterion worded so as to prohibit activities undertaken with hostile intent, while 
not prohibiting those intended for protective, prophylactic or other peaceful 
purposes.1430 Consequently the Draft Convention has appeared to cover RCAs, 
                                                          
1426
 Meselson, M. and Robinson, J. P.(2004)  op.cit., p.58. 
1427
 For full text of present draft of Convention see: Harvard Sussex Program, Draft Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing, Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, 
Transferring or Using Biological or Chemical Weapons, 2009, 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/Draft%20Convention%20-%20English.pdf (accessed 
29
th
 February 2012). Also see accompanying Draft Legal Commentary, available at: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp /Draft %20 Convention%20supporting%20docs/HSP%20papers/ 
Legal%20Commentary.pdf (accessed 29
th
 February 2012). 
1428
 Harvard Sussex Program (2009) op.cit., Preamble. 
1429
 Harvard Sussex Program (2009) op.cit., Preamble. 
1430
 Harvard Sussex Program (2009) op.cit Article III. 
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incapacitants and associated means of delivery within its scope when used for 
prohibited purposes. 
 
The Convention has garnered support from academics concerned with chemical 
and biological weapons.1431 Dando has stated his belief that:  
“Widespread adoption of a convention such as this draft [HSP] treaty, or a 
similar development of the Rome Statute, would add to the web of preventive 
policies that help minimize the potential for the development and use of these 
weapons in the future. Individuals who carried out such activities would do so 
knowing their actions had international, legal ramifications.”1432 
 
HSP has explored a number of potential routes by which the Draft Convention 
could be adopted and implemented by the international governmental 
community. Firstly, a group of States could submit the proposed Draft 
Convention or a similar text in the form of a resolution for consideration by the 
UN General Assembly (UNGA), seeking its referral to the UNGA Sixth (legal) 
Committee for negotiation of an agreed instrument. 1433 Alternatively, a regional 
or other grouping of States might convene a diplomatic conference to produce 
an agreed instrument that could then be opened for signature and ratification by 
any State wishing to do so.1434 Although the current strength and depth of 
support for this initiative amongst States is unclear, the U.K. Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office has previously indicated its support1435 and “a number of 
                                                          
1431
 See for example: Dunworth, T. HSP Draft Convention: some thoughts from a legal perspective, CBW 
Conventions Bulletin, Special Issue, February 2011, pp.31-24; Evidence by Simms, N. and Feakes, D. to 
the UK Foreign Affairs Committee. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Non-
Proliferation, Fourth Report of Sessions 2008-2009, 14
th
 June 2009. 
1432
 Dando, M. Bringing increased biological and chemical weapons provisions to the ICC, Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists, 11th November 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/malcolm-
dando/bringing-increased-biological-and-chemical-weapons-provisions-t (accessed 25th May 2010) 
1433
 Perry Robinson, J. 2011, Criminalization of biological and chemical armament, in: CBW Conventions 
Bulletin, Special Issue, February 2011, Harvard Sussex Program, p.4. 
1434
 The Draft HSP Convention, Implementation of the proposal, Harvard Sussex Program website 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Harvard-Sussex-Program-draft-convention-Implementation.html 
(accessed 4th June 2010); see also Jefferson, C. The Harvard Sussex Draft Convention as a complement 
to Resolution 1540, Resolution 1540: At the crossroads, Stanley Foundation Civil Society Event, 1
st
 
October 2009, www.stanleyfoundation.org/1540/HSDC_and_ 1540.pdf  (accessed 4th June 2010).   
1435
 For example, a memorandum from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the House of Commons stated: 
“The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation has developed a draft Convention 
for the criminalization of CBW activities at the individual level. This draft builds on existing legal precedents 
and international agreements and has been considered by officials since it was first launched in the late 
1990s. It was one of the measures especially identified in the Green Paper as a possible option and it 
remains one that the government would be ready to see taken forward as part of international efforts to 
counter the threat posed by CBW proliferation.” [See: Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
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other European governments ha[d] the convention under consideration”1436  In 
2011, Robinson explained that “Once we are satisfied that the political 
environment is favourable, our plan is to convene an international conference 
that will bring together policy makers, jurists and exponents of the Draft 
Convention.” 1437 
 
10.6. Conclusions  
The progressive development of international criminal law and attendant judicial 
bodies, notably the ICC, are important mechanisms in combating “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community”.1438 As the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1948 recognised: “[C]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.”1439 
 
The application of international criminal law and attendant judicial mechanisms 
to crimes involving chemical weapons can play an important role in 
strengthening and enforcing the prohibition against the use of such weapons, 
allowing those directly or indirectly responsible for such crimes – be they 
government officials, military commanders, scientists, chemical suppliers - to be 
brought to justice, even if their own States were unwilling to do so. Such actions 
would potentially have important deterrent effects. For, as a group of eminent 
prosecutors, have stated “Ending impunity by perpetrators of crimes of concern 
to the international community is a necessary part of preventing the recurrence 
of atrocities.”1440 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Office to the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons papers 150, Session 2002-03 as cited on 
HSP website, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/ Harvard-Sussex-Program-draft-convention-
Status.html (accessed 29th February 2012)]. [See also: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from 
Biological Weapons, April 2002, CM 5484, p.15]. 
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 Meselson, M. and Robinson, J. P.,(2004)  op.cit., p.61.  
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 Perry Robinson, J. (2011) op.cit., p.5. 
1438
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998) op.cit., Preamble. 
1439
 Nuremberg IMT: Judgment and Sentence American Journal of International Law, volume 41 (1947) at 
172, as cited by Dunworth, T. (2011) op.cit. 
1440
 First Chautauqua Declaration, 29
th
 August 2009,  http://www.asil.org/chaudec/index_files/frame.htm 
(accessed 1st May 2012) Signed by the prosecutors of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, International Criminal Court, 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia.  
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To date, whilst two cases involving direct or indirect complicity in the use of 
chemical weapons have been tried, no case involving incapacitants or RCAs 
has been brought before the relevant courts. Indeed the applicability of 
international criminal law to RCAs is unclear; the case being stronger for 
incapacitants. Of the existing judicial bodies, the ICC – with its attendant review 
and amendment mechanisms - appears to afford the best route for clarification 
in this area and should be explored as part of a HAC regulatory strategy. 
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Chapter 11: International humanitarian law applicable to incapacitants and 
riot control agents 
 
11.1. Introduction 
As part of the second stage of the HAC analytical process, this chapter will 
explore the constraints imposed upon States regarding the use of RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery as a result of their obligations under 
International humanitarian law (IHL).  
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the body of law that applies during 
situations of armed conflict with the aim of protecting civilians and others who 
are no longer participating in hostilities, and regulating the conduct of such 
hostilities. Amongst its provisions are those regulating the means of conflict 
(including the weapons employed) and also the methods of warfare (how such 
weapons are employed). IHL is comprised of two elements, the first being IHL 
treaty law. This is binding only on those States that are party to the specific 
agreements. Furthermore, a treaty is only binding on a State if it has ratified it. 
Mere signature, indicating a future intent to be bound, is not sufficient but a 
State that has signed a treaty is not free to undermine its objects and 
purposes.1441 In addition to the weapons specific agreements prohibiting 
development, possession or use of chemical and biological weapons (i.e. 
BTWC, CWC and the Geneva Protocol), there are a number of generally 
applicable IHL treaties of potential relevance to incapacitants and RCAs and 
related means of delivery, particularly the Four Geneva Conventions of 19491442  
and two of their Additional Protocols. 1443 
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 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 18. For further discussion 
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th
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th
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A second body of IHL derived from customary international law is also 
applicable. The Statute of the International Court of Justice described 
customary international law as “a general practice accepted as law”.1444 
According to Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck: “it is generally agreed that the 
existence of a rule of customary international law requires the presence of two 
elements, namely State practice (usus) and a belief that such practice is 
required, prohibited or allowed, depending on the nature of the rule, as a matter 
of law(opinio juris sive necessitatis).”1445 Where customary international law has 
been deemed to be established it is binding on all States whether or not they 
are parties to relevant treaties. The most recent definitive codification of this 
area can be found in the 2005 ICRC Study of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law.1446 
 
11.2. Scope of IHL 
IHL is applicable to international armed conflicts which can be described as 
conflicts which arise between two or more States, even if a state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. It also covers all cases of partial or total occupation 
of the territory of a State, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance.1447  IHL is also applicable to armed conflicts of a non-international 
character which can be considered as conflicts between the armed forces of a 
State and organised armed groups which are under responsible command, 
control territory and carry out sustained military operations. An armed conflict is 
not a situation of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.1448 The 
determination of whether a specific situation should be considered as an 
                                                                                                                                                                          
17
th
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th
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 International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, Article 38(1)(b). 
1445
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volume I, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.xxxi-xxxii.   
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 Henckaerts, J-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) op.cit.  
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 See for example: Geneva Conventions (1949) op.cit., Common Article 2. 
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internal armed conflict or as internal disturbance requiring law enforcement can 
be highly contentious.1449  As well as regulating the activities of States in armed 
conflicts, certain commentators have highlighted the applicability of IHL to 
armed non-State actors that meet requisite criteria.1450  
 
Hampson has noted that while international armed conflicts are subject to both 
“more rules and more precise rules” than are non-international armed conflicts, 
a significant body of customary international law has developed to regulate non-
international conflicts.1451 Particularly important in such developments have 
been the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the judgements of the 
ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Of particular 
note is the Tadic decision of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia which stated that:  
“...elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it 
preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts 
between themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their 
own nationals on their own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently 
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in 
civil strife.”1452  
 
11.3. Obligations of relevance to the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants 
and related means of delivery 
There are a number of obligations which have arisen from IHL – either from 
specific treaties or under customary international law - which potentially 
                                                          
1449
 For example the Russian Federation denied that its military operations in Chechnya were part of an 
internal armed conflict and therefore covered by IHL, even though the Russian Constitutional Court had 
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Russian Federation, 31
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 See, for example: Clapham, A. Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors , Oxford University 
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nd
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constrain the development and utilisation of incapacitants, riot control agents or 
related means of delivery by States.1453 These include: 
  
(i) The recognition that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose 
their methods or means of warfare was not unlimited: This is a basic tenet of 
IHL stipulated, for example, in the Hague Regulations1454 and more recently in 
Additional Protocol I1455 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions1456. As Casey-
Maslen noted this was a general restatement “of the international legal reality 
that certain weapons can never be lawfully used, while other weapons can be 
used subject to the restrictions imposed by applicable international law.”1457 
 
(ii)The protection of persons considered hors de combat:  Additional Protocol I 
(covering international armed conflict) has defined a person as being hors de 
combat if: “(a) he is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) he clearly expresses 
an intention to surrender; or (c) he has been rendered unconscious or is 
otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of 
defending himself; provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any 
hostile act and does not attempt to escape.”1458 Under Additional Protocol I, 
such persons “shall not be made the object of attack.” 1459 
  
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (which covers non-international 
armed conflict) has stated that “Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.”1460  In addition, certain actions 
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 For a detailed discussion of this issue see: Coupland, R. Incapacitating biochemical weapons: risks 
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against the above-mentioned persons are prohibited, including: “(a) violence to 
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;...”1461 There is also a positive obligation to 
ensure that “the wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.”1462 
 
Similar obligations are also deemed to be part of international customary 
humanitarian law. According to the 2005 ICRC study “Civilians and persons 
hors de combat must be treated humanely”1463 whilst “the wounded, sick ... 
must receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, 
the medical care and attention required by their condition.”1464 Furthermore, 
each party to the conflict “must take all possible measures to protect the 
wounded, sick... against ill-treatment...”1465 
 
The ICRC has highlighted its concerns that the use of incapacitants in armed 
conflict would: “make it difficult or impossible to determine when a combatant is 
“out of action” and thereby afforded protection and assistance. An incapacitated 
combatant would probably not appear to be injured and may be unable to show 
a sign of surrender.” 1466 Consequently, the ICRC has argued that: “It would be 
difficult to train soldiers to distinguish whether an enemy were incapacitated or 
remained a threat. The resulting combination of incapacitants and lethal force 
could significantly increase the lethality of armed conflicts.”1467 
 
Further disquiet has been voiced regarding the potential use of certain 
incapacitants in the coercive treatment of enemy combatants rendered hors de 
combat. The Royal Society has highlighted the importance of IHL in 
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constraining such activities, noting in particular that the prohibition against 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment” [as enunciated under Additional Protocol I] “could extend...to the use 
of neuropharmacological agents to control or alter behaviour.” 1468 The coercive 
treatment of prisoners of war has also been prohibited by the Third Geneva 
Convention which stated that prisoners of war were only required to give their 
surname, first names and rank, date of birth and army, regimental, personal and 
serial number. And that: “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information 
of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be 
threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of 
any kind.”1469 The Royal Society has consequently concluded that “the use of 
neuropharmacological agents or stimulation technologies to coerce or 
interrogate prisoners of war is therefore prohibited by this law.” 1470  
 
(iii)Constraints upon the activities of medical personnel: Under Additional 
Protocol I: “The physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the 
power of the adverse Party... shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or 
omission.”1471  Consequently, it is prohibited to subject such prisoners or 
detainees to “any medical procedure which is not indicated by the state of 
health of the person concerned and which is not consistent with generally 
accepted medical standards.”1472 This specifically includes “medical or scientific 
experiments”, even with the person’s consent.1473 In addition, “any wilful act or 
omission which seriously endangers the physical or mental health or integrity of 
any person who is in the power of a Party” is considered to be “a grave breach” 
of Additional Protocol I.1474 Furthermore, under Additional Protocol II medical 
personnel shall not be compelled to “perform acts or to carry out work contrary 
to... the rules of medical ethics or other rules designed for the benefit of the 
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wounded and sick, or this Protocol”. 1475 Consequently, the Royal Society has 
concluded that “The involvement of medical professionals in the administration 
of neuropharmacological agents for purposes other than those consistent with 
generally accepted medical practice is therefore prohibited by international 
law.”1476  
 
(iv) The prohibition upon the employment of means and methods of warfare of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering [SIRUS]: The 
SIRUS prohibition has been enunciated in a number of IHL treaties including 
the St. Petersburg Declaration1477, the Hague Declarations and Regulations1478, 
Additional Protocol I1479, certain weapons specific treaties1480, the Rome 
Statute1481, and is considered customary international humanitarian law.1482 The 
2005 ICRC Study noted that although the existence of the SIRUS prohibition is 
not contested, “views differ as to whether the rule itself renders a weapon illegal 
or whether a weapon is illegal only if a specific treaty or customary rule prohibits 
its use.”1483 Furthermore, there is no international consensus regarding an 
objective means of determining what constitutes "superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering", nor on the criteria which can be used to judge whether 
specific weapons potentially breach the SIRUS prohibition. 
 
In 1996 the ICRC established the SIrUS Project which attempted to develop 
objective criteria in this area. Although a number of States were highly critical of 
this approach and the project was suspended in 20011484, it did gain support 
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from bodies such as the World Medical Association,1485 and its findings are 
worthy of consideration. The SirUS Project proposed that what constituted 
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering should: 
“…be determined by design-dependent, foreseeable effects of weapons when 
they are used against human beings and cause[d]:  
 specific  disease,  specific  abnormal  physiological  state,  specific  
abnormal psychological state,  specific  and  permanent disability  or  
specific disfigurement; or 
 field  mortality  of more  than  25%  or  hospital  mortality  of more  than  
5%; or 
 Grade  3  wounds  as  measured  by  the  Red  Cross  wound  
classification; or  
 effects  for  which  there  is  no  well-recognized  and  proven  
treatment.”1486 
 
Criteria 1 and 4, in particular, appear to be of potential applicability for States 
considering the legality of the development or use of new RCAs and 
incapacitants. Subsequently, the ICRC has specifically highlighted the 
importance of the SIRUS prohibition when considering the development and 
use of incapacitants. For example, Herby, head of the Arms Unit in the Legal 
Division of the ICRC, has argued that incapacitants should not be assumed to 
“merely incapacitate by making a person sleep.”1487 Instead he has raised the 
potential dangers that such weapons, if they resulted in effects such as “lifelong 
epileptic convulsions, permanent damage to internal organs, long-term and 
severe vomiting, or an extended coma” could violate the SIRUS prohibition.1488  
 
(v)The prohibition of deliberate attacks on civilians, the prohibition of 
indiscriminate weapons and of attacks that do not discriminate between civilians 
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and military objectives: These prohibitions are considered fundamental to IHL 
and are covered by both treaty law (e.g. Additional Protocol 11489) and 
customary international humanitarian law.1490 These prohibitions are considered 
applicable to both international and non-international armed conflict.1491 The 
International Court of Justice has stated that the principle of distinction was one 
of the “cardinal principles” of international humanitarian law and one of the 
“intransgressible principles of international customary law”.1492 
 
Certain commentators and/or proponents of “less lethal” weapons have argued 
that the rules of IHL, particularly regarding distinction, should be reviewed and 
applied in a different manner for “less lethal” weapons than for conventional 
weapons. 1493  Herby has noted that in discussions of potential scenarios for the 
use of incapacitants “situations in which civilians are interspersed with 
combatants are consistently mentioned…It is likely that the use of incapacitants 
will lower the threshold for attacks that affect civilians and combatants without 
distinction, with an inherent risk that this rule [prohibiting indiscriminate attacks] 
will be undermined.”1494 The employment of RCAs against mixed populations of 
civilians and combatants - as permitted under existing U.S. policy and 
regulations1495 - raise similar concerns. 
 
(vi)Requirement to respect and ensure respect of international humanitarian 
law: Incapacitants are amongst a range of weapons that can degrade the 
cognitive ability of enemy combatants, with the consequent dangers of their 
committing serious breaches of international humanitarian law. Under Common 
Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of Additional Protocol I 
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“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect” for 
the relevant treaties “in all circumstances”.1496 The Royal Society has argued 
that “degrading the cognitive abilities of an adversary such that they are unable 
to distinguish between military targets and civilians, which often require a high 
degree of concentration, will undermine this requirement.” 1497 This is because 
such cognitive impairment could easily result in an unintended attack on one’s 
own civilians or other persons or places specifically protected by law.  
Furthermore, the Royal Society has contended that “Such attacks could not be 
prosecuted because the perpetrators will have been rendered mentally 
incapable of being responsible for the offences.”1498  
 
(vii)Prohibitions or restrictions based on the principles of humanity and the 
dictates of public conscience (the "Martens clause"): The “Martens clause”, 
which has been found to represent customary international law,1499 has been 
articulated in a number of IHL treaties1500 and has been included in a number of 
State military manuals1501. In the formulation contained in the Additional 
Protocol I, the “Martens clause” stated that: "In cases not covered by this 
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain 
under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of 
public conscience."1502 
 
According to the 2006 ICRC Guide “to the legal review of new weapons, means 
and methods of warfare”, a weapon which was not covered by existing rules of 
international humanitarian law would be considered contrary to the Martens 
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clause if it was determined per se to contravene the principles of humanity or 
the dictates of public conscience.1503 The International Court of Justice has 
affirmed the importance of the Martens clause "whose continuing existence and 
applicability is not to be doubted"1504 and stated that it "had proved to be an 
effective means of addressing rapid evolution of military technology." 1505Herby 
has highlighted its potential applicability to the regulation of incapacitants, and 
has noted that: “Public conscience is of particular relevance to the prohibition of 
chemical or biological incapacitants.”1506  
 
However, although the Martens Clause is considered one of the cornerstones of 
IHL, the interpretation and meaning are contested.1507 As Ticehurst has 
observed “the problem faced by humanitarian lawyers is that there is no 
accepted interpretation of the Martens Clause. It is therefore subject to a variety 
of interpretations, both narrow and expansive.”1508 (Indeed one extreme albeit 
isolated interpretation, that of the Russian Federation, argued that the Martens 
Clause was now redundant.)1509 Consequently, Meron has noted that “except in 
extreme cases, its references to principles of humanity and dictates of public 
conscience cannot, alone, delegitimize weapons and methods of war, especially 
in contested cases.”1510 Endorsing this view, Crawford has stated that “it is 
better that obvious gaps in the IHL schema are addressed with specific treaties, 
rather than reliance on the more ‘negotiable’ Martens Clause.”1511  
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 Russian Federation, Written submission on the Opinion requested by the UN General Assembly, 
Compliation of Written Statements, ANW, 13
th
 July 1995, p.13, as cited by Crawford, E. (2011) op.cit., 
pp.14-15. 
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 Meron, T. (2000) op.cit., p.88. 
1511
 Crawford, E. (2011) op.cit., p.20. 
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In the light of the contested nature of the Martens Clause, the author contends 
that the international community should first seek to employ the existing 
chemical and biological weapons control regimes to effectively regulate future 
forms of RCAs and incapacitants. However, if such avenues prove ineffective or 
unworkable, the application of the Martens Clause in conjunction with the 
relevant principles of IHL highlighted in this section is worthy of further study as 
a potential means to constrain the malign use in armed conflict of the rapidly 
evolving biological and biochemical sciences, until more elaborated controls can 
be developed and implemented.  
 
11.4. Investigation and enforcement measures 
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols have established a range of 
investigation and enforcement measures which may potentially be applicable to 
cases involving the use of incapacitants or RCAs in armed conflict.  For 
example, under the Four Geneva Conventions each High Contracting Party 
must: enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for 
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of 
the Convention; search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have 
ordered to be committed, grave breaches; bring such persons, regardless of 
their nationality before its own courts or hand them over for trial to another High 
Contracting Party concerned, provided it has made a “prima facie” case.1512 If 
there is dispute about the circumstances of an alleged violation, a Party to the 
conflict can request an enquiry, in a manner to be decided between the 
interested Parties. If the enquiry procedure cannot be agreed, the Parties can 
choose an umpire to decide upon the procedure to be followed. Once the 
violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it 
and shall repress it with the least possible delay.1513 Enhanced investigation 
and enforcement mechanisms have been established under Additional Protocol 
I. with the establishment of an independent fact finding Commission. Following 
an allegation by a Party to a conflict, the Commission can “enquire into any 
facts alleged to be a grave breach...or other serious violation of the Conventions 
                                                          
1512
 Geneva Convention I (1949) op.cit., Article 49; Geneva Convention II (1949) op.cit., Article 50; Geneva 
Convention III (1949) op.cit., Article 129; Geneva Convention IV (1949) op.cit., Article 146. 
1513
 Geneva Convention I (1949) op.cit., Article 52; Geneva Convention II (1949) op.cit., Article 53;  
Geneva Convention III (1949) op.cit., Article 132; Geneva Convention IV (1949) op.cit., Article 149. 
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or of this Protocol”1514 and can “facilitate...the restoration of an attitude of 
respect for the Conventions and this Protocol.”1515 
 
11.5. Customary international law obligations relating to specific weapons  
As well as the overarching obligations potentially applicable to the use of all 
weapons, a State must also consider the prohibitions or restrictions on the use 
of specific weapons, means and methods of warfare pursuant to customary 
international law. These rules apply to all States regardless of whether they are 
party to relevant treaties. They have been detailed in the ICRC study on 
customary international humanitarian law; and include the following prohibitions 
that are directly applicable to incapacitants, riot control agents and their means 
of delivery: 
 The use of biological weapons is prohibited.1516 
 The use of chemical weapons is prohibited.1517 
 The use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited.1518 
 
It is important to note that according to the ICRC study, these rules are 
applicable in both international armed conflict and non-international conflict.1519 
As these obligations mirror those contained in the Geneva Protocol, the BTWC 
and the CWC they are discussed further in the relevant sections of this thesis.  
 
11.6. Obligations to review “new” weapons under international 
humanitarian law 
Under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, all High 
Contracting Parties that are engaged “in the study, development, acquisition or 
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare” are “under an 
obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all 
                                                          
1514
 Additional Protocol I (1977) op.cit., Article 90.2.(c).(i). 
1515
 Additional Protocol I (1977) op.cit., Article 90.2.(c).(ii). 
1516
 Henckaerts, J.M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) op.cit., Rule 73, p.256. 
1517
 Henckaerts, J.M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) op.cit., Rule 74, p.259. 
1518
 Henckaerts, J.M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) op.cit., Rule 75, p.263. 
1519
 Henckaerts, J.M. (2005) Study on customary international humanitarian law, International Review of 
the Red Cross, volume 87, number 857, March 2005, p.205. 
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circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party."1520 
  
As at 1st September 2012, there were 172 States party to Additional Protocol 
I1521 that are explicitly bound by this obligation. In addition, the ICRC Guide to 
the Legal Review of New Weapons has stated that this requirement is 
“arguably” one that applied to all States, regardless of whether or not they are 
party to Additional Protocol I.1522 Similarly, Boothby has contended that “All 
states, being … bound by the customary elements of weapons law, are obliged 
to ensure that, in acquiring new weapons, they comply with those rules.”. 
Boothby has further argued that “its existence is attested to by the practice of 
certain states before the adoption of Additional Protocol I”.1523 
 
11.6.1. Scope of weapons to be reviewed 
The ICRC Guide has argued that the material scope of the Article 36 legal 
review should be very broad, and should cover: 
 weapons of all types - be they anti-personnel or anti-materiel, "lethal", 
"nonlethal" or "less lethal"1524 - and weapons systems [which would 
therefore include any new potential riot control agent, incapacitant or 
means of delivery intended for use in armed conflict]; 
                                                          
1520
 Additional Protocol I(1977) op.cit., Article 36. 
1521
 For details of the 172 States Parties and 3 Signatory States to Additional Protocol I see: the 
International Committee of the Red Cross website at: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470?OpenDocument (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1522
 The Guide states “It flows logically from the truism that States are prohibited from using illegal 
weapons, means and methods of warfare or from using weapons, means and methods of warfare in an 
illegal manner. The faithful and responsible application of its international law obligations would require a 
State to ensure that the new weapons, means and methods of warfare it develops or acquires will not 
violate these obligations.”  International Committee of the Red Cross, A guide to the legal review of new 
weapons, means and methods of warfare, Measures to implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 
1977, Geneva, January 2006, p.4. 
1523
 Boothby, W. Weapons and the law of armed conflict, Oxford University Press, May 2009.p.341. 
Sweden, for example, established weapons reviews in 1974, three years prior to adoption of Additional 
Protocol I, similarly the US has maintained a weapons review procedure since 1974 although it is still not a 
party to the Additional Protocol. For discussion of Swedish and US mechanisms see: Daoust, I. Coupland, 
R. and Ishoey, R. New wars, new weapons? The obligation of States to assess the legality of means and 
methods of warfare, International Review of the Red Cross, June 2002, volume 84, number 846, pp.354-
357; Boothby, W. (2009) op.cit., p.341, footnote 41. 
1524
 Similarly, Boothby has contended that “All types of weapon should be reviewed, including non-lethal 
weapons”, Boothby, W. (2009) op.cit., p.345. NATO RTO specifically outlines obligations for legal review 
of all “non-lethal weapons” NATO Research and Technology Organisation, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and 
Future Peace Enforcement Operations’, RTO-TR-SAS-040, December 2004, Annex C. 
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 the ways in which these weapons were to be used pursuant to military 
doctrine, tactics, rules of engagement, operating procedures and 
countermeasures; 
 all weapons to be acquired, be they procured further to research and 
development on the basis of military specifications, or purchased "off-the 
shelf"; 
 a weapon which the State was intending to acquire for the first time, 
without necessarily being "new" in a technical sense; 
 an existing weapon that was modified in a way that altered its function, or 
a weapon that had already passed a legal review but that was 
subsequently modified; 
 an existing weapon where a State had joined a new international treaty 
which may affect the legality of the weapon.1525 
 
In addition, although not specifically called for in Article 36, Daoust, Coupland 
and Ishoey have argued that it “would be desirable” for States also to examine 
the legality of weapons they intend to export. This would be in line with their 
obligation under Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
Additional Protocol I “to respect and ensure respect” for these treaties.1526  
 
The ICRC Guide has stated that the temporal application of Article 36 should be 
very broad. It would require an assessment of the legality of new weapons at 
the stages of their "study, development, acquisition or adoption". This would 
cover all stages of the weapons procurement process, in particular the initial 
stages of the research phase (i.e. conception, study), the development phase 
(i.e. development and testing of prototypes) and the acquisition phase (including 
"off-the-shelf" procurement).1527 Consequently it can be argued that States that 
are currently conducting research and development into new riot control agents, 
incapacitants or related means of delivery, should already have conducted a 
legal review of such weapons before research commenced, and if not should do 
so at the earliest opportunity. 
                                                          
1525
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.9. 
1526
 Daoust, I. Coupland, R. and Ishoey, R. (2002) op.cit., p.352. 
1527
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.23. 
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Similarly, those States seeking to acquire new riot control agents, incapacitants 
or related means of delivery, either from another State or from the commercial 
market, should undertake a legal review at the stage of the study of the weapon 
proposed for purchase, and certainly before entering into the purchasing 
agreement.1528 Furthermore, a range of commentators have emphasised that 
the purchasing State is under an obligation to conduct its own review of the 
weapon it is considering to acquire, and cannot simply rely on the analysis of 
the vendor or manufacturer as to the legality of the weapon, nor on another 
State's evaluation.1529  
 
11.6.2. Criteria for review 
Although Article 36 did not establish specific criteria for States to employ in their 
review of new weapons, Boothby has recommended that States should 
incorporate the following criteria:1530   
 Whether, in its normal or intended circumstances of use, the weapon 
was of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; 
 Consideration of the alternative weapons or methods of choice for 
accomplishing the military purpose intended for the weapon under 
review1531; 
 Whether the weapon was intended, or might be expected, to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; 
 Whether there are any specific rules of treaty or customary law that 
would prohibit or restrict the use of the weapon;1532 
 Whether there are any likely future developments in the law of armed 
conflict that might be expected to affect the weapon. 
 
                                                          
1528
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.24. 
1529
 See for example: McClelland, J. The review of weapons in accordance with Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol 1, International Review of the Red Cross, June 2003, volume 85, number 850, p.411; 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.24. 
1530
 Boothby, W. (2009) op.cit., pp.345-346. 
1531
 Boothby contends that “If the weapon under review involves measurably increased injury or suffering 
compared to those alternative methods and without producing additional generic military advantage, it is 
likely that the superfluous injury test would be breached”. Boothby W. (2009) op.cit., p.345. 
1532
 A detailed description of the full range of relevant customary international law and specific treaty 
obligations that should be considered by States undertaking legal reviews is found in the ICRC Guide. 
[See: International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., pp.10-17].  
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11.6.2.1. Applicability of human rights considerations 
A number of commentators have argued that States should also incorporate 
international human rights law considerations in weapons reviews. For example, 
Casey-Maslen has contended that the reference in Article 36 to “any other rule 
of international law applicable” to a State Party to the Protocol, would also 
encompass international human rights law.1533 Lawland, then ICRC legal 
advisor and principal author of the ICRC Guide, has stated that: 
“…in reviewing the legality of new weapons, states may also need to consider 
the rules of international human rights law applicable to the use of force in 
situations not amounting to armed conflict. This is especially important in view 
of the increased involvement of armed forces in peace support operations, 
where troops are more likely to be involved in law enforcement than 
warfare.”1534 
 
The inclusion of international human rights law considerations in Article 36 
reviews would be particularly critical for any new potential RCAs, incapacitants 
and related means of delivery given the proposals by some commentators for 
the employment of such weapons by military personnel in counter-insurgency, 
counter-terrorism, peace-keeping and other military operations other than 
armed conflict. In addition to their incorporation in Article 36 reviews, such 
international human rights law criteria would be of critical importance in the 
review of any new weapons intended solely for law enforcement purposes.1535  
 
 
                                                          
1533
 Casey-Maslen, S. Non-kinetic-energy weapons termed ‘non-lethal’, A preliminary assessment under 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, Académie de droit international 
humanitaire et de droits humains à Genève [ADH Geneve], October 2010, p.22. In his argumentation, 
Casey-Maslen cited the ICRC legal commentary on Article 36 which stated: “Regarding the clause on ‘any 
other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party’, this refers to any agreement on 
disarmament concluded by the Party concerned, or any other agreement related to the prohibition, 
limitation or restriction on the use of a weapon or a particular type of weapon, concluded by this Party... 
Naturally, it also includes the rules which form part of international customary law.” [See: B. Zimmermann 
et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 425] As Casey-Maslen has noted, the ICRC commentary 
“does not refer specifically to human rights law, which is also generally applicable in situations of armed 
conflict, but nor does it exclude it.” Indeed the ICRC commentary’s reference to “any other agreement 
related to the prohibition, limitation or restriction on the use of a weapon…” together with the use of the 
broad coverall term “international customary law” appears to support Casey-Maslen’s interpretation.  
1534
 Lawland, K. Reviewing the legality of new weapons, means and methods of warfare, International 
Review of the Red Cross, December 2006, volume 88, number 864, p.929. 
1535
 For further discussion see Chapter 12 of this thesis. 
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11.6.2.2. Health considerations 
The ICRC Guide has recommended that States should take into account certain 
health related considerations when reviewing any new weapon [such as an 
RCA, incapacitant and related means of delivery] that injures “by means other 
than explosive or projectile force, or otherwise causes health effects that are 
qualitatively or quantitatively different from those of existing lawful weapons and 
means of warfare.”1536  This approach has been supported by the 28th 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent which encouraged States "to 
review with particular scrutiny all new weapons, means and methods of warfare 
that cause health effects with which medical personnel are unfamiliar."1537  
 
The ICRC Guide has outlined a range of health criteria for consideration by 
States; those that are of particular relevance to the review of new incapacitants 
or RCAs include: 
 whether all relevant scientific evidence pertaining to the foreseeable 
effects on humans has been gathered; 
 how the mechanism of injury was expected to impact on the health of 
victims; 
 when used in the context of armed conflict, what was the expected field 
mortality and whether the later mortality (in hospital) was expected to be high; 
 whether there was any predictable or expected long term or permanent 
alteration to the victims’ psychology or physiology; 
 whether the effects would be recognised by health professionals, be 
manageable under field conditions and be treatable in a reasonably equipped 
medical facility. 
These and other health-related considerations are important to assist the 
reviewing authority in determining whether the weapon in question can be 
expected to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 1538  
 
 
                                                          
1536
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., pp.18-19. 
1537
 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2003) op.cit., paragraph 2.5.2. 
1538
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., pp.18-19. 
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11.6.3. Restrictions on use 
Article 36 has required a State to determine whether the employment of a new 
weapon would “in some or all circumstances” be prohibited by international law. 
The ICRC Guide has noted that a weapon or means of warfare cannot be 
assessed in isolation from the method of warfare by which it is to be used. “It 
follows that the legality of a weapon does not depend solely on its design or 
intended purpose, but also on the manner in which it is expected to be used on 
the battlefield.”1539 Consequently, the ICRC Guide has noted that a weapon 
“used in one manner may "pass" the Article 36 "test", but may fail it when used 
in another manner.” 1540 However, the ICRC's Commentary on Additional 
Protocol I has also noted that the scope of such considerations was limited: a 
State need only determine "whether the employment of a weapon for its normal 
or expected use would be prohibited under some or all circumstances. A State 
is not required to foresee or analyse all possible misuses of a weapon, for 
almost any weapon can be misused in a way that would be prohibited." 
[Emphasis added]. 1541Other commentators, notably Fry, have emphasised that 
these legal reviews should consider anticipated uses of weapons beyond those 
that are considered “normal”.1542  
 
The ICRC Guide has recommended that when the reviewing authority has 
determined that some, but not all of the expected methods of use of the weapon 
were found to be unlawful, it should either place restrictions on the weapon’s 
use which “should be incorporated into the rules of engagement or standard 
operating procedures” or it could request modifications to the weapon which 
“must be met before approval can be granted.” 1543 Similarly Lawland has stated 
                                                          
1539
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.10. 
1540
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.10. 
1541
 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, paragraph 1469, as cited in International Committee of 
the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.10. 
1542
 Fry, J. Contextualized Legal Reviews for the methods and means of warfare: cave combat and 
international humanitarian law, Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, 28
th
 February 2006, pp.470-471.  
As part of his analysis demonstrating how legality might shift depending on the setting in which weapons 
were employed, Fry incorporated a case study of the US military’s alleged use of RCAs in caves and other 
contained spaces, and argued that such alleged use breached the CWC and also the Hague Regulations, 
the Hague Gas Declaration and the Geneva Gas Protocol. [See in particular Fry, J. (2006) op.cit., pp.506-
509]. For further discussion of alleged US employment of CS in Afghanistan caves see Appendix 3 of this 
thesis.  
1543
 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.26. 
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that: “It is essential to incorporate any conditions governing a weapon’s use into 
the operating procedures or ‘‘user’s manual’’ for that weapon, so as to ensure 
that the commanders and combatants who will be using the weapon are fully 
aware of its operational restrictions.”1544  
 
11.6.4. Mechanism of review 
Article 36 did not specify in what manner and under what authority weapons 
reviews should be constituted. Consequently, as the ICRC Guide has stated, “it 
is the responsibility of each State to adopt legislative, administrative, regulatory 
and/or other appropriate measures to effectively implement this obligation.”1545 
Lawland has argued that the obligation to review the legality of new weapons 
implied at least two consequent actions by States. Firstly, a State should 
establish “a permanent standing mechanism” that can be automatically 
activated to undertake a review at any time that a State is developing or 
acquiring a new weapon. 1546 Secondly, for the authority responsible for 
developing or acquiring new weapons “such a review procedure should be 
made mandatory, by law or by administrative directive”. 1547 However Lawland 
has noted that “other than these minimum procedural requirements, it is left to 
each State to decide what specific form its review mechanism will take.”1548  
 
Reviews of State practice in this area that were undertaken by the Danish Red 
Cross,1549 and Daoust, Coupland and Ishoey1550 have shown a variety of 
approaches employed in terms of the size, nature and location of the reviewing 
body, and whether or not it possessed effective veto power. A range of 
commentators have recommended that such review mechanisms should be 
multidisciplinary in nature, being able to draw on relevant legal, medical, military 
and environmental expertise.1551   
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 Lawland, K. (2006) op.cit., p.928. 
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 International Committee of the Red Cross (2006) op.cit., p.20. 
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 Lawland, K. (2006) op.cit., p.927.  
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 Lawland, K. (2006) op.cit., p.927.  
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 Lawland, K. (2006) op.cit., p.927. For a similar analysis see Boothby, W. (2009) op.cit. 
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 Danish Red Cross, Reviewing the legality of new weapons, December 2000. 
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 Daoust, I. Coupland, R. and Ishoey, R. (2002) op.cit., pp.354-360. 
1551
 See for example: Daoust, I. Coupland, R. and Ishoey, R. (2002) op.cit., pp.352-353; Lawland, K. 
(2006) op.cit., p.929; 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2003) op.cit., 
paragraph 2.5.1. 
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11.6.4.1. Information exchange 
Although States are required to provide information, on request to other High 
Contracting Parties, regarding the process of weapons review, there appears to 
be no obligation placed on them to disclose their conclusions as to the legality 
of a particular weapon.1552 However, the author believes that a case can be 
made that reviewing States should provide information to the High Contracting 
Parties of any reviews they have performed that have resulted in a 
determination that a specific weapon, means or method of warfare, would be in 
breach of the Additional Protocol or “any other rule of international law 
applicable.” Such actions would appear to be in conformity with, and in fact be 
required by, the reviewing State’s obligation under Article 1 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I “to respect and ensure 
respect” for these treaties. Although the determination by one State that the 
employment of a particular weapon is prohibited, would not be binding upon any 
other State,1553 the author believes that the exchange of such information 
between States Parties could potentially be an important factor in “closing 
down” possible avenues of research that might - “unchecked” - lead to the 
development of weapons that would be contrary to international law. 
 
A number of arms control experts and relevant bodies have called for greater 
transparency in this area. For example the 27th Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent encouraged States "to promote, wherever possible, 
exchange of information and transparency in relation to these mechanisms, 
procedures and evaluations."1554 Furthermore, the 28th Conference of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent “invited” States that have review procedures in place 
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 According to the ICRC Commentary on Article 36: 
“A State which respects the obligation provided for in Article 36, and determines that a new weapon is 
prohibited, is not automatically obliged to make public its finding. This reservation is quite understandable, 
as modern strategy very often relies not on deployment of military means in the traditional ways, but on 
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vis-à-vis the enemy precisely by means of superior technology in the form of new weapons”. [International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, paragraph 1469]. 
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 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, paragraphs and 
1469 and 1481. 
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 Section 21, Final Goal 1.5 of the Plan of Action for the years 2000-2003 adopted by the 27th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 31
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1999. 
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to cooperate with the ICRC with a view to facilitating the voluntary exchange of 
experience on review procedures.1555  
 
Greater transparency with regard to the determinations of Article 36 reviews of 
new RCAs and incapacitants – particularly when the evaluation concluded the 
weapon to be prohibited – could  play an important role in increasing the 
effectiveness of the regulation of “dual use” life science technologies, 
particularly given the rapidity and scale of advances in this area and their 
potential military applicability. 
 
11.6.5. Current implementation of Article 36 
The obligation upon all States to review new weapons has been voiced by a 
number of multilateral bodies such as the Conference of the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons1556 and NATO’s Research and Technology 
Organisation (RTO)1557. The importance of such legal reviews has also been 
regularly highlighted at successive International Conferences of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent.1558 However, despite the widespread recognition of States’ 
                                                          
1555
 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2003) op.cit., paragraph 2.5.3. 
1556
 For example, in 2001, the States Parties at the Second Review Conference of the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons urged: "States which do not already do so, to conduct reviews such as that 
provided for in Article 36 of Protocol I…, to determine whether any new weapon, means or methods of 
warfare would be prohibited by international humanitarian law or other rules of international law applicable 
to them". [See Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 11
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 -21
st
 December 2001, CCW/CONF.II/2, at p.11]. 
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 In December 2004, NATO’s (RTO) highlighted States’ obligations to review the legality of new ‘non-
lethal’ weapons and recommended that the legal review should “at least” include the following elements for 
analysis: 
 can the weapon cause “unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury”? 
 is the new weapon indiscriminate in its effect?
 
 
The NATO RTO report also highlighted the importance of undertaking an “individual review of specific 
technologies”. It specifically noted that “NLW based on toxic chemicals” will be governed by the CWC and 
consequently “will need to be developed with this Convention in mind.”
 
[See: NATO Research and 
Technology Organisation, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and Future Peace Enforcement Operations’, RTO-TR-
SAS-040, December 2004, Annex C]. 
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 For example, in November1999, the 27th Conference encouraged States "to establish mechanisms 
and procedures to determine whether the use of weapons, whether held in their inventories or being 
procured or developed, would conform to the obligations binding on them under international humanitarian 
law." [See: 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (1999) op.cit]. In December 
2003, as part of its Agenda for Humanitarian Action, the 28th Conference reaffirmed the goal of ensuring 
"the legality of new weapons under international law."  It urged States Parties to Additional Protocol I to 
“establish review procedures to determine the legality of new weapons, means and methods of warfare.” It 
also encouraged States not party to the Additional Protocol to “consider establishing such review 
procedures.” [See: Final Goal 2.5 of the Agenda for Humanitarian Action adopted by the 28th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 2
nd
 -6
th
 December 2003]. Similarly in November 
2007, the 30
th
 Conference recalled “the obligation as expressed in Additional Protocol 1 (Art.36) to review 
the legality of new weapons, means and methods of warfare” and urged “all States to consider 
establishing specific review mechanisms to this effect;”[Emphasis added]. [See: International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Paragraph 19, Resolution 3, Adopted by concensus by the 30th International Conference 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 26
th
-30
th
 November 2007.]  
347 
 
obligations to conduct legal reviews of new weapons, publicly available 
information indicated that in February 2006, only ten States had instituted 
formal weapon review procedures1559. Fry has described this number as 
“shockingly low” compared to the number of States that are party to Additional 
Protocol I.  He has noted that although “more states may have informal review 
procedures…there is no way of telling when the existence of these procedures 
is not publicized.”1560 Boothby, has stated that “the available evidence 
suggests… that many states have no such system” and that “this is a 
shortcoming that should be addressed with some urgency by states.”1561 
Likewise Lawland has argued that “Establishing national mechanisms to review 
the legality of new weapons is especially relevant and urgent in view of 
emerging new weapons technologies such as directed energy, incapacitants, 
behaviour change agents, acoustics and nanotechnology, to name but a 
few.”1562 [Emphasis added] 
 
11.7. Conclusions  
International humanitarian law - specifically the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols, and corresponding international customary law - 
constitutes an important body of rules that places significant constraints upon 
the use of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery. Indeed it is 
extremely doubtful whether the employment of an incapacitant in armed conflict 
could be conducted without breaching a relevant IHL prohibition (e.g. the 
prohibitions on SIRUS and deliberate attacks on civilians); or without 
undermining a relevant IHL obligation (e.g. duty to project persons considered 
hors de combat or the duty to respect and ensure respect of IHL). Similarly 
there are concerns that the use of RCAs in armed conflict, in certain proposed 
scenarios, would contravene the prohibitions on deliberate attacks on civilians 
and the prohibition on attacks that do not discriminate between civilians and 
military objectives. Consequently IHL should certainly be incorporated into a 
                                                          
1559
 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. See Fry (2006) op.cit., p.474. 
1560
 Fry, J. (2006) op.cit., p.474.  
1561
 Boothby, W. (2009) op.cit., p.341. 
1562
 Lawland, K. (2006) op.cit., p.926. 
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comprehensive holistic arms control strategy for the regulation of these agents 
and related means of delivery. 
 
Despite the potential utility of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols 
in this area, these instruments do have important limitations. Firstly, although 
the Conventions and Protocols do incorporate investigation and enforcement 
procedures in response to allegations of grave breaches, these can only be 
initiated by High Contracting Parties, and normally in the first instance by the 
Parties to the specific conflict. If such Parties are unwilling to trigger these 
mechanisms there are no routes by which individuals - such as the civilian 
targets of attacks involving RCAs or incapacitants - can initiate such procedures 
directly. Secondly, although States would be required to undertake reviews of 
the legality under IHL of all new RCAs, incapacitants or related means of 
delivery developed or acquired for use in armed conflict, the number of States 
carrying out such reviews, the nature of the review process and the results of 
such reviews are unknown.  
 
Finally a major limitation to the application of IHL in the regulation of such 
weapons is that this body of law is only applicable to situations of armed 
conflict.1563 Whilst much relevant IHL would extend to non-international armed 
conflicts there may well be disagreements as to whether a particular situation is 
a non-international armed conflict, with the relevant State instead claiming to be 
involved in law enforcement activities against criminals or terrorist 
organisations. Furthermore, the important constraints that IHL potentially 
imposes on the use of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery would 
not be directly applicable for such weapons designed and utilised solely for law 
enforcement activities that fell short of armed conflict. In such situations, 
however international human rights law may be applicable. 
 
 
                                                          
1563
 Hampson, F. (2007) op.cit., p.237. 
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Chapter 12: Human rights law applicable to riot control agents and 
incapacitants 
 
12.1. Introduction 
Although human rights law does not specifically address the use of riot control 
agents (RCAs), incapacitants, or other discrete arms or security equipment, it is 
certainly applicable to the employment of such weapons, as it regulates the use 
of force by law enforcement officials and other agents of the State.   
 
An important strength of international human rights law is its applicability in a 
broad range of circumstances where use of incapacitants or RCAs might be 
considered. The International Court of Justice has affirmed that human rights 
law continues to apply in situations to which international humanitarian law is 
applicable,1564 whilst the Human Rights Committee has affirmed that in 
situations of armed conflict, “both spheres of law are complementary, not 
mutually exclusive.”1565 Thus international human rights law would be applicable 
to domestic policing operations, to non-international conflicts, whether or not the 
State recognized it as such, and to those aspects of an international conflict 
occurring in national territory.1566  
 
While several human rights norms may be applicable to the regulation of RCAs 
and incapacitants, the rights to life, to liberty and security; to freedom from 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; to engage in ‘peaceful 
protest’; and to health, together with attendant obligations on the restraint of 
force, are the most relevant. These rights and the attendant obligations upon 
States will be explored in this chapter as part of the ongoing HAC analysis as 
                                                          
1564
 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9
th
 July 2004, paragraphs 107-112. 
1565
 United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31 on The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation on the States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26
th
 May 2004, paragraph 11. 
1566
 The importance of this breadth of coverage has been highlighted by Hampson who has noted that 
“States frequently refuse to characterize an internal armed conflict as such, preferring to call it criminal or 
terrorist activity. In such a situation, they can hardly challenge the applicability of human rights law.”
  
In 
addition, Hampson has contended that “There is significant case law to the effect that human rights law is 
applicable outside national territory where foreign territory is occupied and it is also applicable to persons 
in the physical control of another State, albeit outside that State’s territory.”See: Hampson, F. International 
law and the Regulation of Weapons’, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007) op. cit., pp.244-5. 
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will the consequent implications for the regulation of RCAs and 
incapacitants.1567 
 
12.2. Protection of the right to life and restrictions on the use of force 
The “inherent” right to life is enshrined in many international1568 and regional 
human rights instruments.1569 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), for example, stated that “every human being has the inherent 
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life.”1570 The UN Human Rights Committee, the body that 
monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, has stated that the right to life is “the 
supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation…” 1571 The Committee has 
further stated that States Parties to the ICCPR should take measures not only 
to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts “but also to prevent 
arbitrary killing by their own security forces.”1572  Furthermore, the Committee 
has considered that: “The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a 
matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the 
circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by such 
                                                          
1567
 The range of associated delivery and dispersal mechanisms are examined in chapter 7 of this thesis 
and questions relating to safety, lethality and discrimination explored.  
1568
 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 
Resolution 217 A (III), 10th December 1948, Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted on 16
th
 December 1966, Article 6; Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by UN General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20
th
 November 1989, 
Article 6.  
1569
 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, adopted by Organisation of African Unity on 27
th
  June 
1981, Article 4; American Convention on Human Rights, signed at San Jose, Costa Rica, 22
nd
  November 
1969, Article 4; European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
signed on 4
th
 November 1950, Article 2.These obligations are binding upon those States party to the 
relevant agreements and their application has subsequently been clarified following judgements made by 
the relevant regional legal institutions. 
1570
 United Nations, ICCPR (1966) op.cit., Article 6(1). However, the Covenant does not prohibit judicial 
executions, albeit under certain limitations. Article 2 states that: “sentence of death may be imposed only 
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime 
and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement 
rendered by a competent court.” Article 5 prohibits imposition of the death penalty “for crimes committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age” and specifies that it “shall not be carried out on pregnant 
women.” In China, Guatemala, Taiwan, Thailand, USA, and Vietnam, the application of chemicals 
including certain incapacitants is provided for as a method of execution. 
1571
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: The right to life, Sixteenth Session, 30
th
 April 
1982, paragraph 1. 
1572
 United Nations, Human Rights Committee (1982) op.cit., paragraph 3. 
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authorities.”1573 The Committee has argued that the right to life, in the case of 
the ICCPR at least, is a right “which should not be interpreted narrowly.”1574 
 
An integral feature of the right to life norm is the attendant restrictions on the 
legitimate use of force contained in several human rights instruments. These 
have been further elaborated in a range of criminal justice standards adopted 
under the auspices of the United Nations that have sought to clarify those 
situations where the use of force may be appropriate and by whom it can be 
legitimately applied. Although such standards are not directly legally binding 
upon States they are widely recognised as exemplifying good practice and do 
reflect existing international norms. Of particular relevance are two international 
normative agreements that have codified the rules by which law enforcement 
personnel should operate:1575 the 1990 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN Basic Principles),1576 and the 
1979 UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (UN Code of 
Conduct).1577 The extent to which these standards reflect customary law has not 
been settled. According to Melzer, though, the UN Code of Conduct “confirms 
the conditions and modalities established by conventional human rights law for 
the resort to force in law enforcement operations”, while the European Court on 
Human Rights have appeared to consider the UN Basic Principles as legally 
binding.1578 
 
                                                          
1573
 Ibid. 
1574
 United Nations, High Rights Committee (1982) op.cit., paragraph 1. 
1575
 See also: Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, First UN Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 22
nd
 August – 3
rd
 September 1955; United 
Nations, Procedures for the effective implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, Economic and Social Council Resolution 1984/47, 14
th
 December 1984; United Nations Basic 
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 
45/111 of 14
th
 December 1990; United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under 
Any Form of  Detention or Imprisonment, General Assembly, 76th plenary meeting, 9
th
 December 1988, 
UN doc. A/RES/43/173. 
1576
 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 7th September 1990, 
adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27
th
 August – 7
th
 September 1990. 
1577
 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 34/169 of 17
th
 December 1979. 
1578
 Melzer, N. Targeted Killings, Oxford Monographs in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009, pp. 199–201. Although not asserting that these standards are directly legally-binding, 
Crawshaw states that: “they do embody provisions, which are given the force of law in human rights 
treaties; they do express standards, which reinforce those provisions; and they do provide a source of 
reference for bodies empowered to interpret those provisions and to make legally binding decisions.” 
Crawshaw, R. International standards on the right to life and the use of force by police, International 
Journal of Human Rights, volume 3, number 4, Winter 1999, p. 91. 
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The UN Code of Conduct has stated that: “law enforcement officials may use 
force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the 
performance of their duty.”1579 The UN Basic Principles have similarly provided 
that: “Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as 
possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and 
firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain 
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.”1580 
Whenever the lawful use of force has been unavoidable, the UN Basic 
Principles has required that law enforcement officials: 
“(a) Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of 
the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; 
(b) Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life;  
(c) Ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or 
affected persons at the earliest possible moment...”1581 
 
The UN Basic Principles have also promoted the use of “non-lethal” weapons 
under certain circumstances: 
“Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means 
as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of 
weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and 
firearms. These should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating 
weapons for use in appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining 
the application of means capable of causing death or injury to persons....”1582 
 
 
 
                                                          
1579
 United Nations, Code of Conduct (1979) op.cit., Article 3. This provision is explained further in the 
accompanying commentary: 
“(a) … the use of force by law enforcement officials should be exceptional; while it implies that law 
enforcement officials may be authorized to use force as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances 
for the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected 
offenders, no force going beyond that may be used. 
(b) National law ordinarily restricts the use of force by law enforcement officials in accordance with a 
principle of proportionality...such national principles of proportionality are to be respected in the 
interpretation of this provision. In no case should this provision be interpreted to authorize the use of force 
which is disproportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved.”  
1580
 United Nations, Basic Principles (1990) op.cit., Principle 4. 
1581
 United Nations, Basic Principles (1990) op.cit., Principle 5 (a)–(c). 
1582
 United Nations Basic Principles (1990) op.cit., Principle 2. 
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12.2.1. Application to incapacitants 
Proponents of incapacitants have promoted their development and use in 
certain law enforcement scenarios (such as hijacking or hostage taking 
situations) where there is a need to rapidly and completely incapacitate 
individuals or a group without causing death or permanent disability.1583 
Although the issue is contested, certain legal experts have argued that the use 
of incapacitants may be permissible in such extreme law enforcement situations 
where the authorities need to resort to potentially lethal force to resolve urgent, 
life-threatening situations because less violent and dangerous methods have 
failed, are impractical or have low chance of success. However, even in such 
extreme situations, the obligations upon States under international human rights 
law (IHRL) to protect the right to life still apply, with contingent constraints upon 
employment of the agent as well as the requirement to take appropriate 
remedial measures.1584  
 
In its September 2012 Synthesis paper the ICRC examined the application of 
IHRL to the regulation of incapacitants. It contended that: 
“Under human rights law the use of potentially lethal force should be avoided. It 
is a measure that must be absolutely necessary, meaning a measure of last 
resort, and strictly unavoidable to protect life or physical integrity. It must be 
                                                          
1583
 Incapacitants have also been raised as a possible tool in a variety of military operations, especially in 
situations where combatants and non-combatants are mixed. See, e.g., Fenton, G. ‘Current and 
prospective military and law enforcement use of chemical agents for incapacitation’, in Pearson, A., 
Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007) op. cit., pp. 103–23; Whitbred, G. Offensive use of chemical 
technologies by US special operations forces in the global war on terrorism, Maxwell Paper Number 37, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, July 2006. Other commentators have, though, 
questioned the utility of incapacitants in certain proposed scenarios such as premeditated hostage 
situations, due to the availability of counter-measures. See Wheelis, M. Nonconsensual Manipulation of 
Human Physiology Using Biochemicals, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007), op.cit., p. 6.  
1584
 Aceves, for example, has stated that:  
“[T]he right to life norm places strict limits on the use of force, which includes the use of incapacitating 
biochemical weapons…. States must, therefore, act with due diligence in all cases involving these 
weapons. The use of these weapons must be carefully regulated and cannot cause indiscriminate harm. 
Their use must be proportionate to the perceived threat and must be justified under the circumstances.” 
[See: Aceves, W. Human Rights Law and the Use of Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons, in Pearson, A., 
Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007) op. cit., p. 286.] 
Similarly, Fidler has argued that: 
“The inability to control dosage or exposure environment in extreme law enforcement emergencies 
heightens government responsibility to ensure all precautions are taken to minimize harm to innocent 
people and to provide immediate and adequate medical attention to those exposed and perhaps adversely 
affected.”
 
[See Fidler, D. Incapacitating Chemical and Biochemical Weapons and Law Enforcement under 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007) op. cit., p. 175.] 
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preceded by other measures, following an escalation of force procedure. It must 
be proportionate to the aim pursued.” 1585 
 
Furthermore, the ICRC has argued that:  
“In the scenarios in which these toxic chemicals have been proposed for use, as 
weapons to incapacitate groups of people, it is not possible to control their 
effects or to target them solely at the persons who are threatening life.  In these 
situations, such as hostage scenarios, the toxic chemicals will pose the same 
risks of death and permanent disability to aggressors and innocent bystanders 
alike.”1586 
 
Consequently, the ICRC has contended that:  
“In light of the certainty that bystanders will also come to harm, the question to 
be asked is whether such a means is absolutely necessary to save the lives of 
those who are threatened, that is whether there are any other means available 
that would achieve the same aim while posing less of  a danger to life; and 
whether this is an unavoidable measure of last resort, the State having 
exhausted all feasible less harmful means before it resorts to this means.”1587 
 
Case law in this area is limited. To date, there has been only one well-
documented instance of an incapacitant agent employed in such extreme law 
enforcement situations, by the Russian Federation in 2002.1588 Two UN human 
rights authorities subsequently issued statements on this case.1589 In a January 
2003 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions expressed concern “about the actions by Russian police/security 
forces” and stated that he “has been collecting information from various sources 
about the incident and plans to take the issue up in 2003 with the Government 
                                                          
1585
 ICRC (September 2012) op.cit., p.3. 
1586 
ICRC (September 2012) op.cit., p.3. 
1587
 ICRC (September 2012) op.cit., p.3. 
1588
 See Chapter 3 of this thesis, for further discussion of this case. 
1589
 Leading human rights NGOs have also raised concerns about this use of incapacitants by the Russian 
Federation. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, press release: Independent Commission of Inquiry Must 
Investigate Raid on Moscow Theater: Inadequate Protection for Consequences of Gas Violates Obligation 
to Protect Life, 30
th
 October 2002; Amnesty International, Rough Justice: The law and human rights in the 
Russian Federation, October 2003 (AI Index EUR 46/054/2003).  
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of the Russian Federation.”1590 To date, however, the results of the 
Rapporteur’s actions on this issue have not been made public.  
 
Subsequently, in June 2003, the UN Human Rights Committee declared that: 
“While acknowledging the serious nature of the hostage-taking situation, the 
Committee cannot but be concerned at the outcome of the rescue operation in 
the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow on 26 October 2002.” 1591 The Committee 
further expressed “its concern that there has been no independent and impartial 
assessment of the circumstances, regarding medical care of the hostages after 
their liberation and the killing of the hostage-takers.”1592 It called upon the 
Russian Federation to “ensure that the circumstances of the rescue operation in 
the Dubrovka theatre are subject to an independent, in depth investigation, the 
results of which are made public, and, if appropriate, prosecutions are initiated 
and compensation paid to the victims and their families.”1593 No further 
reference appears to this incident in subsequent reports of the UN Human 
Rights Committee.  
 
A highly significant development has been a judgement in December 2011 by 
the European Court of Human Rights on this case. In August 2003, a group of 
64 former hostages and relatives filed a complaint before the Court, claiming 
that their right to life (protected under Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights [ECHR]) had been violated by the actions of the Russian 
authorities.1594 The case was accepted by the Court in December 2007 and on 
20th December 2011, the Court announced its ruling.1595  
                                                          
1590
 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, 
submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/36, UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/3, 13
th
 
January 2003, p. 15, paragraph 34.  
1591
 United Nations, Human Rights Commission, Concluding observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Russian Federation, UN doc. CCPR/CO/79/RUS, 6
th
 November 2003, p. 4, paragraph 14. 
1592
 Ibid. 
1593
 United Nations Human Rights Commission (6
th
 November 2003) op. cit., p. 4, paragraph 14. 
1594
 Under Article 2 of the ECHR: 
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save 
in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is 
provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from 
the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” 
1595
 See European Court of Human Rights, Finogenov and others v. Russia, App. Nos. 18299/03 and 
27311/03, Judgement, 20
th
 December 2011.  
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The Court rejected the Russian Federation authorities’ assertions that the 
incapacitant had been harmless, and that according to the official medical 
examinations of the bodies, no direct causal link had existed between the use of 
the incapacitant and the death of the hostages.1596 The Court found that even if 
the incapacitant had not been a “lethal force” but rather a “non-lethal 
incapacitating weapon”, the incapacitant was, “at best, potentially dangerous for 
an ordinary person, and potentially fatal for a weakened person”,1597 so the 
case clearly fell within the ambit of Article 2 of the ECHR.1598 The Court 
declared that: “it is safe to conclude that the gas remained a primary cause of 
the death of a large number of the victims.”1599 
 
Nonetheless, with regard to the decision to storm the theatre and use an 
incapacitant, the Court stressed that in situations of such a scale and 
complexity, it was prepared to grant the domestic authorities “a margin of 
appreciation, even if now, with hindsight, some of the decisions taken by the 
authorities may appear open to doubt.”1600 In this particular case, the Court 
believed there had been a real, serious, and immediate risk of mass human 
losses and the authorities had every reason to believe that a forced intervention 
had been “the lesser evil”. The Court considered that the solution, using a 
“dangerous and even potentially lethal” chemical agent, had put at risk the lives 
of hostages and hostage-takers alike; but “it was not used ‘indiscriminately’ as it 
had left the hostages a high chance of survival, which depended on the 
efficiency of the authorities’ rescue effort.”1601 Indeed, the Court believed that 
the use of the incapacitant facilitated the liberation of the hostages and reduced 
the likelihood of an explosion. The Court therefore concluded that, in the 
                                                          
1596
 The Court stated that:  
“It is unthinkable that 125 people of different ages and physical conditions died almost simultaneously and 
in the same place because of various pre-existing health problems. Equally the mass death of hostages 
cannot be attributed to the conditions in which they had been held for three days, during which none of 
them had died, despite prolonged food and water deprivation, immobility and psychological stress, etc.” 
European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 201. 
1597
 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 202. 
1598
 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 202. Astonishingly, the 
Court did not assess the legality of the use of the incapacitant under the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(see paragraphs 162–4 and 228–9). The Court also claimed that it was impossible for it “to establish 
whether or not the gas was a “conventional weapon” and to identify the rules for its use.” 
1599
 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 203. 
1600
 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 213. 
1601
 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 232. 
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circumstances, the authorities’ decision to end the negotiations and resolve the 
hostage crisis by force by using an incapacitant and storming the theatre had 
not been disproportionate and had not, as such, breached Article 2 of the 
ECHR.1602 
 
However, the Court found that, as a whole, the Russian authorities had not 
taken all feasible precautions to minimise the loss of civilian life as the rescue 
operation had been inadequately prepared and carried out, in violation of Article 
2.1603 In addition, the Court concluded that the investigation into the authorities’ 
alleged negligence during the rescue operation had been neither thorough nor 
independent and had not therefore been effective, in further violation of Article 
2.1604  
  
Certain academics1605 and organisations including the ICRC1606 have raised 
concerns or questioned aspects of the Court’s ruling. However such concerns 
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 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 236. 
1603
 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 266. The Court highlighted 
the serious failings in the planning and implementation of the rescue operation, noting that the 
Government could provide no written documents with a comprehensive description of the evacuation plan. 
Although the authorities’ ‘crisis cell’ handling the incident had ordered the deployment of hundreds of 
doctors and rescue workers to assist the hostages, little had been done to coordinate the work of those 
services. Consequently there had been: no sorting of the dead from the living, many of whom were left 
lying face up instead of in the recovery position and consequently died from suffocation; haphazard and 
insufficient distribution of the antidote; inadequate medical assistance in the buses used to transport 
victims to the hospitals; no clear plan for distribution of victims amongst the various hospitals creating 
bottlenecks and delaying medical assistance to the victims.
 
A major unanswered question was why the 
evacuation of the hostages had been delayed for over an hour and half following the storming of the 
building.
 
[See Ibid., paragraphs 243–62].  
1604
 European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraph 282. The Court noted that 
while the investigation into the terrorist act itself had been quite ample and successful, the investigation 
into the rescue operation had been manifestly incomplete.
 
First and foremost, the precise formula of the 
gas has never been revealed.
 
Next, the investigative team made no attempt to question all the members of 
the ‘crisis cell’ such as FSB officers who could have given more information about the planning of the 
operation as well as the decision to use gas and its dosage. The Court was ‘surprised’ that ‘all’ of the crisis 
cell’s working papers had been destroyed. As a result, the Court could not know when the decision to use 
the gas had been taken and by whom, how much time the authorities had had to evaluate the possible 
side-effects of the gas, and why other services participating in the rescue operation had been informed 
about the use of gas with such delay. The Court considered that the investigative team – which included 
FSB representatives and experts in explosive devices directly responsible for the planning and carrying out 
of the storming and the rescue operation – had not been independent.
 
 [See Ibid., paragraphs 277, 279, 
and 281]. 
1605
 Kelle, A. The Message From Strasbourg, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23
rd
 February 2012; Kelle, 
A. Legally Incapacitated, Politically Outmaneuvered, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 7
th
 June 2012. 
1606
 The ICRC has stated: “There are a number of open questions about this judgement. For example, the 
Court was not provided information about the specific toxic chemicals used and thus was in a difficult 
position to judge whether the adverse effects of their use should have been foreseen.  The dangerous 
effects of anaesthetic and sedative chemicals are well known, and were illustrated by the deaths of 129 
hostages in this incident and permanent disabilities suffered by survivors.  In addition, it is evident  that the 
‘dose’ of a chemical delivered cannot be controlled in such a tactical  situation and that it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, in such situations to provide the immediate medical care that might be 
characterised as adequate to protect life.”[See: International Committee of the Red Cross, Toxic 
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notwithstanding, the initial decision of the Court though subject to an appeal has 
subsequently been made final.1607 Consequently, this ruling may well set 
important precedents and influence future judgements on the use of such 
agents. It is notable that the Court considered the use of the incapacitant as 
definitely falling under the ambit of the ECHR and that such use could 
potentially be a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. It appears that the use of 
such incapacitants would only be considered consistent with the Convention in 
very limited, extreme situations (i.e. where there was an immediate and direct 
threat to life and where there was no recourse to other measures to resolve the 
situation with less risk of injury or death), and only when such use occurred in 
conjunction with proper planning and the provision of adequate medical care 
and remedial support. Although the Court gave the Russian Federation some 
“margin of appreciation” regarding its decision to use an incapacitant with then-
unknown effects, the consequences of such action have now been shown to 
include the deaths of a large proportion of the hostages and long-term injury for 
many of the survivors. Given such empirical data it is debatable whether a court 
would give such a “margin of appreciation” for the use of an incapacitant in 
similar situations in the future. 
 
More generally, this case has also highlighted the potential utility of regional 
human rights mechanisms as a means that victims of human rights violations 
(including those inappropriately targeted with incapacitants or RCAs) can 
employ to hold the relevant authorities to account (and also in the case of the 
ECHR to obtain financial compensation for the wrongs done to them).1608  
Although the relevant courts1609 have a number of limitations and only have 
jurisdiction over those States that have ratified the relevant Conventions and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Chemicals as Weapons for Law Enforcement, A Threat to Life and International Law?, ICRC, Geneva, 
September 2012, p.3.]. 
1607
 Shortly after the initial judgement, during the period of appeal, the applicants in the case requested 
referral to the Grand Chamber of the Court.  However the referral request was rejected. Consequently 
under Article 44, paragraph 2 (c) of the European Convention on Human Rights, the initial judgement has 
become final.[See: European Court of Human Rights, Press release issued by the Registrar of the Court, 
ECHR 270 (2012), 27
th
 June 2012.]. 
1608
 In the case of Finogenov and others v. Russia, the Court ruled that Russia was to pay all 64 applicants 
a total award – as regards non-pecuniary damage – of €1,254,000, and €30,000, jointly, for costs and 
expenses. See European Court of Human Rights (20
th
 December 2011) op.cit., paragraphs 285-296. 
1609
 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-
American Courts of Human Rights. 
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Protocols, they deliver legally binding judgements.1610 Furthermore, as 
Hampson has noted:  
“An important feature of these enforcement mechanisms is that, almost uniquely 
in international law, they can be directly or indirectly triggered by individuals … 
who are far more likely to bring such complaints than are foreign States, 
particularly where the claim concerns something that the State has done on its 
own territory.”1611  
 
12.2.2. Application to riot control agents 
RCAs are widely employed by law enforcement officials throughout the world for 
activities such as the dispersal of assemblies posing an imminent threat of 
serious injury, or the incapacitation of violent individuals. When used in 
accordance with manufacturers’ instructions and in a lawful, proportionate and 
discriminate manner, in line with international human rights and criminal justice 
standards, RCAs can provide an important alternative to other applications of 
force more likely to result in injury or death, notably firearms. However, RCAs 
are also open to misuse. 
 
As described in chapter 2 of this thesis, in order to provide a preliminary 
indication of the nature of the misuse of RCAs by law enforcement personnel, 
an analysis of documentation produced by relevant UN monitoring bodies and 
leading international non-governmental human rights organisations relating to 
reported human rights abuses over a five year period was undertaken. The 
survey indicated that from January 2006 until the end of December 2010, law 
enforcement personnel had used RCAs to facilitate human rights abuses in at 
least 60 countries.1612  
 
UN human rights monitoring bodies and international non-governmental human 
rights organisations have regularly expressed concern regarding reports of the 
employment of RCAs as part of the indiscriminate, excessive or lethal use of 
                                                          
1610
 The Human Rights Committee can also consider a case raised through individual petition, but can only 
reach non-binding conclusions in such instances. See Hampson, F. International law and the Regulation of 
Weapons, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007) op. cit., p. 243. 
1611
 Ibid. 
1612
 A summary of the survey results is provided in Chapter 2 whilst indicative case studies are described 
in Appendix 1. 
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force by law enforcement officials, particularly in crowd control situations. For 
example in 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture stated that: 
“…chemical agents provided for ‘crowd-control’ purposes are prone to abuse if 
used against demonstrators in an indiscriminate manner. Precise practical 
guidelines regarding the circumstances in which such chemical agents may be 
used, as well as information regarding their effects on specific categories of 
persons such as children, pregnant women and persons with respiratory 
problems, are said often to be lacking.” 1613 
 
A specific recurring concern has been the employment of RCAs in excessive 
quantities or in confined spaces where the targeted persons cannot disperse 
and where the toxic properties of the agents can lead to serious injury or death, 
particularly to vulnerable individuals. As well as their widespread use (and 
misuse) in the context of crowd control and public order, RCAs are also 
employed as a means to subdue prisoners and maintain order in correctional 
centres, prisons, police stations, and other places of detention. Human rights 
bodies have raised concerns about the appropriateness of such application, 
particularly of tear gas given the difficulties of effective targeting and 
discrimination.1614  
 
As well as the potential dangers to health due to the toxicity of the chemical 
agents employed, concerns have been raised that RCAs are used by law 
enforcement officials, in conjunction with other “less lethal” or indeed lethal 
weapons to facilitate excessive force or even enhance the application of lethal 
                                                          
1613
 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, submitted pursuant to Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution 2002/36, 13
th
 January 2003, paragraph 12. 
1614
 For example, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has stated that:   
“…tear gas is a potentially dangerous substance and there can be no justification for its use against a 
prisoner in a confined space such as a cell. Further, prison officers should be able to perform their duties 
quite effectively without having recourse to this type of means of coercion, in particular when it is a 
question of exercising control over individual prisoners. In the CPT’s view, only exceptional circumstances 
can justify the use of tear gas inside a place of detention – but never in a confined space such as a cell – 
for control purposes, and such exceptional use should be surrounded by appropriate safeguards. For 
example, persons exposed to the spray should be granted immediate access to a medical doctor, officers 
authorised to use the spray should receive proper training, and adequate reporting and inspection 
mechanisms with respect to its use should be in place.”  See: Council of Europe, European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report to the Portuguese 
Government on the visit to Portugal carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 14
th
 to 25
th
 January 2008, CPT/Inf (2009) 
13, 19
th
 March 2009, paragraph 92. 
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force. Between January 2006 and December 2010, RCAs reportedly 
contributed to excessive use of force in 24 countries, often being employed in 
conjunction with firearms.1615 
  
12.3. The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of association and 
assembly 
In addition to highlighting concerns regarding the indiscriminate or excessive 
use of RCAs by law enforcement officials in crowd control situations, UN human 
rights monitoring bodies and international non-governmental human rights 
organisations have reported the misuse of RCAs to intimidate or punish those 
involved in peaceful demonstrations in many countries.  
 
The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of association and assembly 
are established in a wide range of international1616 and regional1617 human 
rights agreements. Indeed, the ICCPR has expressly stated that: “No 
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed 
in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.”1618 Furthermore, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
recognised that: “In the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-
violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is 
not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.”1619  
 
Despite such strictures, however, RCAs have been employed to suppress 
freedom of expression, association, or assembly in at least 49 countries from 
January 2006 to December 2010.1620 Such misuse of RCAs is just one aspect 
of the widespread inappropriate use of force by law enforcement officials in 
                                                          
1615
 See summary of survey provided in Chapter 2 and indicative case studies are described in Appendix 
1. 
1616
 See, e.g., United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) op.cit., Articles 19 and 20; 
United Nations, ICCPR (1966) op.cit., Articles 19, 21, and 22. 
1617
 See, e.g., Council of Europe, ECHR (1950) op.cit., Articles 10 and 11. 
1618
 United Nations ICCPR (1966) op.cit., Article 21. 
1619
 United Nations, Basic Principles (1990) op.cit., Principle 13. 
1620
 See summary of the survey is provided in Chapter 2 and indicative case studies are described in 
Appendix 1. 
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public gatherings. On 23rd March 2012, the UN Human Rights Council adopted 
Resolution 19/35 on the “Promotion and protection of human rights in 
the context of peaceful protests” in which it encouraged all States to: “explore 
ways of avoiding force wherever possible during peaceful protests, and where 
force is absolutely necessary, to restrict the use of that force to the minimum 
absolutely necessary.”1621   
 
12.4. The rights to liberty and security 
The rights to liberty and security of person are established in a range of 
international1622 and regional1623 human rights instruments. The ICCPR has 
stated that: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as 
are established by law.”1624  
 
Casey-Maslen has argued that the concepts of liberty and security are “typically 
considered broadly, and could potentially cover the use of NKE [non-kinetic 
energy] weapons that prevent a person from moving.... Certain NKE weapons 
may cause paralysis in human beings. This paralysis may last only a few 
seconds or it may be more prolonged.”1625 Consequently Casey-Maslen has 
contended that “the use of such weapons by security officials might, in certain 
circumstances, be deemed to violate a person’s right to liberty and security of 
person in addition to other human rights they may infringe.”1626 
 
The potential relevance of such considerations to a range of incapacitants that 
can immobilise or otherwise incapacitate their targets for extended time periods 
is underscored by NATO’s definition of an incapacitant as: “A chemical agent 
which produces temporary disabling conditions which (unlike those caused by 
                                                          
1621
 Human Rights Council, Resolution 19/35: Promotion and protection of human rights in the context of 
peaceful protests, adopted on 23
rd
 March 2012 without a vote, paragraph 6. 
1622
 See, e.g., United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) op.cit., Article 3; and United 
Nations, ICCPR (1966) op.cit., Article 9. 
1623
 See, e.g., Council of Europe, ECHR (1950) op.cit., Article 5. 
1624
 United Nations ICCPR (1966) op.cit., Article 9(1). 
1625
 Casey-Maslen, S. Non-kinetic-energy weapons termed “non-lethal”, A Preliminary Assessment under 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, 2010, p. 34. 
1626
 Ibid. 
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riot control agents) can be physical or mental and persist for hours or days 
after exposure to the agent has ceased….”1627 [Emphasis added]. Although 
such considerations are worthy of further analysis they do not appear to have 
been applied by any international human rights body to date with reference to 
toxic chemical agents. 
 
12.5. The prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
The prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment is recognised in a wide range of international1628 and regional1629 
human rights agreements, and is a customary norm, applicable at all times and 
in all circumstances, including in armed conflict. It is one of the few human 
rights for which no derogation has been permitted.1630 The UN Code of 
Conduct, for example, has stated that: 
“No law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law 
enforcement official invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such 
as a state of war or a threat of war, a threat to national security, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency as a justification of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”1631  
 
Torture is defined under Article 1 of the Convention against Torture as: 
“…any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
                                                          
1627
 NATO Standardisation Agency, Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6(2010), p. 2-1-1, 22
nd
 March 
2010. 
1628
 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) op.cit., Article 5; United Nations, ICCPR 
(1966) op.cit., Article 7; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UN General Assembly 
resolution 39/46, 10
th
 December 1984; United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
op.cit., Article 37(a).  
1629
 See the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 5; Council of Europe, ECHR 
(1950) op.cit., Article 3; European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Strasbourg, 26
th
 November 1987; and the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted by 15
th
 Regular Session of the General Assembly of the 
Organisation of American States, 9
th
 December 1985, OAS Treaty Series Number 67. 
1630
 See, e.g., United Nations, ICCPR (1966) op.cit., Articles 4 and 7; Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment Number 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), UN doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 21 August 
2001, paragraph 7.  
1631
 United Nations, Code of Conduct (1979) op.cit., Article 5. 
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person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.”1632 
 
Elements of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment have been 
defined in other relevant legal texts. For example, “inhuman treatment”, in the 
context of war crimes, has been defined in the Elements of Crimes for the 
International Criminal Court as the infliction of “severe physical or mental pain 
or suffering”.1633 The notion of “degrading treatment” has been defined by the 
European Commission of Human Rights as treatment or punishment that 
“grossly humiliates the victim before others or drives the detainee to act against 
his/her will or conscience”.1634 The commentary to Principle 6 of the UN Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment (which prohibits torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment) has stated that: 
“The term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ should be 
interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses, 
whether physical or mental, including the holding of a detained or imprisoned 
person in conditions which deprive him, temporarily or permanently, of the use 
of any of his natural senses, such as sight or hearing, or of his awareness of 
place and the passing of time.”1635 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has indicated that the prohibition on 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment places limits on the 
lawful use of force. The UN Special Rapporteur has emphasised that the use of 
                                                          
1632
 United Nations, Convention against Torture (1984) op.cit., Article 1(1). 
1633
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN doc. A/CONF.183/9 of 17
th
 July 1998.  Article 
8(2) (a) (ii), as cited in J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study (2005) op. cit., Rule 90. 
1634
 European Commission of Human Rights, Greek case (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, §1339), as cited in J.M. 
Henckaerts, and L. Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (2005) op. cit., 
Rule 90. 
1635
 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 43/173 of 9
th
 December 1988, Principle 6, Commentary. 
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force must be regulated by the principles of proportionality and that the 
disproportionate exercise of police powers might constitute cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment in certain circumstances.1636 
 
12.5.1. Application to riot control agents 
Despite the absolute prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, degrading 
treatment or punishment, the misuse of RCAs for such purposes by law 
enforcement officials in countries has been reported by UN human rights bodies 
and international human rights NGOs. Presenting the results of a 2003 study on 
the trade in security equipment that could be used for torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,1637 the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Torture, van Boven, stated that:  
“…the allegations of torture that he has received from all regions of the world 
have involved instruments such as [inter alia] … chemical control substances 
(e.g. tear gas and pepper spray).  While some of the cases have involved the 
use of equipment which is inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading, and would 
per se breach the prohibition of torture, the vast majority have involved the 
misuse of those instruments, legitimate in appropriate circumstances, to inflict 
torture or other forms of ill-treatment.”1638 
 
Between January 2006 and December 2010, RCAs were reportedly employed 
for torture or ill-treatment in at least 17 countries.1639  In a number of cases 
RCAs have been employed as a means of inflicting “collective punishment” 
upon groups of individuals or crowds. Many other cases of concern involved the 
use of hand-held irritant sprays against individual prisoners and detainees in a 
targeted fashion. 
 
                                                          
1636
 Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
question of torture, Manfred Nowak, UN doc. E/CN.4/2006/6, 23
rd
 December 2005, paragraph 38. 
1637
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Study on the situation of trade in and production of 
equipment which is specifically designed to inflict torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
its origin, destination and forms, submitted by Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur on torture, pursuant to 
resolution 2002/38 of the Commission on Human Rights, UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/69, 13
th
 January 2003. 
1638
 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo Van Boven, UN doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/62, 15
th
 December 2004, paragraph 13. 
1639
 See summary of survey provided in Chapter 2 and indicative case studies are described in Appendix 
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A potentially significant development in relevant human rights case law has 
been the July 2012 European Court of Human Rights final judgement regarding 
the employment of tear gas against Ali Güneş, a high-school teacher who took 
part in a demonstration on 28th June 2004 against a NATO summit meeting 
being held in Istanbul on that date. According to Mr Güneş, although he was 
unarmed and participating peacefully with colleagues in the demonstration at a 
site sanctioned by the authorities, police grabbed him by the arms, sprayed him 
with tear gas and beat him up, following which they took him to a police station 
in which they kept him for 11 hours. A prosecutor saw him after that and 
ordered his release. 1640   The Turkish Government disputed Mr Güneş' 
allegations and claimed that Mr Güneş and his colleagues had refused to 
disperse after reading their press release, and – despite police attempts to 
persuade them to leave – they had attacked the police with stones and 
sticks.1641 The incident was widely reported in the national press. A photograph, 
published in the Turkish daily newspaper “Sabah”, showed Mr Güneş being 
held by two police officers, one of whom was spraying his face with gas at a 
very close range.1642  
 
In its final judgement, the Court considered “that the unwarranted spraying of 
the applicant’s face in the circumstances described… must have subjected him 
to intense physical and mental suffering and was such as to arouse in him 
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing 
him.” 1643 The Court, therefore, concluded “that by spraying the applicant in such 
circumstances the police officers subjected him to inhuman and degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.”1644 Consequently, 
the Court awarded “the applicant the sum claimed by him in full, that is EUR 
10,000, in respect of non-pecuniary damage”.1645 The Court’s ruling is important 
given the bearing it may have on future judgements on the use of RCAs in such 
circumstances. 
                                                          
1640  
European Court of Human Rights, Ali Güneş v. Turkey, application number 9829/07, Judgement 10 
April 2012. This judgement became final on 10
 
July 2012. See paragraphs 5-10. 
1641
 European Court of Human Rights, Ali Güneş v. Turkey (April 2012) op.cit., paragraphs 11-13. 
1642
 European Court of Human Rights, Ali Güneş v. Turkey (April 2012) op.cit., paragraph 15. 
1643
 European Court of Human Rights, Ali Güneş v. Turkey (April 2012) op.cit., paragraph 43. 
1644
 European Court of Human Rights, Ali Güneş v. Turkey (April 2012) op.cit., paragraph 43. 
1645
 The applicant was also awarded EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses. European Court of Human 
Rights, Ali Güneş v. Turkey (April 2012) op.cit., paragraphs 58 and 61. 
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12.5.2. Application to incapacitants 
Important constraints upon the use of incapacitants arise from obligations to 
prevent torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Such 
obligations are of particular relevance where incapacitants are being considered 
for use against prisoners or detainees. After a review of the relevant law, 
Aceves concluded that: 
“…the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment places 
significant restrictions on the use of incapacitating biochemical weapons. These 
weapons are designed to impair the physical and mental integrity of the 
individual. Depending on the nature, duration and long-term effects of this 
impairment, the use of incapacitating biochemical weapons can give rise to a 
claim of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”1646 
 
In its report exploring the potential use and misuse of neuroscience, the Royal 
Society highlighted the European Commission of Human Rights’ definition of 
degrading treatment and considered it to be of “particular importance in 
considering the potential applications of neuroscience that could, for example, 
manipulate behaviour or thought processes.”1647 A supporting note observed 
that: “the use of potential militarised agents including noradrenaline antagonists 
such as propranolol to cause selective memory loss, cholecystokinin B agonists 
to cause panic attacks, and substance P agonists to induce depression could all 
be considered violations of the prohibition against degrading treatment.”1648 
 
Fidler has stated that: “non-consensual, non-therapeutic use of any chemical or 
biochemical against detained individuals would constitute degrading treatment 
and could, constitute cruel or inhumane treatment and perhaps even 
torture.”1649 He did, however, believe that there may be situations where use of 
incapacitants might be compatible with international human rights law: where 
                                                          
1646
 Aceves, W. Human Rights Law and the Use of Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons, in Pearson, A., 
Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007) op. cit., p. 271. 
1647
 Royal Society, Science Policy Centre, Brain waves module 3, Neuroscience, conflict and security, 
Royal Society, London, February 2012, p. 24. 
1648
 Ibid., p. 24, note 78. 
1649
 Fidler, D. Incapacitating Chemical and Biochemical Weapons and Law Enforcement under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, in Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. & Wheelis, M. (2007) op. cit., p. 176. 
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the detained person posed an immediate, violent threat to himself (e.g. 
attempting suicide) or to safety and order in the detention facility (e.g. attacking 
guards or participating in riots).1650  
 
In addition to the prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment, further important potential constraints upon the non-
consensual application of incapacitants to detainees relate to obligations to 
ensure respect for the detainee’s right to freedom of opinion. For example, 
Article 19 of the ICCPR has declared that “everyone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference”.1651 In his legal commentary to the Convention, 
Nowak stated, that this provision consequently “obligates the States Parties to 
refrain from any interference with freedom of opinion (by indoctrination, 
‘brainwashing’, influencing the conscious or unconscious mind with 
psychoactive drugs or other means of manipulation) and to prevent private 
parties from doing so.”1652 
 
Despite the prohibitions on such actions, evidence of the detention of large 
numbers of political prisoners and other sane detainees in mental institutions, at 
some stage during a period from the 1960s until the 1990s has been 
documented in China1653 and the Soviet Union.1654 In certain institutions forcible 
administration of psychotropic substances for non-therapeutic reasons was 
alleged.1655 Isolated cases of such practices were also recorded in other 
countries during this period.1656 There are indications that such practices may 
still continue – albeit at a far lower level. A review of relevant documentation 
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 United Nations, ICCPR (1966) op.cit., Article 19. 
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produced by UN and international NGO human rights bodies in 2006–10 
indicates that cases of non-consensual, non-therapeutic application of psycho-
active chemicals against political prisoners, detainees or patients have been 
reported in the Russian Federation1657, Vietnam1658 and Uzbekistan1659 
apparently to intimidate or punish them. 
 
12.5.2.1. Use of incapacitants as “truth serums” in interrogation 
Certain States have reportedly employed psychoactive incapacitating chemical 
agents (such as sodium thiopental, sodium amytal, or scopolamine) as so-
called “truth drugs” or “truth serums” against detainees without their consent, for 
the purposes of interrogation by law enforcement officials. Dando and 
Furmanski,1660 and Perry Robinson1661 have documented the attempts by the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War to develop such chemical aids to 
interrogation. More recently, such methods have reportedly been employed in 
India,1662 Turkmenistan,1663 and in the U.S. detention centre at Guantanamo 
Bay.1664  
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Freedom of Information Act by the NGO Truthout, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/395950-
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Such practices are contrary to international human rights law prohibiting cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In addition, the UN Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment (UN Principles for the Protection of Detainees), addressing the 
issue of interrogation, stated that: 
“It shall be prohibited to take undue advantage of the situation of a detained or 
imprisoned person for the purpose of compelling him to confess, to incriminate 
himself otherwise or to testify against any other person…No detained person 
while being interrogated shall be subject to violence, threats or methods of 
interrogation which impair his capacity of decision or his judgement.”1665  
 
The involvement of health professionals in any form of torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment (including the non-consensual application 
of “truth drugs”) is prohibited under the UN Principles of Medical Ethics.1666 
Under these standards it is deemed a contravention of medical ethics for health 
personnel, particularly physicians: “to be involved in any professional 
relationship with prisoners or detainees the purpose of which is not solely to 
evaluate, protect or improve their physical and mental health” 1667 or “to apply 
their knowledge and skills in order to assist in the interrogation of prisoners and 
detainees in a manner that may adversely affect the physical or mental health 
or condition of such prisoners or detainees.”1668 The UN Principles of Medical 
Ethics have also stated that “there may be no derogation from the foregoing 
principles on any ground whatsoever, including public emergency.”1669 
 
Further constraints or outright prohibitions upon the use of incapacitants in 
interrogation have been established at the national level in certain States. In 
May 2010, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the administration of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
pentagon-inspector-generals-report-investigation.html (accessed 1st September 2012); Kaye, J. and 
Leopold, J., DoD Report Reveals Some Detainees Interrogated While Drugged, Others "Chemically 
Restrained", Truthout, 11
th
 July 2012.  
1665
 United Nations, Principles for the Protection of Detainees (9
th
 December 1988) op.cit., Principle 21. 
1666
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/194, Principles of Medical Ethics, adopted on 18
th
 
December 1982.  
1667
 United Nations, Principles of Medical Ethics (18
th
 December 1982) op.cit., Principle 3. 
1668
 United Nations, Principles of Medical Ethics (18
th
 December 1982) op.cit., Principle 4. 
1669
 United Nations, Principles of Medical Ethics (18
th
 December 1982) op.cit., Principle 6. 
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incapacitants to detainees without their consent during interrogation, a practice 
known in India as “narcoanalysis”, violated the Indian Constitution and was 
illegal as it constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.1670  
Similar concerns have been raised by jurists in the U.S., and the use of “truth 
serums” or “truth drugs” is not recognised as an authorised method of 
interrogation by U.S. courts. Under U.S. law, confessions made under the 
influence of “truth serums” are not considered as “voluntary” and are 
consequently inadmissible as evidence.1671 The employment of incapacitants to 
facilitate interrogations also appears to be contrary to the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.1672 It should, however, be noted that 
the U.S. has neither signed nor acceded to this Convention.1673  
 
Further constraints upon the non-consensual use of incapacitants to facilitate 
the interrogation of prisoners may arise from obligations under international 
humanitarian law that may be applicable where law enforcement activities and 
military operations are perceived to overlap. For example, the reported 
application by U.S. military personnel of certain incapacitants for interrogation of 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay would appear to be in contravention of 
regulations laid out in the U.S. Army Field Manual:  
                                                          
1670
 Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction, Selvi v. State of Karnataka & Anr., Criminal 
Appeal No. 1267 of 2004, 5
th
 May 2010, available at: www.indiankanoon.org/doc/338008/ (accessed 15th 
February 2012). [The Court stated that: “Even though ‘the right against cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment’ cannot be asserted in an absolute sense, there is a sufficient basis to show that Article 21 [of 
the Indian Constitution which protects ‘personal liberty’] can be invoked to protect the ‘bodily integrity and 
dignity’ of persons who are in custodial environments. This protection extends not only to prisoners who 
are convicts and under trials, but also to those persons who may be arrested or detained in the course of 
investigations in criminal cases.” (See Ibid., paragraph 195.) 
 
Furthermore, discussing the obligations deriving from Principles 6 and 21 of the UN Principles for the 
Protection of Detainees, the Court concluded that: “It is undeniable that during a narcoanalysis interview, 
the test subject does lose ‘awareness of place and passing of time’. It is also quite evident that 
[narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test] can be 
described as methods of interrogation which impair the test subject’s ‘capacity of decision or judgement’. 
Going by the language of these principles, we hold that the compulsory administration of the impugned 
techniques constitutes ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ in the context of Article 21. It must be 
remembered that the law disapproves of involuntary testimony, irrespective of the nature and degree of 
coercion, threats, fraud or inducement used to elicit the same…. [W]e must recognise that a forcible 
intrusion into a person’s mental processes is … an affront to human dignity and liberty, often with grave 
and long-lasting consequences.”(See: Ibid., paragraph 205.)] 
1671
 See: US Supreme Court, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), pp. 307–9. 
1672
 Article 2 of this Convention defines torture as including: “the use of methods upon a person intended to 
obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not 
cause physical pain or mental anguish.” See: Organisation of American States, Inter-American Convention 
to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985) op.cit., Article 2.  
1673
 See: Department of international law, Organisation of American States, Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture, general information on the treaty www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-51.html 
(accessed 18th January 2012). 
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“The psychological techniques and principles in this manual should neither be 
confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques 
such as brainwashing, physical or mental torture, including drugs that may 
induce lasting or permanent mental alteration or damage. Physical or mental 
torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the source's free will, and are 
expressly prohibited by [the Geneva Conventions].”1674 
 
12.6. Health considerations and the right to health 
The most comprehensive statement of the right to health1675 is enunciated in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR): 
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.  
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:  
 … d. The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.” 1676  
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) which 
monitors the IESCR, has stated that violations of the obligation to respect the 
right to health “are State actions, policies or laws that contravene standards set 
out in Article 12 of the Covenant and are likely to result in bodily harm, 
unnecessary morbidity and preventable mortality.”1677 Furthermore, the 
Committee stated that violations of the obligation to protect the right to health 
“follow from the failure of a State to take all necessary measures to safeguard 
persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to health by third 
parties....”1678 
 
                                                          
1674
 US Army, Field Manual FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52): Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2006, p. 102. 
1675
 See also United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) op.cit., Article 25. 
1676
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI), 16
th
 December 1966, Article 12. 
1677
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 11
th
 August 2000, paragraph 50. 
1678
 Ibid., paragraph 51. 
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Casey-Maslen has noted that the application of the right to health “to the use of 
weapons does not appear to have been tested”,1679 however he has contended 
that “a challenge to certain NKE weapons on the basis of their health effects, 
including by prisoners or patients at a mental health institution, merits 
consideration.”1680 This area appears to be of potential relevance to the 
employment of “less lethal” chemical agents given the long-standing concerns 
voiced by some in the medical community regarding the immediate and long 
term effects of certain RCAs1681 and incapacitants.1682  
 
Such concerns have been acknowledged by human rights bodies.1683 For 
example in 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture stated that: 
“chemical agents, such as tear gas/irritant ammunition and pepper spray 
weapons, are said to be promoted as providing effective control without the risk 
to life, i.e. as ‘humane alternatives’ to lethal force. However, according to 
information received, insufficient research has been undertaken into their 
potential effects on targeted persons.”1684  
 
In addition, human rights monitoring bodies have highlighted the deleterious 
effects to health resulting from the inappropriate employment of RCAs. For 
example, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has 
raised concerns about the use of RCAs during the forcible removal of 
immigration detainees: 
“The CPT also has very serious reservations about the use of incapacitating or 
irritant gases to bring recalcitrant detainees under control in order to remove 
                                                          
1679
 Casey-Maslen, S. Non-kinetic-energy weapons termed ‘non-lethal’, op. cit., p. 35. 
1680
 Ibid., p. 36. 
1681
 See, e.g., Euripidou,E., MacLehose, R. and Fletcher, A. An investigation into the short term and 
medium term health impacts of personal incapacitant sprays. A follow up of patients reported to the 
National Poisons Information Service (London), Emergency Medicine Journal volume 21, 2004,  pp. 548– 
52; Hu, H., Fine, J., Epstein, P., Kelsey, K., Reynolds, P., Walker, B. ‘Tear gas: harassing agent or toxic 
chemical?’, Journal of the American Medical Association, volume 262, 1989, pp. 660–3.  
1682
 See, for example, British Medical Association, The use of drugs as weapons, (May 2007) op. cit.  
1683
 For example, in a July 2012 ruling, the European Court of Human Rights recognised that the use of 
pepper spray: “can produce effects such as respiratory problems, nausea, vomiting, irritation of the 
respiratory tract, irritation of the tear ducts and eyes, spasms, chest pain, dermatitis and allergies.” 
Furthermore the ECHR noted that “In strong doses it may cause necrosis of the tissue in the respiratory or 
digestive tract, pulmonary oedema or internal haemorrhaging (haemorrhaging of the suprarenal 
gland).”[See: European Court of Human Rights, Oya Ataman v. Turkey, no. 74552/01, Final Judgement, 
5
th
 March 2007, paragraph 18; European Court of Human Rights, Ali Gunes  v Turkey, no.9829/07, Final 
Judgement, 10
th
 July 2012, paragraph 37.]. 
1684
 See: United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, submitted pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/36, (13
th
 January 2003) op. cit., paragraph 12. 
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them from their cells and transfer them to the aircraft.  The use of such gases in 
very confined spaces, such as cells, entails manifest risks to the health of both 
the detainee and the staff concerned.”1685 
 
Although more discrete and targetable in nature than tear gas, concerns have 
been raised about the inappropriate employment of hand-held irritant sprays, in 
particular, the deleterious consequences to health of the use of pepper spray 
and its analogues against prisoners or detainees. For example, in 2003, 
Amnesty International documented the cases of more than 100 people reported 
to have died in custody in the U.S. over the previous decade, after being 
subjected to pepper spray. While most of the deaths had officially been 
attributed to other factors such as drug intoxication or positional asphyxia, 
pepper spray was found to be a factor in a number of cases. Further additional 
anxiety has been voiced over the employment of pepper spray in combination 
with restraints, with the consequent danger of restricted breathing.1686 
  
In its 2009 reports following visits to the Czech Republic, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the CPT highlighted cases of inappropriate use of pepper spray 
against detainees and stated that it considered that: “Pepper spray is a 
potentially dangerous substance and should not be used in confined spaces. … 
Pepper spray should never be deployed against a prisoner who has already 
been brought under control.”1687 In its July 2012 judgement in the case of Ali 
                                                          
1685 
See, in particular, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, ‘The CPT Standards’, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 - Rev. 2010, paragraph 38, p. 69.  
1686
 Amnesty International, Pain Merchants: Security equipment and its use in torture and other ill-
treatment, ACT 40/008/2003, 2
nd
 December 2003. 
1687
 See: European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Report to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 19
th
 to 30
th
 March 2007, CPT/Inf (2009) 25, 14
th
 October 2009, 
paragraph 79; European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Report to the Czech Government on the visit to the Czech Republic carried out by the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT) from 25
th
 March to 2
nd
 April 2008, CPT/Inf (2009) 8, 5
th
 February 2009, paragraph 46. In addition, 
the CPT stated that  “Even  when [pepper spray is] used  in  open  spaces  the  CPT  has  serious  
reservations;  if  exceptionally  it  needs  to  be used, there should be clearly defined safeguards in place.” 
See CPT (5
th
 February 2009) op.cit., paragraph 46.   
 
In both reports, the CPT recommended that the relevant authorities: 
“draw up a clear directive governing the use of pepper spray, which should include, as a minimum: clear 
instructions as to when pepper spray may be used, which should  state explicitly that pepper spray should 
not be used in a confined area; the right of prisoners exposed to pepper spray to be granted immediate 
access to a doctor and to be offered an antidote; the qualifications, training and skills of staff members 
authorised to use pepper spray; an adequate reporting and inspection mechanism with respect to the use 
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Güneş v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights stated that it shared the 
CPT’s concerns with regard to pepper spray and concurred with the CPT’s 
recommendations.  The Court stressed “in particular, that there can be no 
justification for the use of such gases against an individual who has already 
been taken under the control of the law enforcement authorities…”1688 
 
Disquiet has also been voiced by medical professionals and human rights 
organisations regarding the involvement of medical personnel in the application 
of certain “less lethal” chemical agents as well as the failure of the State to 
provide adequate medical treatment following the use of such agents.1689  
 
It is notable that a UN Human Rights Commission report into conditions in 
Guantanamo Bay, prepared by five UN Special Rapporteurs, including the 
Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, raised concerns relating to 
the “right to health” regarding the forcible application of drugs to detainees.1690 
The Special Rapporteur on the right to health stated that he “received serious 
and credible reports of violations of the right to health - both health care and the 
underlying determinants of health – at Guantánamo Bay.” 1691 The reports 
alleged, inter alia, that “detainees have been subjected to non-consensual 
treatment, including drugging and force-feeding.”1692 The Special Rapporteur 
also raised concerns that reports indicated that “some health professionals have 
been complicit in abusive treatment of detainees detrimental to their health.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
of pepper spray. (See: CPT (14
th
 October 2009) op.cit., paragraph 79; CPT (5
th
 February 2009) op.cit., 
paragraph 46.) 
1688
 European Court of Human Rights, Ali Güneş v. Turkey (10
th
 July 2012) op.cit., paragraph 41. 
1689
 See, e.g., British Medical Association, The use of drugs as weapons (May 2007) op. cit.; Human 
Rights Watch, press release: Independent Commission of Inquiry Must Investigate Raid on Moscow 
Theater (2002) op. cit.; Amnesty International, South Korea: Call for unimpeded access to food, water and 
necessary medical treatment for Ssanyong striking workers, ASA 25/007/2009, 31
st
 July 2009.  
1690
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, 27
th 
February 2006, UN doc. E/CN.4/2006/120. The report was prepared jointly by: the Chairperson-
Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of 
judges and lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, and the Special Rapporteur on the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
1691
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay (27
th 
February 2006) op.cit., paragraph 70. 
1692
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay (27
th 
February 2006) op.cit., paragraph 70. Although the Commission report did not elaborate on the nature of 
the drugs administered nor the purpose of such actions, a number of former detainees have alleged that 
injections of unknown drugs occurred before interrogation and were intended to coerce confessions. (see: 
Warrick, J. (22
nd
 April 2008) op. cit.)  
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Such unethical conduct violates the detainees’ right to health, as well as the 
duties of health professionals arising from the right to health.”1693 Among the 
range of alleged violations were reports that health professionals were present 
during or engaging in non-consensual treatment, including drugging and force-
feeding.1694 
 
12.7. Obligations to review and monitor the use of “less lethal” weapons 
Although States are required under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions to carry out reviews of all new weapons intended for use 
in warfare,1695 international human rights law does not explicitly require that 
States carry out comparable reviews of new weapons developed or acquired 
solely for the purpose of law enforcement. However, the norm-setting UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms has provided that: “The 
development and deployment of 'non-lethal' incapacitating weapons should be 
carefully evaluated in order to minimize the risk of endangering uninvolved 
persons, and the use of such weapons should be carefully controlled”1696   
 
Furthermore, the argument can be made that in order to effectively fulfil their 
obligations to protect life, prevent torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, and ensure the responsible use of force by law 
enforcement officials, States will need to implement review mechanisms to 
ensure that any new weapons developed or otherwise acquired are consistent 
with such principles. Consequently, the author contends that States should, as 
a minimum: 
 ensure that new weapons are not of a nature to violate relevant 
international human rights law and standards; and, 
 identify whether there are specific circumstances in which use of such 
weapons may breach international human rights law and criminal justice 
                                                          
1693
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay (2006) op. cit., 
paragraph 75. 
1694
 Ibid. 
1695
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
th
 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts [Protocol I], 8
th
 June 1977, Article 36. 
1696
 United Nations, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
(1990) op.cit., Principle 3. 
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standards (for example use of RCAs in confined spaces), and restrict 
such use accordingly.  
 
In order to do this effectively the author argues that a thorough multi-disciplinary 
review of the prospective weapons would be needed, comparable to that 
recommended by the ICRC for fulfilment of Article 36 of Additional Protocol 
I.1697 Similarly leading international legal experts1698 and Amnesty 
International1699 have highlighted the obligations upon States to ensure that 
chemical agents intended for law enforcement have been adequately tested. 
 
Furthermore, concerns about the paucity and reliability of publicly available 
information on the short and long term effects of RCAs have fuelled repeated 
calls for greater transparency and accountability regarding the testing and 
deployment of those agents considered for law enforcement. For example, in 
response to public disquiet over the widespread employment of CS gas by the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary in Derry in 1969, a U.K. Parliamentary Committee 
recommended that:“…if the competent authorities feel it justifiable to release a 
chemical agent for use in civil circumstances, then medical and scientific 
research relevant to this decision should straight away be published in the 
appropriate scientific journals so that informed medical and scientific opinion 
may assess the situation for itself."1700 
                                                          
1697
 International Committee of the Red Cross, A guide to the legal review of new weapons, means and 
methods of warfare, Measures to implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 of 1977, Geneva, January 
2006. 
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 Discussing a hypothetical case of the use of an incapacitant, Hampson has stated that: 
“The fact that the result was not foreseeable is not relevant if the State has not carried out the necessary 
tests. It is not sufficient for the State to test the substance in particular settings. It has to test it in those 
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used in the settings in which it has tested it or else to test the effects of the substance in other settings 
(e.g. confined space). If the result of the use of the substance in a confined space was foreseeable, the 
State will be held responsible for failing to ensure that the forces did not use it in a confined space. This 
appears to require a more rigorous testing regime than that commonly carried out under the weapon 
review requirements of the IHL.” See:  Hampson, F. (2010) Potential implications for human rights law, in 
International Committee of the Red Cross, “Incapacitating chemical agents”: implications for international 
law, expert meeting, Montreux, Switzerland, 24
th
-26
th
 March 2010, p.56. 
1699
 Amnesty International have recommended that States: “Refrain from using incapacitating chemical 
agents designed to sedate people for law enforcement purposes unless it can be demonstrated impartially 
that the agent has been proven to have legitimate use with a suitable margin of safety which will ensure 
that individuals are only exposed to incapacitating and not lethal concentrations, and will be protected from 
indiscriminate or arbitrary effects as required by international human rights standards.” See: Amnesty 
International, The Pain Merchants: security equipment and its use in torture and other ill-treatment, 
December 2003, p.76. 
1700
 Report of the enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological aspects of CS (Orthochlorobenzylidene 
Malononitrile) by a committee chaired by Sir Harold Himsworth presented to Parliament by the Secretary 
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Similar demands for public transparency have been expressed regarding any 
proposed introduction of incapacitants intended for law enforcement. A January 
2012 report of an expert group meeting organised by the Swiss Government 
cast doubt on the likely effectiveness of risk assessments of the development, 
deployment and use of incapacitants. “It is far from clear that such risk 
assessment would be performed thoroughly. The development of any sort of 
weapon intended for law enforcement purposes therefore must happen in a 
transparent manner under public scrutiny – there is no place for secrecy.”1701 
 
In addition to requiring that States “carefully evaluate” development and 
deployment of “non-lethal” or “less lethal” weapons, the UN Basic Principles 
also incorporated obligations upon States to ensure effective control of the use 
of force and firearms through the introduction of rules and regulations, which 
would certainly be applicable to such “less lethal” weapons.1702 These 
provisions have been supplemented by requirements relating to the training of 
law enforcement officials “with a view to limiting the use of force and firearms” 
and the review of “training programmes and operational procedures in the light 
of particular incidents.”1703Furthermore, the UN Basic Principles required that 
“Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms 
by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence under their 
law”.1704 Academics and international non-governmental human rights 
organisations1705 have highlighted the importance of effectively monitoring the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, September 1971, Cmnd.4775, p.48,  as 
cited in Amnesty International, The Pain Merchants (December 2003) op.cit., pp.61-62. 
1701
 Speiz Laboratory, Technical workshop on incapacitating chemical agents, Spiez, Switzerland 8
th
-9
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September 2011, Spiez Laboraratory, Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection, January 2012, p.7. 
1702
 United Nations, Basic Principles (1990) op.cit., Principle 1. Which reads: “Governments and law 
enforcement agencies shall adopt and implement rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms 
against persons by law enforcement officials. In developing such rules and regulations, Governments and 
law enforcement agencies shall keep the ethical issues associated with the use of force and firearms 
constantly under review.” 
1703
 United Nations, Basic Principles (1990) op.cit., Principle 20. 
1704
 United Nations, Basic Principles (1990) op.cit., Article 7. 
1705
 Amnesty International has recommended that States: 
“Establish laws and regulations based upon international human rights standards to strictly control the use 
of chemical irritants in law enforcement, and establish effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure such 
laws and regulations are adhered to, and kept under review; prohibit the indiscriminate or arbitrary use of 
riot control irritants such as tear gas on people in confined spaces; 
 
Suspend the deployment and transfer of those types of pepper spray or other chemical irritants, which 
have revealed a substantial risk of abuse, unwarranted injury or death, pending a rigorous and 
independent inquiry into its effects in each case by appropriate medical, legal, police and other experts. 
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use of “less lethal” weapons (including RCAs), and the requirement upon States 
to take action where such monitoring has highlighted the misuse of such 
weapons.  
 
However, despite concerns raised by human rights NGOs and UN human rights 
bodies regarding the use of “less lethal” weapons and security equipment – 
including RCAs and incapacitants – there are currently no internationally 
accepted procedures for evaluating new “less lethal” weapons and for 
monitoring their subsequent use, at the national level.  
 
12.8. Conclusions 
As part of the second stage of the HAC analytical process, this chapter explored 
the constraints upon the use of RCAs and incapacitants imposed by human 
rights law derived from regional and international agreements, as well as that 
arising from customary international law. Human rights law was found to impose 
significant constraints upon the use of force by the State. Such limitations 
consequently have important implications as to whether, in what circumstances, 
by whom and how RCAs and incapacitants could be lawfully employed.  
 
Human rights law is particularly relevant to the discussion of the regulation of 
RCAs and incapacitants as it potentially covers the full “use of force” spectrum 
from law enforcement activities through to armed conflict, including “grey areas” 
such as counter-terrorist, counter-insurgency, and military operations outside of 
armed conflict where use of these chemical agents has been proposed. While 
several human rights norms may be applicable to the regulation of RCAs and 
incapacitants, the rights to life; to liberty and security; to freedom from torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; to engage in “peaceful protest”; and 
to health, together with attendant obligations on the restraint of force, are the 
most relevant. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Publish the results of the inquiry on each type and sub-type of such weapons and demonstrate before the 
legislature/parliament in each case that the effects are consistent with international human rights 
standards before making any decision on deployment.”See: Amnesty International, the Pain Merchants 
(December 2003) op.cit., p.76. 
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An important aspect of human rights law is that there are a number of 
international and regional mechanisms to monitor adherence to relevant treaties 
and jus cogens norms. Hampson noted that two of these mechanisms - the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions - “can scrutinize relevant conduct of any UN 
member. They are not limited to those that have ratified a particular treaty.”1706 
Furthermore, Hampson has noted that the two Special Rapporteurs and two of 
the international treaty bodies [the Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee against Torture] “could monitor the use of unlawful weapons or the 
unlawful use of potentially lawful weapons.” 1707 In addition to the monitoring 
mechanisms, certain treaties have established enforcement mechanisms that 
can be accessed by individuals and which result in legally binding judgements 
for those States party to the relevant instrument (as was seen in the European 
Court of Human Rights rulings on the use of an incapacitant by the Russian 
Federation and of tear gas by Turkey).  
 
However it must be recognised that these monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms have limited preventative value (though they may have some 
deterrent effect) as they would only be initiated after a potential misuse of RCAs 
or incapacitants has occurred. A further limitation on the effectiveness of 
applying human rights law to RCAs or incapacitants is that there are currently 
no internationally accepted procedures for evaluating new RCAs or incapacitant 
weapons, or for monitoring their subsequent use at a national level. Despite the 
limitations highlighted, it is clear that international human rights law imposes 
significant constraints upon the use of RCAs and incapacitants, and should 
certainly be incorporated into a comprehensive holistic arms control strategy for 
the regulation of these agents. 
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 Hampson, F. (2007) op.cit., p.243. 
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Chapter 13: Mechanisms to regulate the transfer of riot control agents, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery 
 
13.1. Introduction 
This chapter will explore the potential application of transfer controls as part of a 
holistic arms control approach (HAC) to preventing the proliferation and misuse 
of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means of delivery. The 
transfer of these chemical and biological agents and related means of delivery 
currently appears to fall within the scope of three types of control regimes, 
which cover: chemical and biological weapons (and so-called weapons of mass 
destruction); conventional arms and related (para)-military equipment; and 
security equipment utilised in torture and ill-treatment. Finally, the employment 
of certain pluri-lateral and international arms and equipment embargoes to halt 
transfers of these agents and means of delivery in certain limited circumstances 
is assessed. 
 
13.2. Regimes addressing chemical weapons, biological weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin 
Weapon Convention (BTWC) contain legally binding provisions requiring States 
Parties to introduce controls over the transfer of (chemical or biological) agents 
and related goods that could be utilised in the development, production and 
employment of weapons prohibited under the relevant conventions. Such 
measures have subsequently been reinforced by two politically binding pluri-
lateral control regimes – the Australia Group and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime. Although each of the four regimes contains provisions which 
appear to regulate the transfer of at least certain RCAs, incapacitants or related 
means of delivery in certain circumstances, there are a number of limitations in 
the application of such provisions in practice.  
 
13.2.1. Chemical Weapons Convention 
The Chemical Weapons Convention has attempted to strike a balance between 
the rights and desires of States Parties to “participate in, the fullest possible 
exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information 
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relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention”1708 and their obligations “never, under any 
circumstances, to… transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to 
anyone”1709 or “to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in 
any activity prohibited under the Convention.”1710  
 
Consequently, the CWC has included provisions explicitly covering the transfer 
of chemicals listed in three Schedules. Schedule 1 chemicals which are 
precursors and agents that have been developed as chemical weapons and 
which have no significant legitimate commercial use in quantities above one 
tonne per year, may only be acquired on the territory of a State Party and can 
only be transferred to other States Parties for “research, medical, 
pharmaceutical or protective purposes” in quantities of one tonne or below.1711 
All transfers are subject to advance notification and annual declaration. Re-
export is not permitted. These restrictions apply irrespective of the amount to be 
transferred or the concentration of the chemical if transferred in a mixture.1712 
Transfer to any Non-State Party is forbidden under any circumstances.1713  
 
Schedule 2 chemicals are those considered to pose a significant risk to the 
object and purpose of the Convention but which also have legitimate 
commercial uses in quantities in excess of one tonne per year. Since 29th April 
2000, Schedule 2 chemicals may only be exported or imported to/from other 
States Parties.1714 Although trade in such chemicals between States Parties is 
not specifically regulated under the Convention, all States Parties must annually 
declare quantities held, and if relevant, production sites, with the potential for 
on-site monitoring over certain thresholds. 1715   
 
                                                          
1708
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article XI.2.(b). 
1709
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article I.1.(a). 
1710
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article I.1.(d). 
1711
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VI and Verification Annex, Part VI, A. 
1712
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Verification Annex, Part VI, B. 
1713
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Verification Annex, Part VI, A.1.  
1714
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VI and also Verification Annex, Part VII, 
C. The CSP subsequently clarified that that this prohibition also applies to mixtures containing Schedule 
2B chemicals in concentrations above 10 per cent. [See OPCW, Fifth Session of the Conference of the 
States Parties, 15
th
 –19
th
 May 2000, Decision C-V/DEC/16, Implementation of Restrictions on transfers of 
Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals to and from states not party to the convention]. 
1715
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VI and also Verification Annex, Part VII. 
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Schedule 3 chemicals are considered to pose a risk to the object and purpose 
of the Convention but are manufactured in very large quantities for legitimate 
commercial purposes. Although trade of such chemicals between States Parties 
has not been specifically regulated under the CWC, they may only be exported 
to Non-State Parties if such recipient States issue an end-use certificate 
confirming they will only be used for purposes not prohibited under the 
Convention and will not be re-transferred.1716  
 
To date, the major factor that has determined (and therefore limited) whether 
transfer controls should be introduced for a particular chemical agent has been 
whether that agent was included in one of the CWC Schedules. However, 
although the Convention has provided for the Schedules to be updated under a 
simplified technical change procedure that can be initiated by a State Party,1717 
the process has appeared to be heavily politicised and the Schedules have not 
been revised on a regular basis. Consequently at present the only incapacitant 
to have been listed under a CWC Schedule and thus to have triggered, albeit 
limited, transfer controls under the Convention has been BZ1718 (and two of its 
immediate precursors, 3-Quinuclidinol and Benzilic Acid1719). All other chemical 
agents explored as incapacitants to date, as well as all RCAs1720, must be 
considered as non-Scheduled chemicals with no specific CWC provisions 
restricting their transfer. 
 
Although the Convention does not contain specific provisions relating to the 
transfer of non-Scheduled chemicals, there are general obligations under the 
Convention that are applicable to the transfer of all toxic chemicals. States 
Parties are required to: “adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic 
chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise 
acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place 
                                                          
1716
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VI and also Verification Annex, Part VIII. 
1717
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article XV (4-5). 
1718
 BZ has been listed under Schedule 2.a  
1719
 3-Quinuclidinol and Benzilic Acid have been listed under Schedule 2.b.  
1720
 RCAs are defined under the Convention as “Any chemical not listed in a Schedule…” [See: OPCW, 
Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article II.7.] 
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under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.” 1721 
 
Furthermore, as the OPCW has acknowledged “…unilateral legislation may be 
adopted by Member States establishing additional restrictions on the trade of 
non-Scheduled chemicals, equipment and technologies which will have an 
impact on any country, particularly developing countries that are not States 
Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention.”1722  
 
A number of CWC States Parties have introduced “additional restrictions” which 
go beyond those explicitly stipulated in the Convention that are directly 
applicable to the transfer of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery. 
Of particular importance in this regard has been the establishment and activities 
of the Australia Group (see below). 
 
13.2.2. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
Under Article III of the BWTC, each State Party to the Convention has 
undertaken: 
“…not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in 
any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or 
international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of 
this Convention.”1723  
 
However, in provisions similar to the CWC, BTWC States Parties have also 
undertaken to “facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information 
for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes…”1724 Furthermore, Article X requires that the Convention should be 
implemented so as to “avoid hampering the economic or technological 
                                                          
1721
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VI.2. 
1722
 OPCW, International Transfer of Scheduled Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
http://www.opcw.org/our-work/non-proliferation/international-transfer-of-scheduled-chemicals/  (accessed 
1
st
 June 2012). 
1723
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) op.cit., Article III. 
1724
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) op.cit., Article I.(2). 
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development” of BTWC States Parties or international cooperation in “peaceful 
bacteriological (biological) activities”, including the international exchange of 
biological agents, toxins and related equipment for such purposes 1725 
 
There is thus a tension in the regime and a balance that must be struck 
between the non-proliferation aspect of the Convention and that promoting the 
peaceful use of biological agents and toxins. This tension continues to be 
expressed, but not resolved, at BTWC Review Conferences. For example, the 
7th Review Conference called for “appropriate measures, including effective 
national export controls… to ensure that direct and indirect transfers relevant to 
the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever, are authorized only when the 
intended use is for purposes not prohibited under the Convention”1726, but also 
reiterated that States Parties “should not use the provisions of …Article [III]  to 
impose restrictions and/or limitations on transfers for purposes consistent with 
the objectives and provisions of the Convention….”1727  
 
As discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis, the scope of materials covered by the 
BTWC includes RCAs and incapacitants of a biological origin together with 
related means of delivery. Consequently, BTWC States Parties would be 
prohibited from transferring or otherwise assisting in the transfer or acquisition 
of such agents and materials that were not to be utilised for “peaceful 
purposes”1728 but were in fact intended to be employed for “hostile purposes or 
in armed conflict.”1729However the application of the BTWC (as with the CWC) 
in this area suffers from a “double ambiguity”, firstly with regard to the 
characterisation of the agents and their treatment under the Convention 
(explored in Chapter 8), and then from the unresolved free trade/non-
proliferation tension in the regime described above. Consequently, it is likely 
that there will be divergent interpretation and implementation of the Convention 
in this area by States Parties.  
 
                                                          
1725
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) op.cit., Article X. 
1726
 United Nations, BTWC 7
th
 Review Conference Final Document (2011) op.cit., Article III, paragraph 9. 
1727
 United Nations, BTWC 7
th
 Review Conference Final Document (2011) op.cit., Article III, paragraph 10. 
1728
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) op.cit., Article I.(1). 
1729
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) op.cit., Article I.(2). 
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13.2.3. The Australia Group  
The principal objective of the Australia Group has been to employ licensing 
measures to ensure that “exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and 
dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not 
contribute to the spread of CBW [chemical and biological weapons].” 1730 The 
Group has attempted to achieve this by harmonising participating countries’ 
national export licensing measures.1731 The Group meets annually to discuss 
ways of increasing the effectiveness of participating countries’ national export 
licensing measures to prevent would-be proliferators from obtaining materials 
for CBW programs.1732 The members of the Australia Group (AG)1733  - who are 
all parties to the Geneva Protocol, BTWC and CWC - have not undertaken any 
legally binding obligations. Instead “the effectiveness of their cooperation 
depends solely on a shared commitment to CBW non-proliferation goals and 
the strength of their respective national measures.”1734  
 
Key considerations in the formulation of participants’ export licensing measures 
are that they should be: effective in impeding the production of CBWs; practical, 
and reasonably easy to implement; and not impede the normal trade of 
materials and equipment used for legitimate purposes. 1735 Under these 
measures, exports are denied “only if there is a well founded concern about 
potential diversion for CBW purposes.”1736 
 
 
 
                                                          
1730
 Australia Group, Objectives of the Group, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/objectives.html (accessed 
1
st
 September 2012). 
1731
 Ibid. 
1732
 Australia Group, Introduction and Activities, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/introduction.html and 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/activities.html (accessed 1st September 2012). 
1733
 As of 1
st
 June 2012, the participating States are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The European Commission also 
participates. [Australia Group, Participants http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html  (accessed 
1
st
 September 2012)]. 
1734
 Australia Group, Introduction, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/introduction.html (accessed 1st 
September 2012). 
1735
 Australia Group, Introduction, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/introduction.html (accessed 1st 
September 2012). 
1736
 Australia Group, Introduction and Activities, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/activities.html (accessed 
1st September 2012). 
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13.2.3.1. Range of items controlled 
The AG has developed Common Control Lists (reflected in national export 
control regimes) covering: Chemical Weapons Precursors;1737  Dual-use 
chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology and 
software;1738 Dual-use biological equipment and related technology and 
software;1739 Biological agents; 1740 Plant pathogens;1741 and Animal 
pathogens.1742 
 
Since the Australia Groups objectives have not explicitly differentiated between 
“lethal” or “less lethal” chemical or biological weapons, the control regime would 
appear, potentially, to cover biological agents and toxic chemical agents 
(together with their precursors) that could be utilised as RCAs or incapacitating 
weapons. However, no specific riot control agents or their precursors have been 
included in the AG Control Lists. Although no chemical incapacitants have been 
explicitly listed, the AG Chemical Weapons Precursors Control List1743 
contained five precursors of BZ, two of which - Benzilic Acid and 3-Quinuclidinol 
- are also included in Schedule 2.b of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
whilst the remaining three - Methyl Benzilate, 3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, 
and 3-Quinuclidone – did not appear in any of the CWC Schedules. 
 
In addition, the List of Biological Agents for Export Control has included 
“stapholoccous aureus toxins”1744 and thus would cover Staphylococcal 
enterotoxin B (SEB) which was previously weaponised as an incapacitant by 
the U.S.1745 To date, no AG Control Lists have included munitions for delivery of 
                                                          
1737
 Australia Group, Export Control List: Chemical Weapons Precursors, September 2009, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/precursors.html.(accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1738
 Australia Group, Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology and 
software, June 2011, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/dual_chemicals.html (accessed 1
st
 September 
2012). 
1739
 Australia Group, Dual-use biological equipment and related technology and software, April 2012, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/dual_biological.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1740
 Australia Group, List of Biological Agents for Export Control, 1
st
 September 2011, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/biological_agents.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1741
 Australia Group, List of Plant Pathogens for Export Control, April 2012, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/plants.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1742
 Australia Group, List of Animal Pathogens for Export Control, June 2011, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/animal.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012).  
1743
 Australia Group, Export Control List: Chemical Weapons Precursors, September 2009, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/precursors.html. (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1744
 Australia Group, List of Biological Agents for Export Control, June 2011, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/biological_agents.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1745
 For further discussion see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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chemical or biological agents within their scope of coverage. However, the 
Dual-use biological equipment and related technology and software list1746 has 
included “spraying and fogging systems and [their] components”1747 which could 
be applicable to devices intended for dispersal of RCAs and incapacitants of 
biological origin. 
 
13.2.3.2. Transfer control criteria 
Attempting to improve the effectiveness and consistency of application of the 
Control Lists, the AG agreed “Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or 
Biological Items” in June 2007 and subsequently revised in January 2009, 1748 
which were intended to “form the basis for controlling transfers to any 
destination beyond the Government's national jurisdiction or control of 
materials, equipment, technology and software that could contribute to CBW 
activities.” 1749 AG States committed themselves to implementing the Guidelines 
in accordance with their national legislation, and to ensuring that the Guidelines 
were “applied to each transfer of any item in the AG control lists.”1750 
 
When evaluating export applications for goods covered by the AG Control Lists, 
participating States agreed to “take into account” a “non-exhaustive list of 
factors” including1751: “information about proliferation and terrorism involving 
CBW, including any proliferation or terrorism-related activity, or about 
involvement in clandestine or illegal procurement activities, of the parties to the 
transaction”1752 and also “the capabilities and objectives of the chemical and 
biological activities of the recipient state.” 1753 As of 1st September 2012, 
however, neither respect for international humanitarian law nor respect for 
                                                          
1746
 Australia Group, Dual-use biological equipment and related technology and software, April 2012, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/dual_biological.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1747
 Australia Group, Dual-use biological equipment and related technology and software (2012) op.cit., 
Part I (Equipment), section 9. 
1748
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, January 2009, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html. (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1749
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, Article 1, January 
2009, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html.(accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1750
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, Article 2, January 
2009, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html.(accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1751
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, Article 4, January 
2009, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1752
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, Article 4.a, 
January 2009, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1753
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, Article 4.b. 
January 2009, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html (accessed 1
st
 Septmber 2012). 
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international human rights law and standards have been included in the list of 
factors. 
 
The Guidelines incorporated two important innovations – a “catch-all” clause 
and a “no-undercutting” policy. Under the “catch-all” clause participating States 
committed themselves to include a requirement in their regulations for: “…an 
authorisation for the transfer of non-listed items where the exporter is informed 
by the competent authorities… that the items…may be intended, in their entirety 
or part, for use in connection with chemical or biological weapons activities.”1754 
Furthermore if the exporter was “aware that non-listed items are intended to 
contribute to such activities it must notify the [relevant] authorities… which will 
decide whether or not it is expedient to make the export concerned subject to 
authorisation.”1755  
 
Under the “no-undercut” policy a license for an export that was “essentially 
identical” to one denied by another AG participant would only be granted after 
consultations with that participant, provided it had not expired or been 
rescinded. 1756 An “essentially identical” good was defined as “being the same 
biological agent or chemical or, in the case of dual-use equipment, equipment 
which has the same or similar specifications and performance being sold to the 
same consignee.”1757  
 
Following the introduction of these provisions it can be argued that the transfer 
of all types of RCAs and incapacitating agents, as well as dual-use 
manufacturing equipment and facilities, would potentially fall within the AG’s 
area of concern, when such agents may be intended “for use in connection with 
chemical or biological weapons activities.”1758  Furthermore, if one AG State 
                                                          
1754
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, further provisions 
applicable to Australia Group Participants: catch all, January 2009, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1755
 Ibid. 
1756
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, further provisions 
applicable to Australia Group Participants: no-undercut policy, January 2009, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1757
 Ibid. 
1758
 Australia Group, Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, further provisions 
applicable to Australia Group Participants: catch all, January 2009, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
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considered that a specific RCA or incapacitating agent [or their precursors] was 
intended for use in a chemical or biological weapons programme and 
consequently prohibited its export, there appears to be a presumption of export 
denial from all other AG States pending consultation with the AG State which 
initiated the denial.  
 
13.2.4. Missile Technology Control Regime 
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987 is an 
informal association of countries which “share the goals of non-proliferation of 
unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction 
[i.e. chemical, biological and nuclear weapons], and which seek to coordinate 
national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation.”1759 As of 
1st September 2012, there were 34 Member States and a further five States that 
have agreed to abide by its regulations.1760 Although the MTCR Member States 
have given political commitments to abide by the Guidelines, the Regime was 
not founded on a legally binding treaty and there have been no formal 
consequences for noncompliance. The MTCR Member States have adhered to 
common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines)1761 applied to a 
common list of controlled items (the MTCR Equipment, Software and 
Technology Annex).1762  
 
13.2.4.1. Transfer control criteria 
Article 3 of the MTCR Guidelines has identified the following criteria that should 
be “taken into account” by Member States in licensing decisions: concerns 
about WMD proliferation; capabilities and objectives of recipient State missile 
and space programs; transfer significance for potential development of WMD 
                                                          
1759
 Missile Technology Control Regime website: http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html (accessed 1
st
 
September 2012). 
1760
 The 34 Member States are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States. For further 
information see: MTCR website: http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html. (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). In 
addition India, Israel, Romania, Republic of Macedonia and Slovakia  have committed themselves to 
maintaining export controls consistent with the MTCR. [Bureau of international security and non-
proliferation, MTCR fact sheet, 4
th
 March 2009, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/120017.htm (accessed 1
st
 
June 2012)].  
1761
 MTCR Guidelines, http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1762
 MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, MTCR/TEM/2011/Annex, 18
th
 November 2011, 
http://www.mtcr.info/english/MTCR-TEM-Technical_Annex_2011-11-18.pdf (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
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delivery systems; assessment of the end use of the transfers; applicability of 
relevant multilateral agreements; risk of controlled items falling into terrorist 
hands.1763 
 
13.2.4.2. Range of items controlled 
The MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex has been divided into 
Category I and II items. Category I items included: “complete rocket systems 
(including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding 
rockets)” and  “complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including cruise 
missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones)”… “capable of 
delivering at least a 500 kg "payload" to a "range" of at least 300 km.”1764 It 
should be noted that for “ballistic missiles”, “cruise missiles” and “other UAVs”, 
the “payload” is defined as “Munitions of any type (e.g. explosive or non-
explosive).”1765 Also included in Category 1 have been production facilities for 
such systems; and major sub-systems including rocket stages, re-entry 
vehicles, rocket engines, guidance systems and warhead mechanisms. The 
MTCR Guidelines have stated that “Particular restraint will be exercised in the 
consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will 
be a strong presumption to deny such transfers.”1766 They have been “licensed 
for export only on rare occasions.”1767 In addition, exports of production facilities 
for Category I items have been “prohibited absolutely.”1768  
 
Category II goods have included a wide range of equipment, technologies and 
other materials, many of which have uses other than for missiles capable of 
delivering chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.1769 Although not as 
sensitive as Category I items, Member States should apply criteria outlined 
under Article 3 of the MTCR Guidelines when considering whether to authorise 
a transfer of a Category II item. Any potential exports judged by the exporting 
                                                          
1763
 MTCR, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, Article 3, 
http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1764
 MTCR, Equipment, Software and Technology Annex (2011) op.cit., Category 1, Items 1.A.1 & 1.A.2 
1765
 MTCR, Equipment, Software and Technology Annex (2011) op.cit., Technical notes 1, 4 & 5. 
1766
 MTCR, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, Article 3, 
http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm (accessed 1
st
 June 2012).  
1767
 MTCR, Frequently asked questions, http://www.mtcr.info/english/FAQ-E.html (accessed 1st June 
2012). 
1768
 Ibid. 
1769
 MTCR, Equipment, Software and Technology Annex (2011) op.cit., Category 2. 
392 
 
country to be “intended for use in WMD delivery are to be subjected to a strong 
presumption of denial.”1770 
  
Since the MTCR has sought to halt the proliferation of delivery systems for 
“weapons of mass destruction” it is unclear whether this was intended to include 
those delivery systems designed to carry incapacitants. A case could be made 
for their inclusion given that certain “next generation” incapacitants could well 
cause “mass destruction” in the form of “mass casualties” and potentially “mass 
fatalities”. Furthermore, existing incapacitants such as BZ and their pre-
coursers, as well as SEB, are covered under chemical and biological weapons 
non-proliferation measures such as the Australia Group, not to mention the 
BTWC and CWC. The MTCR does not appear to specifically include delivery 
systems designed to carry RCAs within its scope. In practice, however, since 
many of the delivery systems capable of carrying incapacitants or RCAs will 
also be capable of carrying “classic” chemical weapons they will consequently 
be covered by the control regime in practice. 
 
13.3. Regimes addressing conventional arms and related (para)-military 
equipment 
The term “conventional arms” or “conventional weapons” has not been formally 
defined under international law. However, according to Brehm1771 these 
weapons can be distinguished from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as 
defined by the UN namely “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material 
weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed 
in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to 
those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.”1772 In contrast, 
Casey-Maslen has not utilised the term WMD and instead (citing the U.S. 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms1773) has 
                                                          
1770
 MTCR, Frequently asked questions, http://www.mtcr.info/english/FAQ-E.html (accessed 1st June 
2012).  
1771
 Brehm, M. Conventional arms transfers in the light of humanitarian and human rights law, LLM thesis, 
University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, February 2005. pp.6-9;  
1772
 United Nations Security Council Commission for Conventional Armaments Resolution adopted at its 
thirteenth meeting, 12
th
 August 1948. 
1773
 United States Joint Education and Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff.Joint Publication 1-02, DOD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 8th  November 2010, [as amended through 15th April 2012] ,  
United States Department of Defense, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1 02.pdf (accessed 1st 
June 2012), p.71. 
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considered that conventional weapons “are generally understood to refer to all 
weapons other than biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.” 1774  The issue of 
whether RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery should be 
considered as conventional arms does not appear to have been specifically 
addressed collectively by the international governmental community and 
remains open. Examination of the instruments regulating conventional arms 
transfers has shown divergence in the scope of items covered by such 
agreements and how they are described.1775 Consequently, whilst many 
mechanisms regulating the transfer of conventional arms do not currently 
appear to include RCAs, incapacitants or related means of delivery within their 
scope, a number do (see below).  
 
Similar ambiguities arise with regard to the criteria to be applied to determine 
whether specific conventional arms transfers should be permitted or prohibited. 
According to the UN Disarmament Commission Guidelines on International 
Arms Transfers of 1996, "Limitations on arms transfers can be found in 
international treaties, binding decisions adopted by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and 
purposes of the Charter."1776Furthermore, according to the Commission the 
scope of "Illicit arms trafficking is understood to cover that international trade in 
conventional arms, which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international 
law."1777 To date, however, neither the UN General Assembly nor any other 
competent UN body has established a set of explicit standards based on 
relevant international law which UN Member States should apply to the 
international transfer of conventional arms. A process to develop such 
                                                          
1774
 Casey-Maslen, S. Non-kinetic-energy weapons termed ‘non-lethal’  A Preliminary Assessment under 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, October 2010, p.4. 
1775
 For example, the UN Conventional Arms Register which has required UN Member States to provide 
information on exports and imports of seven categories of conventional arms, has not included RCAs or 
incapacitants or related means of delivery. See UN Conventional Arms Register was established under 
UNGA Resolution A/RES/46/36 [United Nations, General Assembly, 65th plenary meeting, 6
th
 December 
1991, General and complete disarmament, Transparency in armaments.]  In contrast the OSCE Principles 
Governing Conventional Arms Transfers has employed the term “conventional arms and related 
technology” but has not defined its scope, so may potentially be applicable to RCAs, incapacitants and 
related means of delivery. [See: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Principles 
Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, 25
th
 November 1993.]  
1776
 United Nations (1996) Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly 
resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991', UN Disarmament Commission, May 1996, Official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/51/42), 22
nd
  May 1996, paragraph 8. 
1777
 United Nations (1996) op.cit., paragraph 7. 
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standards through the negotiation of an international Arms Trade Treaty is 
currently under-way, and is discussed in Appendix 6 of this thesis. 
 
In contrast, from the 1990s onwards a number of regional and pluri-lateral 
bodies began to develop instruments or other measures regulating the trade in 
conventional arms and associated goods. Two of those encompassing RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery – the EU Common Position and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement - are examined below, whilst a third - the Code of 
conduct of Central American States – is discussed in Appendix 6 of this thesis.  
 
13.3.1. The Wassenaar Arrangement 
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was established in July 1996 with the 
expressed intention of contributing to “regional and international security and 
stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of 
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing 
destabilising accumulations.”1778 Consequently, WA Participating States have 
sought, through their national policies, to “ensure that transfers of these items 
do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities 
which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such 
capabilities.”1779 
 
The WA became operational in September 1996 and, as of 1st September 2012, 
comprised 40 participating States.1780  It has a Secretariat located in Vienna, 
Austria. Its decision-making body, the Plenary, normally meets once a year in 
December. Subsidiary bodies meet periodically. All decisions are taken by 
consensus and the deliberations are kept in confidence.1781 
                                                          
1778
 Wassenaar Arrangement, Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, 6
th
 July 1996, last 
amended December 2011, Purposes, Article 1, http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/5%20-
%20Initial%20Elements.pdf (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1779
 Ibid. 
1780
 As of 1
st
 June 2012, the Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States. For further details and links, see Wassenaar Arrangement, Participating 
States, http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1781
 Wassenaar Arrangement, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html 
(accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
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WA Participating States have agreed to: maintain national export controls on a 
range of commonly agreed listed items; report on transfers and denials of 
specified controlled items to destinations outside the Arrangement; exchange 
information on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies; and be guided by 
agreed Best Practices, Guidelines or Elements.1782 
 
13.3.1.1. Range of items controlled 
The range of materials controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement has been 
established in the WA Dual Use Goods and Technologies List and the WA 
Munitions List. 1783 RCAs are contained within the WA Munitions List, under the 
ML7 category [chemical or biological toxic agents, "riot control agents", 
radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials] as follows:  
“d. "Riot control agents", active constituent chemicals and combinations thereof, 
including: 1. α-Bromobenzeneacetonitrile, (Bromobenzyl cyanide) (CA) (CAS 
5798-79-8); 2. [(2-chlorophenyl) methylene] propanedinitrile,  
(o-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile) (CS) (CAS 2698-41-1); 3. 2-Chloro-1-
phenylethanone, Phenylacyl chloride (ω-chloroacetophenone) (CN) (CAS 532-
27-4); 4. Dibenz-(b,f)-1,4-oxazephine, (CR) (CAS 257-07-8); 5. 10-Chloro-5,10-
dihydrophenarsazine, (Phenarsazine chloride), (Adamsite), (DM) (CAS 578-94-
9); 6. N-Nonanoylmorpholine, (MPA) (CAS 5299-64-9);”1784  
 
Although ML7 has listed a number of widely used RCAs, important exceptions 
not specifically covered in this list include common chemical irritants like PAVA 
and OC. In contrast, DM (Adamsite) is covered even though the OPCW has 
recommended its use as an RCA be discontinued.1785 
 
                                                          
1782
 Wasenaar Arrangement website, introduction, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/howitworks.html 
(accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1783
 Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List,WA-LIST (11) 
1 Corr.*, 21
st
 February 2012, http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/2011/WA-
LIST%20%2811%29%201%20Corr/WA-LIST%20%2811%29%201%20Corr.pdf (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1784
 Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (2012) op.cit., 
ML7. 
1785
 In December 2000, following a recommendation by the OPCW SAB, the Executive Council concluded 
that DM was not suitable as an RCA. See: 001106 & 000315-16, Harvard Sussex Events Database, 
retrieved 7th July 2009. 
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The WA Munitions List has provided a definition of riot control agents as: 
“Substances which, under the expected conditions of use for riot control 
purposes, produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical 
effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.  
(Tear gases are a subset of "riot control agents".)” [Emphasis added].1786 
Although this definition was based upon Article II.7 of the CWC, the highlighted 
additional text recognised that the effects of such chemical agents might alter if 
not employed under the “expected conditions of use for riot control purposes.” 
However, exactly what these “expected conditions” were, has not been further 
defined. 
 
Incapacitating chemical agents have been included in the WA Munitions List 
under ML7(b) as: “b.3. CW incapacitating agents, such as: 3-Quinuclidinyl 
benzilate (BZ) (CAS 6581-06-2);” 1787  [Emphasis added]. Although only BZ was 
specifically mentioned in the control list to date, the wording of ML7 has implied 
that other chemical incapacitating agents could potentially be added to this list, 
but were not specifically controlled. Despite the widely reported use of  a 
fentanyl derivative by Russian Federation security forces in 2002, and reported 
research into a range of possible incapacitants by a number of States, ML7(b) 
has not been updated to include such agents. Ambiguities regarding the scope 
of this category and the range of agents controlled have been further 
exacerbated as the term “CW incapacitating agents” has not been defined in the 
WA Munitions List (or indeed elsewhere). 
 
ML7.a. of the WA Munitions List has covered: “Biological agents or radioactive 
materials, ‘adapted for use in war’ to produce casualties in humans or animals, 
degrade equipment or damage crops or the environment;”.1788 The term 
“biological agents” has not been defined and, unlike the chemical agents 
section, there has been no listing of specific agents covered. Although this issue 
has not been clarified by WA Participating States, ML7.a. has appeared to 
                                                          
1786
 Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (2012) op.cit., 
Definitions, Cat 1, ML7. 
1787
 Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (2012) op.cit., 
ML 7.b.3.a. 
1788
 Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (2012) op.cit., 
ML 7.a. 
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cover “less lethal” biological agents (potentially including RCAs such as OC and 
incapacitating agents of biological origin such as SEB) as long as they were 
“adapted for use in war” to produce human casualties.  
 
As well as including a range of chemical and biological agents, the WA 
Munitions List has under ML7.e. covered:  
“Equipment, specially designed or modified for military use, designed or 
modified for the dissemination of any of the following, and specially designed 
components therefor: …Materials or agents specified by ML7.a., ML7.b. or 
ML7.d.; or…CW agents made up of precursors specified by ML7.c.”1789  
 
It should be noted that ML7 e. has only covered equipment “specially designed 
or modified for military use”, consequently law enforcement dissemination 
mechanisms – even if identical to military devices - do not currently appear to 
fall within the scope of these controls. 
  
Finally, the WA Munitions list, under ML18, has also covered “specially 
designed or modified 'production' equipment for the 'production' of products 
specified by the Munitions List, and specially designed components thereof;” as 
well as “specially designed environmental test facilities and specially designed 
equipment thereof, for the certification, qualification or testing of products 
specified by the Munitions List.”1790 
 
13.3.1.2. Transfer control criteria 
All measures with respect to the Arrangement have been taken in accordance 
with national legislation and policies, and have been “implemented on the basis 
of national discretion.” 1791 Consequently, although the scope of items covered 
in Participating States' export controls have been determined by the WA lists, 
the practical implementation has varied from country to country in accordance 
                                                          
1789
 Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (2012) op.cit., 
ML 7.e. 
1790
 Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (2012) op.cit., 
ML 18. [For the purposes of ML18., the term “production” included design, examination, manufacture, 
testing and checking.] 
1791
 Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (accessed 1
st
 
June 2012). 
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with national procedures.1792 As the WA has stated, “the decision to transfer or 
deny transfer of any item will be the sole responsibility of each Participating 
State.”1793  
 
Participating States, have however, agreed certain guidelines, elements and 
procedures as a basis for decision making through the application of their own 
national legislation and policies. These included the advisory, non-binding 
“Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially 
Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons.”1794 This recommended 
that WA States consider a range of factors when making decisions on relevant 
transfers, including the risk that weapons would be used to commit or facilitate 
the violation and suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms or the 
laws of armed conflict, or be used offensively against another country or in a 
manner inconsistent with the UN Charter importance.1795   
 
13.3.2. EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
In December 2008, the EU Member States adopted an EU Council Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP “defining common rules governing control of exports of 
military technology and equipment”.1796 The Common Position has replaced and 
built upon the politically binding EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, adopted 
in 1998.1797  In addition to the 27 EU Member States1798 legally bound by the 
                                                          
1792
 Wassenaar Arrangement, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html 
(accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1793
 Wassenaar Arrangement, Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements (2011) op.cit., 
section II (scope), paragraph 3. 
1794
 Wassenaar Arrangement, Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially 
Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons, WA Plenary approved 3
rd
 December 1998 and 
amended by the WA Plenary in December 2004 and December 2011, 
http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/1%20-%20Elements%20for%20Objective%20Analysis.pdf  
(accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1795
 Ibid. Other factors included: implications for regional security; dangers of weapons accumulations 
causing regional arms races; record of the recipient State's adherence to arms control, non-proliferation 
and confidence and security agreements; levels of existing military expenditure; whether there are UNSC 
arms embargoes against the State or other States in the region; risks that weapons will be diverted to 
other end users including terrorist organisations, used for reverse engineering. 
1796
 Council of the European Union, Common Position 2008/944/CFSP adopted on 8 December 2008, 
Official Journal of the European Union L 335/99, 13
th
 December 2008, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:335:0099:0103:EN:PDF (accessed 1
st
 June 
2012). 
1797
 European Union, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, European Union, EU Council 8675/2/98, 
Rev.2, Brussels, 5
th
 June 1998, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf (accessed 
1
st
 June 2012). 
1798
 EU Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Irish Republic, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, U.K. 
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Common Position, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway “officially 
aligned themselves” with its “criteria and principles.”1799 Furthermore, 
Lichtenstein, Switzerland and Turkey had previously aligned themselves to the 
principles of the EU Code.1800  
 
13.3.2.1. Transfer control criteria 
In the Common Position pre-ambulatory paragraphs, Member States declared 
themselves “determined to set high common standards which shall be regarded 
as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, transfers of military 
technology and equipment by all Member States”1801 and to “prevent the export 
of military technology and equipment which might be used for internal 
repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability.”1802 
They also committed themselves to “strengthen the exchange of relevant 
information with a view to achieving greater transparency.” 1803 
 
The Common Position required that each Member State “assess the export 
licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List…on a 
case-by-case basis against the criteria of Article 2”1804, namely: international 
obligations and commitments; human rights and international humanitarian law; 
the internal situation of the country; regional peace, security and stability; 
national security; terrorism and respect for international law; the risk of diversion 
or re-export under undesirable conditions; and the compatibility of the exports 
with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country.1805  
 
                                                          
1799
 European Union, Thirteenth Annual Report According to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and 
Equipment, 2011/C 382/01, Official Journal of the European Union, 30
th
 December 2011, http://www. 
google.co.uk/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=council+common+position+2008%2F944%2Fcfsp+annual+rep
ort&gbv=2&oq=council+common+position+2008%2F944%2Fcfsp+annual+report&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_l=h
p.3...10156.32156.0.32297.51.25.0.26.2.0.187.2735.16j9.25.0...0.0.DkSv2dC9FDY (accessed 1
st
 June 
2012), p.1. 
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 EU NGO Coalition, Taking Control: The Case For a More Effective European Union Code of Conduct 
on Arms Exports, Saferworld, September 2004, pp.10-12.  
1801
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., paragraph 3.  
1802
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., paragraph 4. 
1803
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., paragraph 3. 
1804
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 1. 
1805
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 2. 
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Article 2, Criterion 2, regarding human rights and international humanitarian law, 
is of particular relevance. Under this Criterion, Member States shall: “deny an 
export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to 
be exported might be used for internal repression.”1806 They are also required 
to: “exercise special caution and vigilance” in issuing licences, “on a case-by-
case basis” and taking account of the nature of the military technology or 
equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been 
established by competent bodies of the United Nations, European Union or 
Council of Europe.1807 
 
Furthermore, in an important advance on the EU Code of Conduct text, the 
Common Position introduced a specific requirement upon Member States to 
assess “the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established 
by instruments of international humanitarian law” 1808 and to “deny an export 
licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be 
exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.”1809 
 
In addition to these binding export criteria, the Common Position also contained 
innovative operative provisions to combat “undercutting”. Member States are 
required to notify each other of arms export licences they have refused when a 
proposed arms export has failed to meet the Common Position criteria. 
Furthermore, before any Member State can grant a licence that has been 
denied by another Member State (for an essentially identical transaction in the 
preceding three years), it is required to consult the Member State that denied 
                                                          
1806
 In further clarificatory text, Article 2 stated: “For these purposes, technology or equipment which might 
be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of 
the use of this or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or 
where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use 
or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with Article 1 of this Common Position, the nature of 
the technology or equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security 
purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights 
instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.” [European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 2, 
Criterion 2]. 
1807
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 2, Criterion 2. 
1808
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 2.2. 
1809
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 2.2.c. 
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the original licence. Although the power to take the final decision remains with 
individual Member States, if a licence is granted in these circumstances, the 
licensing Member State will have to provide a detailed explanation of its 
reasoning.1810  
 
Further operative provisions imposed annual reporting obligations on Member 
States,1811 and required Member States to possess national legislation which 
enabled them to control the export of the technology and equipment of 
concern,1812 which extended beyond physical exports of goods to include 
transit, transhipment and brokering activities, as well as intangible transfers of 
technology.1813 
 
13.3.2.2. Range of items controlled 
Whilst the Common Position instituted relevant operative provisions and the 
criteria by which export applications will be judged, the EU Common Military 
List1814 and EC Regulation 1334/20001815 established the recommended range 
of items covered.1816 Examination of the EU Common Military List has shown 
that the relevant text effectively replicated the Wassenaar Control List wording 
with regard to RCAs1817, incapacitants1818 and their means of delivery1819. 
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 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 4. 
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 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 8. 
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 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 12. 
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 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 1. 
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 European Union, Common Military List of the European Union, (equipment covered by Council 
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military 
technology and equipment), (CFSP) (2012/C 85/01), adopted by the Council on 27
th
 February 2012, 
Official Journal of the European Union C 85/1,  http://www.google.co.uk/url?q=http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do%3Furi%3DOJ:C:2012:085:0001:0036:EN:PDF&sa=U&ei=IuDRT
9KMFdSM0wWKwIiVBA&ved=0CBIQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNFrNCW1ulN5K4Lc_bmlyQcTGCaT1g (accessed 
1
st
 June 2012). 
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 Article 6 of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP extended the scope of coverage to dual use goods and 
technologies covered by EC Regulation 1334/2000. For scope of this coverage see: EC Regulation (EC) 
No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items 
and technology, Official Journal of the European Communities, EN L 159/1, 30th June 2000.  
1816
 It should be noted that Article 12 of the EU Common Position stipulates that the EU Common Military 
List shall act as a reference point for Member States' national military technology and equipment lists, but 
shall not directly replace them. 
1817
 ML 7(a) covered “biological agents…‘adapted for use in war’ to produce casualties in humans or 
animals, degrade equipment or damage crops or the environment.” As with the WA list, no specific agents 
were cited. The wording potentially covered incapacitating biological agents (such as SEB) and RCAs of 
biological origin (such as OC), if they were adapted for use in war to produce casualties in humans. [See 
European Union, Common Military List (2012) op.cit., ML 7(a)]. ML 7(b) has specifically mentioned BZ and 
implied other incapacitants could be added to the control list. [See European Union, Common Military List 
(2012) op.cit., ML 7(b).3.a]. Consequently, a range of chemical agents including fentanyl and its 
derivatives that have reportedly been explored or indeed utilised as possible incapacitant agents by certain 
States are not explicitly covered at present.  
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Although the EU Common Military List has been in place since July 2000 and 
has been reviewed regularly,1820 the relevant text [regarding ML7 (a), (b), (d) 
and (e)] has remained unchanged.1821 Consequently, the direct “import” of WA 
language without adaptation at the time of drafting the EU Code of Conduct, 
and during subsequent revision of the text at the time of its transformation into a 
legally binding Common Position, appears to have “imported” limitations and 
ambiguities existing from the WA control regime into the EU control regime.   
 
EU Member States have been required to ensure full implementation of the 
Common Position in their national legislation or administrative rules. The 
situation regarding national transposition of the Common Position into Member 
States’ arms export control regimes has been monitored by the Commission 
and documented in the EU Annual Reports.1822 Because implementation of the 
Common Position has been mediated at the national level, the decisions on 
whether to deny or grant individual export licences have lain with the relevant 
Member States. Consequently, there has been a risk that the Common Position 
criteria would be interpreted differently by different Member States. To offset 
this, the Council developed a publicly accessible User’s Guide in 2003 (which 
has subsequently been updated) containing advice regarding the interpretation 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1818
 ML 7(d) has covered ‘Riot control agents’, active constituent chemicals and combinations thereof, 
including” CA, CS, CN, CR, DM and MPA”. [See European Union, Common Military List (2012) op.cit., ML 
7(d)]. Consequently, certain RCAs widely employed by law enforcement personnel such as PAVA and OC 
have been excluded from the control regime. Although the EU has partially addressed this deficiency by 
including OC and PAVA within the scope of EC Regulation 1236/2005, this instrument was solely intended 
to regulate transfers of security equipment that may be used to facilitate torture and ill-treatment. Beyond 
this limited range of transfers, the Regulation would not cover, and therefore would not prohibit, transfers 
of OC and PAVA which breached the criteria of the EU Common Position. 
1819
 ML 7(e) has covered equipment “designed or modified for the dissemination of …materials or agents 
specified by…ML7.b. or ML7.d.” [See European Union, Common Military List (2012) op.cit., ML 7.e.] This 
language, as with the relevant WA Munition List category, has only covered equipment “specially designed 
or modified for military use”. Consequently law enforcement RCA dissemination mechanisms – even if 
functionally similar to military devices - would appear to fall outside the scope of both lists. Whilst such 
restrictive language may be consistent with the WA purpose of ensuring that “regional and international 
security and stability”  are not undermined by developments in “military capabilities” [See Wassenaar 
Arrangement, Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements (2009) op.cit., Purposes, Article 1] 
the limitation of the Common Position's coverage solely to military technology and equipment has 
appeared to restrict its capability in halting transfers of goods frequently utilized in “internal repression”. 
1820
 European Union, EU Common Position, paragraph 16. The most recent version of the Common 
Military List of the European Union was adopted on 15
th
 February 2010.  
1821
 Article 3 of the Common Position stated that: “This Common Position shall not affect the right of 
Member States to operate more restrictive national policies.” A more inclusive list of incapacitants, RCAs 
and delivery mechanisms may therefore be added to individual national control lists. 
1822
 For latest summary transposition of the Common Position into Member State control regimes see: 
European Union, Thirteenth Annual Report (2011) op.cit., p.1 and Table C. 
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of the EU Code/Common Position criteria.1823 However, Holton and Bromley 
have maintained that: “whilst the user’s guide is a useful aid in the 
harmonization of EU arms export policies, little work has been undertaken to 
assess whether harmonization is actually taking place.”1824 
 
There have also been concerns about the limited public transparency 
mechanisms contained within the Common Position. Although the Common 
Position has required each Member State to produce a national annual report of 
“its exports of military technology and equipment”1825 such reports have not 
been harmonised, consequently the organisation of information and level of 
detail provided by different Member States has been extremely variable.1826 The 
Common Position has also required Member States to provide the Commission 
with “information on their implementation” of the Common Position, which would 
form the basis of an annual compilation report of Member State licences, 
produced by the Commission. 1827  However, this Annual Report (like many 
national reports) has only recorded licences granted by each Member State 
under the broad ML categories (e.g. ML7) and not by the subcategories (e.g. 
ML7(a)-(i)). 1828 Thus it has not been possible to ascertain whether a licence had 
been granted by a particular Member State for riot control agents ML7(d) or 
incapacitants ML7(b), or indeed protective and decontamination equipment 
(ML7 (f)), let alone whether a specific riot control agent had been exported.1829 
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 For the most recent version see: European Union, User's Guide to Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and 
equipment, 9241/09, PESC 545, COARM 25, 29
th
 April 2009, register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/ 
st09/st09241.en09.pdf (accessed 1
st
 June 2012).  
1824
 Holtom, P. and Bromley, M. The limitations of European Union reports on arms exports: the case of 
Central Asia, SIPRI Insights 2010/5, September 2010, p.4. 
1825
 European Union, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008) op.cit., Article 8.3. 
1826
 For links to most EU Member State annual reports, see Council of the European Union, Security-
related export controls II - Military equipment, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/non-
proliferation,-disarmament-and-export-control-/security-related-export-controls-ii?lang=en (accessed 1
st
 
June 2012).  
1827
 European Union, Council Common Position (2008) op.cit., Article 8.3. 
1828
 For latest version see: European Union, Thirteenth Annual Report (2011) op.cit.  
1829
 It should be noted that the level and quality of information contained with the EU compiliation reports 
has gradually increased over time. From 1999-2001 EU compilation reports only gave aggregate 
information of total licences granted by each EU Member State to world regions. In the 2002 and 2003 EU 
compilation reports total licences granted by each EU Member State to each destination were recorded. 
From 2003 to the present, EU Member State licences to each destination are further categorised 
according to broad ML category. For links to EU compilation reports from 1999-2009 see: Council of the 
European Union, Security-related export controls II - Military equipment, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1484&lang=en, (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
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It should also been noted that despite the increased harmonisation of arms 
transfer controls across the region, facilitated by the introduction of the EU 
Common Position, and the EU Code before it, irresponsible transfers of RCAs 
from the EU to military or law enforcement agencies that have persistently 
abused such agents, have been reported.1830  
 
13.4. Regimes addressing security equipment that can be utilised in 
torture and cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment 
The prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment (CIDTP) is absolute. It applies in all circumstances and, as part of 
international customary law, to all States.1831 However, despite such 
prohibitions, torture is still perpetrated in countries in all regions of the world. UN 
independent experts, UN bodies and non-governmental human rights 
organizations have documented the use of different types of equipment 
including RCAs and incapacitants to commit such torture and CIDTP.1832  
 
Previous UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture1833 as well as human rights NGOs, 
particularly Amnesty International and the Omega Research Foundation1834, 
have promoted the development of mechanisms to prohibit or severely restrict 
the transfer of a range of policing and security equipment that could be utilised 
for torture and CIDTP. In 2006 the European Union introduced the world’s first 
multilateral trade controls in this area.  
 
13.4.1. EC Regulation 1236/2005 
                                                          
1830
 See illustrative case study of French Government sanctioned transfers of RCAs and delivery 
mechanisms to Guinea, detailed in Appendix 7 of this thesis. For further examples, see: Amnesty 
International, Blood at the crossroads: Making the case for a global arms trade treaty, AI Index: ACT 
30/011/2008, 2008, pp.11-12; Amnesty International, Arms Transfers to the Middle East and North Africa: 
Lessons for an effective Arms Trade Treaty, ACT 30/117/2011, 19
th
 October 2011. 
1831
 This prohibition has been articulated in a number of international and regional human rights 
instruments, most notably the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 
10th December 1984, which entered into force on 26th June 1987). For further discussion see Chapter 12 
of this thesis. 
1832
 For further discussion, see Chapters 3, 4 and 12 of this thesis. 
1833
 See for example: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo Van Boven, 
Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2005/62, 15th December 2004, paragraphs 14 and 37. 
1834
 See for example: Amnesty International, Stopping the torture trade, ACT 40/002/2001, February 2001; 
Amnesty International, The Pain Merchants: security equipment and its use in torture and other ill-
treatment, ACT 40/008/2003, December 2003. 
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EC Regulation 1236/20051835, which entered into force in July 2006, is a legally 
binding instrument applicable to all EU Member States. The EC Regulation 
prohibited imports and exports to or from the European Union of certain goods 
“which have no practical use other than...for the purpose of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, so-called Annex II 
goods.1836 The EC Regulation also required national export authorisations for 
exports of certain items, “that could be used for the purpose of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, so-called Annex III 
goods.1837  
 
Article 6 of the EC Regulation obliged Member States to regulate the export of 
controlled items, and to deny authorisations for exports of such items “when 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that goods listed in Annex III might be 
used for torture” or other ill-treatment. 1838 Under Article 6.1, decisions on export 
applications for Annex III goods shall be taken by the competent authority “on a 
case by case basis” and taking into account “all relevant considerations, 
including in particular, whether an application for authorisation of an essentially 
identical export has been dismissed by another Member State in the preceding 
three years.” 1839 
 
Further operative provisions required States to: introduce rules imposing 
penalties on violators of the EC Regulation;1840 fulfil notification and consultation 
requirements;1841 implement information exchange mechanisms1842 to combat 
“undercutting”; and obliged States to produce public annual activity reports.1843  
 
13.4.1.1. Range of items controlled 
                                                          
1835
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain 
goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, Official Journal of the European Union, 30
th
 July 2005,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:200:0001:0019:EN:PDF (accessed 1
st
 June 
2012). 
1836
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Article 3. 
1837
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Article 5.  
1838
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Article 6.  
1839
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Article 6.1.  
1840
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Article 17. 
1841
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Article 11. 
1842
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005(2005) op.cit , Article 13. 
1843
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Article 17. 
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In order that the EC Regulation and consequent control regime could “take into 
account new data and technological developments, the list of goods covered by 
this Regulation should be kept under review and provision should be made for a 
specific procedure to amend these lists."1844 Consequently, Article 12 of the EC 
Regulation empowered the Commission to amend the lists of prohibited (Annex 
II) and controled (Annex III) goods.1845  
 
To date no RCAs or incapacitants have been included within the Annex II list of 
prohibited goods. However, the range of Annex III goods whose trade is 
controlled by the EC Regulation has included: 
“3. Substances for the purpose of riot control or self-protection and related 
portable dissemination equipment, as follows: 
3.1. Portable devices for the purpose of riot control or self-protection by the 
administration or dissemination of an incapacitating chemical substance1846 
3.2. Pelargonic acid vanillylamide (PAVA) (CAS 2444-46-4) 
3.3. Oleoresin capsicum (OC) (CAS 8023-77-6).”1847 
 
Furthermore, in December 2011, Annex III of the EC Regulation was amended 
to include a new category of controlled goods: “Products which could be used 
for the execution of human beings by means of lethal injection... Short and 
intermediate acting barbiturate anaesthetic agents.” 1848 This amendment 
specifically included, but was not limited to, amobarbital, pentobarbital, 
secobarbital and thiopental and their respective sodium salts.1849 Although this 
amendment was introduced with the intention of halting the transfer of such 
drugs for lethal injection, it brought within the EC Regulation’s scope 
“barbiturate anaesthetic agents”, some of which have reportedly been employed 
                                                          
1844
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005(2005) op.cit ,  pre-ambulatory paragraph 23. 
1845
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005(2005) op.cit., Article 12.2 and see also Article 
15. 
1846
 This item does not control individual portable devices, even if containing a chemical substance when 
accompanying their user for the user’s own personal protection. [See: European Union, Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Annex III, footnote.] 
1847
 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (2005) op.cit., Annex III, 
1848
 European Commission,  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1352/2011 of 20
th
  December 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be 
used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,  
L338/34, 21st December 2011, Annex III, paragraph 4. 
1849
 European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1352/2011 (2011) op.cit., 
Annex III, paragraph 4.1. 
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in CIDTP, including as “truth serums” in interrogations1850, or have been 
explored (though discounted) as potential incapacitant weapons by certain 
States.1851 In the future, if Member States were so minded, the EC Regulation 
could potentially be amended to specifically cover incapacitants intended for law 
enforcement purposes, with a prohibition on the transfer of such agents to end 
users likely to misuse them for torture and ill-treatment. If such a measure were 
to be agreed, additional relevant incapacitants could be added to Annex III.1852 
 
An additional potential mechanism to extend the scope of the EC Regulation 
through the introduction of a “catch-all” clause has been proposed by the UK1853 
and such measures have been supported by the European Parliament.1854 
Preliminary discussions between Member States and the European 
Commission on the potential merits of such a mechanism have been initiated, 
but no further details are available.1855 Since this “catch all” clause, if agreed, 
would allow individual Member States to prohibit the transfer of any item 
destined for use in torture and CIDTP, it could potentially cover all RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery not currently listed on the EC 
Regulation Annexes or the EU Common Military List. 
 
13.4.1.2. Potential development of controls in other countries, regions or 
internationally 
Growing international concern about the supply to law enforcement agencies of 
equipment used in torture and ill-treatment has also been reflected in the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) where, since 2001, a bi-annual resolution 
                                                          
1850
 For further discussion see chapter 12 of this thesis 
1851
 For example between 1953 and 1974 the US reportedly explored a wide range of potential 
incapacitant weapons including depressants (barbiturates and opiates), but rejected them as unsuitable. 
See for example: Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology and 
History, volume 2, (eds) Croddy E. and Wirtz, J., Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, inc 2005, p.229.  
1852
 Amnesty International and the Omega Research Foundation, No more delays: putting an end to the 
EU trade in “tools of torture”, ACT 30/062/2012, Amnesty International, June 2012, pp.24-26. 
1853
 UK Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Export Control Act 2002. Review of 
export control legislation (2007): Government's initial response to the public consultation (February 2008), 
as cited in: Amnesty International and Omega Research Foundation, From Words to Deeds: making the 
EU ban on the trade in ‘tools of torture’ a reality, EUR 01/004/2010, Amnesty International, February 2010, 
p.28. 
1854
 European Parliament resolution of 17
th
 June 2010 on implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0236, Trade in goods used for 
torture, (B7-0360, 363, 365, 368 and 0369/2010), paragraph 16. 
1855
 Amnesty International and Omega Research Foundation (2010) op.cit., p.28; Amnesty International 
and Omega Research Foundation (2012) op.cit., pp.27-28. 
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on torture and CIDTP has incorporated a paragraph on transfer controls. The 
most recent resolution adopted by UNGA in November 2011 contained the 
following strengthened language calling upon all States to: 
“take appropriate effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other 
measures to prevent and prohibit the production, trade, export, import and use 
of equipment that have no practical use other than for the purpose of torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”1856 
 
Whilst recognising the limitations and weaknesses of the EC Regulation text in 
certain areas and the inadequate or non-existent implementation of the 
instrument in some European countries,1857 a number of observers including the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture1858 and the European Parliament1859, have 
highlighted the potential for the EC Regulation to act as a model for similar 
controls in other regions or as the basis for international controls in this area. 
There are indications that trade officials from a small number of States outside 
the EU have shown interest in the introduction or further development of 
comparable measures to the Regulation in their countries.1860 
 
13.5. Embargoes on the transfer of arms and (para)-military equipment  
Embargoes on the supply of arms and (para)-military equipment to particular 
States or non-State actors have been increasingly deployed since the end of 
the Cold War by a wide range of individual States, regional, pluri-lateral and 
international organisations. Where such embargoes have covered RCAs, 
                                                          
1856
 United Nations, General Assembly, 66th Session, Third Committee, Torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, A/C.3/66/L.28 Rev 1, 8th November 2011, paragraph 24. 
1857
 For further detailed discussion including examples of OC and PAVA transfers of potential concern see, 
Amnesty International and the Omega Research Foundation, European Union: Stopping the Trade in 
Tools of Torture, POL 34/001/2007, Amnesty International, February 2007; Amnesty International and the 
Omega Research Foundation, (2010) op.cit. 
1858
 As quoted in European Council General Secretariat, Implementation of the EU Guidelines on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – stock taking and new implementation 
measures, 8407/1/08 REV 1, 18
th
 April 2008, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/hr/news129.pdf (accessed 1st June 2012). 
1859
 European Parliament resolution (17
th
 June 2010) op.cit., paragraph 21.  
1860
 Discussions between Amnesty International, Omega Research Foundation and US trade control 
official, April 2008; correspondence from Director General Bureau of Foreign Trade of Taiwan to Amnesty 
International, 5
th
 April 2004 [Both cited in Amnesty International and Omega Research Foundation (2010) 
op.cit., footnote 19.] In July 2010 the US Bureau of Industry and Security introduced amendments to US 
export controls that were similar and in certain areas went beyond some of those contained in the EC 
Regulation. [See US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Revisions to the 
Commerce Control List To Update and Clarify Crime Control License Requirements, Federal Register, 
volume 75, number 135, 15
th
 July 2010]. 
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incapacitants and related means of delivery, they have provided a potentially 
powerful mechanism for halting or at least restricting the supply of such agents 
to specific end users that have seriously misused or were likely to misuse them 
(normally in concert with other arms and (para)-military equipment) for grave 
human rights abuses, breaches of international humanitarian law or for armed 
aggression. The following section will explore the application of UN arms 
embargoes whilst embargoes introduced by regional or pluri-lateral 
organisations will be explored in Sections 13.5.2, 13.5.3. and in Appendix 8 of 
this thesis. 
  
13.5.1. United Nations embargoes 
Under Chapter seven of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) “may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply… complete 
or partial interruption of economic relations… and the severance of diplomatic 
relations”1861 when it has determined “the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”1862 Amongst the sanctions available 
to the UNSC are arms embargoes, which can be either voluntary or mandatory 
(and legally binding) upon all UN Member States. The UNSC Sanctions 
Committees website explains that the use of mandatory sanctions was intended 
to “apply pressure” on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the 
UNSC “without resorting to the use of force” and thus “offer the Security Council 
an important instrument to enforce its decisions”.1863  
 
Since the end of the Cold War the use of arms embargoes and other targeted 
sanctions has increased, and the range of purposes for which they were 
intended has also widened.  The UNSC has used them as a tool to repel 
aggression, restore democracy (and in certain cases protect human rights), and 
apply pressure to regimes supporting terrorist activities and others charged with 
international crimes.1864  Whereas sanctions have traditionally been used 
                                                          
1861
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 26th June 1945, San Francisco, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml (accessed 1st June 2012), Article 41, Chapter 7. 
1862
 United Nations (1945) op.cit., Article 39, Chapter 7.  
1863
 United Nations, UN Security Council Sanctions Committees: an overview, 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/  (accessed 1st June 2012). 
1864
 Stremlau, J. Sharpening Economic Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations, Report 
to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York: Carnegie Corporation, November 
1996. 
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against States, the UNSC also has increasingly imposed sanctions against a 
range of non-State actors. Of the 20 mandatory UNSC embargoes established 
from 1st January 1990 till 31st December 2009, 10 included provisions against 
non-State actors.1865 
 
13.5.1.1. Range of items controlled 
Analysis of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 
which established or amended embargoes adopted from 1st January 1990 to 
31st December 2009 has shown that none of them specifically cited RCAs, 
incapacitants or related means of delivery as items contained within their scope 
of coverage. 1866 However, the majority (14)1867 of the embargoes contained the 
following language in the description of goods covered: “Arms and related 
materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the 
aforementioned.”[Emphasis added].1868  
 
A further four UNSCRs which established embargoes contained variants on the 
terms “arms and related materiel” or “arms and munitions”, but did not 
specifically list “paramilitary equipment”.1869 In addition, a number of UNSC 
embargo Resolutions have explicitly allowed the transfer of “non-lethal military 
equipment” to certain end users in the embargoed country, such as 
peacekeeping troops1870 – thus indicating that the supply of such equipment to 
non-exempted end users was covered (and prohibited) under the scope of the 
embargo. Since RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery, appear to 
fall within the scope of all these terms it can be intimated that 18 of the 20 
                                                          
1865
 During this period UN embargoes were imposed against non-State actors in Afghanistan, Angola, 
DRC, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and against Al-Qaeda. For further information 
on these embargoes see Table 1, Appendix 8 of this thesis.  
1866
 For further information on these embargoes see Table 1, Appendix 8 of this thesis. 
1867
 During the period studied, UN embargoes were established against the following States or non-State 
actors: Afghanistan (Taliban); Eritrea; Eritrea & Ethiopia; Haiti; Iraq; Lebanon (non-governmental forces); 
Liberia; Libya; Rwandan rebel groups; Sierra Leonean Government and Rebels; Somalia; Sudan (Darfur); 
Taliban, Al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden. [See Table 1, Appendix 8 of this thesis for further details]. 
1868
 See for example UNSCR against Lebanese non-governmental forces: United Nations, UNSCR 1701 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on 11
th
 August 2006, Article 15.a. 
1869
 Embargoes against: Angola (UNITA); Cote d’Ivoire; DRC; Yugoslavia (FRY). [See Table 1, Appendix 8 
of this thesis for further details].  
1870
 See for example, UNSCR against Sierra Leonean rebel forces: United Nations, UNSCR 1171, 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3889th meeting on 5
th
 June 1998, Articles 2 and 3. 
411 
 
mandatory embargoes established during the period studied covered these 
items.  
 
As no UNSC embargo Resolution contained an annexed list detailing the 
specific range of arms and related equipment included within its scope, there is 
considerable ambiguity over precisely which RCAs, incapacitants and related 
means of delivery would be covered by each of the 18 embargoes. This 
ambiguity has been compounded by the fact that there have been no agreed 
definitions of key terms such as “paramilitary equipment”, “arms and related 
materiel” or “non-lethal military equipment”, nor have there been any indicative 
lists of materiel covered by these terms. Furthermore, although a number of UN 
Member States and regional or pluri-lateral organisations (such as the EU and 
the Wassenaar Arrangement) have agreed and published lists of arms, and 
military equipment whose export is regulated1871, there were and are still no 
international military or paramilitary lists accepted by all UN Member States and 
applicable to UN embargoes generally. Instead the scope of coverage for each 
embargo has and will be determined by national interpretation of the relevant 
descriptive terms in the UNSCR (and may also be informed by 
recommendations of relevant UN bodies such as UNSC Sanctions 
Committees). This of course presents the danger that different UN Member 
States will interpret the scope of arms and equipment to be embargoed 
differently, leading to inconsistent implementation and the potential weakening 
of the embargo regime.1872 
 
Although the majority of UN embargoes in force in the time period studied 
covered conventional arms and related military and paramilitary equipment, an 
additional small number have included weapons of mass destruction within their 
scope. For example, certain previous embargoes against Iraq prohibited the 
transfer of “[a]ll chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and 
all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support 
                                                          
1871
 All EU embargoes – including those implementing UNSCRs – cover at least all items in the EU 
Common Military List which contains certain RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery.  
1872
 Kirkham and Flew (2003) op.cit., pp.10-11. 
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and manufacturing facilities”.1873Furthermore, the current embargo in force 
against North Korea has prohibited the transfer of “items, materials, equipment, 
goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, 
which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or 
other weapons of mass destruction related programmes.”1874 Although it 
appears that these embargoes would not cover RCAs, they do appear to 
potentially cover materiel utilised in the production of certain incapacitating 
chemical or biological weapons. However, once again the specific goods 
covered by these terms, and consequently the embargoes’ scope, have not 
been detailed and are determined by national implementation. 
 
13.5.1.2. Monitoring and verification of embargoes 
Mandatory UN arms embargoes currently in force contain provisions for 
monitoring their implementation. As a minimum, a UNSC Sanctions Committee 
is normally established to undertake a range of monitoring tasks, which can 
include: seeking information from all UN Member States on embargo 
implementation measures; considering information concerning violations; 
periodic reporting on violations and violators to the Security Council; 
considering requests for humanitarian exceptions; providing guidelines for 
implementation; and making information publicly available through the 
media.1875 UNSC Sanctions Committees often face resource constraints and 
normally work within highly politicised environments. They have a varied record 
of effectiveness – which is often dependent on the personnel and personalities 
driving each one.1876 
 
The work of UNSC Sanctions Committees has been increasingly aided by 
Panels of Experts or Monitoring Groups – tasked with investigating serious 
suspected violations or allegations of non-compliance - some with notable 
                                                          
1873
 United Nations, UNSCR 687, Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3
rd
 April 1991, 
Articles 8.a and 24. 
1874
 United Nations, UNSCR 1718, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5551st meeting, on 14
th
  October 
2006, Article 8.a.(ii).e. 
1875
 Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)/Bonn-Berlin Process, Report of Expert Working 
Group IV, Monitoring and Enforcing UN Arms Embargoes, January 2001, p.5. 
1876
 BICC/Bonn-Berlin Process,  Monitoring and Enforcement of Arms Embargoes, in: Design and 
Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions, Brzoska,M. (ed), BICC, 
Bonn, 2001, p. 114. 
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success. For example, the Fowler Report on violations of sanctions against the 
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)1877 “was 
ground-breaking in its scope and candour”1878 in its exposure of the direct 
involvement of Burkina Faso, Togo and Zaire in sanctions-busting.  However, 
Fruchart et al have noted that in cases where the UN has mandated panels of 
experts or monitoring teams to investigate the implementation of arms 
embargoes, “they have reported that they lack the authority and powers to 
explore the ways in which the embargoes were breached.”1879  
 
A number of academic and NGO researchers have recommended measures to 
improve embargo monitoring, through strengthening the investigative powers, 
resources and time accorded to panels of experts.1880 Whilst others, notably 
BICC1881, have called for the establishment of a dedicated UN Sanctions Unit 
within the UN Secretariat tasked with strengthening the information-sharing, 
investigation, and enforcement functions of the UN. 
 
15.5.1.3. The effectiveness of UN arms embargoes 
UN bodies, as well as academic and NGO researchers, have highlighted the 
failings and limitations of UN arms embargoes.1882 In 2006, Sprague analysing 
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 Report of the panel of experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA in: United 
Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 10
th
 March 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, S/2000/203, 10
th
 March 2000. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm (accessed 1st June 2012). 
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 Shields,V. Verifying European Union arms embargoes, VERTIC, 18
th
 April 2005, p.10.  
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 Fruchart,D., Holtom, P.,Wezeman, S., Strandow, D. and Wallensteen, P. United Nations Arms 
Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour, SIPRI and Uppsala University, September 
2007, p.53. 
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 For example see: Fruchart,D. et al (2007) op.cit., pp.53; Amnesty International/Wood, B. Strengthening 
compliance with UN arms embargoes –key challenges for monitoring and verification, Amnesty 
International, IOR 40/005/2006, March 2006. 
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 BICC/Bonn-Berlin Process, Monitoring and Enforcement of Arms Embargoes, in: Design and 
Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions, Brzoska, M. (ed), BICC, 
Bonn, 2001. See also: Kirkham E. and Flew, C. (2003) op.cit., p.33; Epps, K. International Arms 
Embargoes, Project Ploughshares, September 2002, pp.6 & 9. 
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 See for example: UN Sanctions Secretariat, The experience of the United Nations in administering 
arms embargoes and travel sanctions, An informal background paper prepared by the United Nations 
Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, for: Smart Sanctions, the Next Step: Arms 
Embargoes and Travel Sanctions First Expert Seminar, Bonn, 21
st
-23
rd
 November 1999; Brzoska, M. (ed.), 
Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the 
‘Bonn–Berlin Process’, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn, 2001; Sprague, O. UN Arms 
Embargoes: an overview of the last ten years, Control Arms Briefing Note, Control Arms, 16
th
 March 2006; 
Fruchart,D. et al (2007) op.cit. See also the reports of the informal UN Working Group on General Issues 
on Sanctions, established by the UN Security Council on 17th April 2000 to to develop general 
recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions, reports available on 
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13 embargoes imposed since 1996, concluded that:  “None of these mandatory 
UN arms embargoes has stopped the supply of arms; sometimes the 
embargoes have made it logistically more difficult and expensive to acquire the 
desired arms, but available evidence suggests that on the whole violations of 
UN arms embargoes appear persistent, widespread and systematic.”1883 In 
addition, although “every one” of these embargoes had been “systematically 
violated”, Sprague noted that “only a handful of the many arms embargo 
breakers named in UN sanctions reports has been successfully prosecuted.”1884 
Similarly in 2007, Fruchart et al, analysing UN embargoes implemented since 
1990, concluded that there had been improved target behaviour in only a 
quarter of the 27 mandatory UN arms embargoes studied. 1885  
 
There are a range of factors believed to contribute to the limited effectiveness of 
UN embargoes including widespread lack of political will and insufficient 
resources committed to support enforcement,1886 ineffective border controls 
between the embargoed State and its neighbours, and the failure to incorporate 
arms embargoes into national legislation. Indeed, although all UN Member 
States have a legal obligation under Article 41 of the UN Charter to abide by 
mandatory UN embargoes and a duty to implement measures to ensure that 
persons within their jurisdiction also comply with the embargoes, reports by 
Woods1887 and Shields1888 both noted that many UN Member States have not 
made the violation of a UN arms embargo a criminal offence under their 
domestic law. Often ineffective national implementation is simply because many 
UN Member States do not possess the required technical or financial resources. 
                                                          
1883
 Sprague, O. (2006) op. cit., p.1.  
1884
 Sprague, O. (2006) op. cit. p.1. and p.5. 
1885
 Fruchart,D. et al (2007) op.cit., Executive Summary, p.x. 
1886
 However it should be recognised that many UN Member States do place considerable importance on 
fulfilling their obligations to implement and enforce UN embargoes, and consequently have halted 
attempted arms and equipment transfers to embargoed destinations from their territories or by their 
nationals. For example, the United States Justice Department reported on a successful investigation 
conducted by the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
officials resulting in the prosecution of a citizen of Cote d’Ivoire on charges of conspiring to smuggle goods 
out of the US in connection with a plot to illegally export 4,000 handguns, 200,000 rounds of ammunition, 
and 50,000 teargas grenades to Cote d’Ivoire which was then subject of a UN arms embargo. [See: 
Summary of major US export enforcement and embargo criminal prosecutions: 2007 to the present, 
February 2011, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/ documents/OngoingExportCaseFactSheet.pdf  
(accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1887
 Wood, B. Strengthening compliance with UN arms embargoes – key challenges for monitoring and 
verification, Control Arms, 2006, p.2. 
1888
 Shields, V.(2005) op.cit., p.11.  
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In addition, leading human rights organisations have highlighted the delays in 
imposition of certain UNSC embargoes which have allowed protagonists to a 
conflict or those engaged in human rights abuses to procure sufficient arms to 
continue their activities after the embargo is finally imposed.1889 Furthermore, 
there have been a number of cases where a humanitarian or human rights crisis 
has developed and the UN Security Council has been unable or unwilling to 
impose an arms embargo on the offending State or non-State actor. Indeed 
Kirkham and Flew have argued that UN arms embargoes “are seldom imposed 
solely on human rights grounds owing to the extreme sensitivity of some UN 
Member States as regards the concept of human rights and its application.” 1890 
Consequently, they have stated that “despite the egregious level of abuses 
being suffered by the populations of countries such as Burma/Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe, a UN arms embargo has yet to be imposed.” 1891 
 
Sprague has contended that:  
“Decisions to impose, or more importantly not to impose arms embargoes, are 
also largely guided by political considerations. Often the commercial, political or 
other strategic interests of any one member of the UN Security Council, means 
a decision to impose an arms embargo on a particular regime or armed group is 
not tabled or agreed.”1892  
 
Similarly, an important finding of the research conducted by Fruchart et al was: 
“…that the effectiveness of UN arms embargoes depends primarily on the 
capacity and will of UN member states, particularly the UNSC P5 states, arms-
supplying states, transit and transhipment states, and states neighbouring 
embargoed targets.”1893 In many cases neither the capacity nor political will has 
been manifest. 
                                                          
1889
 See for example Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports highlighting the delayed 
adoption and weak implementation of the UN arms embargo against Rwandan forces that had perpetrated 
genocide in that country between April and June 1994. See in particular: Amnesty International, Arming 
the perpetrators of genocide, AI Index: AFR 02/14/95, 13
th
 June 1995; Human Rights Watch, Arming 
Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War, 1
st
 January 1994.  
1890
 Kirkham E. and Flew, C. Strengthening embargoes and enhancing human security, Biting the Bullet 
Briefing 17, Sponsored by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003, p.9. 
1891
 Kirkham E. and Flew, C. (2003) op.cit., p.9. 
1892
 Sprague, O. (2006) op. cit., p.3. 
1893
 Fruchart, D. et al (2007), op.cit., p.51. 
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As a result of their research, a number of experts believe that a crucial element 
to improving the effectiveness of UN (and other) arms embargoes to limit arms 
flows to embargoed targets would be for all UN Member States to support 
global efforts to improve and harmonise arms export, transit and transhipment 
controls, specifically including the establishment of a set of legally binding and 
globally applicable guidelines for arms transfers, such as that in the proposed 
Arms Trade Treaty.1894 [See Appendix 6 of this thesis for further discussion of 
this initiative]. 
 
13.5.2. Arms embargoes established by regional and pluri-lateral 
organisations  
As the UN Sanctions Committee has noted, the “universal character” of the 
United Nations makes it an “especially appropriate body to establish and 
monitor [arms embargoes].”1895 However it is not the only body that has the 
authority to introduce such measures. Indeed there are a range of regional and 
pluri-lateral organisations and groupings of States that potentially can institute 
sanctions in this area, including the African Union, the Commonwealth, 
ECOWAS, the European Union, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of 
American States and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.1896  
 
However, apart from the EU which will be dealt with in detail below, no other 
regional body, pluri-lateral organisation or grouping of States has established 
systematic mechanisms for introducing and implementing embargoes on arms 
and security equipment. Whilst certain additional bodies have on occasion 
introduced embargoes, these have generally been poorly defined, non-
                                                          
1894
 See for example: Fruchart,D. et al (2007), op.cit., p.51; Sprague, O. (2006) op.cit., p.5; Wood, B. 
(2006) op.cit., p.3. 
1895
 Ibid. 
1896
 For further information on embargoes instituted by the EU from January 1990 till December 2009 see 
Table 2, Appendix 8 of this thesis. Embargoes instituted by other regional and pluri-lateral organisations 
during this period are summarised in Table 3, Appendix 8 of this thesis. Neither the League of Arab States 
nor the Organisation of American States instituted arms embargoes during this time period. However, on 
3
rd
 December 2011 the Ministerial Committee of the League of Arab States made a statement in which it 
announced sanctions including an embargo on the supply of weapons of all types to Syria by Member 
States. For further information on this embargo see the relevant entry on the  SIPRI arms embargo 
database available at http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/ eu_arms_embargoes/syria-1/league-of-
arab-states-embargo-on-syria (accessed 1st June 2012).   
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mandatory sanctions, without any form of monitoring or enforcement 
mechanism.1897 Furthermore, given the limited information available on such 
embargoes it is unclear which, if any, contain RCAs, incapacitants and related 
means of delivery within their scope of coverage.  
 
The effectiveness of embargoes imposed by such pluri-lateral or regional 
bodies may well be further undermined in practice as a result of failings in the 
relevant national export control regimes and border controls of a number of their 
Member States and the inability or unwillingness of relevant national authorities 
to cooperate to ensure effective enforcement across the entire control area. In 
addition, all such embargoes are of course limited in their ability to restrict 
supplies of arms and equipment reaching the embargoed State as a 
consequence of the restricted number of Member States that are bound by 
them. 
 
13.5.3. EU arms embargoes 
According to the European Commission, EU arms embargoes may be applied 
to “stop the flow of arms and military equipment to conflict areas or to regimes 
that are likely to use them for internal repression or aggression against a foreign 
country.”1898 EU embargoes can take two forms, the first, as a minimum, directly 
implements the corresponding UN arms embargo established under a UNSCR. 
Such EU embargoes – of which 20 have been introduced in the period from 
January 1990 till December 2009 - have often contained the same language 
and have covered the same arms and equipment as the UNSCR they have 
duplicated.1899 In certain cases, however, the coverage of these EU arms 
embargoes has been wider than the corresponding UN arms embargo in terms 
of geographic scope and entities embargoed, and/or the relevant EU embargo 
has been adopted long before the corresponding UNSCR1900. For example, the 
EU embargo against the entire Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was 
                                                          
1897
 For further information on these embargoes see Table 3, Appendix 8 of this thesis. 
1898
 European Commission, Restrictive measures, Spring 2008, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf  (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
1899
 For further information on these embargoes see Table 2, Appendix 8 of this thesis. 
1900
 In such circumstances these pre-existing EU embargoes can be amended, if necessary, following the 
adoption of the UNSCR to take into account new embargoed entities, etc. 
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established in April 19931901 whilst the corresponding UNSC embargo (which 
was limited to the Ituri and the North and South Kivu districts of the DRC) was 
not introduced until July 2003.1902 Certain EU arms embargoes have also had a 
wider scope of coverage in terms of goods embargoed. For example, the EU 
embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contained an explicit ban 
on the transfer of “equipment which might be used for internal repression or 
terrorism”1903 which was not included in the corresponding UNSC embargo.1904 
 
In addition to such UNSCR implementing embargoes, the EU has instituted 
autonomous embargoes in situations where a human security, human rights or 
humanitarian crisis has developed and the UN Security Council has not been 
able for reasons of realpolitik to adopt a UNSCR. From January 1990 till 
December 2009 the EU has instituted autonomous embargoes on Guinea, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.1905  
 
Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (previously 
Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community) has allowed for 
an embargo relating to military goods to be implemented by EU Member States 
using national measures.1906 It is, therefore, common practice that arms 
embargoes are imposed by a politically binding Common Position or Council 
Decision, and enforced on the basis of export control legislation of EU Member 
States.1907 EU arms embargoes have generally comprised, at a minimum, a 
prohibition on the “sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel 
                                                          
1901
 European Union, Council Declaration 7
th
 April 1993; see also Council Common position of 21
st
 October 
2002 on the supply of certain equipment into the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2002/829/CFSP. 
1902
 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1493, 28
th
 July 2003. 
1903
 European Union, Common Position of 19
th
 March 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of Article 
J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
European Union Journal, number L 095, 27/03/1998, pp. 1-3. 
1904
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1160, adopted by the Security Council at its 3868
th
 
session, 31
st
 March 1998. 
1905
 For further information on these embargoes see Table 2, Appendix 8 of this thesis. A further 
noteworthy embargo introduced just prior to this period was that against China, see: Declaration of 
European Council, Madrid, 27
th
June 1989. 
1906
 See: European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1992, Article 296;  European 
Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 346. The various versions of the Treaty of 
Rome are available at <http:// eurlex. europa.eu/en/treaties/>. 
1907
 European Union, European Commission – External Relations, Sanctions or restrictive measures, 
Spring 2008, available from http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm (accessed 1st June 2012), 
p.8. 
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of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts.”1908 
 
In addition, these “core arms” embargoes have often been accompanied by an 
additional prohibition on the “provision of financing and financial assistance and 
technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to military 
activities and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of arms and 
related materiel of all types.”1909 Unlike the “core arms” embargoes, these 
additional prohibitions have been imposed through Council Regulations which 
were directly applicable and had direct effect in the EU Member States, creating 
obligations and rights for those subject to them (including EU citizens and 
economic operators). Their application and enforcement has been a task 
attributed to the competent authorities of the EU Member States and the 
Commission.1910 
 
A number of analysts have highlighted the potential difficulties with this dual 
mechanism. For example, Shields has argued that “[T]his divergence in the way 
specific elements of embargoes are implemented is a fatal flaw because 
sanctions regimes are on uneven legal footing at their inception. This can lead 
to insufficient implementation and a multitude of interpretations, resulting in 
disjointed and ineffective policy.”1911 
 
13.5.3.1. Range of items controlled 
Prior to the end of 2003, there had been a certain ambiguity regarding the range 
of arms and equipment covered by EU arms embargoes. This was caused by a 
lack of harmonisation of wording in texts authorising EU embargoes, including 
failures to define key terms used such as “arms and related materiel” and to 
explicitly describe the list of goods covered.  In 2003, the European Council 
embarked upon an exercise of examination of its sanctions practice and policy. 
This resulted in the European Council’s adoption of “Guidelines on sanctions”, 
                                                          
1908
 See for example: European Union, Council Common Position 2005/792/CFSP of 14
th
 November 2005 
concerning restrictive measures against Uzbekistan. 
1909
 See for example: European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1859/2005 of 14
th
 November 2005 
imposing certain restrictive measures in respect of Uzbekistan. 
1910
 European Union, European Commission – External Relations (Spring 2008) op.cit., pp.7-8. 
1911
 Shields,V. (2005) op.cit., p.17.  
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which established standardised wording for EU embargoes, and declared that 
“unless otherwise specified, [EU] arms embargoes should be interpreted as 
covering at least all those goods and technologies included in the 2000 
Common List of Military Equipment.”1912 Consequently all EU embargoes, be 
they autonomous or those implementing UNSCRs, cover the range of RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery listed in the EU Common Military 
List – but would not include goods such as the commonly used chemical 
irritants OC and PAVA. 
 
In addition, the 2003 “Guidelines on Sanctions” recognised that “If a policy of 
internal repression is at the basis of the imposition of restrictive [EU] measures, 
a ban on exports of certain [security] equipment is appropriate.”1913 In such 
circumstances “EU legal instruments could refer to or use an agreed list when 
deciding an embargo on exports of items that could be used for internal 
repression.”1914 A “list of equipment which might be used for internal repression” 
was annexed to the “Guidelines on sanctions” and included: “Portable devices 
designed or modified for the purpose of riot control or self-protection by the 
administration of an incapacitating substance (such as tear gas or pepper 
sprays), and specially designed components therefor”.1915 Subsequently, the 
autonomous EU embargoes for Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Myanmar, Uzbekistan 
and Zimbabwe, which were imposed on human rights grounds, were further 
strengthened by Council Regulations covering equipment that could be used for 
internal repression (and these Regulations incorporated the text above referring 
to tear gas and pepper sprays).1916 Consequently, these five embargoes, at 
least, did appear to cover OC and PAVA within their scope. In 2009, however, 
the revised “Guidelines on Sanctions” contained a shortened “list of repression 
                                                          
1912
 Council of the European Union, Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures 
(Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, EU document 15579/03, 3
rd
 
December 2003. For the most recent revised text see: Council of the European Union, Guidelines on 
Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, EU document 17464/09, 15
th
 December 2009. See also Council of the 
European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), EU document 
10198/1/04 REV 1, 7 June 2004, which outlines the Council’s view of sanctions, and how and when it 
would use them.  
1913
 Council of the European Union, EU 15579/03 (2003) op.cit., paragraph 16. 
1914
 Ibid. 
1915
 Council of the European Union, EU 15579/03 (2003) op.cit., Annex I, paragraph 23. 
1916
 See for example: European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 314/2004 of 19
th
 February 2004 
concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Zimbabwe, Annex I, Article 22. 
421 
 
equipment” which no longer incorporated text on tear gas and pepper 
sprays.1917 Consequently, it appears that subsequent EU sanctions introduced 
on human rights grounds did not explicitly cover those tear gases and pepper 
sprays (such as OC and PAVA) that were not specifically identified in the EU 
Military List.1918  
 
13.5.3.2. Monitoring and verification of embargoes 
In 2004, pursuant to the EU’s Sanctions Guidelines, a “Sanctions Formation” of 
the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group (RELEX) was created and 
mandated with the development of best practices in the implementation and 
application of restrictive measures through the exchange of information and 
experiences.1919 Analysts have, however, highlighted the limited effectiveness 
of such mechanisms to monitor embargo implementation. For example, in 2005 
Shields highlighted the “notable, even critical, lack of monitoring and 
enforcement provisions in EU arms embargoes” and specifically criticised the 
lack of “mandatory reporting or information exchange concerning 
implementation, violations or decisions handed down by national courts.”1920  
 
In 2010, Holton and Bromley reviewed EU arms embargo implementation and 
concluded that there were no “independent monitoring mechanisms to ensure 
implementation and to assess the positive and negative impacts” of such 
sanctions. 1921 The researchers highlighted the limited mandate of 
RELEX/Sanctions which “only exchanges information on alleged violations” and 
cannot “investigate or commission investigators” into such alleged violations. In 
addition, RELEX/Sanctions had no mechanisms to publicly report on the 
implementation and enforcement of EU arms embargoes or on investigations of 
alleged violations.1922 These concerns were exacerbated by the lack of 
adequate oversight by the Council of the European Union. In 2005 the Council 
                                                          
1917
 Council of the European Union, EU 17464/09 (2009) op.cit., Annex II. 
1918
 For example the EU autonomous embargo introduced against Belarus on human rights grounds by 
Council Decision 2011/357/CFSP and implemented through Council Regulation (EU) No 588/2011 does 
not incorporate the relevant text on tear gas or pepper spray within the list of repression equipment. 
1919
 European Union, European Commission – External Relations (Spring 2008) op.cit., p.9. 
1920
 Shields,V. (2005) op.cit., p.18.  
1921
 Holtom, P. and Bromley, M. The limitations of European Union reports on arms exports: the case of 
Central Asia, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2010/5, September 2010, p.19, 
books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1005.pdf (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
1922
 Holtom, P. and Bromley, M. (2010) op.cit., p.19. 
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stated that there should be “regular reporting on the implementing measures 
and enforcement actions taken by Member States to give effect to restrictive 
measures”1923, however according to Holton and Bromley the Council did not 
subsequently “call... for [any] reports on investigations into alleged and actual 
violations.”1924 
 
13.6. Conclusions 
Transfer control regimes could form an important element of a HAC approach to 
the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery, providing 
mechanisms for combating proliferation and misuse of these agents and goods 
by prohibiting their transfer, at least in circumstances where their use is deemed 
inappropriate, e.g. as a method of warfare or to facilitate human rights abuses. 
 
However, existing transfer control regimes have important limitations. Apart 
from the BTWC and the CWC, which can be regarded as global disarmament 
and non-proliferation regimes incorporating transfer control mechanisms, the 
agreements highlighted are either politically-binding or if legally-binding are of 
limited membership. Furthermore, the resulting control regimes have divergent 
transfer control criteria and cover differing ranges of agents and goods within 
their scope. Current attempts to introduce global transfer controls in the form of 
an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) would potentially be an important advance in this 
area, provided that the Treaty's scope encompassed (or provided mechanisms 
to expand coverage to encompass) RCAs, incapacitants and related means of 
delivery. 
 
In addition, the fairness and legitimacy of certain existing regional and pluri-
lateral transfer controls – such as the Australia Group - has been questioned. If 
such mechanisms are employed, particularly in isolation, there is a danger that 
they will be seen by those States outside the regimes as discriminatory or as 
attempts by certain States to keep the perceived benefits of certain agents to 
                                                          
1923
 Council of the European Union, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive 
measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, document 
15114/05, Brussels, 2
nd
 December 2005, paragraph 80, as cited in Holtom, P. and Bromley, M. (2010) 
op.cit., footnote 18. 
1924
 Holtom, P. and Bromley, M. (2010) op.cit., p.5. 
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themselves. Furthermore, the reliance upon such transfer controls as the 
principal or indeed only mechanism to address RCAs, incapacitants and related 
means of delivery would prove ineffective as it would fail to sufficiently address 
the dangers of existing agent production as well as future indigenous 
development in new States. Such concerns could, at least partially, be 
overcome if transfer control mechanisms were to be employed as part of a HAC 
approach to the regulation of such agents (i.e. if such mechanisms were 
coupled with stringent regulation of RCA use for law enforcement purposes and 
a moratorium or prohibition on development and use of incapacitants for law 
enforcement purposes1925 in potential supplier States).  
 
Legally binding embargoes (particularly those introduced by the UN) on the 
supply of arms and security equipment are potentially important tools for halting 
or at least restricting the supply of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of 
delivery to specific end users. The employment of such embargoes could 
become a powerful adjunct in a HAC approach to address the misuse of these 
agents; to be utilised, as a measure of last resort, in cases of persistent, 
widespread and/or serious abuse (e.g. in gross human rights violations) or 
where there was a significant danger to international peace and security. 
However, in practice such embargoes are currently difficult and time-consuming 
to introduce relying on strong and widespread inter-governmental support 
(particularly from the P-5 members of the UNSC). Even when such embargoes 
are adopted they often have limited effectiveness in practice due to ambiguities 
in their scope of coverage, delayed and patchy implementation, and poor or 
non-existing monitoring and enforcement measures.  
 
                                                          
1925
 Development, stockpiling, transfer or use of RCAs, incapacitants (or indeed any other toxic chemical) 
intended as a means of warfare is already currently prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
See Chapter 6 of this thesis for further discussion. 
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Chapter 14: The role of civil society in regulation of riot control agents, 
incapacitants and their means of delivery 
 
14.1. Introduction 
Prior to the late 1990s and early 2000s, much academic research and inter-
governmental discourse on chemical and biological arms control and 
disarmament had focussed on the actions of States in both the development 
and regulation of these weapons. Consequently the activities of civil society 
were largely marginalised or ignored. Whilst such State-centric analytical 
frameworks may have had some utility during the Cold War and early post-Cold 
War periods when States were considered the sole actors in this sphere, this 
situation has changed with the increasing recognition by the international 
community of the potential involvement for good or ill of non-State actors in this 
area.  
 
Furthermore, given the evident ambiguities and limitations of the existing State 
centric chemical and biological weapon control regimes, compounded by 
inadequate and patchy national implementation, and the failures of States 
Parties and international organisations to challenge reported treaty violations by 
other States; exploring the potential role that civil society, particularly the 
scientific community, can play in monitoring and regulating such agents may 
well prove fruitful. As part of the second stage of the HAC analytic process, this 
chapter will therefore investigate the potential application of “societal 
verification” as a complement to the existing official verification mechanisms; 
the development of a “culture of responsibility” amongst the scientific 
community; and finally the possible roles that scientists, academics and other 
civil society actors can play in informing and influencing the actions of States in 
this area.  
 
14.2. Societal monitoring and verification 
Whilst the concept of societal verification had been discussed in the peace and 
disarmament literature for many years under terms such as “citizens reporting”, 
“inspection by the people”, “knowledge detection” or “social monitoring”, it had 
until fairly recently been utopian in nature. The idea was originally introduced in 
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the late 1950s by Bohn1926 and Melman1927, and then utilised in the 1960s by 
Clark and Sohn1928 in the context of ongoing discussions between the Soviet 
Union and United States about the feasibility of general and complete 
disarmament of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 
 
Rotblat noted that: “After it became obvious that the political climate was not 
ripe for such a radical remodelling of the world’s security system, and with the 
intensification of the Cold War and declining stature of the United Nations, the 
subject of citizen's reporting ceased to be a topic of interest, although papers 
elaborating certain aspects of the concept appeared in various journals from 
time to time”1929, such as that by Portnoy.1930 
 
In the 1990s, Rotblat and others, principally around the Pugwash group, “…took 
up these old ideas and applied them to the concept of a treaty on the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons.”1931 In the following decades, Deiseroth1932 and 
others have continued to develop and promote societal verification and have 
sought to apply its concepts to other arms control and disarmament treaties. For 
example Falter has noted that “societal verification is most important where 
other verification provisions have not been politically established, as is the case 
for the Biological Weapons Convention.”1933     
 
                                                          
1926
 Bohn, L. Rand Corporation Memorandum, 1956, as cited in Rotblat, J. Societal Verification, in Rotblat, 
J., Steinberger, J. and Udgaonkar, B., A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Desirable? Feasible? Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colarado, US, 1993. 
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 Melman, S. (ed.) Inspection for Disarmament, Columbia University Press, New York 1958. 
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 Clark, G. and Sohn, L. World Peace Through World Law (2nd ed.), Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1960, p.267. 
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 Rotblat, J. (1993) op.cit., pp.105-106. 
1930
 Portnoy, B. Arms Control Procedure: Inspection by the People - A Revaluation and a Proposal,  
Cornell International Law Journal, volume 4, number 2, 1971, as cited by Rotblat, J. (1993) op.cit. 
1931
 Deiseroth, D. Societal verification: wave of the future? 2000 Verification Yearbook, VERTIC, 
http://www.vertic.org/assets/VY00_Deiseroth.pdf. (accessed 1st May 2012), p.267. 
1932
 Deiseroth, D. (2000) op.cit.; Deiseroth, D. Societal verification: Citizen reporting and whistleblowing as 
integral elements of the disarmament process and of technological and other verification systems, Books 
on Demand, Norderstedt, 2
nd
 edition, 2010, available at: 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=J7PgE1dEzFwC&pg=PA5&lpg=PA5&dq=%22Societal+verification:+Ci
tizen+reporting+and+whistleblowing+as+integral+elements+of+the+disarmament+process+and+of+techno
logical+and+other+verification+systems%22&source=bl&ots=28JoKeC773&sig=HTmj5nERgRa69xsYBwA
ZtvEgP8U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=xBm2T4PpHYLX0QWrr43JCg&ved=0CEcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22Soc
ietal%20verification%3A%20Citizen%20reporting%20and%20whistleblowing%20as%20integral%20eleme
nts%20of%20the%20disarmament%20process%20and%20of%20technological%20and%20other%20verif
ication%20systems%22&f=false (accessed 1
st
 May 2012). 
1933
 Falter, A. Including civil society into confidence building: protecting whistleblowers and societal 
verification, Scientists in: Assessing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (eds) Finney, J. and 
Slaus, I., IOS Press, 2010, p.291. 
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Although there is no agreed formal definition of societal monitoring and 
verification, Diseroth has described societal verification as: 
“connot[ing] the involvement of civil society in monitoring national compliance 
with, and overall implementation of, international treaties or agreements. One 
important element is citizens’ reporting of violations or attempted violations of 
agreements by their own government or others in their own country... A more 
recent development is civil society monitoring of global compliance with 
international agreements. In contrast to official verification organisations 
employing professional experts, societal verification may involve the whole of 
society or groups within it.”1934 
 
Similarly, Rotblat contended that: 
“The main form of societal verification is by inducing the citizens of the countries 
signing the treaty to report to an appropriate international authority any 
information about attempted violation going on in their countries. For this 
system of verification to be effective it is vital that all such reporting becomes 
the right and the civic duty of the citizen. This right and duty will have to become 
part of the treaty [and] of the national codes of law in the countries party to the 
treaty.”1935 
 
Rotblat also highlighted the specific potential role of the scientific community: 
“Apart from relying on sporadic observations, organizations of scientists and 
technologists could be set up for the specific purpose of acting as a watchdog of 
compliance with treaties, by monitoring the activities of individuals likely to 
become involved in illegal projects. Such monitoring can be done, without 
appearing to spy on one's colleagues by keeping a register of scientists and 
technologists, and by noting changes of place of work or pattern of publications 
(or their absence). Other “give aways” of attempted clandestine activities 
include the start of new projects at academic institutions without proper 
justification; the recruitment of young scientists and engineers in numbers not 
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warranted by the declared purpose of the project; or the large scale 
procurement of certain types of apparatus, materials, and equipment.”1936 
 
However, Rotblat has acknowledged that “even if governments were persuaded 
to pass laws to make reporting legitimate, [which itself would be a revolutionary 
development and counter to the existing arms control and disarmament policy 
and practice of many States] this goes so much against traditional loyalties that 
it would require a considerable educational effort to induce people to act on it 
voluntary”.1937 Consequently he stated that “Implementation [of societal 
verification] requires a change in certain attitudes of the general public, which 
may take time.”1938 
 
The establishment of a global societal verification network - involving large 
numbers of civil society actors resident in all States party to relevant chemical, 
biological or nuclear treaties, who are able to  monitor their State's 
implementation of treaty obligations - seems to be quite idealistic in the near to 
medium term. However, a more limited form of societal verification can be 
envisaged, comprised of a smaller number of elite vanguard groups of activist 
researchers, who have access to the relevant technical expertise and can, at 
the very least, undertake open source monitoring and analysis. Due to 
resource, personnel, political and security constraints, such groups are likely to 
be limited in terms of the countries from which they can operate and 
consequently the quantity and quality of information they are able to receive, 
particularly from inaccessible regions and closed or semi-closed authoritarian 
countries. Despite such constraints, variant forms of such elite and limited 
societal monitoring are presently carried out for certain environmental and 
human rights agreements and have been taken up by certain arms control and 
human security communities to monitor agreements prohibiting landmines and 
cluster munitions, and regulate small arms and light weapons.1939  
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Societal verification of the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and means of 
delivery appears, to date, to be at a rudimentary level with ad hoc, limited and 
uncoordinated research activities being carried out by a small number of bodies. 
Some illustrative examples of research activities that have been or could be 
utilised for such work will be explored below. 
 
14.2.1. Open source monitoring and analysis 
A small number of academic and non-governmental organisations1940 have 
undertaken monitoring and analysis of open source information relating to the 
research, development and utilisation of incapacitants, RCAs and related 
means of delivery by States and non-State actors. Others, particularly human 
rights and civil liberties organisations1941 have concentrated upon the transfer 
and/or misuse of RCAs by military, security or police officials.  
 
Although research and development programs for RCAs, incapacitants or 
related means of delivery are often considered to be issues of national security 
and remain classified, information albeit partial can sometimes be obtained from 
monitoring: commercial documentation (e.g. company annual reports, product 
documentation, industry publications); scientific papers and conferences; and 
government policy papers and tender solitications for relevant new 
technologies/means of delivery. Non-governmental researchers, particularly in 
North America and Europe, can potentially obtain information on these activities 
or on relevant government policies regarding such weapons through utilising 
national governmental oversight, transparency and freedom of information 
mechanisms.  
 
Open source monitoring and analysis is often time consuming, resource 
intensive, and the information obtained can be limited and heavily censored (or 
redacted) - as a result of national security restrictions and commercial 
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confidentiality considerations.1942 Furthermore, as the Sunshine Project has 
discovered and described, sometimes government officials or agencies can 
attempt to conceal potentially controversial material by exaggerating 
exemptions allowed for under relevant legislation, thereby “trying to keep 
secrets that they are not legally entitled to maintain.”1943 Sometimes, however, 
the documents obtained do provide important information on the policy and 
practices of States in this area. Furthermore, although uncovering and 
highlighting new information and analysis on government programs is often the 
primary purpose of employing freedom of information legislation or other 
transparency mechanisms, another very important benefit lies in “asserting and 
maintaining the public's right to this information.”1944  
 
Despite the methodological difficulties and the limitations in the information 
obtained, such work is vital to the formation of an informed public discourse on 
the existing threats and potential dangers of the proliferation and misuse of 
RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery. In addition, it can also help 
in development of timely and realistic publicly available threat assessments 
relating to research and development, deployment or utilisation of such 
weapons in specific countries. Furthermore, information derived from civil 
society research can be presented to relevant intergovernmental organisations, 
most notably the OPCW. At present, such evidence would not be formally 
recognised by the OPCW, unless it was submitted by a State Party. However if 
reliable and compelling, the information may serve to alert relevant Member 
State or Technical Secretariat officials to an issue of potential concern and 
potentially lead to the OPCW Director General raising the issue informally with 
relevant States1945, or alternatively a State Party utilising the relevant 
consultation, clarification and fact finding mechanisms available under the 
CWC.1946 
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14.2.2. Field missions and witness testimony 
Independent scientists, health professionals and NGOs can sometimes collect 
their own information, first hand, from on-site investigations or may be able to 
utilise information (e.g. witness testimony) and analyse materials (e.g. weapons 
shells, clothing fragments, blood, soil samples, etc) obtained from other civil 
society actors operating in the field (e.g. journalists, national NGOs, etc). There 
are several potential constraints upon such investigations including access, 
logistics and translation; safety considerations for researchers and witnesses; 
difficulties ensuring chain of custody, as well as establishing the 
representativeness of the information obtained. Despite such constraints, 
material collected during field missions can provide information that could not 
be obtained by any other means, potentially allowing identification of toxic 
chemical agents utilised during a military or law enforcement operation 1947 or 
conversely casting doubt on allegations of such use.1948  
 
14.3. Building a culture of responsibility within the life science and 
biomedical communities 
In its 2004 public statement “Preventing hostile use of the life sciences”, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared:  
“If measures to prevent the hostile use of advances in the life sciences are to 
work, a culture of responsibility is necessary among individual life scientists. 
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This applies whether these scientists are working in industry, academia, health, 
defense or in related fields such as engineering and information technology.”1949  
 
According to the ICRC, such a culture of responsibility was also needed “within 
the institutions that employ scientists and fund research in the life sciences.” 1950 
Similar calls to the scientific (and medical) communities have also been made 
by the States Parties to the BTWC and the CWC at Review Conferences.1951 
The following sections of the chapter will explore the current range of initiatives 
being undertaken by those in the scientific and medical communities to nurture 
a culture of responsibility, beginning with the growing recognition of the “dual 
use” dilemma and the consequent requirement for effective oversight of 
research. This will then be followed by a discussion of the potential utility of 
oaths, codes and pledges and the parallel processes of education and 
awareness-raising in building the appropriate norms of behaviour for the 
scientific and biomedical communities. The practical application of such 
principles by individual scientists through such practices as whistle-blowing will 
be explored as well as the duty of individual scientists to inform the policies and 
practices of Governments in this area. 
 
14.3.1. Regulating “dual use” research 
Whilst scientific discoveries and their application are intrinsic to the advance of 
civilisation, most science to varied degrees is “dual use” or “multi-use”1952 in 
nature – it has the potential for benign and malign pathways and application. A 
balance must be achieved between allowing scientific progress and open 
source disclosure, whilst ensuring against potential misuse of that knowledge. 
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To date, much of the discourse amongst the life science community concerning 
how best to combat the proliferation and misuse of chemical and biological 
weapons has concentrated on regulating the actions of individual life scientists 
conducting “dual use” research of potential concern namely - “research that, 
based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide 
knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others 
to pose a threat to public health and safety, agriculture, plants, animals, the 
environment, or material.’’1953 Highly influential in this discourse have been the 
2004 Fink Report 1954  and the 2006 Lemon Report 1955 both produced under the 
auspices of the National Research Council of the U.S. National Academies. 
Both reports highlighted the importance of taking a comprehensive approach to 
analysing “dual use” research of potential concern, with the Lemon Report 
recommending the adoption of “a broadened awareness of threats beyond the 
classical ‘select agents’ and other pathogenic organisms and toxins, so as to 
include, for example, approaches for disrupting host homeostatic and defense 
systems and for creating synthetic organisms.”1956The broad threat spectrums 
enunciated by both reports, and particularly that of the Lemon Committee, 
appeared to capture incapacitants (but not RCAs) within their scope.  
 
As a result of the Fink and Lemon Reports, and the work of others,1957 a range 
of oversight structures and processes have been established by U.S. and 
European governments, scientific bodies, academic institutions, funders and 
publishers to review “dual-use” research of potential concern, in order to assess 
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the risks and benefits of such research and determine whether the proposals 
needed to be modified or withdrawn.1958  
 
However, following analysis of the application of such oversight measures in 
practice, Rappert has concluded that: “such procedures rarely conclude that 
manuscripts, grant applications or experiment proposals should not be 
undertaken or restricted.”1959 Similarly, Van Aken and Hunger have analysed 
the application of biosecurity policies agreed by a group of 32 influential science 
journals under which manuscripts could be modified or rejected where “the 
potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits.”1960 
Despite such policies having been established in 2003, Van Aken and Hunger 
found in 2009 that no manuscript had ever been rejected on security 
grounds.1961 Rappert has contended the “same could be said” of those funders 
that have established submission-oversight systems.1962  Furthermore, Rappert 
has stated that “even more notable with these review processes is the 
infrequency with which they have identified items ‘of concern’ in the first 
place.”1963 Whilst information relating to the research controls of government 
departments (especially defence-related ones) is not readily available, Rappert 
has argued that in relation to universities and other publicly funded agencies “it 
seems justifiable to conclude that — barring dramatic changes — oversight 
processes will identify little research as posing security concerns and will stop 
next to nothing.”1964 
 
Others have criticised the voluntary nature of the existing controls on life 
science “dual use” research. For example, commenting upon the release of a 
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draft of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) Proposed 
Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies 
for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information,1965 the Sunshine 
Project Director, Hammond stated that the "NSABB is divorced from reality if its 
members believe that another set of voluntary NIH [National Institutes of Health] 
guidelines is sufficient, and would be remotely effective, at preventing dual-use 
disasters..."1966 Research conducted by the Sunshine Project from 2004 to 2007 
indicated that many U.S. organisations obliged to follow NIH guidelines, did not 
do so.1967 A 2007 Sunshine Project survey discovered that 18 of the top 20 U.S. 
biotechnology companies did not comply with existing voluntary NIH 
biotechnology guidelines.1968 Instead of a voluntary approach, Hammond 
stated: "Effective federal management of dual-use risks requires making safety 
and security oversight truly mandatory and subject to the sobering light of public 
scrutiny.”1969  
 
As well as concerns about the implementation of such voluntary oversight 
systems in practice, a further concern relates to the limited range of issues 
being considered by such bodies.  The discourse and much of the current 
activity appears to be concentrated upon preventing the diffusion of “dual use” 
knowledge, skills and materials to various non-State actors with malign intent, 
principally terrorist organisations. Insufficient attention has been given to 
utilising existing “dual use” monitoring mechanisms or adopting additional 
process to specifically combat the misuse of “dual use” expertise in State 
programmes, even though national chemical and biological weapon research 
and development programmes arguably pose a greater danger to the CWC and 
BTWC than the limited activities of non-State actors in this area. 
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14.3.2. Oaths, codes and pledges for the life science community 
One approach to building a culture of responsibility has been through the 
development of a range of non-binding ethical codes, codes of conduct and 
oaths or pledges. An early advocate of such activities was Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate Professor Joseph Rotblat who declared in his 1995 Nobel acceptance 
speech that: 
“The time has come to formulate guidelines for the ethical conduct of scientists, 
perhaps in the form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath...At a time when science 
plays such a powerful role in the life of society, when the destiny of the whole of 
mankind may hinge on the results of scientific research, it is incumbent on all 
scientists to be fully conscious of that role, and conduct themselves accordingly. 
I appeal to my fellow scientists to remember their responsibility to humanity.”1970 
 
The development of ethical codes of conduct became one of the priority areas 
during the BTWC inter-sessional process. Subsequently, initiatives supporting 
such codes were undertaken by a wide range of scientific associations and 
organisations including the American Society of Microbiology,1971 National 
Academy of Sciences, Royal Society,1972 International Centre for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology, International Union of Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology, and the International Council for the Life Sciences. These 
activities have been complemented and stimulated by the ICRC as well as the 
work of individual scientists and academics.1973  
 
In comparison to the time and energy expended in the life sciences, the 
chemical science community’s efforts to develop codes of conduct have been 
more limited. In 2004, the President of the International Union of Pure and 
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and the Director-General of the OPCW agreed  a  
joint  project  on  chemistry  education,  outreach,  and  the  professional 
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conduct of chemists. This led to a joint IUPAC/OPCW international workshop in 
2005 which concluded that codes of conduct were needed for all those engaged 
in science and technology using chemicals so as to “protect public health and 
the environment and to ensure that [such] activities… are, and are perceived to 
be, in compliance, with international treaties, national laws  and  regulations  
such  as  those  relating  to  illicit  drugs,  chemical  and  biological  weapons, 
banned  and  severely  restricted  chemicals…”1974  The Conference also 
concluded that such codes were “complementary to national implementing 
legislation for the CWC” and would “help to achieve in-depth compliance 
throughout academia, industry, and government of those engaged in science 
and technology using chemicals.” They would also “extend awareness of the 
general-purpose criteria of both the CWC and the BTWC and thus help ensure 
its effective implementation.” 1975The Conference also recommended that 
IUPAC should develop a model code of principles as well as draft elements for 
codes which might be promulgated to IUPAC national adhering authorities 
(NAOs) and associate national adhering authorities (ANAOs) urging them to 
review any existing codes to ensure these elements are included.1976 IUPAC 
and its Committee on Chemical Research Applied to World Needs 
(CHEMRAWN) subsequently initiated a project to develop such a code. 1977 The 
project was completed in November 2011 and although a formal IUPAC code of 
conduct has not been established to date, guiding principles for a code were 
developed and promoted.1978 
  
The proponents of codes of conduct assert their potential utility in helping to 
sensitise life (and chemical) scientists to the dangers of “dual use” research, 
and to reinforce the importance of, and promulgate, ethical “red lines” where the 
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legal prohibitions or normative taboos are already clearly defined and widely 
accepted. However, the effectiveness of such an approach, to date, has been 
questioned by a range of scholars.1979 One important limitation of the majority of 
code based initiatives is that the resulting instruments are aspirational and non-
binding in nature with no clearly identified penalties elaborated for those 
individuals who breach the prohibitions, or mechanisms established to monitor 
and enforce such prohibitions.  
 
Recognising the weaknesses of self-governance initiatives to effect change in 
this area, some have called for codes of conduct to become binding with those 
breaching such codes facing sanction from their peers [or the State.] For 
example Rotblat in a letter to a Pugwash Workshop on Science, Ethics and 
Society in 2004 stated his belief that: 
...[S]ome believe that the search for knowledge overrides all other 
considerations and that scientists should be entitled to ignore the ethical 
elements of their work...The harm to society that has resulted from such 
attitudes has brought science into disrepute, and action is needed to restore the 
proper image of science.  The introduction of a “hippocratic” oath is our example 
of such action, but it should perhaps be given more than a symbolic value.  
Perhaps the time has come for a binding code of conduct, where only 
those who abide by the code should be entitled to be practicing scientists, 
something which applies now to medical practice.”1980 [Emphasis added]. 
  
However, examination of the literature reveals that no such binding codes of 
conduct prohibiting or severely constraining research, development or utilisation 
of biological or chemical agents (and that would be applicable to RCAs or 
incapacitants) have been established by any national or international scientific 
organisation to date. 
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Rappert has noted that “...if codes are to go beyond reiterating platitudes about 
the abhorrence of using modern biology toward malign ends, then they are 
likely to confront major issues of controversy. For instance, codes could 
comment on the acceptability of disputed attempts to develop “non-lethal” 
incapacitating agents…”1981 However, it is those areas of dispute or 
controversy, such as research and development of incapacitants, where codes 
remain silent or at best provide ambiguous guidance. Similarly, as with “dual 
use” research oversight, whilst numerous codes condemn and seek to prevent 
the involvement of scientists in development of biological and chemical 
weapons by non-State actors, it is questionable whether enough energy has 
been devoted to targeting the more contentious issues of the involvement of life 
scientists in State-run weapons programmes. More recently there have been 
some indications of an increasing awareness amongst certain life science 
communities of the dangers of co-option into State programmes, and initiatives 
undertaken to address these dangers.1982  
 
As well as questioning the effectiveness of self-governance measures – 
particularly codes of conduct - concern has also been raised over the time and 
resources devoted to such initiatives, particularly as other aspects of the CWC 
or BTWC control regimes are in need of strengthening. For example, in 2006, 
Perry Robinson stated his belief that the international community should: “…put 
most effort into (a) enhancing the OPCW and (b) strengthening the norm 
[against biological and chemical armament]. In comparison, the various other 
sorts of proposal, such as codes of conduct for scientists, seem mere tinkering 
at the edges, useful though they are as topics for international discourse at 
times when real progress is politically difficult.”1983  
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Similarly, in 2006 Corneliussen questioned: 
“…why voluntary self-governance regimes—and codes of conduct in 
particular—are being given so much attention in policy discussions about 
preventing the misuse of biological research when they appear to have 
significant shortcomings in practice. Indeed, why have individual scientists 
become the target of the policy discussions when it is generally accepted within 
the disarmament community that the greatest risk of misuse is at the level of 
national biological weapons programmes?... Preventing these state-level 
programmes in the future should therefore be a primary concern, rather than 
implementing codes of conduct for life scientists.” 1984 
 
Corneliussen further contended that: 
“…the current sole focus on codes, and the extensive investment of resources 
that accompanies it, might well serve to detract from other more crucial 
regulatory measures that target not only individual scientists but also state 
programmes. Without this plurality of regulatory measures in place, codes of 
conduct are doomed to fail.” 1985  
 
In 2010, Rappert concluded that despite the energy and resources expended 
upon the development and promotion of codes, such “efforts to devise 
meaningful codes have largely floundered.” Rappert contended that: “In no 
small part, this has been due to the lack of prior awareness and attention by 
researchers as well as science organisations to the destructive applications of 
the life sciences. Before codes can help teach, education is needed.”1986 
 
14.3.3. Education, awareness-raising and promulgation of the CWC 
The OPCW has formally recognised the important roles that education, 
promulgation and awareness raising initiatives can play in facilitating national 
implementation of the CWC and in combating the development and use of 
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chemical weapons.1987 In order to facilitate work in this area, the OPCW in 2001 
established its Ethics Project with the aims of promoting the “development of 
awareness” among chemistry/engineering professionals of the “object and 
purpose of the CWC” and a “culture of compliance” with the requirements of the 
Convention; integrating ethical and scientific aspects of chemical weapons 
disarmament into chemistry and chemical engineering education;1988 and 
attempting to establish a “non-proliferation code of conduct” for professionals 
working with chemicals. 1989 
  
Following analysis of preliminary surveys indicating that “very few educational 
institutions include ethical issues in their curricula”, the Ethics Project sought to 
work with universities to “target students pursuing degrees in chemistry and/or 
chemical engineering”1990 and to engage National Authorities of States Parties 
and international organisations such as UNESCO.1991 It has also collaborated 
with scientific societies and professional associations – most notably IUPAC1992 
- to “develop public awareness of the ethics involved in the CWC to target 
relevant professionals.” 1993 
 
Despite the recognition of the importance of education and awareness-raising 
by successive CWC Review Conferences, and the OPCW institutional 
machinery potentially available to assist such initiatives, it appears that activity 
in this area has been relatively weak and un-sustained1994, with limited 
engagement by both governmental and non-governmental communities. As a 
2008 IUPAC report acknowledged: 
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“Awareness in the scientific and technological communities in all countries 
about the CWC and its norms, prohibitions, and implementation requirements 
remains poor. This calls for increased outreach by States Parties and the 
OPCW; at the same time, it also proves the need for further efforts to 
incorporate ethical norms and knowledge about the CWC and the dual-use 
nature of advances in science and technology into chemistry education...The 
requirements and norms of the CWC should become a regular part, at an early 
stage, of the education of every student of chemistry and chemical 
engineering.”1995  
 
Furthermore, it appears that the educational initiatives that have been 
undertaken to date – including those developed by IUPAC - have concentrated 
upon the non-contentious areas of the CWC. Although there has been some 
(albeit limited) material produced regarding the regulation of RCAs, there do not 
appear to be any significant attempts to address the contested obligations 
regarding incapacitants.1996  
 
14.3.4. Education and awareness-raising amongst the life science 
community 
Although States Parties to the BTWC have voiced support for education, 
promulgation and awareness raising activities amongst the life science 
community regarding the Convention and measures to combat biological 
weapons development and use1997, surveys undertaken from 2005 onwards 
consistently reveal low levels of awareness amongst life scientists in this 
area.1998 In a 2009 Nature article, Dando highlighted the “lack of engagement 
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with this issue among life scientists” which he considered 
“alarming”1999specifically with regard to the consequent dangers of the misuse 
of scientific and technological advances for the development of incapacitant 
weapons.  
 
In a 2006 paper reviewing the effectiveness of then existing education and 
awareness raising initiatives, Rappert, Chevrier and Dando concluded: “Many of 
the calls and statements surveyed earlier regarding the need for education and 
outreach are largely just that…Thus far, the translation of these calls into 
educational activities have been rather modest.”2000 
 
Furthermore they stated that: 
“In such circumstances it is quite unrealistic to expect that simply, for example, 
adding a lecture to a standard course in the life sciences will make a great deal 
of difference ... in-depth implementation of the BTWC within States Parties 
requires a significant effort on education and outreach for such implementation 
to be effective. To achieve this, a simple declaration as at previous Review 
Conferences about the importance of education will be insufficient and States 
Parties will need to take concerted action to ensure increased educational 
provision and outreach.”2001  
 
Similarly, in 2010 Whitby and Dando stated that “correcting this deficiency in 
education and awareness-levels of life scientists will be a massive task.”2002 It is 
one that commentators believe will require action by a broad range of 
constituencies involved in life-science education including, governments, bodies 
responsible for the administration of standards in higher education, funders of 
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life-science education, civil society groups and non-governmental organisations 
involved in the production of educational material, and teachers and trainers.2003 
Unlike the education and promulgation activities for chemists which were 
facilitated in part by the OPCW, corresponding activities amongst the life 
science community are currently being driven primarily by academic and NGO 
bodies).2004 Such life science initiatives have actively explored a range of 
“contested” issues, such as the development of incapacitants2005, which appear 
to have been largely avoided in previous CWC focussed activities. 
 
14.3.5. Public awareness initiatives about “dual use” concerns  
Whilst a number of albeit relatively small and isolated initiatives have been 
undertaken to educate and raise awareness amongst chemists and life 
scientists regarding “dual use” dilemmas and the potential dangers of research 
being misused for chemical or biological weapons development, there do not 
appear to be any sustained activities designed to foster greater awareness and 
knowledge of such issues beyond these scientific communities. In 2010, 
Rappert noted that: “Scant efforts made prior to 2001 (and even since) by 
scientists to popularise how their work might aid the production of bioweapons 
indicate the historical pattern of not seeking to foster wider debate and 
awareness.”2006   
 
It is, however, worth considering whether and how those scientists, academics 
and educators, concerned about incapacitants and RCAs, and who are 
currently conducting CBW education and awareness raising activities, can also 
engage with key civil society actors in areas such as human rights, international 
humanitarian law and medical ethics who at present have limited or no 
knowledge of the dangers posed by the potential harnessing of advances in 
chemistry and the life sciences to hostile purposes. The education and 
engagement of such expert communities may well enrich and inform the 
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existing discourse concerning incapacitants and RCAs, and potentially broaden 
the range of actors seeking effective restrictions of such weapons. In 
considering such issues it may be worth exploring the roles of civil society 
awareness-raising initiatives and public education in helping to build successful 
multi-disciplinary coalitions dedicated to addressing complex issues such as the 
prohibition of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions; addressing 
climate change; and promoting the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court. 
 
14.3.6. Developing and applying ethical standards for health professionals 
In addition to life scientists, the participation of physicians and other health 
professionals in previous State-run RCA or incapacitant weaponisation 
programmes has been documented in a range of countries including, for 
example, South Africa, the U.K. and the U.S.2007 More recently a number of 
health professionals in certain countries have voiced support for medical 
involvement in the research and development of incapacitant weapons. For 
example, Czech anaesthesiologists who had been engaged in the incapacitant 
weapons development programme funded by the Czech military have argued 
that: “…many agents used in everyday practice in anesthesiology can be 
employed as pharmacological non-lethal weapons. An anaesthetist familiar with 
the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of these agents is thus familiar 
with this use. As a result, he or she can play a role in combatting terrorism.”2008  
 
The necessity of medical participation for the viability of incapacitant research 
has been highlighted by Gross, who has argued that chemical incapacitants are 
among a limited range of “less lethal” weapons that are in effect: “‘medicalized’ 
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in that they rely on advances in neuroscience, physiology, and pharmacology 
and on the active participation of physicians and other medical workers.”2009 
 
Gross has further contended that: 
“Some wonder whether it might be possible to build nonlethal weapons without 
the help of medical doctors and restrict weapons design, development, and 
testing instead to medical scientists, but there is no nonlethal weapons program 
that can do this. Medical oversight, in the very least, is crucial to test devices 
that flirt with the limits of human endurance. Even if one might isolate medical 
doctors from weapons research...this becomes impossible if we consider the 
entire medical community, which includes health care professionals and 
medical scientists alike. They may be the last people you want to build 
weapons, but, sometimes, they are the only ones who can.”2010 
 
In comparison to the life science community, ethical discourse amongst certain 
sectors, at least, of the medical professional community regarding the 
involvement in development and use of “less lethal” chemical weapons appears 
to be more advanced.  There are a number of ethical codes and declarations 
that are potentially applicable and may well constrain the involvement of health 
professionals in this area. Firstly, there are a range of declarations and 
regulations that guide health professionals in situations of conflict and unrest, 
and specifically prohibit their involvement in torture, ill-treatment and other 
forms of human rights abuse.2011 
 
The World Medical Association [WMA] Declaration of Tokyo has stated that: 
“the physician shall not countenance, condone or participate…[nor]…provide 
any  premises, instruments, substances or knowledge to facilitate the practice of 
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torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or to diminish 
the ability of the victim to resist such treatment.”2012   
 
In addition, the WMA Regulations in Times of Armed Conflict has clearly stated 
that it was “deemed unethical” for physicians to: 
“Give advice or perform prophylactic, diagnostic or therapeutic procedures that 
are not justifiable for the patient's health care…Weaken the physical or mental 
strength of a human being without therapeutic justification…Employ scientific 
knowledge to imperil health or destroy life... Condone, facilitate or participate in 
the practice of torture or any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”2013  
 
The WMA has also sought to develop ethical guidelines in the area of weapons 
development, for example by prohibiting biomedical involvement in the 
development of certain internationally outlawed weapons. In its 1990 Rancho 
Mirage Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons, the WMA stated that: 
“…the World Medical Association considers that it would be unethical for the 
physician, whose mission is to provide health care, to participate in the research 
and development of chemical and biological weapons, and to use his or her 
personal and scientific knowledge in the conception and manufacture of such 
weapons.” 2014 
 
Furthermore, under the Declaration, the World Medical Association: “condemns 
the development and use of chemical and biological weapons… asks all 
governments to refrain from the development and use of chemical and 
biological weapons… [and] asks all National Medical Associations to join WMA 
in actively supporting this Declaration.” 2015 
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In its 2002 Washington Declaration on Biological Weapons, the WMA 
recommended: 
 “…the World Medical Association and National Medical Associations worldwide 
take an active role in promoting an international ethos condemning the 
development, production, or use of toxins and biological agents that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes…[and 
that]… the World Medical Association urge all who participate in biomedical 
research to consider the implications and possible applications of their work and 
to weigh carefully in the balance the pursuit of scientific knowledge with their 
ethical responsibilities to society.”2016 
 
In addition to such WMA Declarations and Regulations, guidance has been 
developed by national medical associations and other medical bodies2017 on the 
ethical considerations surrounding health professional involvement in weapons 
development more generally. Certain national medical bodies have also 
established mechanisms and structures to implement ethical standards, 
including ethics boards, which have the authority to suspend or disbar 
physicians from practising medicine in cases of extreme misconduct.2018 
 
There are thus ethical frameworks and mechanisms in place that describe and 
regulate the duty of health professionals to abide by and promote aspects of 
human rights and international humanitarian law, and specifically prohibit 
engagement in acts such as torture or the development of biological and toxin 
weapons. Whilst these and other ethical standards – particularly those 
concerned with medical research involving human subjects2019 - can in theory 
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be applied to the development and utilisation of incapacitants and RCAs, this 
does not appear to have occurred in a consistent manner to date. There are no 
internationally accepted guidelines specifically determining the permissibility or 
non-permissibility of physician involvement in the development, testing or 
utilisation of so-called “less lethal” weapons in general and incapacitants and 
RCAs in particular. Indeed the issue appears, at present, to be both under-
explored and contentious, with a spectrum of opinion held by health 
professionals and medical ethicists. 
 
Amongst national medical associations, it is the British Medical Association that 
has taken the lead in the development of ethical guidance for the health 
community on the issue of “less lethal” chemical weapons, and in particular 
incapacitants. In a 2010 presentation to an expert meeting convened by the 
ICRC on incapacitants, the BMA's Head of Science and Ethics, Professor 
Nathanson, stated that: “[D]octors cannot develop weapons, participate in the 
use of weapons or of interrogation or otherwise use their medical and medico-
scientific skills for anything other than the alleviation of suffering, while 
remaining doctors with the duties and responsibilities inherent in that title.”2020 
 
Previously, in its 2007 publication “Drugs as weapons”, which explored the 
implications of incapacitant research, development and use,2021 the BMA 
declared that:  
“...doctors should not knowingly use their skills and knowledge for weapons’ 
development for the same reasons that these ethical considerations oppose 
doctors’ involvement in torture and the development of more effective methods 
of execution. In other words, the duty to avoid doing harm rises above, for 
instance, a duty to contribute to national security.”2022 
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The BMA report specifically recommended that national organisations that 
represent healthcare professionals should:  
“Work to promote the norms prohibiting the use of poisons, and therefore the 
BTWC and the CWC. They should further promote understanding that the use 
of drugs as weapons would violate such norms…Advocate against the use of 
drugs as weapons and not be involved in the training of military or law 
enforcement personnel in the administration of drugs as weapons.”2023 
 
At present no other national medical associations appear to have issued 
statements or developed guidance on this matter. Consequently, the issue does 
not appear to have been specifically addressed formally by the World Medical 
Association during its General Assembly or in any other public WMA policy 
body.2024 Given the importance of medical participation to development, testing 
and utilisation of incapacitants and RCAs, the development of clear guidance in 
this area is needed from the WMA and professional associations representing 
other health professionals such as anaesthetists and medical toxicologists. 2025 
The potential impact of the application of medical ethics on “less lethal” 
weapons development is illustrated by a case study describing the temporary 
suspension of a U.K. incapacitant research project in the mid-1960s (detailed in 
Appendix 9 of this thesis).  
 
14.3.7. Non-participation/whistle-blowing 
Any serious attempt by State or non-State actors to develop new or indeed 
existing chemical or biological weapons be they considered “less lethal” or 
otherwise, would require the involvement of an array of scientists, engineers, 
technicians and other ancillary workers. Whilst such staff are essential to the 
development and production of such weapons they are also potentially capable 
                                                          
2023
 British Medical Association (2007) op.cit., p.24. 
2024
 A review was undertaken of all relevant publicly available World Medical Association documentation 
from January 1990 to May 2012. 
2025
 The limits of what should be considered acceptable and unacceptable involvement by physicians and 
other health professionals needs to be determined. There are a range of inter-related questions to 
consider including: whether it is acceptable to work on RCAs or incapacitants intended for law 
enforcement as opposed to military purposes? Whether it would be ethical for physicians and others to test 
incapacitants and RCAs on vulnerable elements of the population such as children, the old, those with pre-
existing respiratory conditions? If such testing is not acceptable, how then can physicians determine 
whether an agent is safe, and consequently if such safety margins cannot be determined, should health 
professionals be involved in such “less lethal” weapons development and utilisation at all? And if not, what 
stance should they take regarding such “less lethal” weapons? 
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of “blowing the whistle” on such weapons programmes through public 
denunciations, leaking information to journalists, or by reporting concerns about 
potential or realised breaches of national regulations or violations of 
international treaties directly to the relevant national or international regulatory 
bodies. 
 
In his Nobel acceptance speech, Rotblat stated that: 
“The purpose of some government or industrial research is sometimes 
concealed, and misleading information is presented to the public. It should be 
the duty of scientists to expose such malfeasance. ‘Whistle-blowing’ should 
become part of the scientist's ethos. This may bring reprisals; a price to be paid 
for one's convictions. The price may be very heavy…”2026 
 
Deiseroth has highlighted the particular vulnerability of whistle-blowers: 
“Compared with normal citizens, employees are in a special situation because 
they owe their employer a certain loyalty and, by law, are normally not allowed 
to disclose internal or confidential information. Whistle-blowers, therefore, need 
protection if they make a disclosure in good faith and on the basis of reliable 
evidence.”2027 Similarly, Falter has noted: “it is neither realistic nor legitimate to 
put the full burden of whistle-blowing and potential retaliation on individual 
scientists and their moral sensibilities.”2028  
 
Indeed, whilst it is the duty of individual scientists to make known their concerns 
about the misuse of scientific research for activities that breach ethical 
standards or international law, it is the responsibility of the scientific community 
as a whole to ensure that such whistle-blowers are fully protected. This was 
recognised by the ICRC in its 2004 statement, which declared that: “Those 
working in life sciences who voice concern and take responsible action require 
and deserve political and professional support and protection 2029 and the 
                                                          
2026
 Rotblat, J. (1995) op.cit. See for example the case study of the Russian chemist Dr Vil Mirzayanov 
who alerted the world to Russia’s secret development of “novichock” binary chemical weapons, as 
descried in Appendix 9 of this thesis. 
2027
 Deiseroth, D. (2000) op.cit., p.266. 
2028
 Falter. A, (2010) op.cit., p.289. 
2029
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Preventing Hostile Use of The Life Sciences (11
th
 
November 2004) op.cit. 
451 
 
corresponding action point which was to “ensure that adequate mechanisms 
exist for voicing such concerns without fear of retribution.”2030   
 
However, although a number of States such as South Africa,2031 the U.K.2032 
and the U.S.2033 have legislation relating to whistle-blowing activities on their 
statute books, the effectiveness of such legislation and its enforcement is 
variable.2034 Furthermore, Martin, who has long experience of working with, and 
seeking to protect, whistle-blowers in many different spheres, has argued that: 
“...the track record of whistle-blower protection measures – whistle-blower laws, 
hot-lines, ombudsmen and the like – is abysmal. In many cases, these formal 
processes give only an illusion of protection. Codes of ethics seem similarly 
impotent in the face of the problems.”2035 
 
It is important that independent scientists, health professionals and professional 
bodies – in cooperation with human rights, civil liberties and whistle-blowing 
organisations – promote the establishment of truly effective mechanisms under 
international and domestic law that provide legal protection against 
discrimination and criminal prosecution for whistle-blowers. Furthermore, given 
the failings of the current systems of whistleblower protection, the life science 
and biomedical communities have a duty to support those individuals who 
refuse to participate in what they consider immoral research and development 
projects, and those who blow the whistle on such activities. A number of 
scientific associations and professional bodies have mechanisms for promoting 
                                                          
2030
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Preventing Hostile Use of The Life Sciences (11
th
 
November 2004) op.cit. 
2031
 South African Protected Disclosures Act, available at: 
http://www.workinfo.com/free/Sub_for_legres/data/Disclosure/protected.htm (accessed 1st May 2012). 
2032
 UK Government, Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA).  
2033
 US Federal Whistleblower Protection Act (5 USC sec. 1201), 9
th
 July 1989. 
2034
 See for example, Calland, R. and Dehn, G. (eds) Whistleblowing around the World, Cape Town, Open 
Democracy Advice Centre; London, Public Concern at Work, 2004; Deiseroth, D., (2000) op.cit.; Devine, 
T. The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide, Washington, DC, Fund for Constitutional Government, 1997; 
Devine, T.  Whistleblowing in the United States: The Gap between Vision and Lessons Learned, in: 
Calland, R. and Dehn, G. (eds) Whistleblowing around the World (2004) op.cit.; Martin, B. The 
Whistleblower’s Handbook, Charlbury, UK, Jon Carpenter, 1999; Martin, B. Suppression of Dissent in 
Science, Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, volume 7, 1999, pp.105-135. 
2035
  Martin, B. Whistle-blowing: Risks and Skills, in: Web of Prevention, (eds) Feakes, D., Rappert, B. and 
McLeish, C. (2007) op.cit., p.6. 
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ethical standards amongst their members which can also be utilised to support 
colleagues facing reprisals for acting ethically.2036  
 
14.4. Developing and promoting effective mechanisms to address RCAs 
and incapacitants 
A range of scholars have discussed the important roles that informed civil 
society actors can play in highlighting the limitations of the existing chemical 
and biological weapons (CBW) arms control regimes, and developing and 
advocating means to strengthen these regimes.  
 
According to Dando, Pearson, Rozsa, Robinson and Wheelis: “Whatever else is 
needed, one crucial ingredient is clear: people with scientific and medical 
expertise surely have a special responsibility to alert policymakers in 
governments around the world to the very real dangers of inaction in regard to 
the BWC”2037  
 
Similarly, Robinson has argued that: “When it comes to arms control, all of 
us…need reminding that treaties such as the CWC are engagements, not 
between governments, but between States Parties. Governments may 
represent States Parties in the [relevant regime fora]… but organs of civil 
society are also elements of those same states, no less responsible for proper 
implementation of the treaty.”2038  
 
There a number of coordination bodies that provide important opportunities for 
civil society, particularly the academic, scientific and medical communities, to 
engage with the chemical and biological weapons control and disarmament 
regimes and States Parties, these include the Chemical Weapons Convention 
                                                          
2036
For example the AAAS Science and Human Rights Program (SHRP) which works with scientists to 
"advance science and serve society" through human rights, has successfully campaigned on behalf of a 
number of scientific whistleblowers. See: http://shr.aaas.org/ (accessed 1
st
 September 2011). 
2037
 Dando. M, Pearson. G, Rozsa. L, Robinson. J & Wheelis. M. Analysis and Implications, in: Wheelis, 
M., Rozsa, L., and Dando, M. [eds] “Deadly Cultures”, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2006, 
p.373. 
2038
 Perry Robinson, J.P. Scientists and chemical weapons policies in: Assessing the Threat of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, eds Finney, J. and Slaus, I., IOS Press, 2010, p.89. 
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Coalition2039, the Biological Weapons Prevention Project2040 and the Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs.2041  
 
As discussed in this thesis, a range of academics, legal scholars, NGOs, 
scientific and medical associations and international organisations, particularly 
from the mid-1990s onwards, have highlighted the potential dangers of the 
proliferation and misuse of incapacitants and proposed mechanisms to address 
these challenges during annual meetings and Review Conferences of the CWC 
and BTWC States Parties, as well as through processes such as the 
IUPAC/OPCW conferences exploring the impact of scientific developments on 
the CWC, and the ICRC expert meetings on incapacitating chemical agents. In 
contrast, however, concerns regarding RCAs and related means of delivery 
                                                          
2039
 For discussion of the development and activities of the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition see 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
2040
 The Bio-weapons Prevention Project (BWPP) which was launched in 2003, is a global network of civil 
society actors dedicated to the permanent elimination of biological weapons and of the possibility of their 
re-emergence. BWPP monitors governmental and other activities relevant to the treaties that codify that 
norm.[For further details of BWPP activities and publications see website (www.bwpp.org/). See also 
relevant BWPP Statements to BTWC Meetings of States Parties, BTWC Meetings of Experts or BTWC 
Review Conferences, available on the United Nations Office at Geneva website (www.unog.ch/).]
 
BWPP 
supports and is supported by a global network of partners, which as of May 2012, comprised 57 NGO 
partners based in 16 countries, as well as several international civil society organizations. [See 
http://www.bwpp.org/network.html (accessed 1
st
 May 2012)].BWPP is concerned about the dangers posed 
by the full range of biological and toxin weapons, and a number of individual BWPP member organisation 
as well as the BWPP itself have raised the issue of incapacitants (and to a lesser extent RCAs of biological 
origin) in previous reports presented to States Parties.[See for example: BWPP, The threat from 
incapacitating biochemical weapons, pp. 91-103 in: Bioweapons Report 2004, BWPP, 
http://www.bwpp.org/documents/2004BWRFinal_000.pdf (accessed 1
st
 May 2012); Dando, M. and 
Nixdorff, K. Chapter 4: Developments in science and technology: Relevance for the BWC, pp.33-45 in: 
BWPP Biological Weapons Reader, Mclaughlin, K. and Nixdorff, K. (eds), 2009, http://www.bwpp.org/ 
documents/ BWPP%20BW%20Reader final+.pdf (accessed 1
st
 May).] 
2041
 The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Pugwash) commenced in 1955 following the 
Russell-Einstein Manifesto. [For further information about the initiation, development and current activities 
of Pugwash see Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs website http://www.pugwash.org/ 
(accessed 1
st
 May 2012).] In 1959 the 5th Pugwash Conference was the first occasion since the onset of 
the Cold War where biological and chemical scientists from the East and the West met to discuss CBW 
and subsequently Pugwash CBW study groups have provided forums for experts to meet in private as 
individuals, rather than as representatives of governments or institutions, to discuss CBW issues. [For a 
summary of the activities of previous CBW Study groups see: Perry Robinson, J. Contribution of the 
Pugwash movement to the international regime against chemical and biological weapons, 10th Workshop 
of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Conventions, The BWC Protocol Negotiation: Unresolved Issues, Geneva, Switzerland, 28
th
 -29
th
 
November 1998.] The current Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Conventions was established immediately following the negotiation of the BTWC and 
CWC, and its membership includes academic, defence and industrial scientists from around the world, as 
well as governmental officials involved in the formation and implementation of public policy regarding 
CBW.[For further information see Pugwash Study Group on Implementation of the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Conventions, Harvard Sussex Program website: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/ 
Units/spru/hsp/Pugwash/Pugwashintro.html (accessed 1
st
 May 2012).] Issues relating to incapacitants 
(and to a lesser extent RCAs) have previously been discussed during the Group’s annual workshops on 
the BTWC, CWC and their implementation. [Although these workshops are held under the Chatham 
House rule, summaries can be found at: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Pugwash/Pugwashintro.html (accessed 1
st
 May 2012).].  
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appear to have been given less attention in such forums and have been raised 
by a smaller number of academics and NGOs.  
  
14.5. Conclusion 
The HAC analysis undertaken in this chapter has highlighted the potential roles 
that informed and activist civil society, including members of the scientific and 
medical communities, can play in the scrutiny of RCA and incapacitant 
development and employment, through open source monitoring and analysis, 
and, where appropriate, by undertaking investigative field missions to establish 
the nature of chemical agents utilised in disputed circumstances. However, to 
date, such activities appear to have been, and continue to be, limited to a very 
small and under-resourced group of NGOs.  
 
It appears that some – although still inadequate - attention has been given by 
both governments and civil society to the dangers arising from “dual-use” 
research in the life and chemical sciences, and their potential application to 
biological and chemical weapons programmes. Such considerations have 
fostered debate and reflection within the scientific community upon issues of 
individual researcher responsibility as well as strategies for the regulation of 
“dual use” research programmes of potential concern. However, to date this 
discourse appears to have been largely restricted to preventing the diffusion of 
such technologies to non-State actors of concern and has not adequately 
addressed the dangers of State development of such weapons. Furthermore, 
inadequate consideration has been given to contested issues including how to 
address the development of the “next generation” of incapacitants, RCAs and 
their means of delivery.  
 
Informed civil society – particularly the scientific and medical communities – can 
play a constructive role in the development and promotion of policy proposals to 
strengthen the BTWC and the CWC. Preparations by CWC States for the 
forthcoming 2013 CWC Review Conference  – which in many countries will 
include consultation with relevant academics, NGOs and scientific bodies - 
provide important opportunities for civil society to bring concrete proposals to 
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address RCAs, incapacitants and their means of delivery to the attention of 
relevant officials.  
 
It is clear from the proceeding analysis that a comprehensive HAC strategy for 
the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery will require 
the active involvement of informed and activist civil society in societal 
verification; the development and promotion of norms prohibiting the 
involvement of the scientific and medical communities in weaponisation 
programmes intended for malign application; and far greater active engagement 
of such expert communities in the relevant State and OPCW policy 
development processes, particularly in the run up to the 2013 CWC Review 
Conference.   
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Chapter 15 – Conclusions 
 
15.1. Introduction 
As discussed in chapter one of this dissertation, holistic arms control (HAC) is 
an analytical approach consisting of a three stage process, comprising: 
 Stage one - examination of the nature of the weapon or weapons-related 
technology under review, current and/or potential future scenarios of 
application (together with attendant human security concerns), and the 
potential implications of advances in relevant science and technology;  
 Stage two - exploration of the full range of potentially applicable control 
mechanisms, analysing strengths, weaknesses and limitations; 
 Stage three - development of a comprehensive strategy to improve 
existing mechanisms (and/or introduce additional mechanisms) for the 
effective regulation or prohibition of the weapon or weapons-related 
technology of concern.  
 
During the PhD research process, this analytic approach has been applied to 
the regulation of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitatants and their means of 
delivery. This concluding chapter will summarise the empirical results and 
attendant analysis, covering stages one and two of the HAC process. Building 
upon these findings, a strategy for the regulation of such agents and means of 
delivery in the short-medium term (five to ten years) will be proposed, in line 
with HAC stage three. This will be followed by a discussion of additional 
processes that merit further investigation as potential mechanisms for the 
regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude with a review of the benefits and limitations of the HAC 
approach as exemplified in this particular research project, and a brief 
consideration of its potential application more widely in arms control and 
disarmament research and policy development. 
 
15.2. Summary of empirical results 
Chapter two of this thesis addressed the properties of RCAs - highly potent 
sensory irritants with relatively low toxicity that produce dose and time-
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dependent acute site-specific toxicity. Targeted mainly towards the respiratory 
and mucosal surfaces, their short-term effects are well defined although the 
potential for deleterious long-term effects is contested. There is a small discrete 
range of agents widely stockpiled and regularly utilised by law enforcement 
officials in the majority of States for dispersal of crowds and/or incapacitating 
individuals. Reports of the misuse of RCAs by law enforcement officials for 
human rights abuse are geographically widespread and frequent. Although a 
variety of RCAs were previously employed in armed conflict by a number of 
States, such use by the majority of States is now obsolete. Research into RCAs 
and delivery mechanisms continues to be reported in a number of countries. 
RCAs can therefore be considered as a relatively mature and established 
technology although one that is subject to continuing potential development.  
 
Incapacitants, which were analysed in chapter three, can be considered as a 
diverse range of substances whose chemical action on specific biochemical 
processes and physiological systems, especially those affecting the higher 
regulatory activity of the central nervous system, produce a disabling condition 
(e.g. can cause incapacitation or disorientation, incoherence, hallucination, 
sedation, or loss of consciousness) or at higher concentrations, death. 
Proponents of incapacitants have promoted their development and use in 
certain law enforcement scenarios, particularly hostage situations; and as a 
possible tool in a variety of military operations, especially where combatants 
and non-combatants are mixed. Opponents and sceptics have strongly 
contested the possibility of employing truly “less lethal” incapacitants, have 
highlighted the grave dangers to the health of the targeted populations, and 
raised concerns regarding: the “creeping legitimisation” of such agents with the 
erosion of the norm against the weaponisation of toxicity; the risks of their 
proliferation to both State and non-State actors; their potential use as a lethal 
force multiplier; their applicability in the facilitation of torture and other human 
rights violations; and the militarisation of the life sciences. Although over the last 
fifty years, a small number of States have sought to develop effective 
incapacitants, to date only one State has confirmed weaponising them for 
military purposes (now discontinued) and a second State has employed them 
once in a large scale law enforcement operation. Incapacitants can be 
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considered as an immature, limited and contested technology, however one that 
could be radically affected by advances in science and technology, and that 
may potentially proliferate and be misused by State and non-State actors. 
 
From this review it is apparent that RCAs and incapacitants should be 
considered to be distinct types of technology in terms of their chemical 
properties, action on target populations, nature of employment, consequent 
impact on health, and international security and human security risks. These 
considerations, as well as the existing maturity of research and development, 
and degree of proliferation, have consequently informed the range and nature of 
application of potential regulatory mechanisms analysed under the second 
stage of HAC.  
 
Although this dissertation has concentrated upon the two classes of chemical 
agent under review, a second dimension of effective weaponisation, namely 
potential means of agent delivery, has been considered throughout the research 
process. A range of potential dispersal mechanisms were analysed in chapter 
seven. Although this was undertaken in the context of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the results are applicable more broadly. It was found that the 
properties of the specific delivery mechanism under consideration - including 
range, amount and rapidity of agent dispersal - were of critical importance in 
determining the nature of the weapon’s likely use and potential misuse. 
Consequently, and where appropriate, throughout stage two of the HAC 
process consideration was given to the probable means of delivery as well as 
the relevant chemical agent when analysing the application of potential 
regulatory mechanisms. 
 
It is clear from analysing the results of the HAC stage two survey, described in 
chapters three to fourteen, that a wide range of mechanisms have potential 
utility in the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and/or related means of delivery. 
Whilst all of these mechanisms - summarised in table 15.1 - appear to be 
theoretically applicable to one or more classes of RCA, incapacitant and/or 
related means of delivery; the utility of many of these mechanisms in practice 
has not been established; in many cases the relevant regime bodies or States 
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Parties have never publicly considered such regulation and it is unclear how 
responsive such regimes would be to taking on such controversial issues. When 
such considerations are taken into account, the CWC, BTWC, UN Drugs 
Control Conventions, human rights law, international humanitarian law, and 
certain transfer controls appear to be the most clearly and directly relevant and 
applicable intergovernmental mechanisms available in the present 
circumstances. These, together with the potential roles of civil society, will be 
summarised below. 
 
Table 15.1: Summary of potentially applicable mechanisms for the regulation of RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery 
Mechanism Scope of items regulated 
RCAs Incapacitants Means of 
delivery 
Geneva Protocol x. x. x. 
Chemical Weapons Convention x. x. x. 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention x. x. x. 
UN Secretary General Investigatory 
Mechanism 
x.  x. x. 
Ad hoc UN investigatory mechanisms (e.g. 
UNMOVIC, UNSCOM) 
u/c
2042
 x. x. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 u/c x. x. 
Proliferation Security Initiative  x. x. 
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation 
  x. 
Mine Ban Treaty   x. 
International humanitarian law (particularly the 
Four Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols) 
 x. x. x. 
                                                          
2042
 u/c indicates that, at present, it is either unclear or there is no consensus as to whether riot control 
agents would be regulated by the mechanism studied. 
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International and regional human rights law 
(including the Convention Against Torture, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, European Convention on Human 
Rights) 
 x. x. x. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
x. x. x. 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
 x.  
The Australia Group  x. x. 
The Wassenaar Arrangement x. x. x. 
Missile Technology Control Regime   x. 
EU Common Position 2008/944 x. x. x. 
EC Regulation 1236/2005 x. x. x. 
Arms Embargoes (UN and EU) x. x. x. 
 
To date, most inter-governmental discourse regarding the regulation of RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery has taken place within the context 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the attendant control regime. The 
review of this regime, undertaken in chapters four to seven, clearly shows that 
the CWC and OPCW certainly have the necessary scope of coverage, 
appropriate regulatory constraints, structures and mechanisms to facilitate, 
monitor and enforce implementation with regard to the agents and means of 
delivery under review, and also benefit from near universal membership. 
However, the Convention and its attendant regime have a number of important 
limitations in both design and implementation. 
 
There are weaknesses in the CWC’s textual architecture with ambiguities in a 
number of Articles detailing State Party obligations, exacerbated by a lack of 
definition in certain key terms. For example, although RCAs are defined under 
the Convention, the scope and nature of their permissible use in situations of 
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armed conflict and in law enforcement operations are ambiguously regulated, 
due in part to a lack of definition for “method of warfare” and “law enforcement”. 
The situation is even more uncertain regarding incapacitants, which are not 
specifically addressed or indeed defined under the Convention.  
 
Furthermore, although States Parties have employed bi-lateral consultation 
mechanisms regarding RCAs and incapacitants, the potentially powerful 
multilateral consultation, investigation and fact-finding procedures that could be 
applied to address such cases of concern under the Convention, have never 
been utilised. The failure by individual States Parties to use such mechanisms 
is exacerbated by the very circumscribed ability of the Technical Secretariat to 
undertake independent information gathering and monitoring activities. 
Similarly, there has been a failure by the OPCW policy making organs to 
effectively monitor implementation of the Convention with regard to these 
agents and to take action where reports of possible breaches of the Convention 
have become public. 
  
Of the arms control and disarmament treaties, explored in chapter eight, the 
BTWC appears to provide the greatest likely potential utility for the regulation of 
a section of the agents of concern. Article I of the BTWC, together with the 
extended understandings agreed at successive BTWC Review Conferences, 
make it clear that the Convention is comprehensive in its scope and would 
consequently cover a range of incapacitants (such as bioregulators) as well as 
certain RCAs of biological origin (such as oleoresin capsicum). However, States 
Parties have not, to date, collectively addressed these issues and there are a 
number of uncertainties in application of the Convention in this area. In addition, 
there are important limitations on the value of the BTWC (and its control regime) 
as a tool to regulate incapacitants and RCAs arising from its current lack of 
effective verification and compliance mechanisms, and also the absence of an 
international organization comparable to the OPCW which could coordinate 
such activities and facilitate implementation by States Parties. 
 
Chapter eleven highlighted the significant constraints upon the use of RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery imposed by international 
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humanitarian law (IHL). Indeed it is extremely doubtful whether the employment 
of an incapacitant in armed conflict could be conducted without breaching a 
relevant IHL prohibition (e.g. the prohibitions on SIRUS and deliberate attacks 
on civilians); or without undermining a relevant IHL obligation (e.g. duty to 
protect persons considered hors de combat). Similarly the use of RCAs in 
armed conflict, in certain proposed scenarios, would appear to contravene the 
prohibitions on deliberate attacks on civilians and the prohibition on attacks that 
do not discriminate between civilians and military objectives. However the 
potential utility of IHL to the regulation of these agents is curtailed due to 
limitations in investigation and enforcement procedures, and extremely low 
levels of State implementation of Article 36 legal reviews of new weapons. 
Furthermore, IHL is only applicable to situations of armed conflict. Whilst much 
relevant IHL would extend to non-international armed conflicts there may well 
be disagreements as to whether a particular situation is a non-international 
armed conflict, with the relevant State instead claiming to be involved in law 
enforcement activities against criminals or terrorist organisations.  
 
It is clear from the review conducted in chapter twelve, that human rights law is 
applicable to the employment of RCAs and incapacitants, as it regulates the use 
of force by law enforcement officials and other agents of the State. Human 
rights law is particularly important to the discussion of the regulation of these 
agents as it potentially covers the full “use of force” spectrum from law 
enforcement activities through to armed conflict, including counter-terrorist, 
counter-insurgency, and military operations outside armed conflict, where use of 
these chemicals has been proposed. While several human rights norms may be 
applicable, the rights to life; to liberty and security; to freedom from torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and to health, together with attendant 
obligations on the restraint of force, are the most relevant. 
 
Chapter thirteen highlighted the potential utility of regional and pluri-lateral 
regimes restricting or prohibiting transfer of RCAs, incapacitants and related 
means of delivery (at least in circumstances where their use is deemed 
inappropriate, e.g. as a method of warfare or to facilitate human rights abuses). 
However, the agreements highlighted were either found to be politically-binding 
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or if legally-binding of limited membership. Potentially more effective were 
legally binding arms embargoes (particularly those introduced by the UN), 
wielded to address threats to international peace and security arising from 
armed aggression and, increasingly, gross human rights abuses or breaches of 
international humanitarian law. However, even on the relatively rare occasions 
when they are utilised, such embargoes currently have limited effectiveness in 
practice due to ambiguities in their scope of coverage, delayed and patchy 
implementation, and poor or non-existing monitoring and enforcement 
measures.  
 
Chapter nine described how the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances could both prove to be extremely 
important mechanisms to combat the development, proliferation and use of 
narcotic and psychotropic substances as incapacitants intended for either law 
enforcement or military operations. However, both Conventions (and attendant 
regimes) were developed and have been employed, to date, solely in a crime 
control context rather than for arms control and disarmament, and it is far from 
certain whether the States Parties to either instrument will welcome attempts to 
apply them to such purposes. 
 
In the light of the evident ambiguities and limitations of the existing relevant 
State-centric control regimes - compounded by inadequate and patchy national 
implementation, and the failures of States Parties and international 
organisations to challenge reported treaty violations by certain States - that 
have been highlighted throughout this dissertation; chapter fourteen explored 
the potential roles that civil society could play in monitoring and facilitating the 
regulation of the development and use of RCAs, incapacitants and related 
means of delivery. The application of “societal verification” as a complement to 
the existing official verification mechanisms, the development of “cultures of 
responsibility” amongst the medical and life and chemical scientific 
communities, and the development and advocacy of science-informed policy 
were potentially valuable activities that scientists, health professionals, 
academics and other civil society actors could undertake in facilitating the 
effective regulation of these agents of concern.  
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15.3. HAC stage three: A proposed strategy for the effective regulation of 
RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery 
The HAC analytical framework seeks to actively explore the utility of employing 
a multiplicity of mechanisms and to facilitate the active engagement of a variety 
of relevant actors in the regulation of the weapon or weapons-related 
technology under review. Consequently, it is an axiomatic principle of HAC that 
a number of regulatory processes elaborated as part of existing regimes (as 
well as those independent of such regimes) can be pursued in parallel. 
However it is clearly apparent that relevant actors – be they international 
organisations, States or civil society bodies - have limited human, financial and 
temporal resources to devote to these issues, and competing demands to 
address.  When analysing the potential responsiveness of particular regimes, 
factors such as the existing political environment and previous negotiating 
history concerning such agents, relevant regulatory mechanisms and their 
application, informal and formal regime forum schedules and agenda space will 
have to be considered by the relevant actors.  
 
From the review of the regimes conducted under HAC stage two it is clear that 
the CWC is the most appropriate and probably the most receptive forum, at 
least in the short term, for the discussion of concerns relating to RCAs, 
incapacitants and related means of delivery. However the results of such 
discussions are by no means certain and parallel processes should also be 
established to explore alternative mechanisms with the BTWC, UN drugs 
conventions, international humanitarian law, human rights instruments and 
specific transfer controls potentially yielding positive results in the next five to 
ten year period. Since these are State-centric mechanisms, HAC stage three is 
drafted primarily in terms of policy proposals for States that are party to the 
relevant mechanism. However this section concludes with recommendations for 
complementary civil society activity in these areas. 
  
15.3.1. The Chemical Weapons Convention 
The forthcoming 3rd CWC Review Conference, to be held in April 2013, with its 
mandate to examine long term issues of concern to the Organisation in a 
strategic manner and to “take into account any relevant scientific and 
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technological developments”2043 is an appropriate forum for exploring regulation 
of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery. CWC States Parties 
concerned about these issues could prepare the ground for fruitful and informed 
discussions at the Review Conference by setting out their concerns in 
statements, reports, etc, and raising the issue in suitable forums such as the 
17th Conference of States Parties (CSP) and the Open Ended Working Group 
preparing for the 3rd Review Conference. Consideration could be given to the 
utility of employing one or more of the following mechanisms: 
  
(a) Affirm existing CWC provisions applicable to RCAs and/or incapacitants: 
The CWC States Parties could agree “common understandings” clearly 
annunciating the agreed interpretation of the Convention in these areas, 
affirming that: 
 Incapacitants – whether they are pharmaceutical chemicals or chemicals 
of biological origin such as toxins, proteins, peptides and bio-regulators - fall 
within the definition of “toxic chemicals” under Article II.2 and consequently are 
covered by the Convention.  
 the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare is 
prohibited under the Convention, as is development, stockpiling and transfer of 
toxic chemicals for such ends.2044  
 the use of toxic chemicals for “law enforcement including domestic riot 
control” is permissible only as long “as the types and quantities of toxic 
chemicals are consistent with such purposes”, as specified under Article II.1. 
Furthermore, such use should be in conformity with the “principles and 
applicable norms of international law”.2045  
 
                                                          
2043
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VIII (22). 
2044
 Such an affirmation would extend and complement the 2
nd
 CWC Review Conference’s affirmation of 
“the undertaking of States Parties not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare” [OPCW, Report of 
the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to review the operation of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (Second Review Conference), 7–18 April 2008, RC-2/4, 18 April 2008.]  
2045
 The First and Second CWC Review Conferences both recognised the existence of “principles and 
applicable norms of international law” of relevance to the use of chemicals for “purposes not prohibited”, 
but did not elaborate upon them nor explicitly require that States Parties adhere to them. See for example: 
OPCW (2008) Report of the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review 
the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Second Review Conference), 7
th
-18
th
 April, RC-2/4, 
18
th
 April 2008, paragraph 9.6. If agreement was forthcoming, the Third CWC Review Conference could 
also initiate an appropriate mechanism to develop an indicative list of the principles and applicable norms 
of international law. 
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(b.1) Introduce a prohibition on development, transfer and use of incapacitants 
for law enforcement purposes:  
There appear to be at least three potential mechanisms to introduce an explicit 
prohibition on development, stockpiling, transfer and use of incapacitants for the 
purpose of law enforcement: 
 Option 1 – negotiated amendment to the Convention or negotiation of an 
Additional Protocol. The benefit of such an approach is that the resulting 
obligations would be legally binding upon all States Parties ratifying the 
relevant instruments. However it would necessitate the convening of an 
Amendment Conference under Article XV and entail a subsequent 
ratification process,2046 and thus require extremely high levels of  support 
from a considerable number of States Parties to the Convention; 
 Option 2 – States Parties could agree a “common understanding” 
annunciating an agreed interpretation of the Convention affirming that the 
employment of incapacitants for law enforcement purposes is prohibited. 
The “common understanding” which would be included in the relevant 
CSP or Review Conference Final Document would be politically rather 
than legally binding and would be agreed by consensus; 
 Option 3 - Individual States Parties or a group of like-minded States 
Parties could introduce a prohibition on development, stockpiling, 
transfer and use of incapacitants at the national level and/or seek to 
develop a pluri-lateral agreement or legal instrument outside the 
framework of the OPCW. 
 
Alternatively States Parties could: 
 
(b.2) Introduce a moratorium on development, transfer and use of incapacitants 
for law enforcement purposes:  
This moratorium would not be designed to restrict development, transfer or use 
of agents legitimately employed for medical or veterinary purposes, but solely 
those intended for employment in law enforcement.2047 Such a moratorium 
                                                          
2046
 See: OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article XV (1)-(3). 
2047
 The development, stockpiling, transfer or use of incapacitants intended as means of warfare is already 
prohibited under Article I and Article II(1) of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  
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could be introduced at the same time as a process was established to review 
the status of incapacitants under the Convention (see below), the moratorium 
remaining until the status of these agents had been resolved by the CWC 
States Parties. Such a moratorium could be binding in nature2048 or 
alternatively, the Review Conference could request that States Parties consider 
adopting a voluntary moratorium and associated voluntary reporting and 
transparency measures. If requisite agreement for this is not forthcoming, 
individual States Parties or a group of like-minded States could introduce a 
moratorium on such agents at the national or pluri-lateral level.  
 
(c) Initiate mechanisms to facilitate discussion and make recommendations to 
CWC States Parties on currently contested or ambiguous issues: 
An Open Ended Working Group or some other formal mechanism could be 
established to make recommendations on a range of currently contested or 
ambiguous issues, for consideration by a future CSP or Review Conference. 
Such formal processes would be open to all States Parties who wished to 
participate and would reach their conclusions by consensus.  
 
Alternatively, States Parties could initiate a process of informal meetings of 
experts similar to the model developed by the BTWC States Parties in 2002 to 
“discuss and promote common understandings and promote effective action” on 
BTWC implementation measures.2049 As part of this informal process, expertise 
could be drawn from a range of relevant State sectors including national 
implementation officials, scientific advisors, law enforcement officials, experts in 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. These 
informal expert meetings could run in parallel or prior to the formal mechanism 
and could present recommendations to the formal mechanism or directly to an 
appropriate OPCW body. In addition to any OPCW process, it would be highly 
                                                          
2048
 Although this proposal would not necessarily entail amendment to the Convention, it would need to be 
agreed by consensus. Depending on their nature, accompanying mandatory reporting and transparency 
mechanisms may necessitate changes to the Convention. 
2049
 The utility of such a model for addressing CWC related issues requiring clarification has previously 
been proposed. See Mathews, R. Convergence of Biology and Chemistry: Implications for the Verification 
Regime of the Convention, Including Potential Role of the Other Chemical Production Facilities Regime, in: 
Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution to Security and the Non-Proliferation of Chemical Weapons, 11
th
 -
12
th
 April 2011, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, Mashhadi, H., Paturej, K., Runn, P. and Trapp, R., 
pp.178-179;  Spiez Laboratory, Technical Workshop on Incapacitating Chemical Agents, 8
th
 to 9
th
 
September 2011, Spiez , Switzerland, published January 2012, p.7. 
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beneficial if informal inter-governmental consultation mechanisms on these 
issues were established.2050 Among the issues that these mechanisms could 
explore are: 
 
(i)terms undefined or inadequately defined under the CWC: a suitable 
mechanism could be established to: 
 define the terms “law enforcement” and “method of warfare” as used in 
the CWC, explore the range of activities contained within each term and 
determine where activities such as counter-insurgency operations should 
lie; 
 identify which chemicals should be considered as toxic chemicals in the 
sense of having a “chemical action on life processes that can cause 
temporary incapacitation in human beings or other animals”, in particular 
the position of malodorants should be addressed. 
  
(ii) the status of incapacitants under the CWC: In its National Working Paper 
presented to the 2nd CWC Review Conference, Switzerland called for: “…a 
mandate for a discussion of, inter alia, an agreed definition of incapacitating 
agents, the status of incapacitating agents under the Convention, and possible 
transparency measures...”2051 If such a proposal were to be introduced and 
agreed at the 3rd Review Conference, it is envisaged that a suitable mechanism 
would potentially come to a determination either that development, stockpiling, 
transfer and use of incapacitants for law enforcement is prohibited under the 
CWC or that such actions are permitted but should be regulated under the 
Convention. If the latter position is taken then the mechanism could also: 
 propose a definition of incapacitants under the Convention;  
 clarify under what limited circumstances and with what constraints such 
use would be permissible;  
                                                          
2050
 Such mechanisms could be facilitated by independent, expert and respected bodies such as the ICRC 
or the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. As they would be outside the OPCW, such 
processes could address constraints imposed upon incapacitant and RCA development and use under all 
relevant international law (e.g. BTWC, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, UN 
Drugs Conventions)  not just the CWC, and could present their findings to all relevant control regimes.  
2051
 Switzerland, Working Paper, Riot Control and Incapacitating Agents under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, The Hague, Netherlands, RC-2/NAT.12, 9
th
 April 2008, p.5. 
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 propose options for reporting and transparency measures applicable to 
such agents and their means of delivery;  
 explore the implications for the verification regime. 
 
(iii) the regulation of RCAs under the CWC: a suitable mechanism could be 
established to:  
 identify the range of chemical agents that are covered by the term RCA, 
as defined under the CWC and give particular consideration to whether 
malodorants should be classed as RCAs,  
 clarify the specific restricted circumstances under which the use of RCAs 
by military personnel may be permissible, and identify those 
circumstances under which use is prohibited under the CWC; 
 clarify the CWC limitations on the use of RCAs for law enforcement, 
specifically taking into account the CWC’s constraints upon “types and 
quantities”; 
 explore the implications of the CWC prohibition on the transfer of 
chemical weapons, for the regulation of RCA transfers, particularly to 
States that, from past experience, may use such chemical agents in 
contravention of the Convention; 
 explore the limitations on the development, production, stockpiling, 
transfer and use of RCAs arising from existing obligations under relevant 
international law including international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law;   
 explore measures to improve the effectiveness of the CWC verification 
system including identification of the presence of RCAs. 
 
(iv) the regulation of law enforcement means of delivery: A suitable mechanism 
could develop recommendations for criteria and a suitable process for 
determining which munitions and other forms of dispersal and means of delivery 
for toxic chemicals are inappropriate for law enforcement purposes and would 
consequently breach Article II.1.2052 Potential reporting, information-sharing and 
verification mechanisms applicable to such munitions and means of delivery 
                                                          
2052
 And potentially Article I.5 of the CWC, if the munition contains an RCA. 
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could also be explored and recommendations made on how such measures 
would be implemented. In addition, a guidance document could be developed 
detailing those types of munitions and other forms of dispersal and means of 
delivery considered inappropriate for law enforcement purposes. This guidance 
document could be reviewed regularly in a suitable forum such as a CSP or 
Review Conference.  
 
(v) reporting and transparency mechanisms for toxic chemicals utilised in law 
enforcement: A suitable mechanism could explore and develop 
recommendations for extending the existing RCA reporting and transparency 
obligations2053 to cover all toxic chemicals held by States Parties for law 
enforcement purposes.2054 The working group could also consider whether 
existing information requirements are adequate or should be expanded to 
include, for example:  
 Name/CAS number of each type of toxic chemical and quantities held; 
 Nature and quantities of the associated munitions, means of delivery or 
dispersal; 
 Authorities holding stockpiles and permitted to use toxic chemicals and 
associated munitions, means of delivery or dispersal; 
 Nature of intended use e.g. riot control, hostage situation, judicial 
execution; 
 Decisions by States Parties not to introduce certain toxic chemicals (e.g. 
incapacitants) for law enforcement purposes and their rationale. 
 
Such reporting and transparency mechanisms could be introduced as voluntary 
confidence building measures (CBMs) – similar to the CBMs utilised by BTWC 
States Parties. Alternatively the CWC could be amended to include the relevant 
reporting requirements.2055 
 
                                                          
2053
 Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article III (1) e. 
2054
 The permissibility of developing, stockpiling, transferring and using chemical agents other than RCAs 
for law enforcement purposes (such as incapacitants) is currently contested and would remain so until 
States Parties establish their status under the Convention. For divergent interpretations see: Fidler, D. 
(2007) op.cit., pp.171-194; Chayes, A. and Meselson, M. (1994) op.cit., pp.13-18; Krutzsch, W. (2003) 
op.cit.; Krutzsch, W. & Von Wagner, A. (2008) op.cit. 
2055
 Although, in theory, such an amendment to the Convention could be implemented under Article XV, 
the political barriers to triggering this procedure appear, at present, to be insurmountable.  
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(d) Review relevant science and technology regarding incapacitants:  
Although a range of distinguished medical and scientific bodies2056 have 
disputed the feasibility of developing truly “safe” incapacitants and highlighted 
the dangers of State research in this area, these bodies have no formal 
standing within the OPCW. The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) which was 
established under the CWC to provide specialised advice to the OPCW in areas 
of science and technology relevant to the Convention2057, could be tasked with 
reviewing relevant science and technology to: 
 Determine whether it is possible from a toxiological perspective to 
distinguish between an incapacitant and a classical chemical warfare 
agent; 
 Determine whether any chemical agents currently exist that could be 
considered as “safe” candidate incapacitants for law enforcement - given 
the necessity of ensuing effective but not lethal dosage per targeted 
individual under operational conditions 2058;   
 Explore the feasibility from a technological perspective of establishing 
effective verification measures for incapacitants.2059 
 
(e)Improve OPCW monitoring of science and technology of relevance to 
incapacitant and RCA development:  
In 2011, the report of a high-level expert panel convened by the OPCW Director 
General to explore the future priorities of the Organisation recommended that 
the OPCW should “improve and widen the scope of monitoring and evaluating 
                                                          
2056
 See for example: British Medical Association, The Use of Drugs as Weapons: the Concerns and 
Responsibilities of Healthcare Professionals, London: BMA, 2007; Royal Society, Brain Waves Module 3: 
Neuroscience, Conflict and Security, London: Royal Society, February 2012; Spiez Laboratory (2012) 
op.cit. 
2057
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VIII (21) h.; Ambassador Pfirter, then 
OPCW Director General has previously recognised that the SAB could “help shed some light” on 
incapacitant related issues. [OPCW, Conference of States Parties, 30
th
 November- 4
th
 December 2009, 
Opening Statement by the Director General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourteenth 
Session, C-14/DG.13, 30
th
 November 2009.]. 
2058
 The criteria used for determining such “safe” agents would also need to be established. See for 
example criteria considered by the 2010 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) expert meeting, 
namely: retain chemical stability in a variety of situations; have rapid onset of incapacitant action; produce 
complete incapacitation in targeted individuals; have low level, if any, lethality across a broad range of 
individuals; result in low level, if any, permanent disability. [International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Expert Meeting: Incapacitating chemical agents, implications for international law, Montreux, Switzerland, 
24
th
 - 26
th
 March 2010, p.71.] 
2059
 If appropriate, the SAB could also be tasked with developing analytical procedures for incapacitant 
identification and creating a library of incapacitant-type chemicals integrated into the OPCW central 
analytical database (OCAD), in cooperation with OPCW-designated laboratories. 
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developments in chemical science and technology…”2060 Amongst the 
measures the Organisation may wish to consider are those to: 
 Ensure more frequent and considered review by CWC States Parties of 
relevant advances in science and technology and the implications for the 
Convention. Such review could be undertaken annually by States Parties 
as part of the activities of the CSP, in addition to that currently 
undertaken during the Review Conference; 
 Continue the work of the SAB temporary working group on convergence 
of biology and chemistry2061 at least until the 4th CWC Review 
Conference, and request they include specific analysis of the implications 
of advances in the life sciences and attendant technologies relevant to 
the weaponisation of incapacitants and RCAs; 
 Develop the Technical Secretariat’s ability to monitor advances in 
science and technology of concern to incapacitant and/or RCA 
development, and establish suitable mechanisms allowing it to bring 
relevant concerns to the attention of the States Parties and appropriate 
OPCW organs.   
 
(f)Update Schedules to include chemicals that have been or could be utilised as 
weaponised incapacitants:  
Under Article XV of the CWC, amendments to the Convention Annexes, if 
“related to matters of an administrative or technical nature”,2062 can be made 
using a simplified technical change procedure initiated by a State Party.2063 This 
procedure could be utilised to revise the Schedules so as to include certain 
incapacitants, such as: 
• Pharmaceutical chemicals that States have previously explored or are 
reportedly exploring as weaponised incapacitants, such as certain: 
                                                          
2060
 Ekeus panel, Report of the advisory panel on future priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, OPCW Director General, S/951/2011, 25
th
 July 2011, p.18, paragraph 71. 
2061
 In 2011, an SAB temporary working group (TWG) was established to explore the convergence of 
chemistry and biology, and the implications of this for the Convention. The TWG is chaired by Dr Robert 
Matthews and held its first meeting in November 2011. See: OPCW, Report of the Sixteenth Session of 
the Scientific Advisory Board, 6
th
 April 2011, SAB-16/1; OPCW, OPCW Hosts Series of Science and 
Technology Meetings, 28
th
 November 2011, available at: 
http://www.opcw.org/index.php?id=242&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1459&cHash= 
f4db8a25071e185fbabad1a1dd550af7 (accessed 1
st
 August 2012). 
2062
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article XV (4). 
2063
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article XV (5). 
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– Opiods such as derivatives of fentanyl, 
– Benzodiazepines such as midazolam and diazepam, 
– Alpha2 adrenoreceptor agonists such as dexmedetomidine, 
– Neuroleptic anaesthetics; 
• Toxins that States have previously developed as weaponised 
incapacitants, e.g. Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB); 
• A range of biologically active molecules including certain peptides, bio-
regulators, toxins and their analogues that may have potential utility as 
incapacitants.2064  
 
The development, stockpiling, transfer and use of incapacitants considered as 
Schedule 1 agents would be prohibited for law enforcement purposes.2065 For 
States Parties manufacturing incapacitants considered as Schedule 2 agents 
there would be requirements to declare quantities and production sites, with the 
potential for on-site monitoring over certain thresholds and also a prohibition on 
the transfer of such agents to Non-States Parties.2066 The question of whether 
Schedule 2 incapacitants could be utilised for law enforcement would still need 
to be addressed by the Organisation. 
 
(g) Utilise existing CWC consultation, investigation and fact-finding 
mechanisms: where activities of potential concern are reported, such as the 
alleged use of incapacitants or RCAs by law enforcement, security or military 
forces, for human rights violations or breaches of international humanitarian 
law. In addition to obtaining information regarding the specific alleged incidents 
that have raised concerns, clarification could also be sought concerning: the 
nature and quantities of incapacitant or RCA developed and stockpiled, and the 
entities holding such agents; the range of intended uses to which they can be 
put; the political and legal controls on development, stockpiling, deployment and 
use. If bilateral consultations with the relevant States Parties are not fruitful, 
                                                          
2064
 Modification of the “other chemical production facilities” (OCPF) verification regime could also be 
explored for certain biologically active molecules i.e. peptides. See: Tucker, J. The Convergence of 
Biology and Chemistry: Implications for Arms Control, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 66, number 
6, pp.56-66; Tucker, J. The Body’s Own Bioweapons, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, volume 61, number 1, 
March-April 2008, pp.16-22. 
2065
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VI and also Verification Annex, Part VI. 
2066
 OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VI and also Verification Annex, Part VII. 
474 
 
concerned States Parties could consider a formal request under Article IX of the 
CWC.  
 
(h) Initiate a process to strengthen effectiveness of OPCW structures, 
mechanisms and working practices: Building upon the findings of the Ekeus 
advisory group, a similar expert group could be established to explore: 
 measures to strengthen the independence and autonomy of the 
Technical Secretariat (TS), enabling it to: 
o undertake independent monitoring and information gathering 
activities and formally receive and act upon information provided 
by the United Nations,  international organisations, the media, 
industry, reputable NGOs or academia;  
o formally initiate consultation, investigation and fact-finding 
mechanisms in situations it deems appropriate;  
o present concerns and recommendations to relevant OPCW 
structures particularly the Executive Council, CSP or Review 
Conferences;  
 measures to improve the decision-making processes of the Executive 
Council (EC), including recourse to majority voting as provided for in the 
Convention;  
 measures to improve the preparation for, and the operation of Review 
Conferences to ensure that they fully meet their obligations under the 
Convention;  
 mechanisms for increasing the interaction of, and information exchange 
between civil society organisations and relevant OPCW structures 
(including the TS, EC, SAB and national authorities); including:  
o development of mechanisms to ensure that civil society 
organisations have the opportunity to engage fully in relevant 
decision-making processes such as the Conferences of States 
Parties and Review Conferences;  
o review and revision of existing confidentiality policies to facilitate 
increased transparency and information access to civil society and 
the media. 
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There appears to be a growing recognition – as illustrated by the establishment 
and findings of the Ekeus panel - that the OPCW needs to undergo an 
organisational-wide-process of reflection and adaptation to meet challenges in 
both the external environment (e.g. advances in science and technology, 
globalisation of the chemical industry, changes in the nature of armed conflict, 
etc) as well as those resulting from its successful advance towards the eventual 
destruction of existing CW stockpiles. Although such issues will undoubtedly be 
discussed at the 3rd Review Conference, it is unclear whether the necessary 
political will currently exists in State capitals for the Organisation to effectively 
address the “difficult” questions regarding regulation of incapacitants, RCAs and 
related means of delivery. It is doubtful whether progress will be made on these 
issues, during this meeting, unless at least one State (and ideally a group of 
like-minded States) champions such a cause. Whilst there are indications that 
certain States (most notably Switzerland) may be willing to raise the question of 
incapacitants in such forums, the position with regard to RCAs and related 
means of delivery is less certain. In the light of such uncertainty, alternative 
routes for regulation outside of the CWC/OCPW are explored below. 
 
15.3.2. Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC) 
BTWC States Parties could, at a Meeting of States Parties (MSP) or a Review 
Conference,  affirm that incapacitants and/or RCAs of biological origin and their 
synthetic analogues are covered under the scope of the Convention and that 
the use of such agents and associated means of delivery for “hostile purposes 
or in armed conflict” is prohibited under the Convention. In addition, States 
Parties could give consideration to initiating a suitable formal or informal 
process to collectively address how incapacitants and RCAs of biological origin 
intended for counter-terrorist, counter-insurgency or military operations short of 
armed conflict should be regulated or prohibited by the BTWC.  
 
As part of the 2012-2016 inter-sessional process, BTWC States Parties could 
include a focus on monitoring and assessing the risk of misuse of advances in 
science and technologies relevant to incapacitant or RCA development. 
Additionally, the States Parties and the relevant organisations of the BTWC and 
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the CWC could improve their coordination to address the implications to both 
treaties of the convergence of biological and chemical sciences and 
technologies with respect to the development of incapacitants and RCAs. 
 
15.3.3. International humanitarian law 
States could explore the constraints imposed by international humanitarian law 
instruments (principally the Four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols) 
and customary international humanitarian law upon the development, 
acquisition or use of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery in 
armed conflict; and the consequent implications for State actions in this area. Of 
particular importance would be measures to promote and facilitate the effective 
implementation of States’ obligations under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to 
conduct reviews of any new weapon (including RCAs, incapacitants and related 
means of delivery) developed or acquired, so as to determine its compatibility 
with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.  
 
One possible forum for such deliberations could be the quadrennial 
International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
which bring together the States party to the Geneva Conventions, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies and all recognized National Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies to “examine and decide upon humanitarian matters of 
common interest”.2067  
 
15.3.4. Human rights law 
States could explore the constraints on RCA and incapacitant use arising from 
international and regional human rights instruments and customary international 
human rights law. States could also bring cases of reported RCA and 
incapacitant misuse to the attention of the appropriate human rights 
mechanisms, including: UN Special Procedures and the UN Human Rights 
                                                          
2067
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Statutes of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
Adopted by the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in October 1986 and amended 
by the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent at Geneva in December 1995 
and by the 29th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent at Geneva in June 2006, 
Article 8. Available from: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/statutes-movement-
220506.htm (accessed 1st October 2012). 
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Council; relevant international and regional treaty bodies (e.g. Human Rights 
Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Committee against Torture under the Convention Against Torture); regional 
judicial mechanisms capable of delivering binding legal judgements regarding 
violations of regional treaties (e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Inter-
American Court, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights). Since a 
number of such regional mechanisms are potentially open to individual petition, 
victims and their families can also directly seek redress in cases of agent 
misuse, and civil society organisations can attempt to employ such mechanisms 
to develop human rights case law on these issues.2068  
 
Furthermore, States could consider requesting that a suitable body such as the 
UN Human Rights Council, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, or the UN Crime Congresses, develop guidance/procedures for 
evaluating the human rights compatibility or incompatibility of all proposed “less 
lethal” weapons (which certainly cover RCAs and which some States may 
consider could potentially include certain incapacitants). If appropriate, the 
relevant body could also recommend constraints on the use of any “less lethal” 
weapons deemed compatible with human rights standards2069 and develop 
guidelines for monitoring and ensuring subsequent use is in accordance with 
human rights law. 
 
Alternatively, States, acting through the relevant UN procedures, could seek to 
initiate an investigation by relevant UN Special Rapporteur(s) (such as those on 
Torture, or Extra-Judicial Executions, or Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights) 
on the human rights implications of the development and use of RCAs and 
incapacitants for law enforcement. Such a study could be undertaken in the 
context of a broader study on the use of force in law enforcement operations. 
 
 
                                                          
2068
 With regard to incapacitants see for example: European Court of Human Rights, Finogenov and others 
v. Russia, App. Nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, Judgment, 20
th
 December 2011; with regard to RCAs see, 
for example: European Court of Human Rights, Ali Gunes v. Turkey, App. No. 9829/07, Judgement, 10
th
 
April 2012. 
2069
 Such constraints could include a prohibition on the use of RCAs in confined spaces or against 
restrained individuals. 
478 
 
15.3.5. United Nations Drug Control Conventions 
Both the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the UN Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances restrict the legitimate use of a range of incapacitants 
to “medical and scientific purposes”.2070 States Parties to these Conventions 
could seek to formally establish the implications of these restrictions upon the 
development, stockpiling, transfer and use of incapacitants intended for law 
enforcement or military applications. If appropriate, and required, State Parties 
could bring forward clarificatory amendments (or agree common 
understandings) through the appropriate Convention mechanisms to explicitly 
prohibit or constrain such activities. 
 
The reporting2071 (and potentially the consultation/investigatory)2072 mechanisms 
of both Conventions could be considered by States Parties as potential routes 
for obtaining information relevant to the regulation of incapacitants. Where a 
State Party has a concern about the development, stockpiling, transfer or use of 
a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance potentially intended for employment 
as an incapacitant in either military operations or law enforcement, they could 
consider bringing their concerns before the relevant Drug Convention bodies 
e.g. International Narcotics Control Board, or the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. 
 
The international governmental and non-governmental arms control 
communities have previously paid little attention to the potential applicability of 
these Conventions to the regulation of incapacitants intended for law 
enforcement or military purposes. This, situation may, however, be changing 
with for example, the ICRC highlighting the relevancy of such instruments in its 
September 2012 Synthesis publication.2073 It is certainly an area meriting further 
research and engagement with the State Parties of both Conventions. 
                                                          
2070
 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Article 4; United Nations, Convention on 
Pyschotropic Substances, 1971, Article 5 and Article 7. 
2071
 For example, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs obliges States Parties to provide the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) with annual estimates of drug requirements (Article 19.1-2) 
and drug production (Article 20) for scheduled chemicals (which include some drugs that have been 
explored as potential ‘law enforcement’ incapacitants, such as fentanyl). 
2072
 See for example: United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Article 14. 
2073
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Toxic Chemicals As Weapons For Law Enforcement: A 
threat to life and international law? Synthesis document, September 2012.  
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15.3.6. Transfer controls 
Individual States could, if they have not done so already, establish national 
transfer controls that restrict the import, export, transit, transhipment and 
brokering of RCAs, incapacitants, precursors and/or related means of delivery. 
Whilst certain regions have developed instruments and attendant transfer 
control regimes (e.g. EU Council Common Position 2008/944 and EC 
Regulation 1236) to explicitly regulate the transfer of certain RCAs, 
incapacitants and/or their precursors and related means of delivery, and allow 
for additional agents to be added to the relevant control lists, the majority have 
not. States that are members of the aforementioned regimes could strive to 
ensure control lists are regularly updated so as to encompass the full range of 
relevant agents of concern, and that restrictions on the transfer of such agents 
are strengthened and effectively implemented. States outside these control 
regimes should give consideration to aligning their national control regimes to 
them and/or seeking to introduce similar measures in their relevant regional 
organisations.  
 
Recent attempts, under the auspices of the UN, to develop an Arms Trade 
Treaty that would regulate the international trade in conventional weapons have 
stalled. If and when negotiations recommence, States could consider 
incorporating RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery within the 
instrument’s scope of coverage. Similarly, in the long term, consideration could 
be given to the development of an international instrument restricting and/or 
prohibiting the transfer of security equipment (potentially including certain 
RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery) that could be utilised for 
torture, ill-treatment or the death penalty. States could also seek to establish 
appropriate mechanisms to review introduction, monitoring and implementation 
of UN and regional arms embargoes and where necessary ensure that the 
scope of coverage of such embargoes clearly includes RCAs, incapacitants and 
related means of delivery.  
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15.3.7. Civil society 
Concerned civil society actors - particularly those in the life and chemical 
science communities – can continue fostering a “culture of responsibility” in 
science by developing, promulgating and applying codes of conduct, pledges 
and conventions regulating “dual use” research, but focussing now upon 
initiatives explicitly combating the misapplication of such research by State 
weapons programmes. Complimentary activities include promoting the non-
participation in and “whistle-blowing” on RCA and incapacitant programmes of 
concern; and education and awareness-raising amongst scientific communities, 
States Parties and the general public of the dangers of such development and 
use. 
 
Individual life and chemical scientists and professional associations as well as 
non-governmental organisations informed by such expertise, can play important 
constructive roles in highlighting existing limitations in the BTWC, CWC and 
attendant control regimes with regard to RCAs and incapacitants, and 
developing and promoting possible science-informed policy responses; 
undertaking societal monitoring and verification of existing implementation by 
States Parties of relevant instruments and highlighting research and 
development activities of concern; predicting research trajectories in relevant 
scientific disciplines and highlighting potential future threats.  
 
Preparations by CWC States for the forthcoming 2013 Review Conference, 
which in certain countries will include limited consultation with a narrow range of 
academics, NGOs and scientific bodies perceived to have relevant expertise in 
chemical weapons arms control and disarmament, provide important 
opportunities for at least some civil society actors to bring concrete proposals to 
address RCAs, incapacitants and their means of delivery to the attention of 
relevant State officials. In order to facilitate more informed and comprehensive 
policy as well as more effective advocacy in relevant national and OPCW 
forums, efforts can be made by coordinating bodies such as the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Coalition (CCWC) to engage and be informed by a wide 
range of civil society actors including human rights, international humanitarian 
law and humanitarian aid organisations, as well as those local communities, 
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pro-democracy and civil liberties movements that have been or are at risk from 
the misuse of such agents. 
 
One community of particular relevance and importance are health 
professionals. There are a range of declarations and regulations adopted by the 
World Medical Association (WMA) that guide health professionals in situations 
of conflict and unrest, prohibit physician involvement in development of 
chemical or biological weapons and prohibit their involvement in torture, ill-
treatment and other forms of human rights abuse. However, there are no widely 
accepted guidelines specifically determining the permissibility or non-
permissibility of medical involvement in the development, testing or utilisation of 
“less lethal” chemical agents including RCAs and incapacitants intended for law 
enforcement or certain military operations. Given the potential importance of 
medical participation to development, testing and utilisation of such “less lethal” 
weapons, the introduction of clear guidance by national medical associations 
and subsequently by the WMA constraining the involvement of health 
professionals in such activities is needed. In addition, health professionals 
working together with the broader medical-scientific community can undertake 
and bring to the attention of relevant control regimes and the public the results 
of peer reviewed studies on the short term and long term health consequences 
of the use and misuse of these agents.  
 
15.3.8. Additional processes that merit further investigation 
Although a broad range of potential mechanisms for the regulation of RCAs, 
incapacitants or related means of delivery have been explored in this 
dissertation, the nature of the HAC framework, with its concentration upon 
existing international agreements, law and attendant regimes has meant that 
certain potentially relevant mechanisms have not been studied. For example, 
processes that could potentially play important roles in deterring or ameliorating 
the effects of large scale RCA or incapacitant weapon attack, such as national 
broad-band defensive measures (e.g. strengthening public health surveillance, 
coordinated emergency and health response, development and stockpiling of 
antidotes, development of deterrent weapons and counter-measures, etc) merit 
further investigation.  
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Other mechanisms not considered at the present time but which may become 
relevant in the future depending upon the trajectory of development and 
proposed application of “next generation” “less lethal” chemical agents and 
associated “wide area” means of delivery include the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (Enmod Convention)2074 and the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW 
Convention).2075  
 
Whilst the analysis carried out in HAC stage two sought to be as 
comprehensive as possible, priority has been given during the development of a 
HAC stage three strategy to those mechanisms where: the instrument or regime 
is clearly applicable, there are potential forums for addressing the relevant 
agents and means of delivery, and there are indications that certain States 
Parties are concerned about the issue, so that the mechanism could potentially 
be employed in the short-medium term. Other existing regimes that have not 
fulfilled all such criteria but are certainly worthy of further study and may well 
prove important in the longer term, or sooner if a State or group of States 
decides to champion their application to RCAs, incapacitants and related means 
of delivery, include: the international criminal court and other international 
criminal law entities; the UN Secretary General’s investigation mechanism, and 
other ad hoc UN investigatory mechanisms.  
 
In addition, two civil society initiatives – the Harvard Sussex Convention and the 
draft Framework Convention on Biochemical Weapons - have merit and 
deserve further study. However, neither initiative has yet acquired significant 
support amongst the international governmental community. The negotiation of 
new international agreements is a lengthy process, fraught with delay, 
                                                          
2074
 United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, Adopted by Resolution 31/72 of the United Nations General Assembly on 10
th
 
December 1976. It opened for signature on 18
th
 May 1977 and entered into force on 5
th
 October 1978. 
2075
 United Nations, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, concluded 
on 10
th
 October 1980 and entered into force on 2
nd
 December 1983. 
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compromise and the possibility of failure, with the resulting instruments often 
requiring a further lengthy process of ratification before coming into force. It is 
unlikely therefore that either initiative, if successful, will be in place and 
implemented within the next ten years. 
 
15.4. Lessons learned from the application of HAC 
 
15.4.1. Strengths and benefits 
The formal three stage HAC process is designed to promote and facilitate the 
objective investigation by researchers of a specific weapon or weapons-related 
technology and its actual or proposed employment; and to encourage 
receptivity and a willingness to explore all potential mechanisms that could be 
brought to bear in its regulation, before evaluating which show greatest potential 
utility and in what manner. HAC is intended to question pre-conceived thinking 
and consequently to “open up” the discourse around the regulation of specific 
weapons so as to allow new information, new thinking, new actors and new 
routes of action and to be explored and, if appropriate, employed.2076  
 
From reviewing the empirical data obtained through the application of HAC 
during this PhD research project it is clear that this process, has in large part, 
fulfilled these objectives. Important new information has been introduced under 
HAC stage one, for example, highlighting the nature and geographical spread of 
inappropriate use of RCAs by law enforcement officials, uncovering indications 
of current interest and research into incapacitants with the consequent dangers 
of potential misuse and proliferation, and demonstrating the diversity of 
applicable means of delivery and attendant implications for regulating the 
manner in which chemical agents are employed.  
 
Similarly, analysis during HAC stage two has successfully brought to the fore a 
range of new mechanisms comprising a variety of international law, 
agreements, instruments and attendant regimes outside the narrow arms 
                                                          
2076
 Whilst some of this “new” information may already be publicly available and many of the “new” actors 
and routes of action may already be employed in other contexts, HAC provides a mechanism for reviewing 
and where appropriate applying them to the weapon or weapons-related technology under review.  
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control and disarmament regimes that are normally considered for these 
agents. However although “new” mechanisms such as the UN drug 
conventions, certain human-rights-based transfer controls, and regional and 
international human rights law and judicial entities do appear to be relevant and 
potentially effective at prohibiting or constraining the transfer or employment of 
these agents, at least in certain circumstances, whether they will enter the 
“political” regulatory discourse, be championed by States and eventually 
employed, remains to be seen (see below).  
 
A further potential benefit arising from the HAC requirement of analysing and 
comparing diverse regulatory mechanisms is that effective approaches and 
processes employed in one regime can be considered for use in other regimes, 
whilst weaknesses and limitations can be avoided. For example, the utility of 
certain generic measures has been highlighted during the course of this PhD, 
including “catch-all” clauses and “general purpose” provisions mitigating against 
the limitations of list-based control regimes to respond to technological change, 
and “no undercutting” rules preventing transfer prohibitions imposed by one 
Member State being undermined by a second Member State. The potential for 
such “good practice” to be introduced into comparable relevant mechanisms, 
where appropriate and feasible, is worthy of further study. However full 
consideration must be given to the contextual specificity of each provision – 
which was designed to fulfil a specific purpose in a specific instrument/control 
regime - and the full implications of any “import” into a subsequent 
instrument/control regime analysed, so as to offset dangers that adopting such 
provisions introduces weaknesses and limitations as well as bringing 
benefits.2077 
 
One crucial aspect and strength of the HAC analytical process – derived in part 
from its epistemological roots in critical realism and analytical scepticism -  has 
been the requirement upon the researcher to actively examine, utilising multiple 
                                                          
2077
 The dangers of such unintended consequences have been illustrated during this PhD dissertation by 
the wholesale incorporation of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) control lists into the EU military lists. 
Whilst the WA lists were developed, and may be appropriate, for a regime concentrating upon national and 
international security they are less appropriate and insufficiently comprehensive when utilised in the 
European control regime which as well as national and  international security also seeks to address human 
rights concerns. 
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sources where possible, the nature of the weapons studied and explore and 
question how they are actually utilised in practice rather than to accept the 
claims of their manufacturers and the reports of the States that hold and employ 
them. Such an approach has brought to light a wealth of new information 
presenting a fuller and richer picture of the nature of actual use and/or misuse 
of RCAs, incapacitants and means of delivery.   
 
Similarly, when analysing the effectiveness of control mechanisms, the 
researcher has not automatically and passively taken data publicly released by 
the relevant regime secretariats or States Parties as a full and accurate picture 
of reality, but instead has sought alternate sources of information indicating how 
such mechanisms have been applied in practice. Furthermore, when analysing 
States' obligations under particular law, agreements, instruments and attendant 
regimes, the researcher has not automatically assumed that the State’s reading 
of their obligation is the only possible or indeed the correct one. Instead the 
researcher, whilst acknowledging the limits of his expertise, knowledge and 
experience, has attempted to independently assess such obligations – 
consulting with independent experts where possible – and also to record and 
explore potential ambiguities or divergent interpretations by States Parties. 
Although the results from such analysis are often complex, and full of 
contingencies and caveats, it is argued that they present a more accurate 
representation of reality than an unquestioning reliance upon the (often limited 
and partial) official data released by the control regime organisation or States 
Parties, and therefore give a stronger foundation on which to develop a more 
realistic regulatory strategy.  
 
Consequently, the analysis undertaken during HAC stage two has highlighted 
new potential approaches to the application of existing control regimes (most 
notably the CWC) regarding RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery, 
and explored the routes by which new actors particularly from civil society, can 
engage with relevant interlocutors and utilise mechanisms of such control 
regimes to bring to light cases of concern regarding these agents and delivery 
mechanisms. One illustrative example of many cases highlighted in this PhD 
was the research undertaken by three NGOs into the possession and promotion 
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of 120mm mortar bombs containing RCAs by a Turkish company in apparent 
breach of the CWC, and the mechanisms utilised by these NGOs to raise the 
issue with the relevant State Party and within the OPCW, such actions 
eventually resulting in the destruction of all remaining munitions and a 
clarification of Turkey’s position in this area. The methodology employed by the 
NGOs in this potentially precedent-setting case may well have wider 
applicability, within and beyond the OPCW, and is worthy of further study and 
development. It is also indicative of the far greater and more active range of 
roles civil society can and should play in monitoring and facilitating more 
effective regulation of these agents and means of delivery across all relevant 
regulatory mechanisms, as well as in awareness raising, education, 
promulgation and building cultures of responsibility amongst relevant 
communities. 
 
15.4.2. Challenges and limitations 
A key potential strength of the HAC analytical framework – namely the 
requirement to analyse a wide range of regulatory mechanisms – imposes 
severe challenges for the individual researcher in acquiring sufficient depth of 
understanding of such international law, agreements, instruments and attendant 
control regimes, which may in turn require knowledge acquisition of many 
diverse disciplines.2078  Consequently, it is important for the individual 
researcher to question and acknowledge the limitations of their knowledge, and 
seek relevant expertise where possible.  
 
As well as the challenges of acquiring sufficient knowledge and expertise of a 
broad range of disciplines, there are also important limitations on the quality of 
information that can be obtained on the actual working practices of relevant 
control regimes by researchers not immersed for long periods “within” the 
particular regimes. However, the unique histories, “unwritten” working cultures 
and “politics” of each regime will to varying degrees influence Member State 
interpretation and implementation of the relevant instruments, and regime 
                                                          
2078
 This PhD research project required a working knowledge of a number of disciplines including: 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, arms control and 
disarmament and related international relations theory, as well as knowledge of a range of chemical and 
life sciences. 
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responsiveness to attempts to effect change. Although such knowledge requires 
considerable research investment, without it nuances will be lost, false 
assumptions made, incorrect conclusions drawn and inappropriate 
recommendations proposed.  
 
Whilst such challenges are commonly encountered by all researchers 
investigating individual control regimes, the difficulties faced by researchers 
seeking to employ HAC are magnified because of the number of diverse control 
regimes investigated. A prioritisation process will therefore need to be 
undertaken, with greatest concentration of research resources directed to those 
regimes considered most relevant and potentially responsive to regulating the 
weapons under review.2079 The consequent implications for the veracity and 
“richness” of the resulting empirical data derived from all regimes explored 
should be fully considered and acknowledged by the researcher in the stage 
two analysis and relevant caveats and allowances made in the subsequent 
development of a stage three strategy. 
 
Although HAC appears to have utility in highlighting the range of new 
mechanisms potentially applicable to the regulation of relevant weapons, such 
identification is only the initial step in a long process of research, analysis and 
engagement with key interlocuters in both existing and potentially applicable 
mechanisms to establish which, if any regulatory routes, are politically viable. 
Such a process will likely have to overcome resistance in both existing and new 
mechanisms (not to mention from those States engaged in development of the 
relevant weapons or those who wish to keep the potential open for such 
development). For example, Member States in potentially applicable regimes 
will have existing concerns and priorities and limited temporal, financial and 
personnel resources to devote to that particular regime, and may be wary of 
recognising obligations to regulate an additional range of what may be 
                                                          
2079
 During this PhD research project, priority was given to an in-depth exploration of the CWC and OPCW, 
utilising a range of primary documentary analysis, expert interview, participant observation techniques, 
whilst other control regimes were studied in less detail with greater reliance given to compilation and 
analysis of the formal primary documents produced by States Parties and institutions of the relevant 
control regimes. 
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controversial weapons, already deemed to fall under the purview of another 
regime.  
 
15.4.3. The potential for wider applicability 
Although the concept of holistic arms control was developed and specifically 
designed, as part of the PhD research process, to facilitate investigation of the 
regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery, the analytical 
framework would appear to have a much wider potential utility, particularly with 
regard to arms control and disarmament research.   
 
However, with its requirement to assess a wide range of potentially applicable 
regulatory mechanisms, it does exact high demands upon a researcher's time, 
resources and cognitive flexibility. Consequently, whilst HAC can be conducted 
by the individual researcher, the analytical framework would appear to be 
ideally suited to application by a multi-disciplinary research team able to access 
expertise from a variety of arms control, disarmament, human rights, human 
security, medical, legal, law enforcement and military perspectives as well as 
possessing knowledge of the relevant weapon or weapons-related technology 
under study.2080 
 
HAC is clearly an abductive, rather than a deductive, process, with similarities 
to Grounded Theory Methodology, particularly in its insistence on letting the 
evidence determine the subsequent development of theory. It is particularly 
suited to those researchers who wish to take a “fresh look” at an established 
technology or to comprehensively explore a new or evolving technology,  
questioning preconceived assumptions and unconstrained by existing 
theoretical constructs; and who, although determined to analyse in detail the 
existing clearly-relevant regulatory mechanisms, will also explore what may lie 
beyond.  
                                                          
2080
 In the case of RCAs and incapacitants, such a team would include chemists, toxicologists, medical 
pharmacologists and other life scientists.  Such a multi-disciplinary team approach has recently been 
applied to the study of autonomous military robots. See: Marchant G., Allenby B., Arkin R., Barrett E., 
Borenstein J., Gaudet L., Kittrie O., Lin P., Lucas G., O’Meara R., Silberman J. International Governance 
of Autonomous Military Robots, The Colombia Science and Technology law Review, volume 12, article 7, 
2011.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Case studies illustrating the range of human rights abuses reportedly 
perpetrated by law enforcement officials utilising riot control agents 
(RCAs) 
 
A1. Use of RCAs for suppression of freedom of assembly and expression 
 
Georgia 
Reports by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
situation of human rights defenders 2081 and Amnesty International2082 
highlighted the actions of the Georgian police who were accused of using 
excessive force to disperse demonstrators calling for the resignation of 
President Mikheil Saakashvili on 7th November 2007. The UN Special 
Representative stated that: “…peaceful anti-Government demonstrations in 
Tbilisi were violently curtailed by the riot police. Protesting crowds were 
dispersed by water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets.”2083Amnesty 
International reported that: “Police officers, many of whom were wearing masks, 
were said to have used truncheons, rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannons 
to break up three rallies in the capital, Tbilisi. Eye-witnesses reported that police 
beat and kicked scores of demonstrators, and were also said to have assaulted 
the Georgian Ombudsperson.”2084 
 
Iran 
On 16th June 2006, the UN Special Representative on Human Rights 
Defenders2085 sent an urgent appeal to the Iranian Government2086 regarding 
hundreds of women and men who had attempted to hold a peaceful 
                                                          
2081
 UN Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, Report submitted by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, Hina Jilani, Addendum: summary of cases 
transmitted to Governments and replies received,  A/HRC/7/28/Add.1, 5 March 2008, paragraphs 869-871, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/114/44/PDF/G0811444.pdf?OpenElement. 
2082
 Amnesty International  (13
th
 March 2008) op.cit. 
2083
 UN Human Rights Council (5
th
 March 2008) op.cit. 
2084
 Amnesty International (13
th
 March 2008) op.cit. 
2085
 UN Human Rights Council (27
th
 March 2007) op.cit., paragraphs 329-330. 
2086
 The appeal was sent jointly by the Special Representative together with the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the Special Rapporteur on the 
question of torture and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women. 
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demonstration on 12th June 2006 at Haft Tir Square in Tehran to demand a 
better recognition of women's rights. Before the demonstration could 
commence, the security forces began to beat the participants with batons, 
sprayed them with tear gas and colour spray, and took them into custody. A 
spokesperson for the judiciary reportedly confirmed that security forces arrested 
70 people, including 42 women, to prevent the demonstration from taking place. 
According to the spokesperson for the judiciary, they were charged with 
participation in an illegal assembly. 
 
United States 
Amnesty International2087 reported that on 11th November 2007 the United 
States Border Patrol (BP) violently dispersed a protest organized by the group 
‘No Border Camps’ at the US border with Mexico in Calexico, California. Video 
footage reportedly showed BP police advancing on a group of some 30 
demonstrators, swinging batons and indiscriminately firing pepperball guns 
(projectile weapons that fire munitions containing a pepper agent powder) at the 
protesters. Although the police later reported that some demonstrators had 
assaulted officers and begun to destroy government property, none of those 
shown on the video appeared to be engaged in acts of violence when they were 
charged by officers. Those at the scene also reported that no prior warning was 
given for the protesters to disperse before the police began using their weapons 
against them. A number of the demonstrators were alleged to have suffered 
injuries as a result of the police action. 
 
Vietnam 
According to Human Rights Watch,2088 in August and September 2008, the 
Vietnamese police utilised tear gas in the repression of Catholics gathered in 
Hanoi for peaceful prayer vigils calling for the return of government-confiscated 
church property. On 31st August 2008 a uniformed police officer sprayed tear 
gas on a group of Catholics during a prayer vigil on the grounds of Thai Ha 
Church, resulting in the hospitalization of at least 20 parishioners. In September 
2008 police used tear gas and electric batons to disband prayer vigils, detained 
                                                          
2087
 Amnesty International, (15th November 2007) op.cit. 
2088
 Human Rights Watch (14
th
 January 2009) op.cit.; Human Rights Watch, (6
th
 October 2008) op.cit. 
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protesters, and bulldozed properties considered sacred to Vietnamese 
Catholics.  
 
A1.2. Use of RCAs for ill-treatment or torture 
 
Brazil 
According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture,2089 between the 7th and 9th 
May 2007, the Tactical Intervention Group (GIT), a specialised unit of the State 
Secretary of Penitentiary Administration (SEAP), conducted an "operation" at 
Evaristo de Moraes Prison, during which the detainees were punched, kicked, 
slapped, beaten with shoes, police clubs and pieces of wood. The officers 
screamed war cries and death threats, used pepper spray, tear gas, and fired 
rubber bullets indiscriminately. They also stripped many of the detainees naked, 
made them crawl on the floor, eat garbage, imitate animals and repeat the 
phrase: "the GIT is a good partner". 
 
Turkey 
According to Human Rights Watch,2090 five members of Pemba Hyatt (a 
transgender human rights organization) were arbitrarily arrested and brutally 
assaulted by the Ankara police on 17th May 2010. Police sprayed tear gas 
inside the activists' car and dragged the women out through the car windows, 
pulling them by their hair, throwing them to the ground, and kicking their bodies. 
According to the eyewitness interviewed, the head of police ordered the other 
police officers to specifically attack Bülent Kılıçkaya, co-founder of Pembe 
Hayat and a well-known activist. She was subsequently attacked by ten police 
officers, sprayed with tear gas again and handcuffed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2089
 United Nations Human Rights Council (19
th
 February 2008) op.cit., p.30, paragraph 24. 
2090
 Human Rights Watch (18
th
 October 2010) op.cit. 
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A1.3. Use of RCAs in confined space  
 
Honduras 
On 28th June 2009 a coup d’état deposed President José Manuel Zelaya. 
Amnesty International reported2091 that on 22nd September 2009, around 15 
police officers fired tear gas canisters into the confined space of the offices of 
COFADEH (one of the main Honduran human rights organisations), where 
scores of pro-Zelaya protesters had taken refuge. Around 100 people, including 
children, were inside the office at the time. The demonstrators had taken refuge 
in the COFADEH offices to avoid further abuses by the police and military 
forces and to document abuses which they had suffered during a 
demonstration. 
 
Malaysia 
According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
Defenders2092 on 24th November 2007 over 2,000 persons of ethnic Indian 
origin who were assembled in a Hindu temple in Batu Caves on the outskirts of 
Kuala Lumpur, were reportedly beaten by approximately 300 police officers with 
a view to dissuading those assembled from attending a political rally that was 
due to be held on 25th November 2007. The police officers also used tear gas 
and water cannons, spraying a liquid chemical irritating to the eyes and skin. 
Around 70 persons who attempted to escape were arrested. Many were 
charged with attending an illegal assembly and failing to obey police orders. 
 
Nigeria 
According to Human Rights Watch,2093 on 29th November 2008, following 
clashes between mobs of Christians and Muslims in the Angwan-Keke 
neighbourhood of Jos, Plateau State, a group of Police Mobile Force (MOPOL) 
stormed through Angwan-Keke and the adjacent neighborhood of Bulbulla 
shooting into the air and breaking into houses. Twenty residents from both 
communities interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that over the next 
                                                          
2091
 Amnesty International (28
th
 July 2010) op.cit. 
2092
 United Nations Human Rights Council (4
th
 March 2009) op.cit., paragraph 1601. 
2093
 Human Rights Watch (19
th
 December 2008) op.cit. 
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hour the MOPOLs broke into at least six houses and executed at least 13 
unarmed men and boys they found. They also reportedly threw tear gas into a 
small local mosque and into the home where one of the wounded lay dying. A 
witness reported: 
"I live next door to Mr. A., the shopkeeper. After being shot by the MOPOLs he 
crept, pulling himself along the ground, into my house. I asked him where he 
was wounded, but he said he didn't know. I lifted up his shirt and saw he'd been 
shot twice - once in the back and once in the abdomen. As I was trying to stop 
the bleeding, the MOPOLs came back and threw a tear gas canister into my 
house. A. died a short time later.2094 
 
Another eye witnesses stated: 
When they [MOPOL] got to the mosque, I heard one of them asking: ‘Is this not 
a mosque?' Then another said, ‘Burn it,' but in the end they threw the tear gas 
in and gassed out three people, including one who was sick.”2095 
 
Thailand 
According to Amnesty International, in late January 2007, Thai police employed 
RCAs against a group of refugees from the Hmong minority who resisted 
deportation to Laos even though “these men, women and children have been 
recognised as refugees by the UN and would be at risk of serious human rights 
abuses if they were returned to Laos". Immigration officials dragged women and 
girls crying and screaming out of their cell in the Nong Khai immigration centre 
and used tear gas against the men and boys, who had barricaded themselves 
in the men's cell for hours previously. Immigration officials had called on the 
police to force the men and boys out of their barricaded cell. The police used 
tear gas and tried to saw through the bars but were unable to gain access. 
Witnesses reported that police used tear gas three times, despite the fact that 
20 children, all boys, were in the cell.2096 
 
 
                                                          
2094
 Ibid. 
2095
 Human Rights Watch (19
th
 December 2008) op.cit. 
2096
 Amnesty International (30
th
 January 2007) op.cit. 
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Zimbabwe 
Although the case of RCA employment in confined spaces summarised below 
falls outside the time period (and was therefore not incorporated into the data 
set) of the current survey, it is included here to illustrate the serious 
consequences of such misuse.  
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions2097 and Amnesty International2098 raised concerns about the actions 
of riot police, war veterans, and members of the youth ‘militia’ who went to Porta 
Farm to forcibly evict some 10,000 people on 2nd September 2004. The 
legitimacy of this action as a law enforcement operation was undermined by the 
fact that the police were acting in defiance of a High Court order prohibiting the 
eviction.2099 According to eye-witness testimony, the police fired tear gas 
directly into the homes of the Porta Farm residents. Hundreds of other Porta 
Farm residents reported suffering ill-effects from the tear gas, including chest 
and stomach pains, nose bleeding and other health problems. Doctors who 
examined some of the Porta Farm residents told Amnesty International that they 
believed that those most seriously affected by the tear gas were particularly 
vulnerable due to pre-existing illnesses such as tuberculosis.2100 Eleven people 
died at Porta Farm following exposure to tear gas. Among the dead were five 
babies – the youngest just one day old. Many relatives and eye-witnesses 
believe their deaths to be attributable to their exposure to the tear gas. 2101  
 
 
 
                                                          
2097
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, Addendum, Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies’, 
27
th
 March 2006,  pp. 317–8. 
2098
 Amnesty International, Zimbabwe: Ten dead following police misuse of tear gas, Press release, 22
nd
  
September 2004; Amnesty International, Another Death at Porta Farm – 11 People Dead Following Police 
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A1.4. Serious injury or death caused by RCAs or means of delivery 
 
Iran 
In December 2009, Amnesty International reported that: “Many people who took 
part in the [pro-democracy] demonstrations say that plain-clothed and armed 
personnel, whom they believed to be members of the Basij militia, used 
excessive force against them, including when the protests were entirely 
peaceful. Protesters were often greeted with tear gas, baton charges, 
motorcycle charges, beatings with truncheons, and sometimes live 
ammunition.”2102 
 
The Amnesty International report cites the following testimony of a doctor 
present at a pro-democracy demonstration held in Tehran on 20th June 2009: 
“I am a medical doctor and saw from inside the ambulance how opposite the 
Navvab metro station, a couple of Basijis with Kalashnikov and G3 guns were 
shooting directly at people from the roof of Lolagar mosque…I saw… only some 
meters from me, a young man was hit in the throat by a tear gas bullet that had 
been fired directly and purposely at him. Blood spurted from his throat and he 
dropped to the ground and died.”2103 
 
Israel 
Amnesty International have reported that on 17th April 2009, Bassem Abu 
Rahmeh was hit by a high-velocity Israeli tear gas canister, causing fatal 
internal injuries. He was taking part in the weekly protest in Bil’in village against 
the security fence/wall that cuts off Bil’in from much of its agricultural land. 
Video footage showed that Bassem Abu Rahmeh was unarmed and posing no 
threat.2104  
 
On 14th January 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights on Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967 expressed concern over 
what he described as a “series of illegal acts by Israeli authorities” in the 
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Occupied Territories, including the killing of four Palestinians in the West Bank 
by Israel Defence Forces (IDF). One of the cases highlighted was that of Ms. 
Jawaher Abu Rahmeh, a 36 year-old Palestinian woman, who had been 
observing a demonstration against the separation Wall in the West Bank town 
of Bil’in on 31st December 2010. She died on 1st January 2011, as a result of 
inhalation of tear gas fired by IDF at the demonstrators.2105 
 
Jamaica 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has highlighted how the misuse of an 
RCA contributed to the deaths of seven girls held at the Armadale Juvenile 
Correctional Centre in Jamaica on 22nd May 2009.2106  On the day of the fire, six 
girls attempted to break out of the correctional centre by removing the grills 
covering the windows. The girls threw faeces, urine, water and other articles at 
correctional centre officers, who hit the girls with sticks to keep them inside. The 
supervising correctional officer then summoned assistance, and two police 
officers arrived at the correctional centre. One of the police officers threw a tear 
gas canister into the dormitory, which fell onto a bed and started the fire upon 
contact with a foam mattress. A second fire started when the smoke from the 
tear gas combined with an accelerant found in the dormitory. The door of the 
dormitory was never opened, so the girls had to jump out through the front and 
rear windows. One of the correctional officers continued hitting the girls to 
ensure they stayed inside, despite the fact that the dormitory was on fire. Seven 
girls died as a result of the fire, and many others were injured.2107 The report of 
a Jamaican Government Commission of Enquiry into this event concluded that 
the use of tear gas had been an unlawful use of force by the police officer, and 
that the dormitory door should have been promptly unlocked.2108 
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Mexico 
An Amnesty International report describes the death resulting from the 
inappropriate use of an RCA munition in Oaxaca City, Mexico. 2109 In June 2006 
widespread protests – lasting several months- demanding the resignation of the 
State Governor erupted in Oaxaca State. At midday on 29th October the Federal 
Preventive Police (PFP) entered Oaxaca City with riot gear, water-cannon 
tanks, cranes, tear gas rifle launchers and batons. While the principal streets 
were cleared relatively rapidly, some protesters responded with slings, stones 
and petrol bombs. Several police and protesters were injured and more than 20 
people were arrested. Amnesty International received a number of reports that 
some of the PFP officers had discharged tear gas launcher rifles at a flat 
trajectory directed toward demonstrators at close range, with a high risk of 
causing serious injuries or fatalities. However, the PFP stated that no abuses 
took place during the PFP intervention in Oaxaca.  
 
Despite these denials by the PFP, human rights organisations have highlighted 
the case of Alberto Jorge López Bernal who was reportedly hit by a projectile 
fired at close range by members of the PFP during a clash with demonstrators 
near the Puente Tecnológico.2110 He was taken to a nearby house where he 
later died of his wounds. The official autopsy concluded that he was wounded 
by the discharge of a tear gas projectile that penetrated his chest, injuring his 
heart and left lung. The canister, which was still embedded in his body when it 
was examined was inscribed with the reference: SPEDE — HEAT, CS, 
SHORTT RANGLER 75 YD. The official autopsy concluded it was a tear gas 
cartridge fired by riot police. 2111 Spede-Heat “Short Range” CS cartridges have 
been manufactured by the U.S. company Defense Technology.2112 The 
manufacturer’s product specifications have included an explicit warning “not [to] 
fire [the catrdige] directly at personnel, as serious injury or death may result.”2113 
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Sudan 
According to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on the 
Situation of Human Rights Defenders2114, Sudanese police and security forces 
violently broke up a demonstration on 30th August 2006, blocked access to the 
“green tomb square” where it was taking place, and closed access roads. 
Eyewitness accounts suggest that protestors were beaten and dispersed by 
armed riot police who shelled the area with tear gas. Sidig Mahgoub Munawar 
reportedly suffocated to death from the effects of the tear gas. 
 
United States 
Amnesty International have raised concerns that the employment of pepper 
spray, particularly when used in conjunction with other restraints, or on 
individuals with certain health problems, may increase a risk of respiratory 
failure. Concern was also expressed of its use in conjunction with Taser 
electroshock devices. For example the organisation has described how in 
November 2006, police in de Soto County, Mississippi, reportedly used a whole 
can of pepper spray as well as Taser strikes against Darren Faulkner, who had 
been involved in a street fight; Mr Faulkner subsequently stopped breathing at 
the scene. He had hypertensive heart disease and his cause of death was 
reportedly given as “heart failure”. Amnesty International also record the case of 
Mark McCullaugh who died in Summit County Jail, Ohio, in August 2006 after 
being shocked with a Taser and saturated with a 16-oz can of pepper spray 
whilst he was restrained in his cell. The medical examiner subsequently testified 
that burns to Mr McCullaugh’s windpipe as well as the Taser shocks would have 
impaired his respiration.2115 
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A1.5. Use of RCAs in conjunction with excessive use of force and/or 
firearms 
 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Human Rights Watch have reported2116 how RCAs were used by the security 
forces to flush opposition party supporters from their homes. On 5th December 
2010, uniformed security forces descended on the Abobo Kennedy 
neighborhood around midnight in military trucks. They fired shots into the air 
and then tear gas canisters toward the houses, multiple witnesses said. The 
tear gas forced some families outdoors, and security forces opened fire. At least 
one youth was killed by a gunshot wound to the lung fired from 15 to 20 meters 
away.  
 
Dominican Republic 
Amnesty International has reported2117 that in June 2007, police and military 
officers used pellets and tear gas to evict 75 families from public land in Villa 
Venecia de Pantojas, Santo Domingo Este. César Ureña, a community leader, 
was reportedly extra-judicially executed by military officers during the eviction. 
On 13th May 2008, the Finance Ministry’s Department of National Assets gave a 
plot of land to the evicted families. However, four days later the relocated 
families were forcibly evicted from that land by a contingent of police and 
military personnel. A 76 year old man died of asphyxiation caused by the use of 
tear gas during the eviction. 
 
Indonesia 
According to Amnesty International,2118 on 18th December 2008, around 700 
members of the local security forces discharged small arms and used tear gas 
to forcibly evict residents of Suluk Bongka village in the province of Riau on the 
eastern coast of Sumatra. Local sources reported a two-year-old died after she 
fell down a well during the confrontation, while a two-month-old baby died from 
burn injuries. Two other people suffered gunshot wounds. As the villagers fled 
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into the forest, two helicopters then dropped what was thought to be a fire 
accelerant on the village of Suluk Bongkal, Bengkalis, burning to the ground 
around 300 homes. Bulldozers then went in and flattened the area completely. 
 
Peru 
According to Amnesty International2119, on 5th June 2009, 33 people were killed 
and at least 200 injured after police officers used excessive force in dispersing a 
road blockade organised by Awajún and Wampís Indigenous people in the 
department of Amazonas who had been had been peacefully blockading the 
road in protest against laws over the use of land and resources which they 
claimed posed a threat to their rights to their ancestral land and livelihood. 
Amnesty International researchers conducted interviews with protestors who 
indicated that tear gas canisters were thrown indiscriminately, including from the 
air from helicopters. One eyewitness stated: “My friends got scared when they 
[started] dropping tear gas bombs on them from the helicopters. My friends 
were running all over the place and we carried those who were getting injured. 
They were flying over us very low, very near and firing with machine guns. 
That’s what I saw…”2120  
 
Figures A1.1 and A1.2: (above left)Police helicopter flying over the police  operation on 
the road to Bagua, 5 June 2009.© Thomas Quirynen, (above right), DINOES police 
officers using tear gas against protestors on the road towards Bagua, 5
th
 June 2009. © 
Thomas Quirynen 
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Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Watch have documented the use by military forces of RCAs in 
conjunction with live fire against unarmed civilians engaged in illegal mining 
activities. The Marange diamond fields were discovered in 2006, and they were 
initially open to anyone. Consequently illegal mining and smuggling flourished. 
The Zimbabwean army subsequently took control in October 2008. Human 
Rights Watch have described how the military operation commenced at 7 a.m. 
on 27th October 2008 with five military helicopters carrying mounted automatic 
rifles flying over the fields around Chiadzwa, driving out the local miners. From 
the helicopters, soldiers indiscriminately fired live ammunition and tear gas onto 
the diamond fields and into surrounding villages. A ground operation with over 
800 soldiers was also initiated.2121  
 
One local miner who was caught up in the operation on the first day told Human 
Rights Watch: 
“I first heard the sound and then saw three helicopters above us in the field. I 
was not worried. I just assumed it was a team of buyers who had come for 
business in helicopters as they sometimes did. However, soldiers in the 
helicopters started firing live ammunition and tear gas at us. We all stopped 
digging and began to run towards the hills to hide. I noticed that there were 
many uniformed soldiers on foot pursuing us. From my syndicate, 14 miners 
were shot and killed that morning.” 2122 
 
According to Human Rights Watch, the military operation continued every day 
for the next three weeks until 16th November 2008. Military helicopters would 
fire teargas and live ammunition from the air to support soldiers shooting at 
miners on the ground.2123 
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A1.6. Use of RCAs to facilitate large scale extra-judicial executions and 
other human rights violations 
Although RCAs are considered “non-lethal” or “less lethal” weapons, they have 
reportedly been used to facilitate large scale human rights violations by State 
and/or non-State actors. One notorious example of such large scale misuse – 
albeit one that occurred prior to the survey - was their employment during the 
Rwandan genocide. 
 
Rwanda 
During 1994 an estimated 800,000 people mainly from the Tutsi ethnic group 
were murdered in the Rwandan genocide. Although the majority of the mass 
murders which began on 6th April 1994 were carried out using local farming 
implements such as machetes and hoes, the killings were largely initiated or 
supervised by members of the security forces who had more sophisticated light 
weaponry.2124 In its study of the Rwandan genocide, the Organization of African 
Unity’s International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) stated:  
“The military also organized all the large-scale massacres elsewhere in the 
country. The sequence of killing was repeated throughout. First, troops fired 
grenades, tear gas and machine guns into Tutsi homes or public places of 
refuge. Then the interahamwe, local militia, and civil self-defence forces moved 
in for the kill, using machetes and other weapons. Finally, troops and militia 
formed search parties to track down and kill any survivors…"2125 
 
Reports from human rights organisations and eye witness testimony have 
described how RCAs were used to facilitate massacres for example by flushing 
out potential victims from their hiding places. In an interview in the New York 
Times, two Roman Catholic priests, Father Blanchard and Father Mayer, 
described how Hutu militia members abducted and probably killed some 170 
people hiding in their church. The priests said that a militia member led a group 
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of his men to the church and said he wanted to "evacuate" the people who were 
inside. When Father Blanchard refused to open the door, a militia member 
threw a tear gas grenade inside, forcing the people out. Father Mayer said he 
ran to a nearby Rwandan Army headquarters and begged for help, but was 
refused. After the people were taken away on trucks, the priests fled. As they 
drove up the street they saw militiamen dumping bodies from one of the trucks. 
2126 
 
In the description of human rights abuses committed in the town of Kibuye in 
April 1994, Amnesty International document how: "Tutsi sheltering in churches 
and municipal buildings were herded into Kibuye stadium. More than 15,000 
people were crammed into the stadium. The prefect fired the first shots into the 
crowded arena. Then young and old alike were shot dead or hacked to death 
with machetes. Tear gas canisters were thrown to flush out any survivors.” 2127  
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Appendix 2 
 
Case study: Failures of the OPCW to adequately address concerns 
regarding the development of large calibre riot control agent (RCA) 
munitions 
 
A2.1. Civil society organisations investigate the production and promotion 
of 120mm mortar munitions containing RCAs 
In November 2003, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that the Turkish (State-
Owned) arms manufacturer, Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) had 
developed a 120 mm mortar round - the CS MKE MOD 251 - filled with CS.2128 
[Full details of the munition are described in Chapter 7 of this thesis.]. It was 
promoted by MKEK on their website2129 and at international security exhibitions 
including the 7th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF)held in Ankara, 
Turkey in September 2005.2130   
 
Given the nature of the RCA munition it would appear that its use for riot control 
or other domestic law enforcement operations would have been inappropriate. 
Consequently any manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of such munitions 
may have potentially breached Article I.1.(a), I.5 and II.1.(a) of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). In addition, any promotion and transfer of such 
munitions may have potentially breached Article I.1.(a) and Article I.1.(d) of the 
Convention. 
 
Following correspondence from Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research 
Project (BNLWRP) to the Turkish Government and MKEK highlighting concerns 
about this munition, all information concerning the CS MKE MOD 251 mortar 
round was subsequently removed from the MKEK website.2131  
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However, in September 2010, the CS MKE MOD 251 mortar round was again 
found to be promoted on the MKEK exhibitor stand at the Africa Aerospace and 
Defence (AAD) exhibition held in Cape Town, South Africa.2132 Two additional 
Turkish companies – Furkan Defense Industry and ASCIM Defense Industry – 
were subsequently found to be promoting these munitions on their websites.2133 
Following notification by BNLWRP, the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) and 
the Omega Research Foundation (ORF), all relevant promotional information 
was subsequently removed from both company websites. 
  
BNLWRP, ORF and ISS continued correspondence with representatives of 
MKEK and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the development 
and promotion of CS MKE MOD 251 munitions and sought to raise this issue 
with the OPCW. On 29th November 2010, the author highlighted these issues 
during a presentation given at the OPCW Open Forum attended by a number of 
CWC States Party delegations, representatives from the OPCW Technical 
Secretariat and civil society organisations.2134 During the subsequent question 
and answer session, a representative of the Turkish Delegation stated that 
Turkey was investigating the issue and would publish its results in a transparent 
manner.  
 
In February 2011, in correspondence with BNLWRP, ISS and ORF, the Turkish 
OPCW Ambassador stated that 1,000 CS MKE MOD 251 munitions had been 
produced in 1996, prior to Turkey’s ratification of the Convention and that 
“around 150 of the said ammunitions were used for testing purposes during the 
initial R&D phase in 1997”.2135 In July 2011 correspondence, the Turkish 
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Counsellor to the OPCW stated that “At the time of ratification, there remained 
850 pieces of CS MKE MOD 251 type munitions in the inventory of the Turkish 
Armed Forces. The facility for their production was discontinued after 1997.”2136  
From the Counsellor’s statement it appeared that Turkey had not formally 
declared the existence of the outstanding 850 munitions or provided details of 
the relevant production facilities to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. Such a 
declaration would appear to have been required under Article III, Paragraphs 
1(a) and (c) of the CWC2137. It is unclear whether Turkey subsequently 
submitted a declaration.   
 
The Turkish OPCW Ambassador explained that: “The remaining 850 
[munitions], whose dates of expiry have passed, are stored at the Turkish 
Armed Forces ammunition destruction facility awaiting disposal.” 2138 
Subsequently in his July correspondence, the Turkish Counsellor reported that: 
“The destruction of CS containing canisters of the remaining CS MKE MOD 251 
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munitions has now been completed at our state-of-the-art munitions disposal 
facility located near Ankara.” 2139 In addition to destroying all remaining 120mm 
RCA mortar munitions Turkey also put in place measures to halt promotion and 
brokering of such munitions by Turkish companies or individuals.  Under Article 
III.1.a.(v). a State that has declared chemical weapons is required to “provide its 
general plan for destruction of chemical weapons”. It is unclear whether Turkey 
provided the OPCW with such a plan, prior to destruction, and whether the 
appropriate verification measures were subsequently instituted. Clarification of 
these issues was sought by BNLWRP, ORF and ISS from Turkey but, as of 1st 
September 2012, no response has been received. 
 
A2.2. Civil society organisations investigate the production and promotion 
by a Russian Federation company of a range of munitions containing 
RCAs 
On 5th December 2002, the ITAR-TASS press agency reported a statement by 
the Director of the Russian Federation company, The Federal State Unitary 
Enterprise, State Research and Production Enterprise Bazalt (FSUE SRPE 
Bazalt) (Bazalt), declaring that his company was ready to offer to supply “non-
lethal” munitions filled with chemical irritants for aeronautical delivery, portable 
grenade launchers and hand grenades.2140 Subsequently, there were further 
reports that Bazalt had developed a range of chemical “non-lethal” 
munitions.2141 
 
In May 2009, the English language version of the 2006 “Ordnance and 
munitions” volume of “Russia’s Arms and Technologies, the 21st Century 
Encyclopedia” 2142 (a publication series supported by the Russian Federation 
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Technologies Publishing House, 5th May 2009 (copy held by the author). 
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Defense Ministry)2143 listed a range of “non-lethal” munitions produced by 
Russian companies. Amongst those of potential concern included: 82mm and 
120-mm mortar shells filled with irritant-action pyrotechnic composition; a 500-
kg cluster bomb packed with sub-munitions charged with irritant-action 
pyrotechnic composition, and a heliborne KMGV-type dispenser of packages of 
sub-munitions filled with irritant-action pyrotechnic composition [further details of 
the full range of munitions of concern are discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis]. 
 
Whilst the “Ordnance and Munitions” publication did not specify which Russian 
company (or companies) manufactured these arms and munitions,“Bazalt State 
Research and Production Enterprise (Federal State Unitary Enterprise)” was 
listed among the 58 producers whose products were included in the volume. 
And the publication also stated that: 
 “Specialists of the SRPE Bazalt FSUE have developed a variety of non-lethal 
munitions filled with mixtures based on the CN, CS and CR irritant agents. Their 
application area includes airborne weapons, tube artillery and mortars, light 
grenade launchers and hand grenades. The SRPE Bazalt FSUE is prepared to 
supply these munitions to customers…The non-lethal munitions can be used in 
military and special operations, such as anti-terrorist, peace-keeping, anti-riot 
and police operations, as well as to restrict the escalation of armed conflicts and 
to free hostages. They can also be used in support of humanitarian 
missions.”2144  
 
In addition, as of 1st September 2012, although there were no details publicly 
available of the range of chemical irritant munitions currently manufactured and 
promoted by Bazalt, the company website previously stated that: “The 
specialists of FSUE SRPE Bazalt have developed nonlethal ammunition for 
aircraft delivery, tube artillery and mortar-guns, hand grenade launchers and 
hand grenades.”2145 
 
                                                          
2143
 See Publishing House “Arms and Technologies” website: http://www.orteh.com/eng/company/facts/ 
(accessed 1
st
 July 2011). 
2144
 Non-lethal munitions section, Volume 12 “Ordnance and Munitions” (English language version), 
“Russia’s Arms and Technologies. The XXI Century Encyclopedia”, version 2006.1eng, Arms and 
Technologies Publishing House, 5th May 2009 (copy held by the author).  
2145
 Bazalt website: http://www.bazalt.ru/en/marine_grenade_launchers/ (accessed 1
st
 July 2011). 
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Given the nature of several of the chemical irritant munitions described in the 
“Ordnance and Munitions” publication, it would appear that their use for riot 
control or other domestic law enforcement operations would be inappropriate. 
Consequently the manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of such munitions 
may potentially breach Article I.1(a), I.5 and II.1a of the CWC. In addition, 
promotion and transfer of such munitions may potentially breach Article I.1 (a) 
and Article I.1 (d) of the Convention.   
 
Further information was repeatedly sought from Bazalt and the Russian 
Federation Government on the status of Bazalt’s chemical irritant munitions 
manufacture, marketing and transfer, and of the Russian Federation’s 
regulation, deployment and use of such munitions.2146 As of 1st September 
2012, no response has been received from either party. Correspondence 
detailing the three NGOs' concerns was also sent to the Director General of the 
OPCW, for his information.2147 Correspondence subsequently received by the 
author from the Legal Advisor to the OPCW stated that: “I confirm that up to this 
date no State Party has yet raised the issue during the meetings of the 
Executive Council and has not put in motion consultations or requested the 
clarification of the issue.”2148 As far as could be seen from open sources, there 
did not appear to have been any bilateral representations or dialogues on these 
issues to date. The OPCW Legal Advisor also stated that “the Technical 
Secretariat will put the issue before the pertinent Permanent Representation to 
the OPCW seeking their comments and/or appropriate action.” 2149 To date, the 
results of such action have not been made public.  
 
Given the information publicly available concerning the range of chemical irritant 
munitions described in “Ordnance and munitions” volume of “Russia’s Arms and 
Technologies, the 21st Century Encyclopedia” it appears that the use of such 
delivery systems for riot control or other law enforcement operations would be 
                                                          
2146
 Letters were sent by BNLWRP to Bazalt, the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on 17
th
  December 2008 and 25
th
 July 2009. Two further rounds of 
correspondence were sent by BNLWRP, ORF and ISS to these recipients on 18
th
 February 2011 and 14
th
 
June 2011. 
2147
 Correspondence sent by BNLWRP, ORF and ISS to the OPCW Director General  on 21
st
 February 
2011. 
2148
 Correspondence received from the OPCW Legal Advisor on 2
nd
 March 2011 (copy on file with author).  
2149
 Correspondence received from the OPCW Legal Advisor on 2
nd
 March 2011 (copy on file with author).  
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inappropriate. Although there have been no reports, as of 1st September 2012, 
of these munitions being used in military operations by the Russian Federation, 
nor of their being transferred to other entities, the development of such 
munitions itself appears potentially to be a breach of the CWC. It appears that 
the Russian Federation Government has failed to fulfil its national 
implementation obligations under Article VII.1 of the Convention.2150 Production 
and promotion of a range of RCA munitions designed for military applications, is 
at variance with requirements set forth in Article I of the CWC.  
 
A2.3. Attempts by civil society to bring the issue of large calibre RCA 
munitions to the attention of the OPCW 
Civil society has sought to raise the issue of large calibre RCA munitions and to 
highlight specific cases of concern with the OPCW through a number of 
mechanisms. For example, concerns relating to the production of a range of 
chemical irritant munitions by the Russian Federation company Bazalt were 
raised by a representative of the Federation of American Scientists in May 
20032151 at an Open Forum meeting addressed by then OPCW Director 
General and attended by a number of State Party delegations to the CWC First 
Review Conference. Further information on this case was documented by the 
author in October 20092152 and subsequently reported in the media.2153 Similar 
concerns regarding the manufacture and promotion of a 120mm mortar round 
containing CS by the Turkish company MKEK were publicly documented by the 
author in October 20092154, reported in the media thereafter2155 and 
                                                          
2150
 Under CWC Article VII.1 “Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt 
the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.  In particular, it shall:  
 (a). Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction 
as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;” [See OPCW, Chemical 
Weapons Convention (1993) op.cit., Article VII.1.] 
2151
 Hatch Rosenberg, B. Riot Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Open Forum on 
Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Ban, Federation of American Scientists Working Group on 
Biological and Chemical Weapons, The Hague, Netherlands, 1
st
 May 2003, 
http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/rca.pdf. (accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
2152
 Crowley, M. Dangerous Ambiguities: Regulation of Riot Control Agents and Incapacitants under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, University of Bradford, 
October 2009, pp.108-109. 
2153
 See for example: Schneidmiller, C.  Danger of "Nonlethal" Agents Grows Amid States' Inaction, Report 
Says, Global Security Newswire, 6th November 2009, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20091106_8443.php; 
Crowley, M. Toxic traps - weaknesses of the chemical control regime, Janes Intelligence Review, 
December-January 2009.  
2154
 Crowley, M. Dangerous Ambiguities: Regulation of Riot Control Agents and Incapacitants under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, University of Bradford, 
October 2009, pp.107-108.  
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subsequently brought to the attention of CWC States Parties in consecutive 
Open Forum meetings held on the margins of CSP-142156 and CSP 152157 as 
well as through a range of briefing papers prepared by BNWLRP, ORF and 
ISS.2158 However, correspondence received from the Legal Advisor to the 
OPCW in November 2010 stated that:  “As to the issues that you have brought 
to the attention of the Director General, I can confirm that no State Party has 
called for or initiated consultations on the subject matter.”2159 A similar response 
was received in March 2011 in relation to concerns raised regarding Russian 
Federation munitions. 2160 A subsequent review of relevant open source 
documents showed that no CWC State Party had raised the issue of large 
calibre RCA munitions publicly under the auspices of the CWC, nor initiated any 
of the Convention’s Article IX provisions regarding specific munitions or 
programmes of concern. 
 
Consequently, on 6th July 2011, BNWLRP, ORF and ISS wrote to all 41 
members of the Executive Council highlighting concerns regarding the 
development and promotion of large calibre munitions containing RCAs by the 
Russian Federation and Turkey. To date there has been no record of any EC 
member formally raising this issue at the Council meeting or with any of the 
OPCW policy making organs. Although a number of States Parties informally 
acknowledged receipt of the correspondence with the author, the only written 
response received was from the UK Ambassador to the OPCW, who stated 
that: “I agree with you that these are issues which need further attention from 
the OPCW. The relevant UK authorities will continue to keep in touch with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2155
 See for example: Schneidmiller, C.  Danger of "Nonlethal" Agents Grows Amid States' Inaction, Report 
Says, Global Security Newswire, 6th November 2009, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20091106_8443.php; 
Crowley, M. Toxic traps - weaknesses of the chemical control regime, Janes Intelligence Review, 
December January 2009/10.   
2156
 Crowley M. Dangerous Ambiguities: Regulation of incapacitants and riot control agents under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, 2nd December 2009, Open Forum, CSP-14, OPCW, The Hague, 
Netherlands http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-14/open-forum/Dangerous-Ambiguities 
Regulation-of-Riot-Control-Agents-and-Incapacitants-under-the-Chemical-Weapons Convention_Rev.1.pdf 
(accessed 1
st
 September 2012). 
2157
 Crowley, M. (2010) op.cit. 
2158
 See in particular: Destruction by Turkey of all remaining 120mm mortar munitions containing CS – A 
briefing note for CWC States Parties, September 2011, BNLWRP, ORF and ISS. All Briefing Notes on this 
issue have been circulated to the Permanent OPCW Representatives of all CWC States Parties and are 
available on the websites of the three organisations. 
2159
 Correspondence dated 16
th
 November 2010, received from the OPCW Legal Advisor (copy on file with 
author).  
2160
 Correspondence received from the OPCW Legal Advisor on 2
nd
 March 2011 (copy on file with author).  
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Ambassador Goosen [EC Chairperson] and with you and your team, and will 
contact you if further information is required.”2161 
 
On 6th July 2011, the three organisations also wrote to Ambassador Goosen, 
then Chairperson of the Executive Council (EC), requesting that concerns 
relating to the development and promotion of a range of large calibre munitions 
containing RCAs be brought to the attention of the EC for its consideration. On 
7th July 2011, Ambassador Goosen responded, stating he would in his 
“capacity as Chairperson of the Executive Council… raise the issue in the 
Executive Council Bureau in its preparations for the 66th Session of the 
Council, which is scheduled to take place in October 2011.”2162 
 
In a subsequent letter dated 22nd July 2011 Ambassador Goosen explained 
that: “as indicated in my previous communications, I raised your request that the 
issue of "large calibre munitions containing riot control agents (RCA)" be 
included on the agenda of the Executive Council at a recent meeting of the 
Council's Bureau. The Bureau concluded that according to the rules and 
practice of the OPCW it would not be possible for either the Chairperson or the 
Bureau to include the issue on the Council agenda… Rule 16 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Executive Council establishes that items may only be 
introduced on the agenda of the Council by the Council itself, the Conference of 
the States Parties, Members of the Organisation or, in specific circumstances, 
the Director-General.”2163  
 
In the light of Ambassador Goosen's response,  BNLWRP, ORF and ISS wrote 
to the Director General  requesting that he consider, utilising his good offices, to 
raise this issue with the appropriate Policy Making Organs, namely the 
Executive Council and/or during the forthcoming Conference of States 
Parties.2164 A response was received from the OPCW that noted: “the points 
raised…on the development and promotion of large calibre munitions containing 
                                                          
2161
 Correspondence from Paul Arkwright, UK Ambassador to the OPCW, British Embassy in the Hague, 
dated 18
th
 July 2011 (copy on file with author). 
2162
 Correspondence dated 7
th
 July 2011, received from Ambassador Goosen (copy on file with author). 
2163
 Correspondence dated 22
nd
 July 2011, received from Ambassador Goosen (copy on file with author). 
2164
 Correspondence sent by BNLWRP, ORF and ISS to the OPCW Director General on 15
th
 August 2011. 
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riot control agents” but gave no indication of how and whether the Director 
General would raise this issue as requested.2165  
 
On 12th September 2011, the three organisations distributed briefing papers to 
all 188 Permanent Representatives to the OPCW informing them of the 
research findings regarding Turkish and Russian Federation RCA munitions. As 
of 1st September 2012 there has been no record of any CWC State Party 
formally raising this issue with any of the OPCW policy making organs. 
 
It is clear that despite the efforts of individual Government officials and 
diplomats, appropriate and effective mechanisms allowing civil society to bring 
concerns about potential breaches of the Convention (in this case with regard to 
means of delivery) to the attention of the policy making organs of the 
Organisation do not currently exist. Furthermore, even though the three civil 
society organisations employed a range of semi-official mechanisms to 
distribute material highlighting their concerns to the appropriate organs of the 
OPCW (i.e. the Technical Secretariat, the Executive Council and to all CWC 
States Parties), no body or individual State Party has sought to employ the 
formal consultation and investigatory mechanisms available to resolve the 
serious concerns raised. 
 
 
                                                          
2165
 Correspondence received from Chief of Cabinet, Office of the Director General, OPCW dated 28
th
 
September 2011 (copy on file with author). 
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Appendix 3 
 
Case studies detailing reported use of riot control agents (RCAs) by 
military forces 
 
A3.1. Case study: reported employment of RCAs by US military in 
Afghanistan armed conflict 
A number of researchers, most notably Fry2166, have explored the reported use 
of RCAs by the U.S. military to clear caves and tunnels of enemy combatants in 
Afghanistan as part of the armed conflict in that country which began in October 
2001. According to Fry: 
“RCAs are useful in clearing caves and bunkers of insurgents by either 
incapacitating them long enough for military forces to gain control of the 
situation or driving the insurgents out of the cave into the open where the 
insurgents lose any advantages they would have enjoyed from a defensive 
posture. The fact that caves are an enclosed space, make RCAs even more 
effective because the walls keep the gas concentrated in the targeted 
areas.”2167 
 
Fry has stated that use of RCAs to clear caves and tunnels of enemy 
combatants: “in the context of an international military operation is expressly 
prohibited under Article I(5) of the CWC, as well as implicitly prohibited by the 
Hague Regulations, the Hague Gas Declaration, and the Geneva Gas 
Protocol.” 2168 However, despite such prohibitions, Fry contended that: 
“Unfortunately, in reality, the United States has made the use of tear gas a 
fundamental part of its cave-clearing techniques in Afghanistan.”2169 
 
Research by Bahmanyar, cited by Fry, has described the techniques employed 
by U.S. military forces to deny enemy combatants access to recently captured 
tunnel complexes:  
                                                          
2166
 Fry, J. Contextualized Legal Reviews for the methods and means of warfare: cave combat and 
international humanitarian law, Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, 28
th
 February 2006. 
2167
 Fry, J.(2006) op.cit., p.507. 
2168
 Fry, J. (2006) op.cit., p.507. 
2169
 Fry, J. (2006) op.cit., p.507. 
515 
 
“If time or [explosive] materials are not available for immediate closure, CS-1 
Riot Control Agent can be placed at intervals down the tunnel sharp turns and 
intersections. It must be emphasised, however, that the denial achieved by the 
use of CS-1 is only temporary in duration and used until demolitions are 
available to completely destroy the complex.” 2170 
 
Bahmanyar has also described how RCAs can be used directly by U.S. military 
against enemy combatants still present in tunnel complexes: 
“Time constraints or the threat of enemy action can force a tunnel team to use 
the Mity Mite Portable Blower (RVN, MACV 1965) to flush the enemy from 
tunnels. The Mity Mite can be used in conjunction with burning type CS Riot 
Control Agent grenades (M7A2), which have the additional effect of producing 
smoke which in most cases helps identify hidden entrances and air vents…After 
flushing an entrance with CS grenades, the Mity Mite can then blow powdered 
CS-1 into tunnel entrances, rendering the tunnel unusable to the enemy for a 
short period of time, at least as far as the first “firewall” within the tunnel 
system.”2171  
 
It should be noted that the United States military previously employed similar 
techniques utilising RCAs (or smoke pots) and Mity Mite blowers to clear 
Vietcog fighters from caves and tunnels during the Vietnam War.2172  
 
The U.S. Government has not publicly confirmed the use of RCAs by U.S. 
military to flush enemy combatants from caves in Afghanistan, and it is 
unknown whether such tactics continue to be employed today. However, it 
appears that the employment of such tactics in Afghanistan was tacitly 
acknowledged in testimony given by Donald Rumsfeld on 5th February 2003 to 
the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. In his testimony 
Rumsfeld cited two instances when it was “perfectly appropriate” to use RCAs 
in a military context. The first was “when you are transporting dangerous people 
                                                          
2170
 Bahmanyar M. Aghanistan Cave Complexes 1979–2004: Mountain Strongholds of the Mujahideen, 
Taliban and Al Qaeda , Osprey Publishing. 2004,  p.32. 
2171
 Bahmanyar M. Aghanistan Cave Complexes 1979–2004: Mountain Strongholds of the Mujahideen, 
Taliban and Al Qaeda , Osprey Publishing. 2004,  p.32. 
2172
 See Tunnel clearing operations using the Mighty Mite blower, http://www.eleven-bravo.co.uk/the-
war/tactics/mighty-mite.php (accessed 6th January 2011). 
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in a confined space [like an airplane]”. The second scenario Rumsfeld cited was 
“when there are enemy troops, for example, in a cave in Afghanistan, and you 
know that there are women and children in there with them, and they are firing 
out at you, and you have the task of getting at them. And you would prefer to 
get at them without also getting at women and children, or non-combatants.”2173 
 
Rumsfeld’s statement was given following Committee questioning about the 
possibility of employing RCAs after an invasion of Iraq. In a contemporary 
article in the Guardian, Hay stated: “The CWC explicitly forbids the use of riot-
control agents except for domestic law enforcement purposes. Under the CWC 
these and other chemicals can also be used for policing operations if the 
countrys’ own laws permit them.” Hay further stated that “the exemption applies 
only to those policing operations and not to any external armed conflict. It would 
be stretching credulity to argue that any prospective conflict with Iraq was a 
simple, policing operation.”2174 Although the U.S. subsequently equipped some 
of its troops with RCAs and sanctioned use in certain circumstances, there has 
been no confirmed employment of such agents in armed conflict in Iraq. 
 
A review of all relevant publicly available documentary sources indicates that no 
State Party specifically raised the issue of reported U.S. RCA use in 
Afghanistan publicly under the auspices of the OPCW nor initiated multilateral 
consultation or investigatory mechanisms under the Convention. Furthermore, 
no record of any OPCW policy making organ addressing these allegations has 
been discovered.2175  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2173
 Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony before the 108th Congress House Armed 
Services Committee, 5
th
 February 2003, at http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/2003.html#feb03. 
(accessed 6
th
 January 2011). 
2174
 Out of the Straightjacket, Alistair Hay, The Guardian, 12
th
 March 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/12/usa.iraq (accessed 9
th 
January 2011). 
2175
 On 1
st
 October 2012, analysis was undertaken of all OPCW documents publicly available on the 
OPCW website (http://www.opcw.org).  
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A3.2. Case study: reported use of RCAs by private military company in 
Iraq 
In January 2008, the New York Times reported2176 that personnel working with 
the private military company (PMC) Blackwater Worldwide released CS from a 
helicopter and an armoured vehicle temporarily blinding drivers, passers-by and 
at least ten U.S. soldiers operating a checkpoint in Baghdad in May 2005. 
Officers from the U.S. Army’s Third Infantry Division who were affected by the 
gas stated that there had previously been no evidence of violence at the 
checkpoint that might have triggered such CS release.2177 Instead, they claimed 
that the Blackwater convoy appeared to be stuck in traffic and may have been 
trying to use the riot-control agent as a way to clear a path. It is unclear whether 
permission was given for Blackwater to deploy or use CS under its contract with 
the U.S. State Department. According to the New York Times: “Blackwater says 
it was permitted to carry CS under its contract at the time with the State 
Department. According to a State Department official, the contract did not 
specifically authorize Blackwater personnel to carry or use CS, but it did not 
prohibit it.” 2178 
 
A review of all relevant publicly available documentary sources indicates that no 
State Party specifically raised this incident formally under the auspices of the 
CWC nor initiated multilateral consultation or investigatory mechanisms under 
the Convention. Furthermore, no record of any OPCW policy making organ 
addressing this incident has been discovered.2179 
 
Although troubling, it is very doubtful whether this incident could be considered 
a breach of the CWC prohibition on use of RCAs as a “method of warfare”, 
particularly as the RCA was utilised behind military front lines against a mixture 
of non-combatants and friendly forces, and no military advantage was obtained. 
However, the incident clearly appears to have been an inappropriate use of an 
RCA for a purpose not covered under Article II.9.[purposes not prohibited] of the 
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 2005 Use of gas by Blackwater leaves questions, New York Times, 10
th
 January 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/world/middleeast/10blackwater.html (accessed 15th June 2009). 
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th
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Convention. In addition, it raises concerns as to the range and nature of actions 
that Blackwater personnel were permitted to conduct under the U.S. State 
Department contract and with what oversight. For example, were Blackwater 
personnel permitted to engage in activities amounting to counter-insurgency 
and, if so, what regulations were in place to ensure that RCAs were not 
employed in such actions?   
 
As well as the potential implications for CWC regulation in this area, the case 
highlights broader concerns and far-reaching potential difficulties with 
controlling the use of RCAs by PMCs and private security companies (PSCs). 
This issue is of particular concern given the continuing use of such companies 
by governments and a range of non-governmental entities for a variety of 
security and military activities.2180 Concern is further heightened because PSCs 
and PMCs are often inadequately integrated into State command structures, 
and their accountability for breaches of international humanitarian law2181  and 
international human rights law2182 remains disputed. Attempts have been made 
by certain States to explore and describe the application of international law to 
PSCs and PMCs, most notably under the so-called Swiss Initiative.2183  
 
                                                          
2180
 See for example: Avant, D., The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005; Singer, P., Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatizes 
Military Industry, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003.  
2181
 See for example: Chiara-Gillard, E. Business goes to war: private military/security companies and 
international humanitarian law, International Review of the Red Cross, volume 88, number 863,September 
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obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), their employees may have status under IHL. 
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the type of activities they carry out. Status is thus something that must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.” Chiara-Gillard, E. (2006) op.cit., p.530. 
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 See for example: Droege, C. Private military and security companies and human rights: A rough 
sketch of the legal framework, Swiss Initiative on PMCs/PSCs Workshop in Küsnacht, 16th-17th January 
2006, available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc (accessed 20th November 2008); Kontos, A. “Private” 
security guards: Privatized force and State responsibility under international human rights law, in: Non-
State Actors and International Law, number 4, 2005, pp. 228-237. 
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A3.3. Case study: reported employment of RCAs by Turkish armed forces 
On 27th October 1999, German TV broadcast allegations of the reported use of 
CS gas by Turkish armed forces against Kurdish armed fighters hiding in a cave 
near Balikaya, southeast of Sirnak, on 11th May 1999.2184 The military 
engagement resulted in the deaths of 20 Kurdish combatants. It is unclear 
whether they died from high concentrations of tear gas or whether they were 
shot when leaving the cave. Munition fragments reportedly collected from the 
cave were provided by a Kurdish member of the Red Crescent to a German 
television journalist.2185 An analysis of the munition fragments at the Institute for 
Forensic Medicine at the University of Munich identified the presence of CS on 
the sample.2186 The munitions used were reportedly identified as CS cartridges 
made in Germany and exported under licence to Turkey.2187 A Turkish Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson, Sermet Atacanli, subsequently countered the 
allegations made by German TV, stating that Turkey had assumed the 
obligation not to develop, produce, store or use chemical weapons, which it 
meticulously observed. He declared that “It is logical to infer that Turkey cannot 
use such weapons if they do not exist in Turkey.”2188 
 
According to the Sunshine Project, subsequent video footage of training 
exercises by Turkish anti-terrorist forces aired on Turkish television in 2004 
suggested that such forces continued to be trained to use tear gas in military 
combat alongside lethal firearms fire and explosive grenades.2189 It is unknown 
whether this practice is still in place. 
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Sunshine Project (2004) op.cit., p.16]. 
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The Sunshine Project report stated that Turkey had previously imported CS 
from both Germany and the U.K.2190 If the Turkish use of CS was deemed to be 
contrary to Article I.5 of the CWC, then there may be consequent responsibility 
upon any CWC States Parties that supplied these munitions or that intended to 
supply such munitions in the future to Turkey, to ensure that such munitions are 
not used in contravention of the CWC.2191  
 
A review of all relevant publicly available documentary sources indicates that no 
State Party specifically raised this case publicly under the auspices of the CWC 
nor initiated multilateral consultation or investigatory mechanisms under the 
Convention. Furthermore, no record of any OPCW policy making organ 
addressing this incident has been discovered.2192 Turkey has not made a public 
clarificatory statement about this issue in any of the OPCW policy making 
organs. It did, however, align itself to the EU statement at the Second Review 
Conference, reaffirming prohibition of RCAs as a method of warfare.2193 It is 
unclear how Turkey’s previous use of RCAs in counter-insurgency operations is 
compatible with such a position and it is not publicly known whether any EU (or 
other) CWC State Party has raised this issue with Turkey. 
 
 
                                                          
2190
 Sunshine Project, (2004) op.cit., p.16. 
2191
 Furthermore, depending upon the specific circumstances, a transfer of CS from an EU Member State 
to Turkish armed forces utilising these agents in such counter-insurgency operations may potentially 
breach other multilateral, pluri-lateral or regional agreements such as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports/EU Common Position. [See Chapter 13 of this thesis, for further discussion of obligations under 
these agreements]. 
2192
 On 1
st
 October 2012, analysis was undertaken of all OPCW documents publicly available on the 
OPCW website (http://www.opcw.org).  
2193
 Ambassador Selahattin Alpar, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey to the OPCW, 
Statement of the Republic of Turkey at the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention General Debate, 8
th
 April 2008, The Hague, Netherlands. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Case studies exploring application of arms control and investigation 
mechanisms to incapacitants and riot control agents (RCAs) 
 
A4.1. Case study: development of chemical irritant landmine by a Chinese 
company 
 
The Chinese State-owned No. 9604 Factory has promoted a range of “Anti-Riot 
Warning Mines” which have the: “features of both mine and anti-riot grenade.” 
These mines “can immediately work and barricade rioters and raise an alarm 
when the distributed mine is lifted and knocked down.” They can also be used 
“for guard[ing] along with roadblocks under main roads and important 
departments.”2194 According to State-owned No. 9604 Factory publications, the 
following categories of Anti-Riot Warning Mine are produced:  explosive tear 
gas mine, smoke tear gas mine, rubber ball mine, dye mine and flash mine, with 
the tear gas mine having a dispersion area greater than 200m2.2195 
 
Information on this product has also appeared in the 2006 edition of Jane’s 
Police and Security Equipment which described its status as: “in production and 
in service”.2196  A very similar (if not identical) product has also been promoted 
by a second Chinese company, Hubei Handan Mechatronics Co. Ltd in its 
Military Products Manual.2197   
 
                                                          
2194
 No.9604 Factory Xiangfan City Hubei Province, Anti-riot grenades for police (date of publication 
unknown, but distributed by company in 2006, [copy held by author]). 
2195
 No.964 Factory Xiangfan City Hubei Province (2006) op.cit. 
2196
 Janes Police and Security Equipment 2006, 3
rd
 November 2006, Janes Information Group, p.519. 
2197
 Hubei Handan Mechatronics Co. Ltd, Military Products Manual, the anti-riot warning mine series, pp. 
17-20, (date of publication unknown, but distributed by company in 2008 [copy held by author]).  
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Figure 8.1. Less than lethal mines displayed on the 9604 Factory Xiangfan City Hubei 
Province stall at Asia Pacific China Police Expo, 2008. They include a smoking tear gas 
mine (blue) and an explosive tear gas less lethal mine (pink).(Photo: Robin Ballantyne, 
Omega Research Foundation). 
 
As of 1st September 2012,  no determination had been made by the relevant 
decision making bodies of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention (i.e. 
Meeting of the States Parties)2198, as to whether such chemical irritant 
landmines fell within the scope of the Convention. Furthermore since China is 
not currently a State Party to the Mine Ban Convention even if such mines were 
to be controlled or prohibited under the Convention, manufacture by Chinese 
companies would not be regulated by that instrument. However, if such 
munitions were determined to be prohibited under the Convention no State 
Party to the Convention could subsequently acquire or utilise these mines. 
 
A4.2. Case study: Investigation of alleged chemical agent use in 
Afghanistan, 1981-82 
Following United States’ allegations of the use of a range of chemical weapons 
by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and by Vietnam in Indochina, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 35/144C requesting the UN Secretary 
General “with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts2199…to 
                                                          
2198
 On 1
st
 September 2012, a review was undertaken of all relevant documents available on the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines website: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Annual-Meetings  (accessed 1
st
 September 2012).   
2199
 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 35/144 C, Chemical and bacteriological (biological) 
weapons, 12
th
 December 1980, paragraph 5. 
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carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to the 
reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent 
of the damage caused by the use of such weapons.”2200 The Secretary General 
subsequently established a Group of Experts from Egypt, Kenya, the 
Philippines and Peru who undertook their investigations during 1981-82, their 
findings being forwarded by the Secretary General to the UNGA in November 
1982 and published on 1st December 1982.2201 Despite being refused access by 
the Soviet Union to the sites of alleged chemical weapon employment in 
Afghanistan, the Group attempted to collect medical and other evidence and 
interviewed alleged eye witnesses residing in hospitals and refugee camps in 
Pakistan. The Expert Group report detailed the limitations of and conflicting 
nature of the consequent findings.2202 
 
The Group investigated, but were unable to substantiate, allegations of water or 
grain poisoning;2203 artillery attacks, resulting in the production of various forms 
of smoke; or gas and aerial attacks by airplanes or helicopters disseminating 
smoke, gas or other substances.2204 However they did reach conclusions 
regarding alleged chemical agent attacks upon people seeking shelter in 
underground water canals (karez) in attempts to flush them out of their hiding 
places.2205 
 
According to witness testimonies collected by the Expert Group, an unspecified 
chemical agent was said to have been introduced either directly through the air 
shafts or through pipes of the karez. The Export Group report stated that 
“witnesses described the alleged chemical agent that was poured directly into 
the air shafts as a greenish liquid that reacted rapidly with water, resulting in the 
evolution of a gas.”2206 
 
                                                          
2200
 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 35/144 C, Chemical and bacteriological (biological) 
weapons, 12
th
 December 1980, paragraph 4. 
2201
 United Nations, General Assembly, Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, report of the 
Secretary General, A/37/259, 1
st
 December 1982. 
2202
 See in particular United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., pp.32-37. 
2203
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., pp.34-35, paragraphs 126-130. 
2204
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., pp.33-34, paragraphs 123-125. 
2205
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.33, paragraphs 119-122. 
2206
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.33, paragraph 119. 
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The symptoms reported from these alleged chemical attacks included “eye 
affections (sic), respiratory difficulties, skin irritation, vomiting and 
unconsciousness.” 2207 Furthermore “a few fatal cases were reported by some 
witnesses.” In some cases, witnesses said that the effects could be “more or 
less avoided by breathing through a wet piece of cloth or by submerging their 
heads under water for a short while.”2208 
 
The Expert Group reported that: “Physicians and male nurses who had been 
attending Mujahideen related medical histories, including signs and symptoms 
suggestive of the use of harassing agents and incendiaries, for example, 
lachrymation and upper respiratory tract involvement following exposure in 
enclosed spaces such as the karez.”2209  
 
The Expert Group Report stated that: “Based on the accounts, it is the opinion 
of the Group that the attacks on the karez were not carried out by the use of 
high explosives or incendiary weapons, but confirm with the use of some form 
of harassing agent.” 2210 The Group concluded that: “except for the prolonged 
unconsciousness that was reported in some cases, the symptoms reported 
were similar to what would be expected from the use of a harassing agent of the 
adamsite type in a confined space.” 2211 They also noted that if the “chemical 
agent had a very low vapour pressure, and hence had to be disseminated as a 
particulate aerosol (as in the case of adamsite), breathing through a wet piece 
of cloth might offer some protection, as was reported.” 2212 Although the Expert 
Group's findings were based primarily upon witness testimony and some limited 
medical histories, they illustrated that the Mechanism has been employed to 
investigate and indeed form conclusions, albeit tentative, regarding the misuse 
of a chemical agent believed to be an RCA (harassing agent) in apparent 
breach of the Geneva Protocol. The possible harassing agent utilised - 
Adamsite – is no longer employed by States as an RCA due to its high toxicity 
compared to agents such as CS and CN. However, according to a SAB report 
                                                          
2207
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.33, paragraph 121. 
2208
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.33, paragraph 121.  
2209
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.36, paragraph 135. 
2210
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.33, paragraph 122. 
2211
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.33, paragraph 122. 
2212
 United Nations, General Assembly (1
st
 December 1982) op.cit., p.33, paragraph 122. 
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of 2000 whilst “its use as an RCA has been exceptional...in recent years” it had 
previously “been used as a riot control agent (RCA) for many decades” 2213  
 
A4.3. Case study: Investigation of potential use of incapacitant in 
Mozambique, 1992 
On 27th January 1992, Mozambique formally alleged that chemical weapons 
were used in an attack on its forces during operations against the Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO), and requested that a UN team of experts be 
sent to Mozambique to investigate the incident.2214 RENAMO formally denied it 
had utilised chemical weapons.2215  
 
According to the testimonies of Mozambican Government soldiers present, the 
alleged chemical weapon attack took place on 16th January 1992, against 
Mozambican Government forces operating close to the South African border in 
the Ngongue region. After examining a deserted RENAMO base, the 
Mozambican Government force came under small arms fire. An explosion 
occurred overhead which produced dark smoke which dissipated. The 
Mozambican Government force withdrew from the area, but after 15 minutes 
there were problems keeping the soldiers moving and control was lost. Soldiers 
were disorientated and confused and their vision was affected. Between 18th 
and 27th January 1992, 28 soldiers were admitted to Maputo hospital, four were 
reported dead, two wounded during “uncontrollable shooting” and 38 soldiers 
reported missing.2216 According to a subsequent report by Mozambique, an 
(unnamed) physician working for the International Committee of the Red Cross 
who examined some of the hospitalised soldiers “concluded that the victims 
were exposed to a non-conventional weapon and of toxic nature.”2217 
 
                                                          
2213
 See: OPCW, Report of the third session of the Scientific Advisory Board, SAB III/I, 27
th
 April 2000, 
pp.2-3. 
2214
 Letter dated 27
th
 January 1992 from the Permament Representative of Mozambique to the United 
Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, General Assembly, Security Council document A/47/87, 
S/23490, 29
th
 January 1992, cited by Stock, T. (1993) op.cit., p. 262; See also Littlewood, J. (2006) op.cit., 
p.19. 
2215
 Renamo denies reported use of chemical weapons, in FBIS-AFR-92-018, 28
th
 January 1992, as cited 
in Stock, T (1993) op.cit. p.262. 
2216
 For further descriptions of the Ngogunue incident see reports by the South African, Swedish, UK and 
UN investigation missions. 
2217
 Government of Mozambique, Report on South African Verification Mission (from Mozambican 
perspective), 30
th
 January 1992, Maputo. [Copy kindly provided to author by Gould C. ], p.16.   
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Prior to the dispatch of a UN mission, three separate investigations were 
undertaken by teams of South African2218, Swedish2219 and U.K.2220 experts – 
the latter two at the request of the Mozambican Government. The three 
investigations came to three differing conclusions, with the South African 
verification mission concluding that: 
“Although there is reason to suspect that an unusual incident of sorts did occur, 
we have not found sufficient evidence to support the allegation that chemical 
weapons were used. …the patients seen described a variety of strange 
symptoms after allegedly being exposed to the effects of an airburst ground 
launched rocket, but these symptoms do not fit the picture of any known 
chemical agent. At the time of examination, no patients or corpses showed 
signs attributable to known chemical agent exposure. Although a chemical 
exposure can not be excluded, it can also not be confirmed from the evidence 
seen.” 2221  
 
The Swedish mission concluded that “the soldiers involved in the Ngungue 
operation have been exposed to military smoke.”2222 And that “the symptoms 
are in good agreement with those observed in poisoning with yellow 
phosphorous.”2223 However, they did acknowledge that: “the feeling of intense 
heat, dryness of skin and mucous membranes, the mental disturbances, even 
the long duration of the symptoms could be signs and symptoms of intoxication 
induced by an atropine-like agent.”2224  
 
Whilst, the Swedish experts believed that the use of an atropine-like substance 
(such as a glycollate) was not impossible, they thought it unlikely. Furthermore, 
they argued that although these types of agents had been studied 
                                                          
2218
 Davy, B. Chemical Incident Verification Mission, Mozambique 22
nd
- 24
th
 January 1992, 29
th
 January 
1992. The South African team, comprising nine experts and four support staff, was joined by a 
Mozambican five member delegation during the mission.  
2219
 Andersson, A. and Persson, S. The final report given by the experts appointed by ASDI [Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency] to assist the government of Mozambique in order to 
investigate the alleged use of chemical warfare agent(s) in the Ngungue Incident, 3
rd
 March 1992. The 
Swedish two person team conducted its mission from 5
th
 to 11
th
 February 1992.   
2220
 Thompson, J. Report of an investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons in Mozambqiue, 
January 1992, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, 17
th
 February 1992. The UK two person 
team conducted its mission from 27
th
 to 31
st
 January 1992. 
2221
 Davy, B. (1992) op.cit., p.1. 
2222
 Andersson, A. and Persson, S., (1992) op.cit., p. 8. 
2223
 Andersson, A. and Persson, S., (1992) op.cit., p.7. 
2224
 Andersson, A. and Persson, S., (1992) op.cit., p.8. 
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experimentally “the step to use these substances in full-scale in the field is a 
rather large one. We also think even if munition with atropine-like agents would 
exist they should not easily be available.”2225  In her subsequent analysis of the 
Ngongue incident, Gould noted that: “Had the Swedish team been aware of the 
SADF [South African Defence Force]’s interest in BZ [see below] perhaps their 
findings would have been different.”2226 
 
In contrast to the Swedish team who interviewed six patients and the South 
African team who interviewed three patients and saw another six very briefly, 
the U.K. mission managed to interview thirteen “soldiers from each of the four 
companies involved” in the incident. The U.K. report noted that: “Throughout the 
investigation…the [soldiers’] evidence was non-contradictory and 
supportive.”2227 And furthermore, that: “The symptoms described by the 
casualties during the interviews…are strikingly similar to those which would be 
caused by exposure to an anti-cholinergic CW agent…This class of CW agent 
includes BZ and the glycollates.”2228 
 
The U.K. report concluded that: It is unlikely that traces of agent will be 
detectable in biological samples taken nearly two weeks after the attack”. And 
consequently, “given that analysis of the samples is unlikely to be informative, it 
can be concluded from the symptoms and signs of the casualties and the 
reports of the incident, that it is certainly a possibility that CW was used…”2229 
The report recommended that “In the absence of analytical data on the exact 
nature of the agent, casualties exhibiting similar signs and symptoms following 
a future attack should be treated as though they have been exposed to a 
centrally acting anti-cholinergic agent.”2230 
 
Following these preliminary investigations, the UN Secretary General appointed 
a team of experts from Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. to conduct an 
                                                          
2225
 Andersson, A. and Persson, S., (1992) op.cit., p.8. 
2226
 Gould, C. South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare programme 1981 – 1995, Phd thesis, Rhodes 
University, August 2005, p.234. 
2227
 Thompson, J. (1992) op.cit., p.5. 
2228
 Thompson, J. (1992) op.cit., p.7. 
2229
 Thompson, J. (1992) op.cit., p.8. 
2230
 Thompson, J. (1992) op.cit., p.8. 
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investigation in Mozambique.2231  The investigation took place from 23rd to 27th 
March 1992. The subsequent report, which was submitted to the UN Secretary-
General on 1st April 1992,2232 was somewhat contradictory in nature. On the one 
hand the report stated that: “The signs and symptoms of the casualties are 
consistent with the use of an atropine-like chemical warfare agent”. However, it 
also noted that these symptoms “are also consistent with severe heat stress. 
The use of an atropine-like agent does not remove the possibility of heat stress; 
rather, it increases an individual’s susceptibility to it.”2233 
 
The report also stated that: 
“[I]t is improbable that a chemical attack would be planned using a single round 
[as reported by the victims interviewed]. However, it cannot be excluded that the 
limited quantity of agent that could be delivered would have had an effect which 
could have been exacerbated by local climatic conditions and limited water 
supply.”2234 
 
The report concluded that: “In the current absence of analytical data, we cannot 
conclude that a chemical warfare agent was used in the attack.”2235 
 
Gould has stated that:  
“The UN report presented two interpretations of the symptoms, reflecting the 
opinions of Heiner Staub [from Sweden] on the one hand and JP Thompson 
[from the U.K.] on the other. Staub believed that the symptoms experienced by 
the troops were the result of dehydration and resultant heat stress. Thompson 
contended that the symptoms were consistent with exposure to a centrally 
acting atropine-like agent.”2236 
                                                          
2231
 The experts were Dr Sven-Ake Persson, Professor of Toxicology and Research Director of the 
Swedish National Defence Research Establishment, Mr Heiner Staub, Chemical Engineer, from the Swiss 
NC-Laboratory Defence Technology and Procurement Agency, and Dr J.P. Thompson, Head of Human 
Studies at the UK Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment. Dr Persson and Dr Thompson had 
previously conducted investigations into this incident on behalf of Sweden and the UK respectively. See: 
United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary General, Report of the Mission dispatched by the 
Secretary-General to investigate an alleged use of chemical weapons in Mozambique, S/24065, 12
th
 June 
1992, paragraphs 3 and 4, pp.1-2.  
2232
 United Nations Security Council (12
th
 June 1992) op.cit. 
2233
 United Nations Security Council (12
th
  June 1992) op.cit., paragraph 32, p.5. 
2234
 United Nations Security Council (12
th
  June 1992) op.cit., paragraph 33, p.5. 
2235
 United Nations Security Council (12
th
 June 1992) op.cit., paragraph 36, p.5. 
2236
 Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.236.   
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Gould appeared to favour Thompson’s hypothesis, and stated that “It is relevant 
to note that Joachim Jonasse, a Mozambican lieutenant with 12 years 
experience in the military, said that the troops had no water supply 
problems.”2237 According to Gould one soldier2238 “stated that the soldiers found 
25 drums of water when they entered the Renamo base. Three of the drums 
were taken by the first company of troops.”2239  
 
In addition to the conflicting views of experts, the UN report raised 
methodological problems it faced, specifically, that: “A considerable delay 
occurred between the attack and the investigation being mounted. For this 
reason, it may not be possible to detect traces of agent if a chemical warfare 
agent had been used in the attack.”2240 
 
Littlewood highlighted further difficulties faced by the UN investigation team, 
noting that “an appendix to the report, not widely available publicly, also hinted 
at problems in the conduct of the investigation. There was also some dispute 
about the exact location of the incident. Other problems included the 
investigation team having no clearly defined leader and difficulties with transport 
to and from the alleged event area.”2241 
 
Furthermore, in discussing the work of all the investigation teams, Gould stated: 
“It is worth noting that in the absence of reliable biological or field samples all 
the teams involved in the investigations relied solely upon information gathered 
in interviews with troops involved.”2242  
 
 Gould further noted that: 
“The outcomes of these investigations reveal some of the problems 
experienced by verification missions whose terms and political agendas are 
                                                          
2237
 Davey, B. “Chemical Incident Verification Mission Mozambique 22 – 24 January 1992”, 29
th
  January 
1992, as cited in Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.236. 
2238
 Casualty 13 interviewed by Thompson on 30th January 1992, as cited in Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., 
p.236. 
2239
 Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.236. 
2240
 United Nations Security Council (12
th
 June 1992) op.cit., paragraph 37, p.5. 
2241
 Littlewood, J. (2006) op.cit., p.19. 
2242
 Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.235. 
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determined by the governments that appointed them. A lack of trust between 
the teams and suspicions of cover-ups by the South African team hampered a 
free and honest discussion between the missions. The missions were also 
hampered by other circumstances - it was not possible to locate the site of the 
incident and, therefore, to take reliable environmental samples; the bodies of 
the deceased soldiers were in a state of advanced decomposition by the time 
the verification teams had access to them; and the bodies had been piled into a 
mortuary that lacked refrigeration facilities. These factors made it almost 
impossible for the verification missions to reach a conclusion as to the nature of 
the incident.2243  
 
The equivocal nature of the UN report's findings led to divergent interpretations 
of the event. For example the Foreign Broadcast Information Service stated that 
“it can certainly be concluded as possible that an anti-nervous system chemical 
weapon was used”2244 whilst Tucker believed that the “UN expert team(s) 
concluded that the allegations were false.”2245 Following publication of the report 
no further public action appears to have been taken on this matter by the UN 
Secretary General, the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly.2246  
 
A4.3.1.Subsequent publication of additional material 
New material subsequently released through the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee investigations and the subsequent prosecution of 
Brigadier Dr Wouter Basson, has documented Apertheid South Africa’s 
research into RCAs and incapacitants, and highlighted its transfer of 120mm 
and 155mm projectiles containing CR to its allies, the UNITA forces in 
Angola.2247 The evidence of an active South African chemical weapons 
programme and South Africa’s willingness to transfer certain chemical 
                                                          
2243
 Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.237. 
2244
 Experts confirm Renamo use of chemical weapons, in FBIS-AFR-92-140, 21
st
 July 1992, as cited by 
Stock, T. (1992) op.cit., p. 262. 
2245
 Tucker, J. (2002) op.cit. 
2246
 A review was undertaken of all relevant public documents available on the United Nations website 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml  (last accessed 17
th
 January 2012). 
2247
 Perry Robinson, J. The General Purpose Criterion and the new utility of toxicants as weapons, 15
th
 
Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Conventions, Approaching the First CWC Review Conference, Oegstgeest, The Netherlands, 23-24
th
 June 
2001. (Limited distribution, copy received from the author). See also Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., and Gould, 
C. and Folb, P. The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview, The Non-
proliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000). 
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munitions to its allies appears to bolster Mozabique’s claims of a chemical 
attack. As Perry Robison noted:   
“…we now see past South African projects for weaponizing psychotropic 
chemicals apparently involving not only domestic manufacture of the 
substances but also, for example, the purchase from Croatia of ton quantities of 
3-quinuclidinyl benzilate, which is the anticholinergic glycollate whose 
hydrochloride has been weaponized as Agent BZ.  This chemical agent or 
something like it, so it appeared from one of the investigations mounted in 
response to a Mozambican government plea in January 1992, might actually 
have been used against anti-RENAMO forces (though this is disputed).”2248   
 
Further information of relevance to the Ngongue incident was revealed through 
the publication of a previously classified document prepared by General Steyn 
of the South African Defence Force (SADF), based on investigations carried out 
by the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) into the activities of 
certain SADF members.2249 As part of its wide-ranging determinations, the 
Steyn Report claimed that: “Allegedly the chemical attack on Frelimo soldiers in 
Mozambique was a practical training session. A small unmanned 
reconnaissance bomber was located shortly before the attack on Komatipoort. 
The toxic substance used in the attack was manufactured and stored by 
Petrotechnics.”2250 The Steyn Report noted the allegation was “Confirmed and 
the individuals involved are known.”2251 
 
Bale noted that “the SADF sought to blame the African National Congress 
(ANC) for sponsoring this CW attack”.2252 However, shortly after the Steyn 
                                                          
2248
 Perry Robinson, J. (2001) op.cit., p.3. 
2249
 Republic of South Africa, National Intelligence Service, Steyn Report “Staff paper prepared for the 
Steyn Commission on alleged dangerous activities of SADF components, December 1992, p.14, as cited 
in Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.230. For further discussion of the Steyn Report allegations see: Burgess, S. 
and Purkitt, H. The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Programme, USAF Institute for National 
Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado, February 2001; Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., pp.53-54. See also: 
Bale, J. South Africa’s Project Coast: death squads, covert State-sponsored poisonings, and the dangers 
of CBW proliferation, Democracy and Security, volume 2, pp.27-59, 2006; Nuclear Threat Initiative, South 
Africa Profile, Chemical Chronology, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SAfrica/Chemical/index.html 
(accessed 11
th
 January 2012).  
2250
 Republic of South Africa, National Intelligence Service, Steyn Report, December 1992, p.14, as cited 
in Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.230.  
2251
 Republic of South Africa, National Intelligence Service, Steyn Report, December 1992, p.14, as cited 
in Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.230.  
2252
 Bale, J. (2006) op.cit., p.42. 
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Report was produced, “both the U.S. and British governments issued a 
diplomatic protest (demarche) to South Africa, which suggests that they too 
believed that the SADF was responsible.”2253 
 
Although never substantiated, the alleged involvement of Petrotechnic 
Laboratories in the manufacture of the “toxic substance” used in the Ngongue 
incident raises questions concerning the independence of the South African 
verification mission and its findings, particularly as several members of the 
mission were Petrotechnik personnel. These included Petrotechnic’s managing 
director and a senior chemist who was responsible for the verification mission’s 
field sample handling and analysis.2254  
 
As Gould has concluded: 
“All those consulted have… agreed that something strange happened [in 
Mozambique] and it raises the spectre that the SADF may, as claimed by the 
Steyn report, have seen an opportunity to test BZ on human subjects. Given the 
amount of time which has passed since the incident it is unlikely ever to be 
resolved satisfactorily.” 2255  
 
A4.4. Case study: Summary of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC findings relating 
to incapacitants, RCAs and related means of delivery held by Iraq 
 
A4.4.1.Incapacitants  
In its declarations, Iraq stated that it had conducted research on the synthesis of 
“BZ” type hallucinogens in 1982 and 1986. Iraq also stated that it had imported 
“BZ” of different types from two foreign sources, and sought to determine the 
structures of these compounds.2256 Although Iraq declared that it had not 
conducted any toxicological tests, a number of documents from “Haidar Farm”- 
including those detailing successful tests on animals, a feasibility study for a 
new production unit to produce “BZ”, as well as studies to weaponise these 
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 Bale, J. (2006) op.cit., p.42. Footnote cites: U.S., Department of State, "Recent Chemical Weapons 
(CW) Use Allegations — Africa," 9 March 1992 memo (declassified). 
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 For a description of the South African verification mission’s personnel and responsibilities see: Davy B. 
(1992) op.cit., pp.7-8. 
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 Gould, C. (2005) op.cit., p.237. 
2256
 United Nations, UNMOVIC (6
th
 March 2003) op.cit., pp.93-94. 
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substances - suggested the contrary. While these documents pointed towards 
Iraq’s intent to produce “BZ”, UNSCOM did not find any evidence that such 
production had taken place.2257 Subsequently UNMOVIC found no evidence 
that BZ had been weaponised or produced in other than laboratory 
quantities.2258 
 
UNMOVIC did raise concerns regarding the lack of information regarding the 
range of BZ analogues Iraq studied, apart from the two imported BZ samples it 
declared, and what compounds it considered for military use. Although the 
documents from “Haider Farm” revealed that Iraq extensively studied a number 
of similar psychoactive compounds, the exact extent of its work on BZ 
analogues was unclear.2259 In addition, UNMOVIC reported that “phencyclidine 
(PCP), a hallucinogenic compound known as “angel dust”” was also 
investigated as a potential incapacitating chemical weapons agent.2260 
  
While the precursors for BZ were on the UN export/import list, the precursors for 
many of its analogues were not, and some of those were “dual-use” items. 
UNMOVIC assessed that Iraq would have been capable of making BZ 
analogues in pilot or even industrial-scale by importing precursors which were 
not covered by the export/import mechanism or other international regimes.  
However, UNMOVIC found no indication of BZ production in Iraq at pilot- or 
industrial- scale in the past or at the time of UNMOVIC investigations.2261  
Neither UNSCOM nor UNMOVIC reports provided any evidence detailing Iraqi 
research or development of incapacitating toxins, though there were indications 
of incapacitating biological agent research.2262 
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 United Nations, UNMOVIC (6
th
 March 2003) op.cit., pp.93-94. 
2258
 United Nations, UNMOVIC (6
th
 March 2003) op.cit., pp.93-94. 
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 United Nations, UNMOVIC (6
th
 March 2003) op.cit., pp.93-94. 
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 United Nations, UNMOVIC, Compendium (undated) op.cit., p.88. 
2261
 United Nations, UNMOVIC (6
th
 March 2003) op.cit., p.94. Such findings highlight the potential 
importance of effective transfer controls in restricting the development of incapacitants by certain States – 
as long as the control regime covers all relevant precursors. These issues have been explored in Chapter 
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 According to Iraq's declarations, research was performed on camelpox virus, rotavirus and entervirus 
70 as incapacitating agents. United Nations, UNMOVIC, Compendium (undated) op.cit., p.993. 
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A4.4.2.Riot control agents 
UNMOVIC found that “despite the classification of CS as riot control agent it 
was widely used by Iraq for military purposes.”2263 According to Iraq's 
declarations, because of its ability to “hinder unprotected personnel for short 
periods of time (several  minutes) when exposed to the requisite concentration”, 
CS was used “in conjunction with other chemical agents and conventional 
ammunition to cause confusion among enemy ground troops during Iran-Iraq 
war.”2264Iraq declared that “CS was weaponised and delivered by artillery and 
aircraft...”2265 According to UNMOVIC “Even when the Iran/Iraq war ended in 
1988, Iraq continued its work with CS until 1990. It appears that, based on its 
experience during that war, Iraq considered this agent a prospective warfare 
agent.”2266 In addition, Iraq declared that its scientists had studied the effects of 
mixing CS with biological agents, in particular aflatoxin, although Iraq claimed 
that results from this research did not lead to weaponisation.2267 
 
UNMOVIC's analysis of Iraq’s CS programme indicated “that some, if not most 
elements” of this programme had not been declared by Iraq.2268 UNMOVIC 
stated that “It is possible that the CS programme was more extensive or 
complicated than declared or was used partially to disguise other programmes 
or elements of programmes.”2269 
 
Although CS was by far the most important RCA developed by Iraq, there are 
indications that other agents were considered. According to UNMOVIC Iraq also 
studied synthesis techniques for adamsite (DM), although there is “no evidence 
that any of these were produced at levels beyond the laboratory scale.”2270 
UNMOVIC also cited a test using a smoke canister containing Adamsite, CS 
and smoke generating chemicals that was carried out at a chemical proving 
ground in 1988. According to Iraq’s declarations the result was not 
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 United Nations, UNMOVIC, Compendium (undated) op.cit., p.1110. 
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 United Nations, UNMOVIC, Compendium (undated) op.cit., p.95. 
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encouraging.2271 However, UNMOVIC believed that “this statement is 
contradictory to other Iraqi documents2272 indicating that the results of trials with 
Adamsite were acceptable to the Special Weapons Acceptance Committee.”2273 
 
A4.4.3. Means of delivery 
According to UNMOVIC: “From 1984 until 1985, an unknown number of ‘RPG-7’ 
[rocket propelled] grenades, and over 1,000, 82mm, and 20,000 120mm 
mortars were filled with CS.” 2274 Whilst the “’RPG-7’ type grenades and 82mm 
mortars were indigenously produced by Iraqi companies” it appears that “empty 
120mm mortars casings were procured in 1985...”2275 In addition, a “few 
hundred” BR-250 and AALD-250 bombs, which had a capacity of 60 litres of 
agent, and a “few hundred” BR-500 and AALD-500 bombs, which had a 
capacity of 120 litres of agent, “were filled with CS”.2276 
 
UNSCOM reported that Iraq claimed to have unilaterally destroyed 125 “250 
gauge” aerial bombs containing CS and that “remnants of bombs consistent 
with the declared quantity were seen by UNSCOM”.2277 In 1995, documentary 
evidence was provided by Iraq to UNSCOM that 116 “500 gauge” bombs filled 
with CS that had been stored at a facility were destroyed during the Gulf war, 
although UNSCOM noted that “No remnants of destroyed bombs have been 
found.” Furthermore the report noted that “20,000 motor [sic] bombs filled with 
the riot control agent CS... were destroyed during the Gulf war at one of the 
storage facilities.”2278 
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Appendix 5 
 
The application of international criminal law in cases involving chemical 
weapons 
 
A5.1. Case study – Anfal trail of Iraqi officials 
On 21st August 2006, the Anfal trial opened before the Iraqi High Tribunal in 
Baghdad.2279 Seven former Iraqi high officials2280 were charged with crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, and two of them (former Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein and his cousin and former military commander in the region, 
Ali Hassan Al-Majid) with the additional charge of genocide.2281 The charges 
related to the defendents’ involvement in the Anfal military operation against the 
Iraqi Kurdish population in 1988. During this operation an estimated 182,000 
people lost their lives, entire villages were razed, mass executions were carried 
out with the dead buried in mass graves, survivors were forcibly relocated to 
detention camps  elsewhere, and chemical weapons were used repeatedly. The 
testimony of numerous witnesses and victims of the chemical attacks were 
heard and documentary evidence and film footage linking the defendants to the 
chemical weapons attacks was presented.  
 
On 24th June 2007 the court sentenced three of the accused -Ali Hassan al-
Majid, Sultan Hashim Ahmed and Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti – to death by 
hanging; Farhan al-Jibouri and Saber Abdul Aziz were sentenced to life in 
prison; all charges were dropped for lack of evidence against Taher Muhammad 
al-Ani. Previously the trial against Saddam Hussein had been discontinued 
following his execution on 30th December 2006. Whilst the trial was important in 
documenting the use of chemical weapons in activities the Tribunal considered 
as amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, there were 
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 For information and analysis of the Anfal trial see: International Centre for Transitional Justice, the 
Anfal trail and the Iraqi High Tribunal updates 1-3, 2006,  available at:  http://ictj.org/publications (accessed 
29th February 2012); Trahan, J. A critical guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgement: genocide 
against the Kurds, Michigan Journal of International Law, Volume 30, pp.305-407, 13
th
 March 2009; 
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 Saddam Hussein Majid Al-Tikriti, Ali Hassan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, Sultan Hashem Ahmed, Sabir Abdul-
Aziz Al-Douri, Hussein Rashid Al-Tikriti, Tahir Tawfiq al-A’ni, Farhan Mutlak Al-Joubori. 
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 Saddam Accused of Genocide in New Charges, Associated Press (4
th
 April 2006), as cited by Tabassi, 
L. and van der Borght, E. (2006) op.cit.  
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serious concerns expressed about the fairness of the trial and the lack of an 
adequate appellate process.2282  
 
A5.2. Case study: van Anraat trail - complicity in war crimes  
On 23rd December 2005, the District Court of The Hague, Criminal Law Section, 
found Dutch businessman, Frans van Anraat, guilty, under Dutch law, of 
complicity in war crimes committed by the former Iraqi regime.2283 The Court 
sentenced van Anraat to the maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment while 
concluding that the sentence was insufficient due to the severe repercussions of 
the chemical attacks and the nature of the crime.2284 During the 1980s, Mr Van 
Anraat was Saddam Hussein’s most important supplier of chemicals used for 
the production of mustard gas. According to the Court, van Anraat’s 
involvement in supplying chemicals to Iraq was an essential contribution to the 
chemical weapons programme of Saddam Hussein’s regime. 2285  
 
The Court determined that Mr van Anraat knowingly and intentionally supplied 
chemicals to the former Iraqi regime which were used to produce chemical 
weapons employed by Iraq in Iraqi Kurdistan and in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
during the period 1984-1988. 2286  Mr van Anraat was convicted of complicity in 
war crimes since his deliveries facilitated the attacks on the Kurdish peoples 
and made the carrying out of the regime’s ambitions considerably easier. 2287  
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Mr van Anraat was acquitted of a second charge: complicity in genocide. 
Although the Court determined that the attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan (including the 
use of chemical weapons) formed part of a genocidal campaign in the period 
1985-1988, the Court was not convinced that the accused had actual 
knowledge of the genocidal intention of the perpetrators– which was a 
necessary element for a conviction of “complicity to genocide”.2288  
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Appendix 6 
 
Case studies exploring additional potential mechanisms for regulating the 
transfer of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means of 
delivery 
 
A6.1. Case study: SICA Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Arms, 
Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materiel 
In December 2005, States belonging to the Central American Integration 
System (SICA) agreed the Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Arms, 
Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materiel.2289 The range of materials 
covered by this agreement was outlined in the preamble and Article 1 as 
“conventional, non-conventional, small and light weapons, ammunition, 
explosives and other related materiel.” Although these broad categories were 
not further defined in the text, nor were lists of munitions and goods established, 
the terms “conventional”, “non-conventional” and “other related materiel” taken 
together would certainly appear to include RCAs, incapacitants and related 
means of delivery within their scope. 
 
Under Article 1, transfers of arms and related materiel “shall not be carried out 
from or to States” which: “Commit and/or sponsor crimes against humanity or 
human rights violations or commit serious violations of the laws and customs of 
war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols 
thereto of 1977 or other rules and principles of international humanitarian law 
applicable to situations of armed conflict between States and within States;”2290  
 
Transfers of arms and related materiel would also be prohibited to States which: 
restrict freedom of expression and assembly, restrict free and fair elections, lack 
democratic governance, fail to comply with UN or regional arms embargoes, 
                                                          
2289
 Central American Integration System (SICA) (2005), Code of conduct of Central American States on 
the Transfer of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materiel, 2nd December 2005, 
Submitted as a working paper by Government of Nicaragua, Conference to Review Progress Made in the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 26 June-7 July 2006,A/CONF.192/2006/RC/WP.6,  
http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/rc.wp.6-e.pdf (accessed 1st June 2012). 
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violate Organisation of American States' (OAS) treaties, fail to provide full 
reports to the UN Conventional Arms Register, initiate armed aggression, 
promote hatred, undertake actions that lead to significant numbers of displaced 
persons or refugees, or fail to combat terrorism.2291 
 
Although the scope of arms covered by the Code and the transfer control 
criteria appear comprehensive, the instrument's effectiveness has been 
tempered due to its  politically rather than legally binding nature. Furthermore, 
although it was an important declaration of Member State commitments, its 
effectiveness in practice has been constrained by relatively weak operative 
provisions intended to facilitate reporting and transparency and to ensure full 
and harmonised implementation by Member States. Consequently the nature 
and extent of its utility in regulating the transfer of RCAs, incapacitants and 
related means of delivery cannot be determined. Furthermore, as the SICA 
region incorporates only eight States, the area of coverage is not large.2292  
 
A6.2. Case study: The on-going initiative to develop an Arms Trade Treaty 
The initiative to develop a binding international agreement to regulate 
conventional arms transfers based on principles of international law was 
initiated by a group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Nobel 
Peace Laureates in 1996.2293 This group, working with lawyers from the 
Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law developed a proposal for a 
Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers, more popularly known 
as the Arms Trade Treaty, or ATT.2294 
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June 2012). The NGO text was first formally circulated to the international governmental community at the 
UN conference on small arms and light weapons in 2001 and subsequently amended and reviewed by a 
range of national and international lawyers and government experts.  As State support for this initiative 
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In October 2003 a group of NGOs led by Amnesty International, Oxfam and 
IANSA initiated the Control Arms Campaign with the aim “to reduce arms 
proliferation and misuse and to convince governments to introduce a binding 
arms trade treaty.”2295 As of June 2012, the campaign had 89 national and 
international NGOs member organisations2296, and over a million people 
supported its million faces petition calling for the international governmental 
community to take effective action to control the conventional arms trade, which 
was subsequently presented to UN Secretary General Annan in 2006.2297 
 
Following four years intense and sustained advocacy by civil society throughout 
the world, the international governmental community became responsive to this 
initiative. On 6th December 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 
61/89 – “towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”,2298 with 153 
States voting in favour and only one State, the U.S., voting against.2299 
Resolution 61/89 requested the UN Secretary-General to “seek the views of 
Member States on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a 
comprehensive, legally-binding instrument establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms and to submit 
a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session.”2300 A UN Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE) was mandated under Resolution 61/89 to 
examine the “feasibility, scope and parameters” of an ATT. Their report was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
increased Control Arms sought to promote key elements for inclusion in an instrument developed under 
the auspices of the UN.  
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published on 26th August 2008.2301 In October 2008, 147 UN Member States 
voted in favour of a second resolution on the ATT2302. This resolution mandated 
the UN to establish an Open-Ended Working Group, open to all UN Member 
States to further consider the elements in the GGE report where consensus 
could be developed for their inclusion in an eventual, legally binding treaty.  
 
In December 2009 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 64/48, which 
decided to convene a Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2012 “to 
elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common 
international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.”2303 The General 
Assembly Resolution also decided that the Conference would be undertaken 
“on the basis of consensus.”2304 Four Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 
sessions2305 took place before the Conference, which was held from 2nd-27th 
July 20122306. Unfortunately, although the vast majority of the negotiating States 
voiced support for the draft treaty text proposed by the President of the 
Conference2307, the U.S. and subsequently Cuba, North Korea, the Russian 
Federation and Venezuela requested more time to consider the matter.2308 It is 
thought that a number of other States opposed agreement including Syria, 
North Korea, Iran, Egypt and Algeria.2309  Consequently the Conference ended 
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without formal agreement of a Treaty text. As of 1st September 2012 it is unclear 
how this process will be taken forward.  
  
A6.2.1. Transfer control criteria 
The original Framework Convention developed by NGOs, international lawyers 
and Nobel laureates incorporated obligations upon States not to authorize arms 
transfers likely to be used contrary to international law including for gross 
violations of international human rights law; serious violations of international 
humanitarian law; acts of genocide or crimes against humanity; violations of UN 
Charter obligations; or that breach UN Security Council arms embargoes. 2310 
The Framework Convention also required States to take into account a further 
range of considerations such as a transfer’s impact upon sustainable 
development or regional security. 2311  
 
Following UN Resolution 61/89, some 100 Member States submitted their views 
to the UN Secretary General in 2007 on the feasibility, scope and draft 
parameters of an ATT.2312 Analyses of these responses were conducted by 
both Amnesty International2313 and UNIDIR2314, and the results indicated broad 
support for inclusion of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law criteria, and significant support for criteria relating to terrorism, 
regional and international commitments, arms embargoes, crime, diversion, 
sustainable development and regional stability.2315  
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The Preparatory Committee Chair’s Non-Paper2316, intended for Member States' 
consideration in preparation for the subsequent Conference, recommended the 
objectives of the ATT should be to prevent international transfers of 
conventional arms that “contribute to or facilitate…human suffering, serious 
violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
violations of United Nations Security Council sanctions and arms embargoes 
and other international obligations, armed conflict, the displacement of people, 
transnational organized crime, terrorist acts…”2317The Non-Paper subsequently 
incorporated and elaborated upon these objectives in proposed export criteria 
for States to apply when considering export licence applications.2318 
Subsequently the draft treaty text proposed by the President of the Negotiating 
Conference required States to deny authorisation for conventional arms 
transfers where there was an “overriding risk”2319 that such arms would “be 
used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian 
law2320 or international human rights law.”2321 
 
A6.2.2. Range of items controlled 
The original Framework Convention was wide-ranging in the scope of the items 
covered2322, and the requirement for such a comprehensive instrument has 
been consistently advocated by civil society. Control Arms have argued that “If 
an ATT is to be effective, it must regulate the international transfer of the items 
actually being used to fuel violent conflict, to commit serious human rights 
violations, to undermine peace and security or sustainable development, in 
terrorist attacks, and in connection with organised crime.” 2323 
 
                                                          
2316
 Chair’s Non-Paper, 14
th
 July 2011, in: United Nations, United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty, New York, 2
nd
 -27
th
 July 2012, Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/, 17
th
 March 2012, Annex II. 
2317
 United Nations, A/CONF.217 (2012) op.cit., Section III, paragraph 4. 
2318
 United Nations, A/CONF.217 (2012) op.cit., Section V. Criteria. 
2319
 United Nations General Assembly, A/CONF.217/CRP.1, (26
th
 July 2012) op.cit.,  Article 4. 5. 
2320
 United Nations General Assembly, A/CONF.217/CRP.1, (26
th
 July 2012) op.cit.,  Article 4. 2. a. 
2321
 United Nations General Assembly, A/CONF.217/CRP.1, (26
th
 July 2012) op.cit.,  Article 4. 2. b. 
2322
 “c) Paramilitary, police and security equipment, its parts, components, accessories and related 
equipment including but not limited to… portable anti-riot devices for administering an incapacitating 
substance” and  “e) Sensitive military and dual-use technologies, including…chemical irritants.” AFSC, AI, 
Arias Foundation, BASIC, DfD and Saferworld (2001) op.cit., Article 9. 
2323
 Control Arms, NGO Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee Position Paper: Scope - Types of 
equipment to be covered by an Arms Trade Treaty, March 2009, Available on Control Arms website: 
http://www.controlarms.org/en (accessed 1st June 2012). 
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Consequently, Control Arms has recommended that amongst the 
comprehensive range of goods2324 covered by the ATT should be “[o]ther 
internal security weapons with potential lethal effects—items often described as 
“less than lethal” but which can have lethal effects, such as lasers, tear gases, 
baton rounds and electric-shock guns” as these “have a significant bearing on 
the internal use of force by armed forces and police…”2325 
 
Similarly, Amnesty International has recommended that generic descriptions of 
goods should be included as an indicative list in an annex to the ATT and be 
regularly updated to guide each State Party in the establishment of its national 
arms control list. These should specifically include: “Incendiary, smoke-
producing, riot control and incapacitating agents and gases designed for military 
or law enforcement purposes, as well as other chemical and biological toxic 
agents. “ 2326 
 
According to the analysis by Amnesty International, a majority of Member 
States that submitted views to the Secretary General in 2007 believed that an 
ATT must cover “all conventional weapons”,2327 such as, but not limited to: 
small arms and light weapons; man portable air defence systems (MANPADS); 
main battle tanks; armoured fighting vehicles; combat aircraft; warships and 
conventionally armed missiles; ammunition (including explosives); parts and 
components. Furthermore, the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and/or 
the European Union (EU) Military List – which both include RCAs, incapacitants 
                                                          
2324
 Other proposed goods that should be covered by an ATT include:  All conventional military, security 
and police armaments, weapons and related materiel, conventional ammunition and explosives used for 
the above, Components, expertise and equipment essential for the production, maintenance and use of 
conventional arms and ammunition, Dual-use items intended for military, security and police use. For 
further discussion see: Control Arms (March 2009) op.cit. 
2325
 Control Arms, NGO Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee Position Paper: Scope -Types of 
equipment to be covered by an Arms Trade Treaty, March 2009, Available on Control Arms website: 
http://www.controlarms.org/en (accessed 1st June 2012). 
2326
 Amnesty International, Arms for internal security, will they be covered by an arms trade treaty?, ACT 
30/120/2011, June 2011, p.4. 
2327
 According Amnesty International, 57 of the 92 submissions analysed stated this, including: Albania, 
Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea 
Latvia, Liberia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Togo, UK and Zambia. See: Amnesty International (2007) op.cit., p.15. 
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and related means of delivery - were also suggested as providing more 
comprehensive and precise specifications by 45 Member States.2328  
 
However, although the Preparatory Committee Chair’s Non-Paper2329 
incorporated the majority of arms detailed above it did not include RCAs, 
incapacitants or related means of delivery. Control Arms subsequently argued 
that “the omission of police and internal security equipment from the scope of 
the Treaty could have serious implications for efforts to prevent human rights 
abuses, such as witnessed during the Arab Spring.”2330  
 
Subsequently the draft treaty text proposed by the President of the Negotiating 
Conference included battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre 
Artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; missiles and 
missile launchers; and small arms and light weapons but not RCAs, 
incapacitants or related means of delivery within its scope.2331 Consequently 
although still possible, it is unlikely that such agents will be included if and when 
an ATT is finally agreed. However such agents and means of delivery could 
potentially be added at a later date providing the Treaty contains provisions for 
such extension of coverage.   
 
 
 
                                                          
2328
 According Amnesty International these included the submissions of: Australia, Argentina, Austria, 
Brazil, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, 
Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, UK and Zambia.  See Amnesty International (2007) 
op.cit., p.16. 
2329
 The Chair’s Non-Paper states that“[for] the purposes of this Treaty, conventional arms shall include 
any items which fall within the following categories: a .tanks, b. military vehicles, c. artillery systems, d. 
military aircraft…,e. military helicopters…f. naval vessels…g. missiles and missile systems…h. small arms, 
i. light weapons, j. ammunition…k. parts or component[s]…l. technology and equipment…to develop, 
manufacture, or maintain…” United Nations, A/CONF.217 (2012) op.cit., Section IV. Scope. 
2330
 Control Arms, February 2012 ATT PrepCom Briefing Paper, http://speakout.controlarms.org/ 
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Feb2012Prepcom_Public.pdf (accessed 1st June 2012). 
2331
 United Nations General Assembly (26
th
 July 2012) op.cit., Article 2.1.  
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Appendix 7 
 
Case study: Regulation of the transfer of riot control agents (RCAs) and 
related means of delivery to Guinea and the misuse of such items by 
Guinean security forces  
 
The following case study describes the misuse of RCAs and related delivery 
mechanisms by Guinean security forces, the previous transfer of such items to 
Guinea and the subsequent attempts to restrict supplies of arms and security 
equipment to abusive end users. It highlights the difficulties faced and the 
current limitations of employing such supply-side controls. 
 
A7.1. Use of RCAs and related means of delivery to facilitate a massacre  
Reports by Amnesty International2332, Human Rights Watch2333 and an 
International Commission of Enquiry2334 have documented how Guinean 
security forces utilised RCAs and launchers in combination with automatic 
firearms against opposition activists who were holding a rally in Conakry 
Stadium on 28th September 2009. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
events at the stadium, which resulted in an estimated 150-200 opposition 
supporters being killed and dozens of women and girls being raped, were 
“organized and premeditated.”  2335 
 
At around 11:30 a.m., soon after the opposition leaders arrived at the stadium, a 
combined force of several hundred soldiers, police, and civilian-clothed militias 
positioned themselves around the exits to the stadium. Anti-riot police then fired 
tear gas into the stadium from their vehicles, causing widespread panic. 
                                                          
2332
 Amnesty International, Guinea: “You did not want the military, so now we are going to teach you a 
lesson”, AFR 29/001/2010, Amnesty International, London, February 2010, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR29/001/2010/en/ab0336e0-1ce8-4110-9203-
302798ae21d0/afr290012010en.pdf (Accessed 1st June 2012). 
2333
 Human Rights Watch, Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated, In-Depth Investigation 
Also Documents Widespread Rape’ 27
th
 October 2009, available from: www.hrw.org/en/node/86269 
(accessed 1st June 2012). 
2334
 United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and 
circumstances of the events of 28
th
 September 2009 in Guinea, paragraph 198, annexed to Letter dated 
18
th
 December 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the UN Secretary-General, UN 
doc. S/2009/693, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2009/693&Submit=Search&Lang=E 
(accessed 1
st
 June 2012).  
2335
 Human Rights Watch (27
th
 October 2009) op.cit., pp.27-29.  
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Minutes later, Presidential Guard soldiers [red berets], and a smaller number of 
other forces, stormed through the principal entrance, firing directly as they 
advanced forward into the packed and terrified crowd. 2336   
 
A retired professor in her sixties, interviewed by Human Rights Watch, stated: 
“All of a sudden, I heard these loud noises—boom, boom—it sounded like a 
war. That was the firing of the tear gas from outside the stadium. Then, within 
minutes, the red berets entered. They were everywhere. The youth were on 
the field. When the soldiers entered, they opened fire right away on that 
crowd. Everyone went into panic, people were running everywhere—I saw 
people jump from the top of the covered stands. There was screaming 
everywhere, screaming so loud, and the crowd started to stampede.”2337  
 
Many reportedly died from the indiscriminate firing; others were beaten or knifed 
to death; and still others were trampled to death by the panicked crowd. 
According to the International Inquiry report “dozens of people attempting to 
escape through the stadium gates either suffocated or were trampled to death 
in stampedes, which were compounded by the use of tear gas.’2338 
 
Outside the main stadium, on the sports complex grounds, many more 
opposition supporters were killed as they tried to escape.2339 Evidence 
uncovered by Amnesty International strongly suggested that the RCAs and 
delivery mechanisms utilised by the Guinean security forces in this massacre 
were exported from France.  
 
A7.2. Failure of French national and EU-wide transfer control measures 
As an EU Member State, France has been obliged since1998 to adhere to the 
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and, subsequently, to the EU Common 
Position. Both agreements prohibit EU Member States from issuing export 
licences for controlled military or security equipment, including RCAs and 
                                                          
2336
 Human Rights Watch, (27
th
 October 2009) op.cit., pp.27-29. 
2337
 Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), Conakry, 15
th
 October 2009 in: Human Rights Watch 
(27
th
 October 2009) op.cit., p.29. 
2338
  United Nations (18
th
 December 2009) op.cit. paragraph 70. 
2339
  Human Rights Watch (27
th
 October 2009) op.cit., pp.27-29. 
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related means of delivery, “if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might 
be used for internal repression”, and require them to “exercise special caution 
and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of 
the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human 
rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of 
Europe or by the EU”.2340  
 
Analysis of both the French Government’s national reports to parliament on the 
export of French armaments2341 and also the EU compilation reports of 
exports,2342 from 2000 to 2009, show no record that licences were approved for 
goods within the ML7 category (covering RCAs and related means of delivery) 
to Guinea during this period.  
 
However, Amnesty International has claimed that France:“…repeatedly 
authorised export licences to Guinea for riot control and tear gas munitions, 
despite the Guinean security forces’ ongoing record of using tear gas grenades 
unlawfully for the exercise of disproportionate and excessive force, and in 
conjunction with live ammunition.”2343 
 
                                                          
2340
 European Union, Common Position (2008), op.cit., Article 2, and see also: European Union, EU Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 8th June 1998, European 
Union 8675/2/98, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ 08675r2en8.pdf (accessed 1
st
 June 
2012), Article 2. 
2341
 Links to French national export reports from 2000-2009 are available from the SIPRI website on 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/national_reports_deafult#
france (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
2342
 For links to EU compilation reports from 1999-2009 see: Council of the European Union, Security-
related export controls II - Military equipment, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/non-
proliferation,-disarmament-and-export-control-/security-related-export-controls-ii?lang=en (accessed 1
st
 
June 2012). 
2343
 See Amnesty International (February 2010) op.cit. The report cites previous misuse of RCAs in 
October 1999, December 2001, and January/February 2007. See Amnesty International, Guinea: 
Maintaining order with contempt for the right to life (AI Index: AFR 29/001/2002), May 2002; Amnesty 
International, Guinea: ‘Soldiers were shooting everywhere’: the security forces’ response to peaceful 
demands for change (AI Index: AFR 29/003/2007), June 2007. 
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Figure A7.1. Left: Image of what appears to be a Cougar 56mm anti-riot grenade launcher 
made in France, photographed at Bellevue police station, 1
st
 October 2009 © Private; 
Figure A7.2. Right: Police with what appears to be a French made anti-riot grenade 
launcher, in front of stadium, 28
th
 September 2009 © Private. 
 
According to Amnesty International, “photographs taken in the Bellevue district 
of Conakry on 1st October 2009 show police personnel carrying 56mm 'Cougar' 
grenade launchers. Police officers were filmed with similar launchers at the 
demonstration in front of the stadium on 28th September 2009 itself.”2344 [See 
above] 
 
Cougar grenade launchers have been manufactured by the French company, 
SAE Alsatex. According to Alsatex publications, the Cougar launcher has a 
“high rate of fire (6 to 8 rounds per minute) enabling zonal saturation and 
reduction in the number of gunners.” It is “light, compact and very 
discrete…very easy to handle, both in use and transport, with a non-aggressive 
appearance (good media image…).” It “reinforces user’s mobility and allows 
them to move around with the launcher charged but not cocked.” It is also 
“adaptable to stationary firing mounts: cupola, all terrain vehicle, etc…”2345  
 
Alsetex publications have also stated that: “all Alsetex riot control grenades can 
be fired by the Cougar launcher from a range of 50, 100 or 200 metres using 
                                                          
2344
 Amnesty International (2010), op.cit., p.27. 
2345
 SAE Alsetex catalogue, Cougar riot control grenade launcher, circulated at MILIPOL 2003 security 
exhibition, Paris (copy held by author). 
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the appropriate delay propelling device”. 2346 Alsetex balistic munitions have 
included smoke and tear gas grenades and combined effect grenades 
comprising tear gas and flash/bang properties. Cougar launchers can also fire 
kinetic munitions containing multiple small rubber balls or a single kinetic effect 
projectile.2347 Comparing Alsetex product catalogue photographs with those 
obtained by Amnesty International indicates that Guinea gendarmerie were 
deploying launchers that look identical to Alsetex products. 
 
Furthermore, in response to information requests from Amnesty International, 
the French government informed AI that during 2006 it exported 500 
unspecified anti-riot grenades to the Guinean Ministry of Interior - the last export 
licence granted for ‘military materials’ [materiels de guerre] destined for 
Guinea.2348 Given the previous history of misuse of such equipment by the 
Guinean security forces, documented by AI, these licences have appeared to 
breach Criterion two of the EU Code. Furthermore, these licences do not 
appear to have been recorded in the French national or EU compilation reports.  
 
These concerns were deepened following a subsequent response by the 
French government to AI which acknowledged that between January 2004 and 
February 2008 a further 13 authorizations were granted for the export to the 
Guinean police and gendarmerie of tear gas grenades and accompanying 
“dispositifs de propulsion à retard” (the latter designated for ‘Cougar’ grenade 
launchers) under a completely separate licensing mechanism.2349 Once again 
these licences have appeared to breach Criterion two of the EU Code/Common 
                                                          
2346
 SAE Alsetex catalogue, Cougar riot control grenade launcher, circulated at MILIPOL 2003 security 
exhibition, Paris (copy held by author). 
2347
 Ness, L. and Williams,G. Janes Ammunition Handbook 2009-2010, Janes Information Group, 
Coulsden, Surrey, UK, 2010, p.244; SAE Alsetex catalogue, Cougar riot control grenade launcher, 
circulated at MILIPOL 2003 security exhibition, Paris (copy held by author). 
2348
 The French government also stated that in 2008 it issued a further pre-export authorization [agrément 
préalable] for the sale to the Ministry of Interior of stun grenades and 56mm GM-2L tear gas grenades, 
specifically designed for the launchers seen with Guinean police forces on the 28
th
 September 2009 and 
subsequently; but the French government said that the 2008 pre-export licence did not receive its final 
export authorisation. Correspondence to Amnesty International from the French Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs, 29th September 2009, as cited in Amnesty International (February 2010) op.cit., p.27. 
2349
 Correspondence to Amnesty International from the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 
18
th
 December 2009. ‘Dispositifs de propulsion à retard’ (DPRs) designate propelling devices specifically 
for the 56mm grenades fired by ‘Cougar’ launchers of the kind seen in use by Guinean police. See 
‘Lanceur de munitions de maintien de l’ordre type COUGAR’ in Ministry of Defence (France), TTA 207: 
Mesures de sécurité à appliquer à l'instruction et à l'entraînement: Lors de l’exécution des tirs techniques 
et tactiques, approuvé le 11 février 2005 sous le n°196/DEF/EMAT/BPO/ICE/32, pp. 202-203, as cited in 
Amnesty International (February 2010) op.cit., pp.27-28. 
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Position. In addition, these latter licences do not appear to have been published 
or reported to the French parliament. 
 
A7.3. Limitations of ECOWAS and EU arms embargoes 
On 17th October 2009, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)2350 imposed an arms embargo prohibiting any ECOWAS State from 
supplying arms to Guinea. In a communiqué issued at their day-long 
extraordinary summit in Abuja, the Heads of State, declared that: 
“In view of the atrocities committed on 28th September 2009 and the steps 
taken by the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) 
authorities to acquire new weapons, the Heads of State imposed an arms 
embargo on Guinea under the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, their Ammunitions and Related Materials.”2351  
 
However, there has been no further documentation publicly available on the 
scope of, and mechanisms for implementing and enforcing, the embargo. Since 
the ECOWAS SALW Convention2352 did not specifically cover RCAs (or 
incapacitants) within its remit it is doubtful whether these agents have been 
covered by the embargo, even though RCAs and attendant launchers were 
used to facilitate the 28th September massacre. 
 
The Heads of State also directed the “ECOWAS Commission to take all 
necessary measures to obtain the support of the African Union, the European 
Union and the United Nations in the implementation and enforcement of the 
embargo” 2353 and recommended that the international community “impose [a] 
total embargo on arms shipment for Guinea.” 2354 
 
                                                          
2350
 The 15 Member States of ECOWAS are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
2351
 ECOWAS Heads of State communiqué N°: 111/2009, 17th October 2009. Available from ECOWAS 
website http://news.ecowas.int/ (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
2352
 ECOWAS Convention on small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and other related materials, 
14th June 2006, http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/documents/CONVENTION-CEDEAO-ENGLISH.PDF 
(accessed 1st June 2012). 
2353
 ECOWAS Heads of State communiqué N°: 111/2009 (17th October 2009) op.cit.  
2354
 ECOWAS Heads of State communiqué N°: 111/2009 (17th October 2009) op.cit.  
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On 27th October 2009, the EU imposed an arms embargo on Guinea.2355 This 
was subsequently revised and strengthened on 22nd December 2009. 2356 In 
addition to the 27 EU member States legally bound by these Common 
Positions, the EU candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process and potential EU candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia; and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway, also declared that they “shared the objectives of Council Decisions 
2009/1003/CFSP and 2010/186/CFSP” and that they “will ensure that their 
national policies conform to these Council Decisions.” 2357 
 
Article 1 of the strengthened Common Position stated that: 
“1. The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types, 
including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, 
paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as 
equipment which might be used for internal repression, to the Republic of 
Guinea by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States 
or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited whether originating or 
not in their territories.” [Emphasis Added] 
 
Although the addition of “equipment which might be used for internal 
repression” has seemed to include RCAs, certain ambiguity over the range of 
items covered has arisen from Article 2 of the Common Position which stated 
that:  
“1. Article 1 shall not apply to:  
                                                          
2355
 European Union, Council Common Position 2009/788/CFSP of 27October 2009 concerning restrictive 
measures against the Republic of Guinea. 
2356
 European Union, Council Decision 2009/1003/CFSP of 22 December 2009, amending Common 
Position 2009/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea, Official Journal 
of the European Union, 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:346:0051:0057:EN:PDF (accessed 1
st
 
June 2012). 
2357
 European Union, Summary: 2
nd
 June 2010, Brussels - Declaration by the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on the alignment 
of certain third countries with the Council Decisions 2009/1003/CFSP and 2010/186/CFSP concerning 
restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea, 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?q=http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/1
14723.pdf&sa=U&ei=Ps_2T6vVAs748QPf_dWnBw&ved=0CBIQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNFjDuW36-JQ-
hwOloV8-AuC-5K1xw (accessed 1
st
 June 2012). 
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(a) the sale, supply, transfer or export of non-lethal military equipment or 
of equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely 
for humanitarian or protective use, or for institution building programmes of 
the United Nations(UN) and the EU, or for EU and UN crisis management 
operations;” [Emphasis Added]. 
 
Consequently, there is a danger that abusive end users could potentially claim 
that “non-lethal military equipment” or “equipment which might be used for 
internal repression” such as RCAs were “intended solely for humanitarian or 
protective use” and thus be excluded from the controls. 
 
As well as the foregoing limitations in implementation of the ECOWAS and EU 
embargoes, their effectiveness may well be mitigated as they did not cover 
countries that have previously reportedly supplied arms, security equipment or 
assistance to Guinea, such as China, Morocco or South Africa.2358 To date, 
neither the African Union nor the United Nations have instituted arms 
embargoes on Guinea.2359  
 
In conclusion, it appears that the French national controls and EU wide control 
regime failed to prevent French transfers of RCAs and delivery mechanisms to 
security forces in Guinea that had a history of abusing such equipment and 
which subsequently employed these or similar items in the 28th September 
massacre. Furthermore, limitations in the text and implementation of the 
ECOWAS and EU arms embargoes, and the failure of the UN and African 
Union to impose arms embargoes, subsequently have potentially allowed 
further RCAs and delivery mechanisms to be transferred to abusive end users 
in Guinea. 
                                                          
2358
 For further information on countries reportedly supplying arms, security equipment, training and other 
assistance see: Amnesty International (February 2010) op.cit., pp26-31. 
2359
 Analysis was undertaken of all relevant African Union and United Nations documents publicly available 
on the AU website (www.africa-union.org) and UN website (www.un.org/en/) [in particular UN Security 
Council Sanctions Committee website (http://www.un.org/sc/committees/)], as of 1
st
 June 2012. 
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Appendix 8 
Details of arms embargoes introduced during the period 1st January 1990 – 31st December 2009 
Key 
Equipment covered: 
1 = Arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary 
equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned. 
2 = Arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police 
equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as the provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of 
licensing arrangements, for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned. 
3 = Arms and related material  
4= Weapons designed to kill and their ammunition, weapons, platforms, non-weapons platforms and ancillary equipment. Also 
covers spare parts, repairs, maintenance and transfer of military technology.  
5 = equipment that can be used for internal repression [or terrorism]. Range of equipment prohibited includes: “Portable devices 
designed or modified for the purpose of riot control or self-protection by the administration of an incapacitating substance (such as 
tear gas or pepper sprays), and specially designed components therefor.” 
Exemptions 
6 = non-lethal military equipment; 7 = weapons and ammunition 
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Table 1 - UN arms embargoes introduced during the period 1st January 1990 – 31st December 2009  
Target Entry into 
force/ expiry 
Details of resolution Type of 
resolution 
Relevant items covered Exemptions Verification 
Afghanistan 
(Taliban) 
22/10/ 1999  
19/12/2000 - 
16/01/ 2002 
UNSCR1076(1996);                
UNSCR 1333(2000) 
Non-mandatory; 
Mandatory 
2 6 - intended solely for 
humanitarian or protective 
use. 
Committee 
Taliban, Al-
Qaida, Usma Bin 
Laden 
16/01/02 - UNSCR 1267(1999); 
1333(2000); 
1388(2002); 
1390(2002); 
1452(2002); 
1526(2002) 
Mandatory 2 6 Committee and 
Monitoring Group 
Angola (UNITA) 15/09/1993 – 
09/12 2002 
UNSCR: 864 (1993); 
1448(2002) 
Mandatory/legally 
binding 
2 (but paramilitary 
equipment not 
specifically mentioned) 
 Committee 
Cote d’Ivoire 15/11/2004 - UNSCR 1572(2004) Mandatory Arms or any related 
materiel, in particular 
military aircraft and 
equipment. 
For UN Operation in Cote 
d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and 
French forces.  
UNOCI; Group of 
Experts and 
Committee 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) 
[Non-State 
actors] 
28/07/03 - UNSCR 1493(2003) 
(rebels); UNSCR 
1596(2005)(extends 
provisions to other 
recipients in the DRC). 
Mandatory Arms and related 
materiel 
  
DRC army and police and 
UN Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC). Also 6 – 
intended solely for 
humanitarian or protective 
use. 
MONUC; Panel of 
experts 
Eritrea 12/02/99 - UNSCR 1227 (1999);                            Non-mandatory;  Arms and munitions   
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17/05/2000 
17/05/2000 - 
15/05/ 2001 
 
UNSCR 1298(2000) 
 
Mandatory/legally 
binding 
 
2 
 
6 –intended solely for 
humanitarian use. 
 
Committee 
Eritrea 23/12/2009 -  UNSCR 1907 (2009) Mandatory Supply and export of 1.  Committee and UN 
Monitoring Group 
on Somalia 
Ethiopia 12/02/99 -
17/05/2000 
17/05/2000 - 
15/05/ 2001 
UNSCR 1227 (1999);                            
 
UNSCR 1298(2000) 
Non-mandatory;  
 
Mandatory/legally 
binding 
Arms and munitions 
 
2  
 
 
6 –intended solely for 
humanitarian use. 
 
 
Committee 
Haiti 16/06/1993 – 
29/09/1994 
UNSCR 841; UNSCR 
944 
Mandatory 1. (but police rather than 
equipment specified).  
 Committeee 
Iran 23/12/ 2006 - UNSCR 1737 (2006); 
1747 (2007); 1920 
(2010) 
Mandatory Materials, technology, 
etc which could 
contribute to nuclear 
weapons programme. 
Also major conventional 
weapons. Prohibit export 
of 3. 
Certain conventional 
weapons including most 
Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW) and 
other military equipment. 
Committee and 
Panel of Experts. 
Iraq 06/08/1990 – 
08/06/ 2004 
UNSCR:661(1990); 
687(1991); 707(1991); 
1483(2003);1511(2003)
; 1546(2004) 
Mandatory/legally 
binding 
1 Government of Iraq and 
multi-national forces 
Multi-national 
forces and 
Government of 
Iraq. 
Lebanon (non-
governmental 
forces) 
11/08/2006 - UNSCR 1701(2006) Mandatory 2 Government of Lebanon or 
UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNFIL) 
Government of 
Lebanon or 
(UNFIL) 
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Liberia 19/11/1992 - UNSCR: 788(1992); 
1343(2001); 
1521(2003); 1532 
(2004); 1579 (2004); 
Mandatory/legally 
binding 
2 6,7 for UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) and for 
trained and vetted Liberian 
government police and 
security forces. 
Committee, Panel 
of experts, UNMIL 
Libya 31/03/1992 – 
12/09/2003 
UNSCR 748 (1992); 
UNSCR 
(S/6662);UNSCR 1506. 
Mandatory/legally 
binding 
2  Committee 
North Korea 14/10/2006 - UNSCR 1718 (2006); 
1847 (2009) 
Mandatory 3. Also materials, 
technology, etc which 
could contribute to WMD 
programmes. 
Allows supply of small arms 
or light weapons if UN 
Committee notified. in 
advance. 
Committee and 
Panel of Experts. 
Rwanda (rebel 
groups) 
16/08/1994 – 
10/06/2008 
UNSCR: 918(1994); 
997(1995); 1005(1995); 
1011(1995) 
Mandatory/legally 
binding 
2 Government of Rwanda. Committee 
Sierra Leone 
(Government)  
(Rebels) 
08/10/1997-
05/06/1998 
05/06/1998 – 
09/2010  
UNSCR 1132 (1997); 
 
UNSCR: 1171 (1998); 
1306 (2000); 1940 
(2010) 
Mandatory 
 
Mandatory 
1 
 
1 
 
 
Government of Sierra 
Leone and ECOMOG UN 
Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) 
 
 
UNAMSIL and 
Committee 
Somalia 23/01/1992 - UNSCR 733 (1992); 
1356 (2001); 1425 
(2002); 1725 (2006); 
1774 (2007); 
1844(2008) 
Mandatory 1 6 for use in humanitarian 
operations; African Union 
intervention force and 
Government of Somalia 
Committee and 
Panel of Experts 
(which was 
replaced by 
Monitoring Group).  
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Sudan - Darfur 
Region (non-
government 
forces) 
All forces in 
Darfur 
30/07/2004 - UNSCR 1556(2004);  
 
 
UNSCR 1591(2005) 
Mandatory 1 
 
 
1 
 
 
Provision of arms and 
military equipment to the 
Government of Sudan 
outside the Darfur region 
 
UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS); 
Committee and 
Panel of Experts 
Yemen 01/06/1994  UNSCR 924 (1994); 
UNSCR 931 (1994) 
Non-mandatory “arms and other materiel 
which might contribute to 
the continuation of the 
conflict.” 
 None 
Yugoslavia 
(FRY) 
31/03/1998 -
10/09/2001 
UNSCR 1160 (1998); 
1367 (2001) 
Mandatory 1 (but paramilitary 
equipment not 
specifically mentioned.) 
 Committee 
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Table 2 - EU arms embargoes introduced during the period 1st January 1990 – 31st December 2009  
Target Entry into 
force/ expiry 
Details of resolution Type of resolution Relevant items 
covered 
Exemptions EU Verification 
Afghanistan 17/12/1996 - 
26/02/2001 
Common Position (CP) 
96/746/CFSP 
Politically binding 4  None 
Afghanistan 
(Taliban) 
26/02/2001 - 
27/05/2002 
CP 96/746/CFSP Politically binding 1  None 
Taliban, Al-
Qaida, Usama 
Bin Laden 
27/05/2002 -  CP 2002/402/CFSP; CP 
2001/154/CFSP;  
Council Regulation (EC) 
881/2002 
Politically binding  
Legally binding. 
Implementing 
UNSCR. 
1 6 None 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
05/07/1991 - 
23/01/2006 
Council Declaration 
05/09/1991; CP 
96/184/CFSP; CP 
98/240 CFSP. Council  
Declaration 
99/481/CFSP;CP 
2006/29/CFSP 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. Amended 
following UNSCR. 
4. Subsequently “No 
equipment which might 
be used for internal 
repression or for 
terrorism will be 
supplied to the Federal 
Republic of 
Yugoslavia.” 
Small arms to 
Bosnia/Herzegovina 
police. 
None 
China 27/06/1989 - Council Declaration 
27/06/1989 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. 
Arms. As scope not 
defined, it is left to 
national interpretation. 
UK includes range of 
conventional weapons 
and 5. 
 None 
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Cote d’Ivoire 15/11/2004 - CP 2004/852/CFSP; 
Council Regulation 
174/2005 
Politically binding. 
Legally binding 
Implementing 
UNSCR 
1 
5 
For UN Operation in Cote 
d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and 
French forces. 
None 
Croatia 05/07/1991 - 
20/11/2000 
Council Declaration 
05/09/1991; CP 
96/184/CFSP; CP 
98/240 CFSP. Council 
Declaration 
99/481/CFSP; CP 
2000/722/CFSP 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. Amended 
following UNSCR.  
As for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
None None 
DRC (Covering 
the entire 
country)[Non-
State actors 
since 2003] 
07/04/1993 - EC Declaration; CP 
2002/829/CFSP;  
Council Regulation 
1727/2003 
Politically binding 
Legally binding 
1 DRC police and 
(MONUC). Also 6 – solely 
for humanitarian or 
protective use. 
None 
Eritrea  15/03/1999 - 
31/05/2001 
CP 1999/206/CFSP; CP 
2001/215/CFSP 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. 
4 None None 
Ethiopia 15/03/1999 - 
31/05/2001 
CP 1999/206/CFSP; CP 
2001/215/CFSP 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. 
4 None None 
Guinea 27/10/2009 - CP 2009/788/CFSP Politically binding, 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. 
1 6 solely for humanitarian 
or protective use, or for 
UN/EU institution building 
programmes/crisis 
management operations. 
None 
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Indonesia 17/09/1999 - 
17/01/2000 
CP 1999/624/CFSP 
Council Regulation 
2158/1999 
Politically binding 
Legally binding 
Autonomous EU 
embargo 
4  
5 
None None 
Iran 23/04/2007 - CP 2007/140/CFSP; 
CP2007/246/CFSP 
Politically binding, 
implementing 
UNSCRs. 
1 None  None 
Iraq [Non-State 
actors since 
2004] 
04/08/1990 - Council Declaration 
04/08/90; CP 
2003/735/CFSP; CP 
2004/553/CFSP 
Politically binding, 
implementing 
UNSCRs. 
1 Government of Iraq and 
multinational forces 
None 
Lebanon [Non-
State actors] 
15/09/2006 - CP 2006/625/CFSP Politically binding, 
implementing 
UNSCR. 
2 Government of Lebanon 
or UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNFIL). 
None 
Liberia 07/05/2001 - CP 2004/137/CFSP; 
2004/487/CFSP; 
2004/902/CFSP; 
2006/31/CFSP; 
2006/518/CFSP 
Politically binding, 
implementing 
UNSCRs. 
2 6,7 for UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) and for 
trained and vetted 
Liberian government 
police and security forces. 
None 
Libya 27/01/1986 -
11/10/2004 
Statement of Foreign 
Ministers 14/03/1986;CP 
1999/261/CFSP; 
1999/611/CFSP 
Politically binding, 
autonomous EU 
embargo 
“arms or other military 
equipment” 
 
None. None 
Myanmar 29/06/1991 - Council Declaration; CP 
2004/423/CFSP; CP 
2004/730/CFSP;  
Council Regulations 
798/2004 and 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. Politically 
binding.           
Legally binding.  
4  
5 
None None 
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1853/2004 
Nigeria 20/11/1995 - 
01/06/1999 
CP 95/515/CFSP Autonomous EU 
embargo. Politically 
binding 
4 None None 
North Korea 22/11/2006 - CP 2006/795/CFSP Politically binding. 
Implementing 
UNSCR 
1.  
The embargo also 
prohibits supply of 
materials, technology, 
etc which could 
contribute to WMD 
programmes. 
None None 
Sierra Leone 
(rebels) 
05/06/1998 - CP 98/409/CFSP Politically binding. 
Implementing 
UNSCR 
1 Government of Sierra 
Leone and ECOMOG UN 
Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) 
None 
Slovenia 05/07/1991 -
16/02/1996 
Council Declaration 
05/09/1991; CP 
96/184/CFSP; CP 
98/240 CFSP. Council 
Decision 
1998/398/CFSP 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. Amended 
following UNSCR.  
As for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
None None 
Somalia 10/12/2002 - CP 2002/960/CFSP; CP 
2009/138/CFSP;  
Council Regulation 
147/2003 
Politically binding.   
 
Legally binding. 
Implementing 
UNSCRs. 
1  6 for use in humanitarian 
or protective use 
operations; African Union 
intervention force, EU and 
UN institution building 
operations. 
None (check) 
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Sudan 15/03/1994 - CP 2004/31/CFSP; 
Council Regulation 
131/2004 
Politically binding. 
Legally binding. EU 
embargo over entire 
country 
1 None None 
Uzbekistan 14/11/2005 - 
31/10/2009 
CP 2005/792/CFSP; 
Council Regulation 
1859/2005 
Politically binding. 
Legally binding. 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. 
1 
5 
None None 
Yugoslavia 
(FRY) 
05/07/1991 - 
08/10/2001 
Council Declaration 
05/09/1991; CP 
96/184/CFSP; CP 
98/240 CFSP. 
CP2001/719/CFSP 
Politically binding 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. Amended 
following UNSCR. 
As for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
None None 
Zimbabwe
2360
 18/02/2002 - CP 2002/145/CFSP; 
Council Regulation 
314/2004 
Politically binding 
Legally binding 
Autonomous EU 
embargo. 
1 
5 
None None 
 
                                                          
2360
  See in particular, Council of the European Union, Council Common Position of 18 February 2002 concerning restrictive measures on Zimbabwe, (2002/145/CFSP),  
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Table 3 – Other regional or pluri-lateral arms embargoes introduced during the period 1st January 1990 – 31st December 2009  
Target Entry into 
force - expiry 
Details of resolution Type of  
Resolution 
Scope of relevant 
items covered 
Exemptions Verification 
Azerbaijan 
(Nagorno-
Karabkh)  
28/02/1992 - Seventh Committee of 
Senior Officials meeting, 
Organisation of Security 
and Cooperation in 
Europe Prague, 27-28
th
 
February 1992. 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous OSCE 
embargo. 
“all deliveries of 
weapons and 
munitions to forces 
engaged in combat in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh 
area.” 
None None 
Burundi 06/08/1996 -
23/01/1999 
See SIPRI arms 
embargoes database. 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous 
embargo by 
Embargo by the 
DRC, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia. 
Scope unknown None None 
Guinea 17/10/2009 - ECOWAS Heads of 
State Communique N°: 
111/2009, 17
th
 October 
2009 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous 
ECOWAS embargo. 
“Arms embargo on 
Guinea under the 
ECOWAS Convention 
on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons.” 
None None 
Nigeria 24/04/1996- 
11/1999 
Statement of 
Commonwealth 
Ministerial Action Group, 
24
th
 April 1996. 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous 
Commonwealth 
embargo. [Though it 
is uncertain whether 
Arms None None 
567 
 
this was actually put 
into effect]. 
Togo 19/02/2005- 
26/02/2005 
ECOWAS Heads of 
State, Government, 9
th
 
February 2005. See 
SIPRI arms embargoes 
database. 
Politically binding. 
Autonomous 
ECOWAS embargo. 
Replaced by AU 
embargo. 
“Complete arms 
embargo” 
None None 
Togo 25/02/2005- 
28/05/2005 
African Union, 25
th
 
February 2005. See 
SIPRI arms embargoes 
database.  
Politically binding. 
Autonomous African 
Union (AU). 
“Complete arms 
embargo” 
None None 
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Appendix 9 
 
Case studies highlighting civil society activities of relevance to the 
regulation of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means 
of delivery 
 
A9.1. Case study: Independent investigation of use of chemical agents by 
USSR in Georgia 
On 9th April 1989, troops from the Soviet Ministries of Defence and Interior 
reportedly used entrenching spades and toxic chemicals to break up a peaceful 
demonstration of 8,000-10,000 people in Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia. Sixteen people 
were killed at the scene and a further four died from injuries sustained, whilst 
between 3,000-4,000 required medical attention.2361 Soviet authorities at first 
denied that toxic gas had been used and then, one week after the event, 
acknowledged the use of CN. In early May, an investigative team comprising 
Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Dr. Andrei Sakharov and representatives of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross were informed that CS had also been 
used on 9th April 1989. 2362 
 
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) was subsequently asked by Dr. Andrei 
Sakharov and Dr.Irakli Menagarishvili, Minister of Public Health for Soviet 
Georgia, to provide technical expertise in assessing the possibility that toxic gas 
or gases had been used against the crowd. This NGO investigation was highly 
unusual in being requested by a State (Georgia) – and highlights the limited 
options for independent investigation then available in such cases.2363 It is also 
noteworthy for the high level of (Georgian) State resources and access provided 
to it. During the five-day mission, the PHR team met with officials of the 
Georgian Ministry of Health, members of the Georgian Committee of 
Investigation, directors and department heads of the major hospitals, officials 
                                                          
2361
 Physicians  for Human Rights, Bloody Sunday: Trauma in Tblisi, The Events of April 9, 1989 and Their 
Aftermath, February 1990; See also: 9th April and 24th May 1989 entries in the News Chronology section 
of Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, number 5, August 1989, Harvard Sussex Programme, pp. 7 
and 10. 
2362
 Physicians for Human Rights (1990) op.cit., p.xi. 
2363
 In 1989, the Chemical Weapons Convention and its investigatory machinery had not come into 
existence. Although the UN Secretary General’s investigation mechanism was already established, it was 
restricted by geo-political considerations and the remits of the Geneva Protocol. 
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from the State departments of pathology, toxicology, and pharmacology, as well 
as physicians present at the demonstration and physicians responsible for the 
direct care of patients who had been injured. The team reviewed the pathology 
and toxicological evidence that was available and two videotapes that had been 
taken at the scene on 9th April 1989. One member of the PHR team visited the 
State toxicology and pharmacology laboratories and one of the main analytic 
chemical laboratories of the University of Tbilisi, where he was provided with 
access to a gas chromatography-mass spectrometer. The PHR were also able 
to administer a questionnaire to over 100 victims still hospitalised and 
interviewed  and examined 22 who, in the view of the Georgian physicians, 
were considered to be the most seriously ill.2364 
 
On the basis of clinical and toxicological evidence available, the PHR team 
concluded that “By instructing the Soviet soldiers to use potentially lethal 
weapons and toxic agents to disperse a peaceful crowd, the Soviet authorities 
are responsible for committing a major violation of human rights against the 
citizens of Tbilisi.”2365 The PHR report stated that in addition to the use of CN 
and/or CS:  
“…the Soviet troops most probably used a third toxic agent, chloropicrin. This 
gas was identified on the basis of mass spectroscopy in a cannister allegedly 
recovered on the scene. Chloropicrin, known for its unpredictable toxicities in 
crowd use, can cause skin and mucosal blisters, broncho-constriction, and 
pulmonary edema, all of which were reported among the casualties of the April 
9 demonstration.”2366  
 
In addition, the PHR team concluded that although the cause of  death for the  
initial 16 victims of the demonstration could not be precisely determined, “In the 
absence of signs of external trauma, sudden death could have resulted from 
suffocation in the midst of crowd flight, asphyxiation from  exposure to  high 
concentrations at close range of a lacrimator, such as CN or CS, or a more  
                                                          
2364
 Physicians for human rights (1990) op.cit., p.xii. 
2365
 Physicians for human rights (1990) op.cit., p.46. 
2366
 Physicians for human rights (1990) op.cit., p.xii; See also 9th April and 24th May 1989 entries in the 
News Chronology section of Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, number 5, August 1989, Harvard 
Sussex Programme, pp. 7 and 10. 
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toxic agent, such as chloropicrin, or from direct exposure at close range to 
Freon, the propellant used in the CN cannisters.”2367 
 
A9.2. Case study: Independent analysis of new riot control agent used in 
the West Bank 
In July 2005, the Israeli army reportedly employed a new riot control agent 
against Palestinian and Israeli civilians protesting about the erection of the 
‘Separation Wall’ on the West Bank, that resulted in severe skin injuries. The 
Israeli army refused to identify the agent. However, scientists based in the U.K. 
obtained one of the munitions utilised, and following physical and chemical 
analysis were able to identify the contents as capsaicin with an inert carrier and 
a dispersal agent.2368 The results were found to correspond with the 
commercially available “Pepperball Tactical Powder”.  
 
The paper subsequently published by the U.K. scientists noted that “Skin 
injuries of the severity described had not previously been reported with this 
agent, and would be difficult to manage for clinicians who were unaware of the 
nature of the agent.”2369 As well as alerting clinicians to the nature and effects of 
chemical agents they may face in the future, such research can help to identify 
possible international transfers of chemical agents and devices. It can also 
sensitise the international community to potentially inappropriate use of such 
agents. A 2012 Royal Society report, citing this research, concluded that: “While 
the use of RCAs for domestic policing is permitted by the CWC, in the context of 
the conflict between Israel and Palestinian territories the legality of using 
capsaicin-type munitions against demonstrators is a matter of concern.”2370 
 
 
 
                                                          
2367
 Physicians for human rights (1990) op.cit., pp.xii-xiii. 
2368
 Hay, A. Giacaman, R. Sansur, R. and Rose, S. Skin injuries caused by new riot control agent used 
against civilians on the West Bank, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, October-December 2006, volume 22, 
number 4, Routledge Press, pp.283-291. 
2369
 Hay, A. Giacaman, R. Sansur, R. and Rose, S. (2006) op.cit., p.283.  
2370
 Royal Society, Science Policy Centre, Brain waves module 3, Neuroscience, conflict and security, 
Royal Society, London, February 2012, p.22. 
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A9.3. Case study: Developing a pledge to oppose the use of neuroscience 
in human rights abuse   
In January 2010, Dr Curtis Bell, Senior Scientist Emeritus at the Oregon Health 
and Science University, circulated a pledge intended to foster opposition 
amongst neuroscientists to the application of neuroscience to “torture and other 
forms of coercive interrogation or manipulation that violate human rights and 
personhood.” 2371 According to Bell, “such applications could include drugs that 
cause excessive pain, anxiety, or trust, and manipulations such as brain 
stimulation or inactivation.”2372Furthermore signatories would oppose the 
application of neuroscience to “aggressive war…illegal under international 
law...” The pledge stated that “[a] government which engages in aggressive 
wars should not be provided with tools to engage more effectively in such wars.  
Neuroscience can and does provide such tools. Examples include…drugs 
which damage the effectiveness of soldiers on the other side…” 2373 
 
Under the pledge, neuroscientists commit to making themselves aware of the 
potential misuse of neuroscience for violations of “basic human rights or 
international law such as torture and aggressive war” and commit to refusing to 
“knowingly participate in the application of Neuroscience to violations of basic 
human rights or international law.” 2374 Bell has acknowledged that: “Signing this 
pledge will not stop aggressive wars or human rights violations or even the use 
of neuroscience for these purposes.” However he has argued that: “by signing, 
neuroscientists will help make such applications less acceptable.”2375  
 
A9.4. Case study: IUPAC education and promulgation project 
In October 2005 following a joint IUPAC/OPCW workshop on Education, 
Outreach and Codes of Conduct, an IUPAC project was launched to “develop 
                                                          
2371
 Bell, C. (2010.a), Pledge by Neuroscientists to Refuse to Participate in the Application of Neuroscience 
to Violations of Basic Human Rights or International law 
http://spreadsheets.google.com/viewform?formkey= dEF4RFhhSWZwNktCakYtbTdkd1cxckE6MA 
(accessed 1
st
 May 2012); Bell, C. (2010.b) Letter to International Society for Neuroethology, 
http://neuroethology.org/cgi-bin/dada/mail.cgi/archive/emaillist/20100106211821/ (accessed 4
th
 June 
2010); Bell, C. Responsibilities of neuroscientists concerning aggressive war and torture, poster display, 
available at: http://files.me.com/curtiscbell/pu0ycj (accessed 1st May 2012). 
2372
 Bell, C. (2010.a) op.cit.  
2373
 Bell, C. (2010.a), op.cit. 
2374
 Bell, C. (2010.a) op.cit. 
2375
 Bell, C. Neurons for peace: Take the pledge, brain scientists, New Scientist, 8th February 2010, 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20527465.900 (accessed 1st May2012).  
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educational material for IUPAC chemists and chemistry teachers about the 
Chemical Weapons Convention”2376 and an international working group was 
established to develop an educational package that would “foster debate on the 
issues.”2377 Four working papers were subsequently produced, designed for use 
by university and high school chemistry teachers, covering the multiple uses of 
chemicals2378, the toxicology of selected chemical warfare agents,2379 applicable 
regulatory regimes,2380 and codes of conduct.2381 The papers, which each 
provide enough material for a one-hour lecture, have been peer reviewed and 
tested in workshops in the U.K., Russia, South Korea, and Italy, and have been 
translated and are available in the working languages of the OPCW—Arabic, 
Chinese, French, English, Russian, and Spanish.2382 One of the papers 
included a case study of the regulation and use of a riot control agent, CS.2383 
However, whilst the education materials referred to “the possibility of new 
discoveries that might lead to the emergence of new generations of chemical 
weapons”,2384 there has been no corresponding case study regarding 
incapacitants. The project ended in 2007 and it is unclear how the initiative has 
been taken forward subsequently.2385 
 
A9.5. Case study: civil society development of bioethics educational 
materials 
Bradford University together with the Australian National University and the 
Universities of Bath and Exeter have undertaken a collaborative project: 
Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual-Use Bioethics.2386 A core element in 
                                                          
2376
 IUPAC, Project: Educational material for raising awareness of the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
the multiple uses of chemicals, 2005, http://www.iupac.org/web/ins/2005-029-1-050 (accessed 1
st
 May 
2012). 
2377
 Hay, A . Multiple Uses of Chemicals: Clear Choices or Dodgy Deals? Chemistry International, volume 
29, number 6, November-December  2007, http://www.iupac.org/publications/ci/ 2007/2906/pp2_2005-
029-1-050.html (accessed 1
st
 May 2012). 
2378
 Mahaffy, P. Multiple uses of chemicals, July 2007, available on: Multiple uses of chemicals website, 
http://multiple.kcvs.ca/ (accessed 1
st
 May 2012). 
2379
 Hay, A. Toxicology of chemical warfare agents, July 2007, available on: Multiple uses of chemicals 
website, http://multiple.kcvs.ca/ (accessed 1st May 2012). 
2380
 Becker, E. Chemicals – good and bad, July 2007, available on:Multiple uses of chemicals website, 
http://multiple.kcvs.ca/, (accessed 1st May 2012). 
2381
 Rappert, B. The prevention of chemical weapons – what role for codes of conduct? July 2007, 
available on: Multiple uses of chemicals website, http://multiple.kcvs.ca/ (accessed 1st May 2012). 
2382
 Available from: multiple uses of chemicals website, http://multiple.kcvs.ca/ (accessed 1st May 2012). 
2383
 Hay, A. (2007) op.cit., p.5. 
2384
 Mahaffy, P. (2007) op.cit., p.5. 
2385
 IUPAC (2005) op.cit. 
2386
 About the Project on Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual-Use Bioethics, See: Bradford University 
website: http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/About/ (accessed 1
st
 May 2012). 
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this programme has been the development by Bradford University, the National 
Defence Medical College (Japan) and the Landau Network Centro Volta (Italy) 
of an Educational Module Resource (EMR) designed to support life scientists 
and educators in learning about bio-security and “dual-use” issues, and also in 
building educational material for teaching students. The EMR has been 
designed to be “modified and tailored in order to fit the requirements of different 
local educational contexts.” It was “intended to be a resource that can be used 
by a lecturer in order to develop one or more lectures, seminars, role-plays or 
other teaching aids suitable for the course he or she is presenting.”2387 The 
EMR consisted of 21 lectures covering a history of offensive biological 
weapons, the BTWC and its implementation, the web of prevention, “dual-use” 
dilemmas and the responsibilities of life sciences; and included two lectures 
devoted to incapactitants.2388 To date the EMR has been translated into French, 
Georgian, Japanese, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Spanish and Urdu2389, and 
trialled in Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain.2390  
 
Building on this initiative, Bradford University has also developed an internet 
based “Train the Trainer” programme comprising a six week certified on-line 
course in Applied Dual-Use Biosecurity Education, which has aimed to raise 
students' awareness of a range of “dual-use” ethical dilemmas that arise due to 
the impact of science and technology on society. The course has been intended 
to have “an applied, practical dimension in that its aim is to enable and facilitate 
more bioethical research into `dual-use' issues, and facilitate best practice that 
will prevent the misuse of knowledge generated through biomedical 
research.”2391 The course commenced in January 2011 with the first cohort of 
students from Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the 
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Philippines, Qatar, the Russian Federation, the UAE, Uganda and Yemen, and 
drawn from academia, government, industry, the military and professional life 
science associations.2392   
 
A9.6. Case study: medical ethics and CBW research in South Africa 
In 2007, the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA)2393 issued 
Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Professions: Research, 
Development and Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.2394 The preamble 
noted that: 
“…the South African military authorities under the apartheid government 
sustained a covert programme for the development of chemical and biological 
weapons, and recruited health care practitioners and scientists to staff the 
programme. The evidence that emerged in the TRC’s [Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s] investigations into this clandestine project has pointed to the 
importance of developing clear guidelines for the health professions in regard to 
participation in such programmes. It was particularly evident that the secrecy 
surrounding the apartheid government’s CBW programme enabled health 
professional scientists to conduct research outside of any ethical oversight.”2395 
 
The preamble further stated “… It is completely contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the ethics of the health professions for a health care practitioner to 
participate in research activities directed at generating materials intended to 
cause harm to human health and well-being…” 2396 
 
The guidelines consequently established the following ethical obligations upon 
health care professions: “All research to develop CBWs designed to inflict harm 
on humans is unethical and health care practitioners should not participate in 
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such activities. Should health care practitioners find themselves in dual loyalty 
situations where they are coerced or experience pressure or threats to comply 
from the military or other authorities, they should appeal to the HPCSA or any 
other appropriate professional body for support in resisting such pressures.”2397 
While the guidelines recognised the potential for physicians to become involved 
in legitimate research to “protect military or civilian personnel against CBWs”, 
such research “should be subject to open peer review and ethical oversight by a 
suitably appointed independent body…” as elaborated in the guidelines.2398  
 
The HPCSA considered that “the guidelines form an integral part of the 
standards of professional conduct against which a complaint of professional 
misconduct will be evaluated.”2399 And furthermore that “Health care 
practitioners who decide not to follow the guidance in this Booklet… must be 
prepared to explain and justify their actions and decisions to patients and their 
families, their colleagues and, if necessary, to the courts and the HPCSA.”2400  
 
As of 1st September 2012, the HPCSA has been conducting an investigation 
into the activities of Dr.Wouter Basson, former head of Project Coast, the 
Apartheid South African CBW research and development programme. Dr 
Basson initially faced six charges of alleged professional misconduct as a result 
of his activities at Project Coast from 1981 to 1993.2401 The HPCSA 
investigation was initiated after it received a complaint in 2000 of Basson's 
unethical conduct by over 40 doctors, but was delayed pending Basson's 
criminal trial on related charges.2402 The HPCSA disciplinary hearing, which 
followed Basson's acquittal in 2002 on all criminal charges, was blocked 
following claims by Dr. Basson that the HSPCA was biased against him. 
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However on 10th May 2010, the North Gauteng High Court of Pretoria found the 
claim to be unjustified, prompting the continuation of the investigation.2403 
Although two charges have been dropped, the Professional Conduct Committee 
of the HSPCA has ruled that a hearing on the four remaining charges should 
continue.2404 Among the remaining charges against Dr Basson are that he “co-
ordinated the production of the following drugs and tear gases on a major 
scale…methaqualone…MDMA…BZ…CS…CR…”2405 Dr Basson is also 
accused of having “weaponize[d] thousands of 120mm mortars with tear 
gas”2406 Dr Basson has been working, as a private practice cardiologist in Cape 
Town, South Africa. If the HPCSA’s investigation concludes that Dr. Basson’s 
conduct, as director of Project Coast, was unethical, he could lose his license to 
practice medicine.  
 
A9.7. Case study: U.K. incapacitant research and medical ethics in the 
1960s2407 
The main U.K. programme of human studies into incapacitating agents which 
ran from 1959 to the early 1970s,included trials with physical incapacitating 
agents such as oripavine derivates2408  and psychological agents including 
LSD2409, LAE2410, BZ, tryptamines and MPIPG2411. During the mid-1960s, 
members of Porton Down’s Medical Division reportedly developed significant 
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concerns about the incapacitating research programme,2412 following serious ill-
effects suffered by test subjects including a case of cardiovascular depression 
induced by T2636, a catatonic episode produced by T2833 and instances of 
toxic delirium in the BZ tests.2413 Two members of the Medical Division resigned 
in November 1964 and December 1964. One member of the Medical Division, 
who played an important part in the programme, consequently fell sick in 
January 1965 and was admitted to hospital suffering from depression, although 
he subsequently recovered he did not rejoin Porton.2414 His assistant was “very 
near breaking point” by mid-February 19652415 and resigned a few days 
later.2416  
 
On February 2nd 1965, the Committee on the Safety of Human Experimentation 
(COHSE) – Porton Down's internal body for monitoring experiments – 
questioned the advisability of giving volunteers the doses necessary to induce 
full incapacitation.2417 The Head of the Medical Division at Porton Down thought 
that while incapacitating agents were reputed to be safe there appeared to be 
“strong reasons” for doubting this. If tests were dangerous, even if the effects 
appeared to be innocuous, it was considered unethical and unjustified to 
conduct human tests with these agents in peacetime. 2418COSHE agreed that 
very serious consideration be given as to whether any more work with these 
agents should be conducted on man. On 12th February 1965 the Head of the 
Medical Division banned all further tests with hallucinogenic drugs,2419 the ban 
being extended to oripavine derivatives in March 1965.2420 The Director of 
Porton Down was concerned with this “question of medical conscience” and 
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believed that the ban had caused “considerable embarrassment to senior 
officials in London”.2421  
 
A meeting of senior external medical experts, with the Head of Porton Down's 
Medical Division, was held at University College Hospital in August 19652422, to 
address this issue. Most discussion centred on the question of the extent to 
which Porton Down medical officers were justified in “deliberately dosing 
healthy men with drugs specifically designed to induce some malfunction, either 
physiological or psychological?” The external medical experts were content that 
this could be done ethically if Porton Down were seeking to develop therapies 
against the agents which enemies might use against the Armed Services. At 
this point the Head of the Medical Division intervened, as recorded in his notes 
of the meeting:2423 “I had therefore to disclose after warning those present that 
this was a highly secret matter that we were in fact looking for an agent which 
we could use under certain circumstances.” his admission “changed the 
complexion very considerably”2424 and it was thought that scientists at Porton 
Down were being asked to do things that “went far beyond the Medical 
Research Council rules for human experiments.”2425 One concrete result of 
these discussions was the establishment of the Applied Biology Committee 
(ABC) – an external group of respected scientists to monitor Porton Down’s 
human experimentation - which should serve as “Father Confessor” for Porton 
Down staff and “damn the proposals [for experiments] of those who were trying 
to go too far and to fast.”2426 It seems that the meeting with external medical 
colleagues and the decision to set up the ABC external regulatory body 
convinced Porton Down researchers that the work on incapacitating agents was 
ethically acceptable and the incapacitating agent programme subsequently 
recommenced. 
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It is important to note that the suspension – albeit temporary – of incapacitant 
research took place in the midst of the Cold War and occurred despite 
considerable U.K. interest in weaponising such agents. Furthermore, the 
suspension occurred well before the coming into force of the CWC or BTWC, 
when there was consequently no international legal prohibition on the 
development of chemical weapons.2427 This case highlights the potential for 
medical ethics [which have developed and been strengthened considerably 
since the mid-1960s] to influence both the actions of individual medical 
researchers and also delay, regulate and restrict State incapacitant research 
and development programmes.  
  
A9.8. Case Study: Vil Mirzayanov – the tale of a Russian whistle-blower 
Dr Vil Mirzayanov was a chemist by training who worked for 26 years at the 
State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology 
(GosNIIOKhT) on the Soviet Union's chemical weapons programme.2428 
Mirzayanov discovered that despite signing an agreement2429 with the U.S. to 
halt production and testing of chemical weapons in June 1990, the USSR 
continued the secret development of so-called “novichock” binary chemical 
weapons.2430  
 
On 10th October 1991 Mirzayanov published an article in the newspaper 
Kuranty attempting to draw public attention to the “dangerous and deceiving 
policies of the chemical weapons complex.”2431 However, few inside Russia and 
even fewer abroad responded to his warnings. As he noted: “The only ones 
paying attention to my actions were the leaders of the chemical weapons 
complex, who fired me on 6th January 1992.”2432 
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On 16th September 1992, Mirzayanov co-authored an article with Professor Lev 
Fyodorv entitled “Poison politics” that appeared in the Moscow News2433, and 
also gave interviews to Western and Russian reporters.2434 “Poison politics” 
warned that  GosNIIOKhT's activities threatened the safety of Moscow, the 
authors claiming that, because of the Institute's inadequate filtration system its 
exhaust gases “have been literally poisoning Muscovites” and that the soil and 
water underneath the Institute's grounds had been thoroughly contaminated 
with mustard gas and related compounds. On 22nd October 1992 Mirzanyanov 
was arrested and imprisoned in Lefortovo, an infamous former KGB prison. 
Mirzanyanov was charged with revealing State secrets though he claimed that 
he had “been careful not to disclose technical details about the program.”2435 
 
Mirazyanov was the first person to be accused of violating Russia's post-Soviet 
secrecy laws since President Yeltsin came to power and observers were 
concerned that this case was the “leading edge of an effort to re-establish 
censorship of the press.”2436 Mirazyanov was held for 11 days incommunicado 
without access to his wife or defence lawyer. He was released on condition that 
he did not leave Moscow.2437 A subsequent dispute over procedure with the trail 
judge led to his being imprisoned a second time. Mirzayanov stated that: “What 
became clear was that those prosecuting me were less concerned with 
protecting State secrets than with making an example of me.”2438 
 
International human rights organisations, such as Helsinki Watch, and Russian 
human rights groups, including Memorial, took up Mirzanyov’s case. 2439 They 
were joined by many in the international scientific community who mobilised to 
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campaign on his behalf. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which was among 
numerous news2440 and scientific publications to highlight Mirzaynaov's plight, 
noted how: “Human rights committees of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science [AAAS], the American Chemical Society, and the 
Federation of American Scientists, as well as individual scientists here and 
abroad, have written letters to [Russian President] Yeltsin expressing strong 
concern for and support of Mirzanyov.”2441 
 
The AAAS was particularly active in defence of Mirzayanov, with its Committee 
on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility addressing a strongly worded appeal 
directly to President Yeltsin,2442 whilst its Science and Human Rights Program 
launched five action alerts throughout 1994 on his behalf through their Human 
Rights Action Network.2443  The U.S. State Department, repeatedly expressed 
concern about the Mirzayanov case, and lobbied for an open trial with 
international observers permitted.2444 Elsewhere, German scientists collected 
funds for a Mirzanyov defence fund and claimed they had successfully lobbied 
the German Foreign Minister to complain about the scientist's prosecution with 
the Russian Foreign Minister. 2445 After more than three weeks in jail, Mirzanyov 
was released on 22nd February 1994. Subsequently, on 11th March 1994, acting 
Prosecutor-General A. Ilyushenko officially closed his case due to “absence of 
evidence of the crime.”2446 Mirzanyov declared that: “Had it not been for the 
protests of numerous scientific and human rights organizations in the United 
States, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Canada, Italy, Sweden and elsewhere, 
I have no doubt that I would still be in prison.”2447 
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